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PLAYING TO WIN

Clientelist Campaign Strategy in Southern Africa

By Zoë Brouns

One major mark of a strong democracy is the use of policy-based rather than clientelist campaign strategies—but in southern Africa, we still see political parties in relatively strong democracies using clientelist strategies. I aim to build on the small existing pool of literature on this topic by performing a comparative study of campaign strategies in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia. I then examine how political parties in those countries use clientelist and policy-based strategies in general elections and what relationship strategy has to economic development and educational quality over time and relative to other countries in the same region. The data come from news sources, party manifestos, and candidate speeches of major parties in the countries used. I find that although they are harder to observe within countries across time, clientelism rates are lowest in countries with higher levels of economic development and educational quality. This trend is most clearly seen when analyzing inter-country differences. This study will hopefully provide further explanation regarding how political and state infrastructure can affect the motivations of political parties and take another step toward understanding and strengthening democracy.

I. Introduction

In the 1950s, much of Africa began to undergo political transitions, breaking away from the countries that had colonized them and establishing independence. For some countries, this resulted in a direct turn to a democratic, if weak, state. For others, however, independence led to military regimes, one-party states, and authoritarian dictatorships. Throughout the rest of the century, states continued to transition and work through the difficulties of independence and move towards democracy. For the states that successfully achieved full democracy, there were constant challenges in the form of development, infrastructural issues, ethnic conflicts, and a changing geopolitical playing field. Nonetheless, there are currently 25 “free” or “partly free” countries in sub-Saharan Africa—these democracies may be flawed, but their institutions are generally functional.¹ We expect, given their Freedom House (FH) scores, to see healthy electoral institutions in the absence of large-scale issues.

However, one issue that has proved especially difficult to overcome is the prevalence of clientelism in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter referred to as “Africa” or “SSA”—a geopolitical rather than strictly geographical distinction). Clientelism will be formally defined in a later section, but essentially it refers to the practice of offering jobs, goods, or money in exchange for votes in an election. Countries in which the electoral infrastructure is weaker may witness higher levels of clientelism, because of parties’ inability to get votes and power using more

¹ Freedom House, 2016. “Sub-Saharan Africa.”

democratic means, or because of incumbent parties' desire to hold onto power. There are now a small number of African countries—18—that possess fairly high levels of democratic strength (a 3.5 or lower on the Freedom House scale).² They have made sustained strides towards full democracy, and experience the freest and fairest elections on the continent. However, some of these countries still see the use of clientelism even with developed electoral institutions. This is an obvious barrier to full democracy—a healthy multi-party system is crucial to democratic strength, and that depends on the ability of parties to connect with voters and the ability of voters to understand the policies advertised by the parties. If parties continue to engage in clientelism and voters continue to respond positively, the cycle remains in place. When voters no longer react to offers of jobs or goods, parties are forced to evolve their positions and enact truly sustainable policies. This phenomenon is not specific to Africa by any means, but the continent has a history of political leaders who have manipulated electoral institutions to maintain power, without devolving into full-scale authoritarianism. This manipulation of institutions also manifests itself in clientelism. It is the relationship between voter and candidate that I find interesting because it is increasingly important both inside and outside of Africa. Further developing explanations for particular campaign strategies could shed light on the rise of recent populist movements in Europe and the United States, given how related those movements are to changing attitudes in populations affecting campaign tactics and party formation. What affects party strategy is often overlooked in research, especially in Africa, leading to a relatively small body of literature on this topic—most of which has been focused on singular case studies. This paper contributes to the existing research by conducting a small-n comparative study investigating why political parties in southern African democracies continue to use clientelist strategies in favor of policy-based strategies, despite the strength of their democratic institutions.

I draw on several existing papers to develop my arguments, spanning from theories of democracy in Africa to uses of campaign strategy in Benin and Kenya. I begin with two arguments: in short, that less economically developed countries will see more use of clientelist strategies, and that countries with weaker educational systems will see more use of clientelist strategies. These arguments use campaign strategy as a dependent variable, and the two mechanisms mentioned as independent variables. These hypotheses are based on the current literature, which I will detail further on. My findings address the relative validity of these hypotheses and lead to a fuller understanding of what drives use of the two strategies. I focus on five specific countries that share regional and political similarities but vary in terms of the above variables: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, and Malawi.

The arguments I propose in this paper are built on the few pieces written specifically on campaign strategy use in Africa. Wantchekon conducted an intensely in-depth experiment in Benin in 2003 that examined how voters reacted to different campaign strategies—finding that regional and incumbent candidates tended to be more successful when using clientelist strategies, but that low-income voters were not always swayed by the same rhetoric.³ More recently, Kramon and Brierley conducted a study in Ghana on the same topic and had similar findings, including a more comprehensive idea of how incumbent and challenger parties strategize.⁴ In this paper, I examine the link between economic development and strategy based on these intra-country analyses as well as on the extensive research done on the relationship between economic development and democratic strength.⁵ Although much of the literature I base my research on studies the entirety of SSA, I have intentionally chosen five case studies in southern Africa, a region within sub-Saharan Africa. In my first section I will develop my arguments from this literature more thoroughly, and in the following section I will operationalize my hypotheses and explain my research design, as well as list my study's limitations. I will then delve into my five case studies, exploring the backgrounds, political institutions, and links between them. I find that intra-country trends are often

2 Freedom House, 2016. "Sub-Saharan Africa."

3 Wantchekon, L. 2003. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin." *World Politics* 55 (April): 399–422.

4 Kramon, E. and Brierley, S. 2015. "Political Party Campaign Strategies and Incumbency Advantages in an African Election." Working Paper.

5 Neudorfer, N. 2015. "Development, Democracy and Corruption: How Poverty and Lack of Political Rights Encourage Corruption." *Journal of Public Policy* 35 (3): 421–57; Burns, T.J. 2005. "Democracy, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality. Ph.D., United States -- California: Claremont Graduate University; Houle, C. 2010. "Inequality, Economic Development and Democracy." Ph.D., United States -- New York: University of Rochester.

tenuous and depend more on party dynamics than on specific economic or educational developments over time, most likely due to the limited change in most economic and educational indicators. However, across countries, I find that there are rough correlations between low clientelism and the following factors: high GNI, low percentages of rural populations, and low percentages of populations in poverty. In terms of educational quality, I find that low clientelism has a rough correlation with both high average years of schooling and high secondary school enrollment. These results fit with my expectations, given the long-researched connection between economic development and democracy.

I have unexpected results in some of the case studies, and I introduce two alternative variables that might contribute to campaign strategy use: party competition, which is observed more in countries with higher rates of clientelism, and geopolitical influence. These two variables are not the focus of the paper, but there is some evidence that they play a role in how parties use strategy, and I discuss this. At the end of the paper, I explore opportunities for further research.

II. Literature Review

As democracies develop, institutions are created with the intent of ensuring free and fair elections at every level. An important part of this is a political environment that allows for party competition. In an ideal world, there would be a healthy opposition between several political parties—but the reality is often different. However, democratic strength depends on more than just the existence of these players and institutions—if candidates use clientelist rhetoric to gain votes rather than by proposing effective, sustainable solutions to issues in the country, that could be a sign that democracy is not alive and well. Few sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries that are technically democratic are able to maintain a Freedom House score below a 4, and clientelism is an oft-cited issue in these democracies, as it constrains countries from achieving a higher score. Because the scale runs from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic), a 4 is virtually in the middle. Although there are countries with scores of 5 that are still considered “partly free”, these countries experience more frequent conflict, either violent or non-violent, but still have democratic institutions in place. In Africa, countries like Swaziland that still have a monarchy in place, or countries like the Central African Republic that experience massive amounts of violence and disruption, are classified as 6 and 7, respectively. Countries on the lower end of the spectrum still experience issues with democracy, but they are much less disruptive to daily life.⁶ I chose countries with scores of 3.5 or below because they tend to see more institutional weakness than structural disruption and dissolution.

In this review, I will explore three bodies of literature that help inform my question. By piecing together these bodies and using them as a toolbox, I aim to provide context for the question and background for my hypothesis, as well as examine the gaps in the literature that I hope to fill by executing this project. Firstly, I will look at the process of democratization in SSA, including the role that political parties play more generally in democracies. I will discuss these two bodies of literature in the same section because while parties are an integral part of democracy, and their theory can be applied broadly, democratization in SSA is unique and carries its own motivations and contexts. Then, I will look at how democracy is linked with factors like economic development (GDP and inequality) and ethnic fragmentation, which are two variables that could affect how parties campaign. Finally, I will look at the small amount of literature that deals specifically with how parties use campaign strategies in SSA. The final section will impact most directly how I form my research, as it is there that I hope to contribute something to the literature with my project.

Democratization and Party Politics

A system of competitive political parties is one of the most important parts of a democracy. The way that these parties develop and propagate in a state can have serious effects on the strength of the democracy because they are the link between a populace and their elected representatives. Parties are important—they represent values and provide a structure for organizing around candidates and issues that can make political participation more accessible—but they are also flawed. In order to accomplish their goals, they (or their candidates) must attain a

6 Freedom House, 2016. “Sub-Saharan Africa.”

certain level of power. It follows that parties that may have good intentions begin to rely on patronage for resources, both organizational and financial.⁷ More than this, they also retain private and personal interests in addition to the interests of the state or population. Shefter explains this process and the motivations that drive a party's decision to use either patronage or policy-based strategies, and his work, although it focuses on American politics, is vital to understanding how parties think and function. He goes on to describe how incumbent parties will use different strategies than those of opposition parties, while both use "coercion", "collusion" and "mobilization", among other strategies.⁸ Ultimately, however, it comes down to a struggle to maintain power by whatever means parties deem appropriate, even if that includes less-than-democratic strategies. The types of strategies that parties and politicians use impact their relationships with the state, the populace, and the institutions they operate within. Shefter also writes that party development is impacted by the context in which the party came to power and the historical legacies of power that its populace has experienced.⁹ This is especially relevant to this project because of the unique historical backgrounds of many of my case studies. I draw upon his work as a basis for thinking about party formation in general, as well as for understanding what may motivate politicians to use particular strategies.

However, studying SSA states requires a different set of knowledge than studying other, more established states. SSA states were formed (at least in the sense of what we call "modern statehood") more recently and in different ways than European or East Asian states. Most fought for independence from a colonial power, moved into a period of authoritarian or military rule, and then democratized.¹⁰ In regards to what factors are most important in determining when or if an SSA country will democratize, there is a fair amount of literature on the topic. The authors of the pieces I have chosen do not present rigorous definitions or prerequisites for democratization, but rather build theoretical structures of possible avenues towards regime change. They also look forward, and their research illuminates the stability and longevity of the democracy in question, depending on the conditions present at transition. Bates's work is a summary of the post-colonial political history of Africa: he analyzes the factors that led to democratization and finds that geopolitical events and intervention from international institutions and other nations played a large role in how countries democratized.¹¹ That being said, Bates also does not underestimate the power that is held by the populace of these nations, and how their desires and needs help shape the regime. This is a view also shared by Doorenspleet, and in some respects by Bratton and van de Walle, and is especially important to the question that I am asking.¹²

The weaknesses and pitfalls of stronger democracies often manifest in more structural and institutional ways, rather than the debilitating conflict we might see in more fragile states. One of the biggest issues present is that of patronage—the prevalence of which is affected by both the motivations of the population and its ability to understand and drive policy. This, in turn, directs how political parties and representatives relate to their constituents—whether through policy-based or clientelist rhetoric. When it comes to looking at examples—in this case I will be looking at South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, and Malawi—the context in which democracy developed matters deeply to how the population interacts with its leaders and candidates. In Namibia and South Africa, for example, the party that is associated with the independence struggle is the dominant party, leading to a virtual one-party regime in the former. Bratton and van de Walle, although the article I use comes from 1997, provide an excellent background for my project. They lay out six major influencers of democratization in dyads: international and domestic dynamics, structural and contingent factors, and economic and political elements. They then explore how each one impacts strength of democracy in SSA. There cannot be a single model of democratization for SSA, and examining several structures of explanations is important to understanding why political parties behave in certain ways—the parties are a part of the democratic institution, and their behavior

7 Shefter, M. 2016. "Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience."

8 Shefter, M. 2016. "Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience." 7-10.

9 Shefter, M. 2016. "Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience."

10 CIA World Factbook, 2017. "Africa."

11 Bates, Robert H. 2010. "Democracy in Africa: a very short history." *Social Research* 77.4: 1133+. Business Insights: Global.

12 Doorenspleet, R. 2012. "Critical Citizens, Democratic Support and Satisfaction in African Democracies." *International Political Science Review/Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 33 (3): 279–300; Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspectives*. Cambridge University Press.

is contingent upon how the country transitioned and how the populace played a role in that. Although within the same region, the political parties in my cases are built differently, which is where the historical origin of democracy could have an impact and should be considered.

Ethnicity and Economic Development

There are two major variables widely considered to have some relationship with the strength of democracy in Africa: ethnic ties and economic development. Given that many of the borders in SSA were artificially constructed and do not necessarily correspond to tribal boundaries, ethnicity is often cited as a major player in how parties form. However, it is debatable to what extent and in what ways it actually has an impact. Basedau et al. and Elischer both contribute to this discussion, writing that the empirical role that ethnic ties play in determining party preference or voting behavior is still unclear and further research is needed.¹³ Basedau concludes that while ethnicity seems to play a role, there are other factors that matter more to how political parties form and use campaign strategies. Some parties are formed on the basis of ethnicity, but its effect overlaps with factors like one-party dominance and culturally specific features.¹⁴ That being said, an ethnic fragmentation index or a history of ethnic conflict could provide partial context for a party's behavior. Given Elischer's conclusion that countries with core ethnic groups are more likely to form non-ethnicity based parties, it would be wise to look at ethnicity as a contributor—but I doubt it will be an incredibly meaningful predictor, because of the aforementioned overlap with other factors.¹⁵ Cooper and Horowitz engage in the same type of research, in Namibia and Kenya, respectively.¹⁶ They both find a stronger relationship between ethnic identity and party strategies than previous authors. Cooper writes that opposition parties, without the resources that are available to the incumbent, often resort to ethnic rhetoric—making their strategies identity based while interacting with both economic development and ethnicity.¹⁷ Horowitz finds that negative ethnic rhetoric plays a large role in how Kenyan political parties market their campaigns, an interesting deviation from the first two authors.¹⁸ It is clear that more research is needed, but there is still room for discussion as to whether and to what extent ethnicity plays a role in campaign strategies.

A more impactful variable may be that of economic development. A country with a healthier economy, whether that is measured through GDP or literacy rates or another index, may indeed have a healthier democracy. This debate—centered around which direction the causal relationship between economic development and democracy goes, because there undeniably is a relationship—has been around for a long time, and therefore there exists a large body of literature arguing back and forth. My aim is not to summarize this body of literature, but to focus on a key piece that specifically looks at how development affects political rights. Neudorfer argues that in a more economically developed country, there will be a larger middle class and it will be easier for the populace to express needs to the government and to hold them accountable.¹⁹ It may also have a positive effect on educational quality and access, giving citizens a better idea of how their own government works and what policies are effective (as well as make them less likely to respond to clientelist strategies). Economic development on a more micro level could also impact a citizen's ability to think long-term rather than focusing on short-term economic benefits out of necessity—the latter of which could prompt them to respond more positively to clientelist strategies rather than policy-based ones. Although the larger question my project seeks to answer is not one regarding the correlation between democracy and economic development, I believe that if development is

13 Basedau, M. et al. 2011. "Ethnicity and Party Preference in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Democratization* 18 (2): 462–89; Elischer, S. 2013. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*. Cambridge University Press.

14 Basedau, M. et al. 2011. "Ethnicity and Party Preference in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Democratization* 18 (2): 462–89.

15 Elischer, S. 2013. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*. Cambridge University Press.

16 Cooper, I. 2014. "It's My Party: Opposition Politics, Party Motivation, and Electoral Strategy in Namibia." *Journal of Southern Africa Studies* 40 (1): 111-127; Horowitz, J. 2012. "Campaigns and Ethnic Polarization in Kenya." Ph.D., United States -- California: University of California, San Diego.

17 Cooper, I. 2014. "It's My Party: Opposition Politics, Party Motivation, and Electoral Strategy in Namibia." *Journal of Southern Africa Studies* 40 (1): 111-127.

18 Horowitz, J. 2012. "Campaigns and Ethnic Polarization in Kenya." Ph.D., United States -- California: University of California, San Diego.

19 Neudorfer, N. 2015. "Development, Democracy and Corruption: How Poverty and Lack of Political Rights Encourage Corruption." *Journal of Public Policy* 35 (3): 421–57.

indeed found to have an impact on how campaign strategies are used by political parties, this could be a stepping stone to further research and could contribute to the continuous debate on this issue.

Campaign Strategies in SSA

Research specifically on how political parties in SSA use campaign strategies is fairly limited. However, the literature that does exist is substantive and provides an interesting context for the question I am asking. The most well-known piece is a paper by Wantchekon in which a field experiment is conducted in Benin to examine how different social groups respond to clientelist and policy-based presidential platforms.²⁰ He found that clientelist policies are most effective when used by regional and incumbent candidates, and also when the promises made are more credible (i.e. it follows that incumbents have more access to resources and could use clientelist policies more heavily). He also found, interestingly, that women are more inclined towards policy-based strategies, and that furthermore, “clientelist appeals...are not universally accepted even among poor voters and at low levels of economic development.”²¹ Generally, Wantchekon found that parties that have a larger capacity to implement clientelist promises and better access to economic resources will use clientelist strategies more, even if voters don’t respond more positively. These conclusions make it clear that economic development may be an interesting variable to pursue and dig deeper into.

Kramon and Brierley’s paper has a similar focus—their research was focused in Ghana and compared the use of programmatic strategies (policy-based) and non-programmatic strategies (clientelism), also including an analysis of how the incumbent party used strategies as compared to the opposition party.²² They found evidence that despite the extensive focus on clientelism in SSA, there are significant amounts of policy-based strategies being used. Also, they report that incumbency advantage and economic development play a part in targeting strategies, only increasing my sense that this is a meaningful variable.²³ The two papers discussed here provide a basis for the specific methodology of my project, and I use their operationalization and findings to build my own hypotheses and research design.

The goal of my project is to engage these authors in conversation and attempt to build on existing literature while filling in “gaps”. These democracies, as mentioned before, are strong and are well established with less danger of dissolving into civil war. However, their democratic institutions are still weak, in that patronage does occur and there are veins of corruption in order to secure power for a particular party or candidate. Without the resources to perform a full-scale experiment like Wantchekon’s, I will rely on primary sources of campaign rhetoric like candidate speeches and secondary sources like press vehicles—while acknowledging the bias in media especially in countries that struggle with press freedom (Zambia and Namibia). My aim in conducting a more comparative study of campaign strategies is to produce a larger picture of how campaign strategies are being used, at least regionally. Some of the conditions under which I expect to find variance are ethnicity (less so) and economic development (more so), for the reasons described above. Some of my case studies also struggle with one-party dominance—in as Cooper writes, in Namibia it is a serious issue.²⁴

This literature is not exhaustive, but by incorporating broader theories about democratization and what (and who) plays a role in party politics in SSA, I hope to use these bodies to conduct research and contribute to the smaller and more in-depth body of literature specifically regarding how parties use campaign strategies in stronger democracies.

III. Hypotheses

20 Wantchekon, L. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin.” *World Politics* 55 (April): 399–422.

21 Wantchekon, L. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin.” *World Politics* 55 (April): 422.

22 Kramon, E. and Brierley, S. 2015. “Political Party Campaign Strategies and Incumbency Advantages in an African Election.” Working Paper.

23 *ibid.*

24 Cooper, I. 2014. “It’s My Party: Opposition Politics, Party Motivation, and Electoral Strategy in Namibia.” *Journal of Southern Africa Studies* 40 (1): 111-127.

This project adds depth and new knowledge to existing literature rather than trying to settle conflicting conclusions. Before I present my hypotheses in full, I will operationalize the concepts that appear in all of my arguments.

Although my hypotheses vary in terms of independent variables, there were several terms that remained consistent throughout: “democracies,” “policy-based campaign strategies,” and “clientelist campaign strategies.” There were several well-established measures assessing the degree of democracy in a country, with the most prominent measures being Polity V and Freedom House. Although I considered both of these measures, I primarily used Freedom House, because it included civil liberties in its calculations. Since my case studies needed to be *strong* democracies, I limited my search to SSA states with Freedom House scores of 3.5 or lower—either “partly free” or “free.”

In the literature, policy-based strategies are also referred to as “programmatic” strategies, and they have generally been defined as “a campaign method where the party discusses policy, past record, and future plans.”²⁵ When measuring frequency of use of these strategies, I used a database of news articles, candidate speeches, and party manifestos. The news articles came from a period of three to five months leading up to the election date in a given country. The inconsistency in the data collection period arose from the tendency in each country to begin reporting on elections and party activity at different intervals.

Wantchekon defines “clientelist” strategies, or “non-programmatic” strategies, as “transactions between politicians and citizens whereby material favors are offered in return for political support at the polls.”²⁶ I developed a codebook for both of these strategies and will detail it in the next section. For both types of campaign strategies; however, the application is often not as straightforward as in the definitions, and requires creative collection of data to account for the variety of rhetoric used—that is, there are clear-cut examples of both, but also grey areas that I will address in the analysis section.

Hypothesis 1

Political parties in SSA democracies with higher levels of economic development will use more policy-based over clientelist campaign strategies in presidential and parliamentary elections.

My first hypothesis uses the type of strategy as the dependent variable and the level of economic development as an independent variable. “Levels of economic development” was used as an independent variable because of the prior research on the connection between development and democracy, and, as laid out in the literature review, because economic development is intertwined with democratic strength and because citizens with a lower level of economic need respond better to long-term economic promises. In this hypothesis I take a broad view of what “economic development” could be, whereas in the next hypothesis, I make the variable more specific. In order to obtain and analyze this data, I used four basic economic indicators from the World Bank, UNESCO, UNDP, and the Human Development Index. I used GNI per capita, unemployment, percentage of the population living in rural areas, and percentage of the population under the poverty line (\$1.90 per day).

Hypothesis 2

Political parties in SSA democracies with better education systems will use more policy-based over clientelist campaign strategies in presidential and parliamentary elections.

This hypothesis is similar to the first one, but uses a more specific indicator of economic development: educational infrastructure. I used four educational quality indicators taken from World Bank, UNESCO, UNDP, and Human Development Report: mean years of schooling, adult literacy rate, public expenditure on education (percentage of GDP), and percentage of the population enrolled in secondary school. Secondary school is generally defined by UNESCO as the end of compulsory schooling.²⁷ Education could produce higher levels of

25 Kramon, E. and Brierley, S. 2015. “Political Party Campaign Strategies and Incumbency Advantages in an African Election.” Working Paper: 2.

26 Wantchekon, L. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin.” *World Politics* 55 (April): 400.

27 UNESCO. 2007. “Operational Definition of Basic Education.”

civic knowledge and an ability to think about long-term solutions, and therefore increase the likelihood that voters will respond to policy-based strategies.

IV. Methodology, Research Design, and Limitations

In this section I explain my coding methods as well as the way I have organized my data. The two major concepts that I have to define are “policy-based strategies” and “clientelist strategies,” and the descriptions I use were developed by synthesizing definitions from the literature with the available data and context of these countries. I was careful to only consider particular sources when studying rhetoric and strategies used by parties in news articles. For example, the rhetoric had to come from party chairs or leaders, candidates for parliamentary or presidential seats, or other representatives who could reasonably be seen to speak on behalf of the party. Private companies in alliance or coalition parties were not included, and opinion articles by citizens were not included, but editorials and interviews were considered.

It should also be noted that the definitions outlined below are not taken from any specific literature, but were originally designed using Wantchekon’s research, as well as that of Kramon and Brierley, as a foundation. They are based on prevailing campaign strategy theory and input from the data available for this study. There is no agreed-upon measure for qualifying campaign strategy (as there is for democratic strength, for example), and the definitions I used are inherently normative. This does not weaken my results, as the definitions I used are still based on prior research, but should be considered when interpreting them.

I applied a code of 1 to policy-based strategies, or: *campaign rhetoric that references or describes any concrete plan to make sustainable improvements in the country, including but not limited to economic development plans, education, and healthcare.*

I applied a code of 0 to clientelist strategies, or: *campaign rhetoric that references or describes the delivery of goods, services, or funds in exchange for votes or support (for a party or candidate) in an election. This can include explicit, direct transactions as well as promises to specific communities for financial or infrastructural packages without a sustainable element. This rhetoric is often directed at a specific group of people—a province, community, or vulnerable section of the population.*

By “sustainable element,” I refer to proposals by candidates that are attempts to solve a larger problem, rather than immediate solutions without long-term considerations. An example of this would be a party handing out food parcels in a village as opposed to a party constructing a program for emergency food aid across the country, or a youth entrepreneurship program as a mechanism for job creation. The coding for clientelism also intentionally includes a regional component, because promising to improve housing “opportunities” countrywide or promising to provide more access to housing across the country is different from specifically offering to build houses in a community. Another way in which clientelist strategy was distinguished from policy-based strategy was if the party offering the good was the only source of that good. For example, if a government offering agricultural subsidies to certain farmers was the only entity with enough resources to offer subsidies, it would be clientelist strategy. Again, the strategies are often less straightforward than these definitions imply, but I have attempted to include necessary elements of both strategies in order to consistently differentiate them from each other in the sources.

This study also experiences a few limitations. First, because the project was completed remotely, the availability of data was an issue. For example, my data sources—both news articles and manifestos—have their own inherent biases. Although press can be a useful tool for holding politicians accountable, outlets are also responsible for reporting news that is appealing to a market. As a result, they may be more prone to report sensational news items than be completely objective. In the same vein, news outlets may have varying degrees of relationships with their governments which affect their coverage of incumbents or opposition parties. Manifestos, in contrast, are far more likely to include policy-based strategies because they are comprehensive reviews of political strategies. For this reason, I calculated separate ratios for manifesto and article data in order to avoid weighing the data in a particular direction. These limitations do not invalidate the results, but they are important to consider.

Another limitation was the inconsistency in available data for economic and educational indicators. As I

demonstrate in the next section, the indicators are taken from UNESCO, UNDP, and World Bank databases, but because of the lack of infrastructure in some of my case studies, data for some variable combinations were not available. I have corrected this by taking data from years close to the election year, and I consider this limitation and note these inconsistencies when analyzing the data.

V. Case Studies

This section introduces my five case studies. I examine why they were chosen and their significance both to the context of the project and to one another. This section will highlight each case and give background and added meaning to my findings and analysis.

South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, and Malawi all share a common denominator: they all have a Freedom House score of 3.5 or below, and are classified as “free,” “partly free” or their equivalent in most democracy indices.²⁸ I limited my case studies to these countries for a few reasons, including the restricted timeline of the study. They share regional and cultural similarities given their proximity to each other and shared history as both sub-Saharan and southern African countries. Again, because of the time and resource constraints of this project, I intentionally limited the scope of my cases to southern Africa, a particular region of sub-Saharan Africa. Their electoral systems vary slightly, but all share basic tenets of representative democracy. The countries also have varying levels of economic development, (relative to each other) which makes a comparative study focusing mainly on the impact of development on campaign strategy fairly straightforward. In this section, I will provide background information on each country, including their history and current electoral systems, then explore the differences in their economic developments and their education systems as they relate to my arguments.

These countries have a larger importance as a part of this study; as stronger democracies in Africa, they represent a good, if imperfect, model for the region and for the continent. Their process of dealing with particular institutional challenges could provide direction for other countries trying to move towards a liberal democratic model. This makes research on these countries all the more important.

A. South Africa

South Africa has been a formal state since 1910, but before that year and up until 1994 was ruled by a combination of British and Afrikaners—40 years of which were under a white-minority-led apartheid system. The African National Congress (ANC), led by Nelson Mandela, achieved democracy and ended apartheid in 1994 with the first somewhat free elections. In the four elections since then, the ANC has maintained the power of the presidency and, for the most part, the parliament, although the recent elections in 2016 showed a declining share of the votes for ANC candidates.²⁹ South Africa is a parliamentary republic, electing representatives through proportional representation. Both national and regional elections take place every five years and municipal elections have the same terms, although they run on offset schedules.³⁰ Other than the ANC, there have consistently been three or four significant minority parties—including the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Congress of the People (COPE)—although officially, there are many more registered parties (the 2014 elections saw 33 parties compete).

South Africa has become one of the most economically developed countries on the continent, and is a rising leader in global markets, as part of the coalition of increasingly developed countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). However, it still struggles significantly with unemployment and income inequality—it has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world.³¹ Since 1990, South Africa has experienced steady and slow economic growth and human development, but as a result of poorly targeted economic policy, infrastructural weaknesses, and latent social inequalities from the apartheid period, there is still a reasonable amount of poverty,

28 Freedom House. 2016. “Sub-Saharan Africa.”; Center for Systemic Peace. 2010. “Polity IV Country Reports 2010.”; The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2016. “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index.”

29 BBC News. 2016. “South Africa Local Elections: ANC Suffers Major Setback,” BBC News. August 6, sec. Africa.

30 Electoral Commission South Africa. 2017. “Election Types.”

31 World Bank. 2016. “World Development Indicators 2016”.

especially in rural areas.³² Although certain economic indicators are hard to evaluate consistently before 2010, the table and chart below provide an overview of major indicators in South Africa, specifically those that are related to human development. Table 1.1 lists the four variable indicators as measured during the ten-year period studied. Programs, such as social welfare programs, increased housing opportunities, and competent monetary policy, instituted by the ANC were cited as having an impact on the large drop in poverty from 2004-2009.³³ As a result, I expect to see an increase in policy-based strategies during this period.

The educational infrastructure of South Africa is more developed than that of the other case studies considered here (see Table 1.2). Its literacy rate is high, especially given its economic challenges, and its education index (calculated by combining the mean and expected years of schooling) has been steadily increasing over the years.³⁴ Public expenditure on education is relatively high, and this investment has been part of South Africa's push for economic growth since independence.³⁵ As I find in my research, government-funded education is a popular campaign promise made by virtually all parties in all provinces. This is for good reason, as educational structure has a significant impact on almost the entire population. Educational quality also matters in this context because of the impacts that apartheid and post-apartheid dynamics have had on structural inequity, inequality within the education system, and society at large.

Given the level of both economic and educational indicators in South Africa, I expect to see some of the lower clientelist ratios in my study. Its status as a political and economic leader in Africa also leads me to expect a lower ratio of clientelist to policy-based strategies.

B. Namibia

Namibia's history has been intertwined with South Africa's, as it was a mandate of the latter from after World War II until they gained independence in 1990. The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the ruling party after the first elections, occupied a role similar to that of the ANC in South Africa before independence—they were seen as the “freedom fighters” and often collaborated and fought with ANC members when the countries were under the same rule.³⁶ SWAPO has held a super-majority in Parliament and has held onto the presidency in all elections since independence, but other major parties represented include the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), and the United Democratic Front (UDF).³⁷ In total, there are 17 registered parties. These parties operate within the structure of a presidential republic, with a bicameral parliament. Many of the smaller (and currently unrepresented) parties align with specific ethnic groups in Namibia, like the Damara or the Ovambo.³⁸

Namibia faces challenges similar to those of South Africa, because although it has a smaller population and less interaction with world markets, it does not hold the same place in global trade (see Table 2.1). Like South Africa, it has high income inequality and unemployment, although it shows steady improvement. Its rural population has decreased at about the same rate that its percentage of population in poverty has decreased, and unemployment is the only indicator that has not improved consistently over the ten-year period.

Namibia has issues with its educational systems (see Table 2.2). Most students attend primary school, but about a fifth repeat one grade, and about half of all students don't pass Grade 10.³⁹ Because of the difficulty of accessing schools in rural areas, many students forego schooling, especially when economic situations often present a more immediate need for families—this affects the rate of secondary dropout. The racial inequities present in South Africa are also present in Namibia due to the longstanding rifts.

Because of these statistics, I expect to see lower clientelist ratios, although not as low as those of South

32 Tregenna, F. 2011. “A New Growth Path for South Africa?” *Review of African Political Economy* 38 (130): 627–35.

33 Statistics South Africa. 2017. “Poverty Trends in South Africa | Statistics South Africa.”

34 UNDP. 2014. “Education Index.”

35 Badibanga, T. 2010. “Essays on Economic Growth, Education, and the Distribution of Income: A Structural Analysis for the Case of South Africa.” Ph.D., United States -- Minnesota: University of Minnesota.

36 Britannica. 2016. “SWAPO Party of Namibia.” *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

37 CIA World Factbook. 2017. “Africa.”

38 Elischer, S. 2013. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation*. Cambridge University Press.

39 UNICEF. 2011. “Ninnes Trends and Gaps.”; Maletsky, C. 2007. “More Students Fail than Pass Grade 10.” *The Namibian*.

Africa. The country has benefited from its relationship with South Africa, but it still struggles with key economic and educational indicators.

C. Botswana

Botswana, unlike Namibia and South Africa, has been independent since 1966. However, it also has experienced a long period of uninterrupted rule by one party—the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Before 1966, the country was a British protectorate, but managed to maintain its democratic system consistently after independence. Their government consists of one parliamentary body, which is elected through a “first-past-the-post” system. This body then elects the President, who serves as both the head of state and the head of the National Assembly. The BDP has held the presidency since independence, but there are several significant minority parties, including the Botswana National Front (BNF), the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), and the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC; technically a coalition group of three minor parties). In total, nine parties registered in the last election.⁴⁰ The BDP, in addition to holding the presidency, has held a large majority of seats in parliament since the first elections, and opposition parties are often more competitive on a provincial level.

For many years, Botswana has been regarded as the most economically developed country in Africa, and is similar to South Africa in terms of both growth and economic development levels (see Table 3.1). Its GNI per capita has risen rapidly and poverty rates have declined rapidly since 2004. As with many of the states I study, its unemployment is fairly high, although its rural population has been in decline as well.

Botswana’s educational quality is among the best seen in these cases—almost on par with that of South Africa (see Table 3.2). It has by far the highest amount of public expenditure on education with almost ten percent consistently (although the data for 2014 are unavailable). Its mean years of schooling remains consistent, but both literacy and secondary enrollment show steady improvements over time. Given the data, I expect to see significantly lower rates of clientelism in Botswana, as both its educational quality and economic development are relatively strong.

D. Zambia

Zambia gained independence in 1964 from British colonial forces that had maintained control since the early 1900s. However, the state did not democratize immediately, but instead was ruled under a one-party state until the first democratic elections in 1991. The Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) won the first elections, and won subsequent elections until 2011, when the Patriotic Front (PF), a major opposition party, won the presidency.⁴¹ Zambia’s history of elections has been slightly complicated. Under their system, special elections are held in the event that the President dies before their term ends. Zambia has held special elections in both 2008 and 2015, as a result of the natural death of the President. Because these are special elections and are therefore closer to the regular election years, I have chosen to exclude them from my study for consistency with the other cases.

Zambia’s electoral system is a presidential republic—the President is elected by the population rather than by a parliamentary body. It’s a single-member district state, and like in Malawi, there is only one parliamentary body. The two major parties are MMD and PF, but there are a few minor opposition parties, most notably the United Party for National Development (UPND) and the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD). There are currently several independent candidates in the National Assembly as well.⁴²

Zambia is less economically developed than the previous three cases, with high poverty rates and rural populations, as well as a low GNI per capita (see Table 4.1). Housing is a serious issue, with huge rural populations, many of which are not connected to electricity, water, or plumbing.⁴³ Furthermore, its GNI has risen very slowly over the ten-year period studied, marking inefficient growth. Unemployment is lower in Zambia than in many of the other cases, but the percentage of the population in poverty increased from 2006 to 2011.

As is evident in the table, much of Zambia’s educational information is not available (see Table 4.2). This

40 CIA World Factbook. 2017. “Africa.”

41 CIA World Factbook. 2017. “Africa.”

42 *ibid.*

43 UNDP. 2016. “Zambia Human Development Report.”

will limit the significance of these findings and the amount of quantitative analysis that can be done. However, the data that are available are interesting. Although mean years of schooling stays consistent over the ten-year period, the literacy rate increases considerably from the first to the second election year. Because of this, I expect to see a similar decrease in clientelist policy in the same time period.

E. Malawi

Similar to Zambia, Malawi gained independence in 1964 after years of British protectorate rule. Until 1994, it was governed under a one-party regime, after which it had its first round of multi-party elections. It is also a presidential republic, with a directly elected president and one parliamentary body. There are several parties that compete for parliamentary seats and for the presidency—unlike in the previous cases. The current President, Peter Mutharika, is a member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), but the other important parties include the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the People’s Party (PP), and the United Democratic Front (UDF).⁴⁴ In 2012, the President died during his term, similar to the situation in Zambia. However, unlike in Zambia, in Malawi there is a line of succession, not a special election. The parties are competitive and power shifts between them: in 2004 the UDF won the presidency but MCP won a majority in the National Assembly; in 2009 the incumbent won reelection, but under the umbrella of the DPP, who also won a majority in the National Assembly. In 2012 the incumbent president passed away, leaving the vice-president Joyce Banda of the PP to take control, although in the 2014 elections she lost to current President Peter Mutharika of the DPP. DPP maintained a slight majority in the National Assembly. Although the DPP has held control, their candidates have shifted parties and names, with Banda creating the PP in office in 2011, and Bingu wa Mutharika changing parties from 2004 to 2009. The margins by which these parties won elections are also slimmer than in the other cases: in the last presidential election the DPP, MCP, and PP garnered 36.4%, 27.8%, and 20.2% of the vote, respectively. In the National Assembly, the vote share was 22%, 17.4%, and 18.2%, respectively.⁴⁵ This marks one distinction between Malawi and the other cases presented here in terms of party dynamics within the country. The party politics in Malawi are more competitive than in many of the other cases, which may lead to unexpected results, based on the research incumbency and opposition strategy discussed in the literature review.⁴⁶

Although Malawi’s democracy has been stable, its economic development is among the lowest in these cases (see Table 5.1). There exists significant poverty that is exacerbated by food insecurity issues and the effects of climate change, as well as little infrastructure and a population that is mostly rural. Unlike some of the other cases, Malawi has not experienced as much or as rapid growth, but for the most part has remained constant in its development. It has very low unemployment, but also a low GNI that has grown slowly over the ten-year period.

Malawi also has the poorest quality educational systems of all of the countries in this study (see Table 5.2). Mean years of schooling is far lower than in the other cases, with the average student failing to finish the equivalent of an elementary school education. Just over half of the population is literate, and in 2014 only 40% of the school-age population was enrolled in secondary school.

With these data in mind, I expect to see the highest rates of clientelism come from Malawi parties, as both education and economic development are at an extremely low level.

VI. Findings and Analysis

In this section, I lay out my findings and analyze them in relation to my hypotheses. I first examine each country individually, studying the relationship over time, and then move on to a cross-country analysis. Although this section is mostly qualitative analysis, I conducted simple correlation analyses in order to illustrate basic connections between my variables. To present the data in a constructive way, I have organized the charts by indicator. I have placed economic/educational indicators on the x-axis and my strategy ratio on the y-axis. I have also plotted all election years for all countries. The charts that follow only illustrate the strategy ratios calculated from newspaper

44 CIA World Factbook. 2017. “Africa.”

45 CIA World Factbook. 2017. “Africa.”

46 Kramon, E. and Brierley, S. 2015. “Political Party Campaign Strategies and Incumbency Advantages in an African Election.” Working Paper.

articles, not the ones counted from manifestos, which are discussed later in the text. This decreases the number of charts and makes the data concise and easy to understand. Furthermore, I conducted linear analysis tests with all of the data—although they were not statistically significant, they illustrate the larger qualitative point about campaign strategy in many of these countries.

A. South Africa

In South Africa, political parties engage in somewhat predictable behavior. The significance of the African National Congress in the country's struggle for independence is well known, partially because of Nelson Mandela, the party's notable leader. The data shows a particular pattern: for both manifestos and articles, the clientelist to policy-based strategy is fairly low in 2004 (0.15 and 0.29), sinks in 2009 (0.14 and 0.19), and then rises again in 2014 (0.25 and 0.24). The low clientelist ratio is most likely a result of South Africa's increased democratic strength. I will discuss further on what this means in relation to the other countries. I have found that time trends do not directly correlate with my economic indicators or educational indicators; instead, they seem to point towards another conclusion. In 2004, the ANC was still reaping the benefits of being associated with independence. Mandela made constant appearances at ANC rallies for the re-election of Thabo Mbeki, who was running for president in 2004 with Jacob Zuma as his deputy (vice-president). As time passed, the ANC may not have believed its connection to South African independence was strong enough to win, forcing the party to resort to more clientelist strategies. This theory is supported by the increase in clientelist strategies in the manifestos in 2014.

As evidenced by the low clientelist ratios, most of the campaign rhetoric used by the South African political parties was policy-based. These policies addressed a range of issues, but often covered economic development (including poverty reduction), land reform, and housing. Policies were more detailed in campaign manifestos, but in both manifestos and news articles, parties generally made an effort to expand on their policies and make them sustainable (by including long-term considerations). One example of this further explanation of policy was seen in speeches made by party leaders at rallies which were covered by press outlets. Leaders like Jacob Zuma laid out major priorities for the party, and expanded on party ideas. When leaders mentioned education, not only they did mention free schooling for all ages, but they also discussed improving and expanding training for teachers, building new facilities across the countries with public-private partnerships, and increasing access to student loan programs, many of which were then targeted at vulnerable groups like women and people with disabilities. These policies are well-rounded and multifaceted, and go beyond a clientelist approach. For example, when speaking about the criminal justice system, Zuma talked about increased efficiency, accountability, and working conditions of employees. Examples like this showed that the majority of South African campaign strategies were well-suited to a stronger democracy.

Over the years, there were commonly used clientelist strategies in South Africa, and some were more straightforward than others. In all three election years the ANC used the majority of the clientelist strategies in comparison to the other parties because they had access to the most resources. They were also more capable of constructing clientelist programs that were disguised as "policy." A good example of this is their work on combating HIV/AIDS. In the media, the ANC was often lambasted for failing to address HIV/AIDS substantively during their terms in office. Opposition parties like the Democratic Alliance attempted to use this as a point of attack, but the ANC ended the conversation by handing out free antiretroviral drugs (treatment drugs for the disease).⁴⁷ In spite of Mbeki's offensive and confusing rhetoric surrounding HIV/AIDS (continuously stigmatizing, doubting scientific evidence, and refusing to build a sustainable solution for South Africans), the party's weakness on the issue did not seem to affect their performance in the campaign. This specific strategy is coded as clientelist, rather than a socialist policy, for example, because it was clearly an attempt to avoid historical policy weakness by distributing free goods to vulnerable voters. If the only access to drugs was provided by ANC, voters with HIV/AIDS would be more likely to vote for them—despite the fact that there was still no sustainable prevention solution to the disease in-country, like education programs or sexual health resources.

A similar example of clientelist strategy used by the ANC in these years was that of distributing free food parcels in villages. This happened often and more frequently in poorer villages. In countries like South Africa, and

47 Kahn, T. 2004. "ANC's Track Record on HIV/AIDS Fails to Enliven Voters." *Business Day*. Johannesburg.

in most of the countries in this study, it is difficult to distinguish between a short-term, emergency strategy and a clientelist strategy because the level of food insecurity sometimes required an immediate response. However, in many of the South African ANC cases, the food parcels were preceded or followed by an ANC campaign rally or an encouragement to “Vote Mbeki” or “Vote ANC.”⁴⁸ Furthermore, the food parcels were distributed by village and not necessarily through a country-wide emergency food program, making it harder to defend as policy. In other situations, voters reported being threatened with revocation of their food parcels or social benefits if they voted for a party other than ANC.⁴⁹ This type of negative strategy was more rare than other forms of clientelism, but was still observed.

Although ANC used clientelist strategies, voters seemed to recognize the difference between clientelist and programmatic (policy-based) strategies. Many citizens expressed disappointment with the ANC as a party, which, in their eyes, had promised many things but failed to deliver. However, despite the prevalence of clientelist strategy, the ratio of clientelist to programmatic policy was relatively low. The ratio was even smaller in the analysis of the manifestos, given the medium of the data. Although this is not the direct focus of this project, there also is a difference between clientelism used by opposition and incumbent parties. This has been discussed in previous literature⁵⁰ but it’s worth noting here that the ANC used clientelism at a higher rate than the Democratic Alliance or the UDM and that this was especially stark in the manifestos. Opposition parties tended to put more detail and research into their manifestos and clearly used policy-based strategies.

In terms of economic development, the data showed a rough trend. Generally, fewer clientelist strategies were used during periods of better economic development. There are not enough data points for this to be statistically significant, but it is important to recognize qualitatively. However, there was one anomaly. In 2014, clientelist strategies spiked again, although not to 2004 levels. The figure below shows that this occurred with an increase in development, illustrated in the decrease in rural population, unemployment, and the percentage of the population under the poverty line. This increase was most likely not connected to economic development but to party dynamics within the country. The ANC comfortably maintained power as the independence party, but it still used clientelist strategies in 2004 as a response to the lower level of development in the country. As development increased, their clientelist strategies decreased. However, 2014 may have been the last election that ANC dominated. There had been a sense of decline of the party for a decade, which has only increased since Mandela’s death (the death of a unifying figure for the party and the country). I posit that ANC, as the incumbent party, feared a power loss and began to more aggressively use the resources at their disposal to try and prolong their power by appealing to the population with clientelist, short-term strategies. However, as I stated above, development still increased and there was recognition among the population (even rural populations) that the ANC was not as powerful or as impactful as in the past.

Gross National Income (GNI) isn’t shown on the graph, but there is a similar trend in relation to campaign strategies (see Figure 1.3). GNI steadily increased, but clientelist strategies spiked again in 2014. The relationship between clientelist strategies and the indicators is clearest in the rural population pattern. The population living in rural areas consistently decreased over the ten-year period, but clientelism didn’t follow the same trend, rising again in 2014. A correlation test performed on all of the economic indicators yielded a negative linear relationship of -0.58, though again, these numbers were not statistically significant, only illustrative.

Figure 1.4 shows a similar relationship between educational quality and clientelist strategies, although there was almost no correlation. A strong relationship would be hard to prove, given the minute changes in educational quality over time. The small shifts in the independent variable also make it difficult to see a relationship with clientelism, especially when considering public expenditure on education (the data for which stayed virtually constant over the ten-year period). This is also demonstrated by the correlation test, which yielded a weak trend of -0.46.

Although there was a spike in the last election year, there is an overall trend of lower clientelism rates observed in years with higher economic development and educational quality. The data are difficult to analyze, however, because they are not statistically significant and the changes are small over the ten-year period.

48 Duncan, J. 2014. “The Dangers of Transactional Elections.” South African Civil Society Information Service.

49 *ibid.*

50 van de Walle, N. 2003. “Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa’s emerging party systems.” *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 41 (2): 297-321.

B. Namibia

Namibia's party dynamics and strategies are very similar to South Africa's. As with the histories of the two countries, there are similarities in party formation and in salient issues. In Namibia, SWAPO has retained a higher share of the vote for a longer period of time. Unlike the ANC, SWAPO has not showed signs of weakness in recent years. However, the party's strong association with independence and now-long record of leadership makes them a popular choice. The clientelist ratios followed a pattern similar to that of South Africa: Parties had a high ratio in 2004 (0.78 in articles), which sunk in 2009 (0.22 in manifestos and 0.23 in articles), and rose again in 2014 (0.34 and 0.5). There was not enough available manifesto data for calculation of a ratio in 2004; however, the manifesto data in this case seems consistent with their article counterpart. Again, these numbers do not connect well with the economic and educational trends in the country, but I believe the pattern may be more related to party dynamics. SWAPO, unlike ANC, did not come close to losing its power in the 2014 elections, and a surge of clientelism as an attempt to maintain its power may not have held the same credence as in South Africa. There may be other dynamics at play as to why the rate of clientelism increased again. A possible explanation is that policy-based strategies were poorly formulated. In the data studied, there is a significant difference between a clientelist strategy and a poorly written policy, although as stated in the methodology section, this is a normative assertion. To compensate for the improved but still low level of economic development, SWAPO shifted to clientelist strategies to produce short-term solutions for a disgruntled population. There also needs to be an explanation for the large drop in clientelism after 2004. Some possible explanations will be explored in the cross-country analysis section later.

Although there was a high rate of clientelism in Namibia in 2004, the rate was lower in the following two years, and therefore there was still a substantial amount of policy-based strategy used in the country. As in South Africa, these strategies were more detailed in the manifestos, focusing on issues like service delivery, housing, education, and good governance. For example, in 2009, many of the attacks launched at SWAPO came out of anti-corruption platforms, accusing the ruling party of covering up illiberal practices and protecting illegal acts within the upper echelons of government. These parties, like NUDO and the UDF, promised to implement accountability measures in their government.

Almost all parties promised not only an increase in quality of education, but also increased access through gender parity legislation and programs incentivizing trained teachers to move to and work in rural areas. These policies presented more sustainable solutions (as explained in the methodology section, not short-term or emergency solutions) to issues that countries faces, and were broad rather than focused on one region.

Namibian clientelism focused on similar key issues to those of South Africa: service delivery, educational provision, and housing, food, and infrastructure. With infrastructure, voters in key constituencies (often rural or far from urban centers, such as in Kavango) were told that roads would be built in their districts, connecting them to larger cities. This was promised without a larger sustainable plan for improving infrastructure, and was often promised only in certain provinces or villages. The same strategy was used with hospitals and schools—ANC party members would enter villages and promise new facilities without any policies to provide funding or support.⁵¹ There was consideration of respective community needs, to the extent that party members knew precisely what to offer each area, enabling them to make promises that were, more often than not, not fulfilled once they were voted into office. Negative clientelist strategies such as threats from party officials to withhold certain benefits like food aid if citizens didn't vote for a particular party, were also observed.⁵²

Clientelist strategies were often applied to housing policy, as many of the housing opportunities in Namibia were underdeveloped, lacking proper toilets or running water. Candidates often made promises in districts to provide houses for those in need. However, the distinction between regional and national campaign strategies made in the methodology section applies here. The same dynamic was seen with service delivery and other infrastructural issues. Many villages and townships, especially in rural areas, were promised basic amenities—in particular, hygiene and plumbing facilities. Because these promises only applied to specific areas, they were

51 New Era. 2014. "Venaani Implores Otjinene Residents to Vote DTA for Economic Development." Windhoek.

52 Nunuhe, M. 2014. "Drought Food Used As Campaign—DTA Leader." New Era. Windhoek.

categorized as clientelist.

Another key issue in both South Africa and Namibia was the reform of land rights. This issue was particularly prevalent during campaigns because of the complicated transitional justice programs implemented and promised in post-apartheid South Africa. Land reform was a common promise made by candidates, and policies ranged from programmatic attempts to please every constituency to promises to provide land for all poor Namibians. This was often a promise made regionally, although parties generally had overarching land reform policies that didn't fall into the category of clientelist.

Clientelism in Namibia in relation to economic development followed a pattern similar to that of South Africa (see Figure 2.3). Although development steadily increased (with the exception of unemployment, which rose in 2009), the ratio of clientelism fell, only to rise again in 2014. This may again be due to the relatively small changes in economic development overall: many of the same problems existed consistently over the ten-year period studied. Because the rate of clientelism varied more widely in Namibia, the trend is easier to see on this graph. Looking specifically at the rural population, which consistently decreased, the rise and fall of clientelism is clear. The correlation between GNI (not included in the graph below) and clientelism is weak, at -0.37.

In terms of education in Namibia, there again is a similar trend to that of South Africa in that the changes in educational quality over time are too minute to fully establish a relationship between the two variables (see Figure 2.4). Note also in the figure that there is a limited amount of information to graph and that the years vary according to indicator (data for public expenditure and secondary education in 2014 and the data for literacy in 2004 are not available). Literacy is the only indicator that experienced a sizable jump over time. This may be due to an investment in education by the government, although it was also accompanied by a rise in clientelism, staying consistent with the pattern observed so far. Mean years of schooling stayed virtually constant over the ten-year period, at 6.2 years, and a correlation test does not provide any further insight into the relationship.

As in South Africa, the general trends observed in Namibia were lower clientelist rates with higher economic and educational development. Changes in the independent variable are easier to see in Namibia, but there is not a strong correlation between the dependent and independent variables.

C. Botswana

Botswana clientelism ratios were difficult to quantify because there was insufficient available article data to calculate a ratio for the 2014 election year. That being said, there was still enough to provide a general picture of the strategies used within the country. The ratio slightly increased from 2004 (0.22 in manifestos and 0.46 in articles) to 2009 (0.22 and 0.55), with a manifesto ratio decrease in 2014 of 0.16. Given South Africa's ratios and the similarity between Botswana and South Africa's economic and educational indicators, these ratios are higher than I expected to see. I will discuss this discrepancy in the cross-country analysis section. However, Botswana's ratio increase in between the first two election years diverges from the trend in other countries studied. In terms of nominal difference, the increase in the first two years may not have indicated a larger trend. Given that the manifesto ratio stayed consistent, the increase may not mean anything for the strength of the political institutions or for democracy overall. Although in South Africa and Namibia the opposition parties used clientelism less often than the ruling parties due to a lack of access to resources, this same theory does not necessarily hold true in Botswana. In Botswana, there was more competition between BDP and the various opposition parties over time (parties like BNF and UDC often gain larger percentages of the vote in Botswana than do DTA and DA in Namibia and South Africa, respectively).

In terms of qualitative analysis, clientelist strategies focused on fairly straightforward issues in Botswana, such as land reform and HIV/AIDS. One major case from the 2004 elections was similar to the case in South Africa—the BDP government advertised free antiretroviral drugs a few months before the election. Although the party has not historically received the same criticism as ANC for ignoring HIV/AIDS, the timing of the advertisement and the promotion of free medication without a coupled sustainable education and prevention plan is a clear example of the type of clientelism in which Botswanan parties engaged.⁵³ This specific issue created controversy within Botswanan media and civil society groups, showing that, to a certain extent, citizens did

⁵³ Kaiser Network. 2004. "Botswana: Daily HIV/AIDS Report." Washington, DC.

recognize the difference between clientelist and policy-based strategies. However, as we see from the election results, it did not matter to most citizens.

Jobs, housing, and poverty reduction in general also proved to be salient topics for parties and candidates. Promises to provide housing subsidies were made by parties, as were promises to build more houses in specific areas. However, these promises were made without providing funding or strategies to implement them. In terms of housing, parties also promised to “upgrade” structures including housing infrastructure and the widely-used “pit latrines.” These strategies appeared consistently over the ten-year period, meaning either the amount built was not noticeable, or the promises were made without any mechanisms to follow through. The reality is most likely a combination of those two factors. Regarding job creation, another common issue, promises made to citizens rarely went beyond “job creation” or “job opportunities,” with politicians promising vast increases in the number of job opportunities but not providing avenues for implementation or details about the sectors in which these jobs would be created. This is another example of how the normative nature of my coding impacted strategy categorization. Because the simple offer of jobs does not even constitute a vague policy, these promises are coded as clientelist. If these promises included any sort of plan for job creation, it was coded as policy-based. At some points politicians did specify a plan; for example, infrastructural projects or youth entrepreneurship programs were proposed as job creators. This justified coding it as policy-based strategy.

Policy-based strategies, although seen more in the manifestos, focused on the same issues. Despite the controversy regarding free antiretroviral treatment, healthcare was often extensively addressed with policy-based platforms. Healthcare policies involved reform of higher education, expanded training for nurses and doctors, improved working conditions to decrease brain drain within the country, and rural outreach. Another example of policy-based strategies was associated with economic development. Parties and candidates tried to involve community and traditional leaders in economic development. This tied into governance reform policies, which often included sections on decentralization. The policies advocated for local distribution of power, from constructing more rural resource centers to increasing traditional leaders’ access to higher levels of government. These reforms were multi-faceted and indicative of a stronger democracy, despite clientelism making up the other half of campaign strategies in Botswana.

Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between clientelism and economic development. It is important to note that because the scale on the y-axis is different, the drop in clientelist policies looks larger—in reality it is only a drop of 0.09 points. GNI is not included, but it almost doubled in the ten-year period, and rose quickly during the first two election years. This odd counterintuitive relationship may point to another variable responsible for how campaign strategies are used in certain countries, such as competitive party dynamics or the influence of international geopolitics. These alternative explanations are discussed more in the cross-country analysis section.

The lack of available data on Botswana’s educational sector combined with the missing ratio for the election year makes it difficult to produce an illustrative graph. However, there is some analysis that can be done. There does not seem to be any substantive relationship between educational quality and clientelist strategy in Botswana. Botswana’s educational quality is comparable to that of South Africa, but its clientelist ratios do not reflect the same dynamics. However, the manifesto ratio decreased in the final election year, which is a positive sign for other forms of campaigning. The analytical differences between manifesto and article ratios are interesting, but will be discussed further on in the cross-country analysis section.

D. Zambia

Zambia’s strategies and rhetoric are distinct from those of the previous three countries. The interplay between candidates is less formal, less based on promises to constituents (either clientelist or policy-based), and more filled with ad hominem attacks on other parties and candidates. Attack campaigning can be expected in any country, but Zambia had more than the other countries. This may have resulted from more party competition in Zambia—there is no party with a monopoly over elections, unlike in the three previous countries. In terms of clientelist ratios, the rate in Zambia rose over time, from 0.14 in manifestos and 0.65 in articles in 2006, to 0.16 and 0.37 in 2011, and 0.06 and 1.0 in 2016. This pattern is similar to the other case studies, with relatively high rates in the first election year, a drop in the second, and a rise again in the third. However, Zambian rates increased considerably in the third

year, surpassing even the 2006 ratio. Another interesting anomaly in Zambia was the manifesto trend—a small increase in the second election year and a drop in the third election year. As I will discuss in the cross-country analysis, this is more indicative of improved party institutions than improved rates of policy-based strategy.

The main difference in much of Zambian (and Malawian, discussed further on) campaign strategy is the rhetoric that was used between parties. Parties often used personal insults and ad hominem attacks to criticize the other candidates and parties rather than criticizing policy. This type of rhetoric makes the campaigns, and indeed the electoral institutions, seem less formal and less professional. It also creates an election environment that is more focused on the relationships between candidates than the relationships between the candidate/party and the population. This also makes it difficult to analyze any type of campaign strategy, as candidates speak more on the negative personal attributes of other candidates than on their policies. This may result from a media environment that is less friendly to campaign strategy—personal fights between candidates may be more exciting to constituents than the complexities of fiscal and monetary policy. This is a limitation of my data collection method that I discussed earlier, because of how media coverage might be skewed, but is also a function of the general sociopolitical environment in which democracy and media operate.

The clientelist strategies in Zambia focused on foreign investment, agriculture, and infrastructure. Many of the promises centered on job creation used foreign investment as leverage—they pledged to take away jobs from foreigners and return them to Zambians (although in some cases immigrants were referred to as foreigners, highlighting a strongly nationalist narrative). This strategy also involved critiques of foreign investors and arguments over the role foreign aid should play in the country—this angle was more policy-based. Many of the campaign promises regarding agriculture were similar to those of other countries. Agricultural subsidies were popular, although the policy-based strategies make more references to international aid programs and agreements. The emphasis on international integration when it came to food security was most likely because of the urgency of the ongoing food security problem in both Zambia and Malawi. Strategies that addressed infrastructural issues often made promises for specific physical structures in certain parts of the country. These promises were made in village or town settings, making them regionally focused and clientelist.

However, there were still policy-based strategies present in Zambia. As has been mentioned, food security was a major issue. Politicians and parties promoted solutions to this problem including not only agricultural subsidies (technology, seeds, or other capital), but also diversification of crops, implementation of solutions in international agreements (like the Maputo Declaration in 2003), and access to land reform and agricultural training.

Another policy-based strategy was targeted at youth empowerment. Many parties had thorough plans to improve youth engagement in government and society, including programs like youth entrepreneurship trainings and loans specifically for youth. They also promoted vocational institutions for youth, and technology and learning centers to provide greater access to resources and communication and to keep them off the street.

As with the other cases, economic indicators in Zambia changed so little over the ten-year period that it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the data. Figure 4.3 shows the economic indicators (excluding GNI) plotted against clientelism. This relationship mostly follows the same trend as the other cases, with the exception of the last election year: as with the other cases, clientelism spiked again, but in Zambia it spiked higher than in the first election year. GNI, however, consistently improved over the ten-year period and it is difficult to see a relationship between GNI and clientelism.

Because much of the educational indicator data from Zambia are unavailable, it is difficult to chart them against clientelism. Only mean years of schooling and adult literacy rates were available for all three election years, and the patterns are similar to the other cases. Mean years of schooling stayed consistent at 6.3-6.6. Adult literacy, however, jumped from 61.4% in 2006 to 83% in 2011 and 85.1% in 2016. Although the initial jump in literacy seems to be connection with the drop in clientelism during those years, the rise in clientelism in 2016 did not follow the same trend, as literacy also increased slightly. There does not seem to be a discernible consistent relationship between clientelism and educational quality in Zambia.

E. Malawi

Higher levels of clientelism were observed in Malawi as well. There is more competition between parties in the country and no one ruling party, adding credence to the argument that higher rates of clientelism are observed with more competitive party environments, which will be discussed in the cross-country analysis section. This being said, clientelist ratios followed the same pattern seen in the previous cases to a certain extent. Use of clientelist strategy was relatively high in the 2004 elections (0.14 in manifestos and 1.13 in articles), decreased dramatically in 2009 (0.08 and 0.33), and increased again in 2014 (0.1 and 0.52). Campaign strategies used in Malawi, as in Zambia, focused more on personal attacks than on actual policy issues, likely for similar reasons. As analyst Danga Mughogho put it: “The political parties have developed around personalities and not ideologies.”⁵⁴ NGOs and civil society organizations seem to play an important role in Malawian elections. They have pushed consistently for stronger electoral institutions, for accountability of candidates and parties, and for inclusion of specific policy platforms in candidates’ goals and promises. These platforms were not intended to benefit the NGOs directly (e.g. a policy for more civil society grants), but instead were often focused on social issues. They pressured politicians to pursue substantive and policy-based strategies for addressing problems like gender-based violence and youth empowerment. In fact, in 2009, several civil society organizations released their own manifesto as a coalition—a document that outlined their priorities and attempted to help form the candidates’ policies. International NGOs were also vocal during elections, providing pressure on parties and candidates to address certain issues.

In Malawian elections, candidates had more of a regional focus when campaigning. Candidates who came from certain provinces in Malawi were often expected to win those areas and the surrounding areas, with strong presidential candidates often coming from the south of the country. This type of regionalism affected how and where certain parties campaigned, especially when parties had limited resources. Though this is a common practice in many democracies, it was more directly observed in Malawi. It was also seen in South Africa, where opposition parties did well in one or two provinces but did not succeed countrywide. This created a more favorable environment for clientelism, as politicians may feel more responsible and more comfortable offering benefits to their home region. Although studies (like Wantchekon’s) disaggregate regions within a country, they are not regionally focused, which could benefit from more research.

Clientelist rates varied widely over the ten-year period, but the highest ratio was seen in 2004, rising again in 2014. Clientelist strategies in Malawi focused on issues of corruption and development. Across the ten-year period there were several controversies surrounding how politicians garnered support from political elites. Accusations and reports of the new administration promising position in exchange for support were common. This applied not only to political elites, but also to churches and clergy members, whose support offered a significant number of votes across the country. Opposition parties running against these candidates tended to make anti-corruption legislation the center of their campaigns, often citing cases of incumbents making clientelist promises for positions.

Development was a frequently mentioned issue because of its importance in Malawi—the country with the lowest level of economic development and a marked struggle with food security. Clientelist strategies in this sector were similar to ones used in other countries—promises of technology like tractors and seed subsidies to farmers in particular villages. Agricultural development promises frequently fell into the “grey area” between clientelist and policy-based strategies. Subsidy programs in the country were continuously proposed to farmers, who did not see other options that would meet their immediate needs, but they proved to be short-term non-sustainable solutions. Normative definitions of campaign strategy make it difficult to distinguish between poorly constructed policy and clientelism, but as mentioned in the methodology section, I attempted to do so by categorizing strategies as clientelist if they were seen as the only source of the promised benefits. For example, a ruling party that has the capacity to provide food aid in a country like Malawi may be the only group able to provide those benefits, necessarily limiting farmers’ options.

In their manifestos, parties were more likely to propose more comprehensive, policy-based strategies for economic, social, and agricultural development. Every year, the monetary and fiscal policy sections of their manifestos became more detailed. The sections of the manifestos focused on these types of development grew longer than other sections, showing an improvement in way those strategies were communicated to voters, if not in the formulation of policy-based strategies, because the rate of clientelist strategies in articles did not decrease.

54 Mughogho, D. 2004. “Notes of a Native Son: 20/20 Vision.” *The Chronicle*. Lilongwe.

Figure 5.3 shows the relationship of the economic indicators with clientelism. The change in economic development was so limited that it was difficult to observe any real trend. However, because the pattern of clientelist rates over time is similar to other case studies, it is reasonable to say that there is no consistent relationship between economic development and clientelism. While development stayed mostly consistent, the rates of clientelism varied over the ten-year period. The percentage of the population in poverty experienced the most change, but the clientelist ratio did not follow the same pattern. These results further illustrate the lack of a strong trend between these indicators and clientelism. GNI (not included in the figure below) increased steadily over time from 730 PPP per capita in 2004 to 1140 in 2014 and there was a negative correlation of -0.8, although clientelism did not decrease consistently with the increase of GNI.

Figure 5.4 plots clientelism against educational indicators. Educational quality indicators changed somewhat more than the economic indicators, so a trend is easier to see. It looks similar to the trends in other cases: while literacy, secondary enrollment, and public expenditure increased consistently and steadily over the ten-year period, clientelist rates saw a rapid decrease in the second election year and a slight increase in the third election year. Mean years of schooling increased slightly from 3.4 to 4.3 in 2004 and 2009 and stayed constant at 4.3 in 2014. As in other cases, these trends point to a combination of factors impacting campaign strategy within countries and not a singular indicator, especially because of the inconsistency in clientelism.

In Malawi, although the educational indicators are more dynamic over the ten-year period than the economic indicators, it is still difficult to observe a strong trend. As with most of the other countries, clientelism rates do not follow a linear pattern. There is a rough negative relationship between clientelism and economic and educational development.

F. Cross-country analysis

Although intra-country analysis did not seem to yield strong relationships between clientelism and economic development or education, cross-country analysis presents a fuller picture. Looking at country trends from a broader view provides more insight into the various relationships.

First, all of the countries studied, with the exception of Botswana, had an unexpected pattern of clientelism. Their clientelist ratios dropped in the second election year, and rose slightly again in the last election year, although not necessarily to the same level as in the first election year. In Zambia, the clientelism rate in the third election year surpassed that of the first election year, a surprising result. However, as the intra-country analyses concluded, this trend didn't correspond with country-specific development and educational indicators. I discussed some possible explanations for this trend in the country sections above, but given how consistent it is, I offer a more comprehensive explanation here. Because most of the second election years in each case occurred during the brunt of, or immediately after, the global financial crisis of 2008, it could be that international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were increasingly focused on policy implementation in affected regions of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa. The IMF released a report in 2009 putting pressure on sub-Saharan African countries to establish working economic policies in order to lessen the impact of the crisis. This pressure may have resulted in fewer clientelist strategies in the years after the crisis, leaving parties to return to clientelist habits (especially in countries like South Africa and Namibia, where party habits were more entrenched) in the most recent election year. This, combined with the level of economic development achieved in the ten-year period, could explain the strange trend observed across these countries. This merits more research, however, as the global financial crisis may have played a role, but the specific mechanisms might have varied.⁵⁵

The key issues on which parties in these countries campaigned were very similar—as were their policies for dealing with these issues. “Free and compulsory education” was a commonly used phrase, and parties had similar ideas for dealing with problems like workforce gender disparities, youth unemployment, corruption, and insufficient agricultural production. For example, subsidization of crops and of serviced land for farmers was a typical agriculture policy, as was providing training centers and access to new technologies by promoting trade and integration between farmers. Opposition parties focused more on anti-corruption measures, often pointing out specific instances of misuse of public funds by the ruling party. Every party also had a policy on gender-

55 International Monetary Fund. 2009. “Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa.”

based violence and gender equality, advocating for gender quotas in public institutions and for increasing access and opportunities in private employment and education. Parties sometimes even recognized the disproportionate amount of work done by women in the informal sector and moved to support and legitimize that work. There are parallels between the policies of the five countries, showing that the issues the countries struggle with are similar and that the institutional knowledge within each set of institutions is not immune to regional diffusion. This emphasizes the importance of a cross-country analytical study, because the similarities create an environment more conducive to a project comparing strategy in the countries.

Another point to note is the similarity between the clientelism rates in countries' manifestos. All are much lower than the rate in the articles, which is expected given the type of media. However, the discrepancy between the manifestos and press reports (as well as what citizens experienced on the ground) is concerning. Manifestos are not necessarily widely distributed—the flyers put up by parties around villages and cities certainly didn't contain the mass of information within the documents that often spanned 50 pages. Manifestos are helpful as a campaign strategy and show that most parties do not lack institutional knowledge or policy-writing experience. The lack of access to manifestos by average citizens is where manifestos fall short. This is the reason that the article ratios offered may be a more telling indicator of campaign strategy than manifestos. Manifestos are a comprehensive picture of a party's platforms, but press reports, speeches, and records of visits to specific villages reflect how parties actually interacted with the population. The latter is what this project intends to study, and while manifestos are an important part of campaigning, they don't present a realistic view of party interface with population. This is a compelling explanation for why manifestos have much lower clientelist strategies and vary less widely—the language described above was not only shared between countries, but was often used repeatedly in subsequent election years.

In regards to the relationship between the strategies and the indicators, the figures referenced in the following section plot all strategy data points against each of the indicators separately. This offers an indicator-focused analysis rather than the country-focused analysis of the previous figures. In Figure 6, the clientelist ratios of all countries in all election years are placed on a graph against GNI. There is a clear trend that points to a lower clientelist ratio being connected with a higher GNI. The country points are color-coded, and are roughly chronological from left to right, as the GNI improved every year.

Figure 7 plots unemployment against all country data points. This trend is the only true outlier, and rather than pointing to a correlation between high unemployment and low clientelism, it is most likely a symptom of the inconsistency in unemployment definitions across countries. Both Namibia and South Africa had higher levels of development in almost every other indicator measured, but still had astronomically high unemployment rates. The opposite is true for Malawi, where there was low development throughout the ten-year period, but considerably lower unemployment. Without further research, it is difficult to attribute these differences to campaign strategies or economic or other factors.

Figure 8 plots clientelism against the percentage of the population living in rural areas in a country. The trend seen here is similar to the one in the first figure—as the proportion of rural population decreases, countries tend to use fewer clientelist strategies.

Figure 9, the last of the economic indicator charts, presents the percentage of the population living in poverty (on less than \$1.90 a day) against clientelism. The trend is less obvious than in the other charts, but there seems to be at least a rough correlation between low poverty and low clientelism. It is important to note again that due to the number of data points, these relationships are not statistically significant, but serve to illustrate the larger point made in this paper.

The next four charts plot educational indicators against clientelism. Because of the lack of availability of data in some cases (more data was unavailable than in the case of economic indicators), some patterns are less clear and the correlations are less reliable. However, the figures are still valuable in producing a larger picture of cross-country analysis.

Figure 10 presents the mean years of schooling in each country plotted against clientelism, and this relationship is the strongest of the educational indicators. For these countries, generally a higher average of years of education is observed with a lower rate of clientelism. There are some anomalies here—Botswana and Namibia both had varying degrees of clientelism over the ten-year period, but had fairly consistent average years

of schooling during the same period. This may mean that a combination of educational and/or economic factors impact clientelism rates.

Figure 11 plots literacy against clientelism. Literacy, like unemployment, is difficult to define consistently. However, with the exception of those in Zambia, there is a weak trend between the two variables. Generally, higher literacy rates go along with lower clientelism, as evidenced below.

Figure 12 plots a country's public expenditure on education (as a percentage of its GDP) against clientelism. There are more extensive data gaps here, as can be seen with Zambia, and because of this the relationship between clientelism and public expenditure is difficult to see. Several of the countries had similar amounts of public funding directed at education (South Africa, Namibia, Malawi) but varied widely in terms of clientelism. Botswana spent the most on education, but their clientelist rates were not significantly lower than that of other states. Public expenditure may not be the best variable for measuring educational quality, as it seems that it doesn't matter how *much* money is spent on education, but rather how that money is used.

The final figure, Figure 13, plots the percentage of students in secondary education against clientelism. This indicator had the least amount of data available, although there is a rough trend observed. Generally, countries with higher secondary enrollment tend to have lower rates of clientelism. However, this is another example of indicators changing little and clientelism varying more over the ten-year period. The trend in this figure would be more easily observed if more data could be collected on secondary enrollment in these countries.

VII. Conclusion

For the most part, intra-country analyses do not show a strong relationship between economic or educational indicators and the rate of clientelist strategies. In the future, a study conducted over a longer period of time could possibly produce a stronger relationship or more reliable trends, but because of the generally small changes over a period of ten years, patterns are hard to identify. That being said, there are some consistent clientelism trends that are observed in almost every country. Clientelism tends to be highest in the first election year, drop in the second year, and increase again in the third election year, although not to the levels in the first year. I presented various theories to explain this, one of which connected the odd pattern to the increased pressure from international institutions to implement working policy immediately after the global recession in 2008. However, the conclusions I drew would benefit from further research that incorporates a larger data set and a longer period of time.

Patterns are easier to observe across countries. I attribute this to the larger variation in both economic development and educational quality: over a ten-year period, indicators didn't shift dramatically, and that made it more difficult to draw connections between those variables and campaign strategy use. Because countries vary more amongst themselves, relationships are clearer. I find that countries with higher GNIs, lower percentages of rural populations, lower percentages of populations in poverty, higher mean years of schooling, and higher secondary school enrollment tend to have lower rates of clientelist strategy compared to policy-based strategy. Relationships with the other indicators (unemployment, public expenditure on education, and literacy) have much weaker relationships with clientelism rates, for various reasons.

The relationships observed in this study are not conclusive, but certainly add to existing literature, and not only that of campaign strategy. This study provides insight into less-researched areas of how economic development and democracy are connected. It produces evidence for the idea that economic development affects more than human capital and political institutions, and that it impacts how those two sectors engage and relate to one another. The connection between economic development and democracy is multi-faceted, and campaign strategy is an important piece of their relationship.

Because the study of how policy-based and clientelist strategies are used in Africa is fairly new and tends to focus on specific country dynamics, the field could benefit from future research. This might necessitate a larger set of countries and a more intensive data collection method, including fieldwork and interviews with candidates. Research could go in two directions: either to expand upon work within countries and increase the length of the time period studied, in order to gain a better idea of in-country dynamics; or to expand the number of countries to observe clearer patterns across Africa. This type of further research could answer questions about the nature of

democracy in Africa, and whether it is unique relative to the rest of the world.

Note: All figures and tables are displayed in Appendix I and II.

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Appendix I: Case Studies

Table 1.1 South Africa Economic Trends (in PPP)

	2004	2009	2014
GNI per capita	9,010	11,210	12,750
Unemployment (% of pop 15+)	39.8%	40.4%	39.4%
Rural pop (% of pop)	41%	38.3%	35.7%
Poverty (<1.90/day, % of pop)	32.59%	16.89%	16.56%

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 1.2 South Africa Educational Trends

	2004	2009	2014
Mean years of schooling	8.8	9.5	10.3
Adult literacy rate	-	92.9%	94.14%
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.07%	5.25%	6.06%
Secondary enrollment, %	88.5%	90.2% (2010)	93.8% (2013)

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 2.1 Namibia Economic Trends (in PPP)

Indicator	2004	2009	2014
GNI per capita	6,280	7,650	9,990
Unemployment (% of pop 15+)	21.9%	29.7%	18.6%
Rural pop (% of pop)	64.33%	59.4%	54.32%
Poverty (<1.90/day, % of pop)	31.46 (2003)	28.7%	-

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 2.2 Namibia Educational Trends

	2004	2009	2014
Mean years of schooling	6 (2005)	6.2 (2010)	6.2
Adult literacy rate	-	76.5% (2007)	90.8% (2015)
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	6.1 (2003)	6.5 (2008)	-
Secondary enrollment, %	63.6	64.8 (2007)	-

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 3.1 Botswana Economic Trends (in PPP)

	2004	2009	2014
GNI per capita	8,630	11,660	15,660
Unemployment (% of pop 15+)	22.9%	18.4%	18.2%
Rural pop (% of pop)	45.16%	44%	42.81%
Poverty (<1.90/day, % of pop)	29.75 (2002)	18.24%	-

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 3.2 Botswana Educational Trends

	2004	2009	2014
Mean years of schooling	8.3 (2005)	8.9 (2010)	8.9
Adult literacy rate	81.2 (2003)	-	87.7
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	10.7 (2005)	9.6	-
Secondary enrollment, %	-	81.4 (2007)	83.9 (2013)

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 4.1 Zambia Economic Trends (in PPP)

	2006	2011	2016
GNI per capita	2,170	3,180	3,640
Unemployment (% of pop 15+)	15.6%	13.2%	13.3% (2014)
Rural pop (% of pop)	62.97%	60.85%	59.08%
Poverty (<1.90/day, % of pop)	60.46%	64.42%	-

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 4.2 Zambia Educational Trends

	2006	2011	2016
Mean years of schooling	6.3 (2005)	6.6	6.6 (2014)
Adult literacy rate	61.4 (2007)	83 (2010)	85.1 (2015)
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	2 (2005)	-	-
Secondary enrollment, %	-	-	-

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 5.1 Malawi Economic Trends (in PPP)

	2004	2009	2014
GNI per capita	730	980	1,140
Unemployment (% of pop 15+)	7.8%	7.5%	7.5%
Rural pop (% of pop)	85.04%	84.57%	83.90%
Poverty (<1.90/day, % of pop)	73.63%	70.91% (2010)	-

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Table 5.2 Malawi Educational Trends

	2004	2009	2014
Mean years of schooling	3.4 (2005)	4.3 (2010)	4.3
Adult literacy rate	-	61.3 (2010)	66 (2015)
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP)	4.2 (2003)	4.4 (2010)	6.9
Secondary enrollment, %	27.4	31.8	39.5

Source: UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP

Appendix II: Findings and Analysis

Figure 1.3




Figure 1.4




Figure 2.3




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


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


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


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


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


Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9




Figure 10




Figure 11




Figure 12




Figure 13

