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# Jantelagen and Multiculturalism

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A Dynamic Dual

Sofie Fredlund-Blomst

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>BRA</b>	Brottsförebyggande Rådet (The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention)
<b>DN</b>	<i>Dagens Nyheter</i>
<b>EEA</b>	European Economic Area
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>MIPEX</b>	Migrant Integration Policy Index
<b>SCB</b>	Statistiska Centralbyrån (Statistics Sweden)
<b>SFI</b>	Svenska för Invandrare (Swedish for Immigrants)
<b>SvD</b>	<i>Svenska Dagbladet</i>
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

## Introduction

Over half a century has passed since the flows of post-war migration began and European nations are still struggling to define methods for the incorporation of immigrants. Although former waves of migration were largely comprised of labor migrants and temporary guest-workers, contemporary migrations are characterized by their degree of diversity and permanency. Advocating the norms of international human rights, European nations have increasingly received ethnically and culturally diverse immigrants whose reception has coincided with the emergence of rather heterogeneous societies. The diversity of modern migrations is unparalleled and has challenged the traditional narratives of European nations. Despite efforts to integrate or even assimilate immigrant populations, national identities are changing. The fluidity of national identities and the permanency of this diversity must be recognized.

The diversity of modern migrations has made the task of incorporation sufficiently difficult for many Europe nations. The persistence of socio-economic difficulties, labor market discrimination, high unemployment rates and continued segregation has disproportionately affected immigrant populations. Moreover, immigrants have often become the scapegoats of society, being blamed for their unequal burden on the welfare state, increased criminality and overall lack of incorporation into European societies. Most recently, the “incompatibility” of particular cultures and religions with Western values has been seen as a threat to Europe, posing irrevocable implications for incorporation. Through perceived threats of criminality, fundamentalism and terrorism, European nations have experienced a surge of racism and xenophobia. These heightened tensions between members of society have challenged the traditional narratives of incorporation, forcing European nations to rethink dominant discourses and policies. Identifying the limitations of national models of incorporation, the European Union (EU) has taken a greater role in the debates over the past years.

From its early embryonic state, the EU has evolved from a limited economic unit to a socially, politically and economically integrated structure, vastly expanding its powers and spheres of influence. Despite the sovereignty of member nations, the degree to which the EU represents a very real supranational body continues to manifest itself through policies, programs and international law. Since the removal of internal borders through the Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990, national challenges and concerns have overflowed territorial borders and presented member nations with new challenges. In effect, immigration has become a regional phenomenon, spanning beyond national borders. For this reason, the dulling of internal security measures has happened concurrent with the sharpening concerns over security issues at Europe’s external borders.

In an effort to address this “spill-over” effect, the EU has taken a greater role in the promotion of a cohesive policy agenda for all member nations.<sup>1</sup> Since the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, the policy areas of visas, asylum and immigration have been elevated to a supranational level.<sup>2</sup> Through initiatives such as the Hague Programme in 2005, the

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<sup>1</sup> The idea that the EU’s responsibilities would be expanded through time due to a natural “spill over” effect was a contribution by Ernst B. Haas and his theory of neofunctionalism. Philippe C. Schmitter, “Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism,” *Journal of Public Policy* 12:2 (2005): 257.

<sup>2</sup> The Treaty of Amsterdam established an “area of freedom, security, and justice” under the first pillar of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs. Thereby, the significance of this treaty is the establishment of a legal base to harmonize an immigration agenda in the EU. Since 1997, the area of immigration has been a priority in the

top ten priorities for the “area of freedom, security and justice” have been established, emphasizing the need to harmonize a European agenda for immigration and integration.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the creation of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration in the EU and the publication of Integration Handbooks in 2004 and 2007 illustrate an effort to harmonize standards and promote international benchmarking tools. Despite these efforts to coordinate international policies, the bureaucratic structure of the EU has made it difficult to harmonize the number of diverse interests in the union. Although the effort to coordinate a common immigration agenda took a big step forward with the ratification of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (October, 2008), relatively little, less common standards and benchmarking tools have been achieved in the area of integration.

Faced with the increasing challenges of incorporation, European nations have taken a number of approaches to integration. While countries such as the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Sweden were quick to promote multiculturalism as a liberal policy of accommodation and tolerance, the highly publicized bombings in London (2005) and the brutal murder of Theo van Gogh in The Netherlands (2004) have posited potential failures of this doctrine of immigrant incorporation.<sup>4</sup> Challenging this model, countries such as France have promoted a more traditional policy of civic nationalism in an effort to promote universal political equality. While both doctrines of incorporation have evolved from liberal political theory in an attempt to foster individual liberty and universal equality, a scholarly debate has emerged portraying the two as fundamentally incompatible.

Much scholarship has already been written on both sides of the debate in an attempt to understand the complexities of incorporation. Although multiculturalism has often been promoted as a more progressive alternative to civic nationalism, recent scholars have highlighted its limitations. That is, by accommodating and even encouraging a multitude of languages, cultures and religions in society, the importance of language skills and civic integration may easily be overlooked. The purpose of this thesis will be to critically examine and uncover the potential limitations of multiculturalism. While there is no deficit in scholarly work on multiculturalism in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, relatively little has been published on the Swedish model of incorporation. To fill this void, I will conduct a detailed study of incorporation in Sweden. Although any study of immigrant incorporation in the EU may intuitively call for a comparative study, such a study is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, by grounding my analysis in the existing scholarship and theoretical debates, my intent is to position this thesis within the larger context of incorporation in the EU.

### ***Theoretical Perspectives***

Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka is one of the leading advocates of multiculturalism. While he has written extensively on the topic in a number of books and publications, it is crucial to understand his central claims. In *Multicultural citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* and *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: recognition and*

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EU. Nonetheless, only minimum standards have been established and more than ten years later, the EU is still in the process of determining a cohesive agenda. Sandra Lavenex, *The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between human rights and internal security* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2001), 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix A.

<sup>4</sup> Christian Joppke, “The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and policy,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 55 (2004): 239.

*redistribution in contemporary democracies*, Kymlicka outlines the basic principles of his theory. Unlike many “post-war liberals” who assume that “religious tolerance, based on the separation of church and state” can also provide a “model for dealing with ethnocultural differences,” Kymlicka refutes the idea that equality can be achieved through the suppression of such differences to the private sphere.<sup>5</sup> Rather, Kymlicka argues that only through the protection of the members of society who are routinely discriminated against, stigmatized and marginalized can they afford to practice their individual freedoms in languages, cultures and religions. In order to distinguish between the descriptive and normative uses of multiculturalism, Kymlicka highlights the difference between multiculturalism and multicultural policies (MCPs). To emphasize this difference he produces a list of multicultural policy prescriptions including the legal affirmation of multiculturalism, multicultural school curriculums, dual citizenship policies and the state funding of cultural groups and religious associations.<sup>6</sup> “By removing barriers and contesting stigmas that disadvantage members of ethnic and racial minorities,” Kymlicka asserts that MCPs promote the principles of freedom and equality and thereby, multiculturalism provides the best means to foster the incorporation of diverse groups into society.<sup>7</sup> Although many of his contenders have argued that his theory is inconsistent with liberalism, Kymlicka stresses that multiculturalism or a “multicultural citizenship” neither threatens individual freedoms nor the solidarity of the nation.

As the leading contender to multiculturalism, Brian Barry published his notorious polemic *Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* as a theoretical condemnation of the discourse. As a “post-war liberal,” Barry is a strong advocate of the liberal doctrine and fostering the principles of universal equality and liberty in contemporary societies. Although a number of scholars have viewed multiculturalism as an extension of liberal democratic theory, Barry argues that multiculturalism is fundamentally inconsistent with liberalism. By legally recognizing groups and group rights he argues, multicultural legislation does not adequately provide the “civic equality” necessary in diverse societies.<sup>8</sup> Referring to multiculturalism as the “politics of difference,” Barry argues that only through the “depoliticization of differences” or the privatization of culture and religion can universal freedoms and equality be fully expressed. In addition to its inherent inconsistency with liberalism, Barry posits that multiculturalism actually poses a great threat to the solidarity, fundamental values and beliefs, and security of nations. While generating significant divisions between cultural minorities and respective majorities, Barry claims that MCPs such as bilingual education programs can establish a form of structural segregation and in fact, be inherently exclusionary.<sup>9</sup> Declaring multiculturalism as a “formula for manufacturing conflict,” Barry’s publication is a vehement attack on multiculturalism and an attempt to deconstruct the entire discourse.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 3.

<sup>6</sup> Will Kymlicka and Keith G. Banting, *Multiculturalism and the welfare state: recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 56.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>8</sup> Brian M. Barry, *Culture and equality: an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), 24.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 237.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

Closely correlated to the theories of incorporation are the ways in which states can foster membership through citizenship and naturalization policies. The concept of citizenship is fundamental to the debates regarding incorporation, particularly incorporation in democratic nations. In fact, the acquisition or attribution of citizenship has often been considered the ultimate goal of integration policies in liberal democratic nations. In addition to establishing formal recognition and representation, citizenship can help to encourage a sense of unity, constructing a common political link between diverse members in society regardless of preexisting cultures and identities. Citizenship has thus come to represent a form of membership which can construct national identities and thereby generate feelings of solidarity. Although citizenship is not an indicator of ultimate incorporation, the degree to which states encourage membership through open and accommodating naturalization policies is nevertheless crucial to the process of immigrant incorporation.

The politics of citizenship are not stagnant; rather citizenship laws are framed by dominant discourses which can and do change. Sociologist Rogers Brubaker has written extensively on the concept of citizenship and nationality. Recognizing its exclusionary principles, he notes that “by inventing the national citizen and the legal homogenous national citizenry,” citizenship simultaneously produces the “foreigner.”<sup>11</sup> It forges a common political alliance, but more crucially, it outlines a means to define those who belong and those who do not. Thus he claims that “despite the concern of liberal political theory to found political obligation on the voluntary consent of individuals, the state is not and cannot be a voluntary association.”<sup>12</sup> An opponent to constructivist theories on group formations and identities, Brubaker confides in more traditional forms of national citizenship as a means of political assimilation. In addition to providing a formal legal status of membership, Brubaker argues that citizenship also provides a sense of political loyalty through nationality or the sense of belonging to a nation.<sup>13</sup> By fostering this shared identity, naturalization, he argues, is imperative to integration.

While agreeing that citizenship is a fundamental step in the process of incorporation, Thomas Hammar has argued that citizenship or the “naturalization of integration” is the “last step in a long process of integration.”<sup>14</sup> In contrast to Brubaker however, Hammar acknowledges the importance of cultural and national identities to individuals and recognizes that these identities may impede on an individual’s desire to naturalize when doing so implies the denial of former identities.<sup>15</sup> Hammar thus advocates that the low propensity of immigrants to naturalize must be overcome by dual citizenship legislation and through this means, the realization of multiple identities.<sup>16</sup>

In *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*, Yasemin Soysal notes the limitations of traditional interpretations of citizenship. Challenging the claims of Brubaker and Hammar, Soysal asserts that “national citizenship” is no longer “imperative to

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<sup>11</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 46.

<sup>12</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 1989), 102.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>14</sup> Thomas Hammar, “Dual citizenship and political integration,” *The International Migration Review* 19 (1985): 448.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 441.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 447



membership in a polity.”<sup>17</sup> Rather, she defines a form of “postnational citizenship” which is no longer territorially confined.<sup>18</sup> Announcing that “rights, participation, and representation in a polity, are increasingly matters beyond the vocabulary of national citizenship,” she asserts that the manifestation “postnational citizenship” has emerged in response to heightened pressure on states to meet the growing demands of universal human rights discourse, redefining the relationship between citizens and aliens.<sup>19</sup> While she does recognize that European membership is broadly encompassing, she does not overlook the role that individual nations must take in immigrant incorporation. Through a survey of national institutions and models, Soysal categorizes nations into four different models: Corporatist, Liberal, Statist, and Fragmental. She notes the degree to which nations rely on top-down incorporation through institutions and programs versus bottom-up incorporation mainly through the labor market.<sup>20</sup> Through this survey, Soysal illustrates her belief that states and immigrants must both share the responsibility of integration. In this sense, Soysal dismantles the myth that incorporation is a one-way process by declaring that the “institutional repertoire(s)” of nations play a greater role in the process of incorporation than is generally attributed.<sup>21</sup>

The persistence of socio-economic disparities, segregation and high unemployment across Europe reflects the inadequacies of national models to sufficiently address incorporation. In response, a number of nations have begun to emphasize greater efforts of civic integration. Although obligatory language, civic and “workfare” courses may be seen as a disguise for political and economic assimilation, voluntary civic integration does not dictate an outright rejection of multiculturalism. Rather, voluntary civic integration assumes that immigrants want to integrate into the communities they live in. This assumption challenges the notion that civic integration must inherently be incompatible with multiculturalism. Instead of imposing civic integration or assimilation, the latter perspective asserts that voluntary measures should be encouraged and fostered by the state.

In 2004, Political Scientist Christian Joppke called the push for obligatory civic integration a “retreat of multiculturalism.”<sup>22</sup> In his essay “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” Joppke examines the failures of multiculturalism through the lens of some of the discourse’s greatest opponents. Joppke begins by examining the confusion present among many scholars between multiculturalism as a theory and as a set of policy prescriptions. Questioning why the existence of a multicultural society must inevitably result in a “prescription that the state has to duplicate or even to further this reality in its laws and policies,” Joppke notes that this reinforcement of differences may in fact be opposite to that which is

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<sup>17</sup> Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, *Limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994), 3.

<sup>18</sup> Analogous to the concept of postnationalism, “postnational citizenship” is intended to describe the transfer of rights, identities and power from nation states to an increasingly global realm. Furthered by the process of globalization and the increasing position of supranational institutions such as the European Union, the United Nations and the North American Free Trade Agreement, the concept depicts the increasing weight given to international rights and identities (i.e. the transfer of rights from national political rights to international human rights).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 165.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 37. In this survey, Soysal describes Sweden as a corporatist state with a strong bureaucracy and a number of institutions and programs to foster integration.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>22</sup> Joppke, 243.

needed.<sup>23</sup> Rather, he argues that a “centrifugal society” may require “centripetal state policies to keep it together.”<sup>24</sup> By examining the main critiques of multiculturalism, Joppke asserts that the decline of multiculturalism and the shift towards obligatory civic integration is the result of the discourse’s inherent “shortcomings and failures” and a general decline in public support of multiculturalism.<sup>25</sup>

In *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, Bhikhu Parekh raises a theoretical debate regarding assimilation and assimilationist measures such as obligatory civic integration. Recognizing that diversity is inevitable in a globalized world, Parekh argues that the role of the state must be to cultivate a strong sense of solidarity among diverse groups. Although traditional assimilationist models have attempted to foster this unity by imposing culture on immigrant populations, Parekh argues that this model is inappropriate in that it overlooks the “demands of diversity.”<sup>26</sup> Parekh acknowledges the degree to which cultures, languages and religions are embedded within individual identities and the unfeasibility of trying to recreate these identities. In addition, Parekh points out that even if one is able to assimilate, discrimination may very likely persist.<sup>27</sup> In this sense, assimilation is nothing more than the “intolerance of differences.”<sup>28</sup> Parekh is clearly opposed to obligatory civic integration, claiming that immigrants are unlikely to assimilate “if assimilation is imposed.”<sup>29</sup> In lieu of forced assimilation, Parekh would most certainly agree that integration must be a two-way process fostered by the state and realized through the ambition of the individual.

The concept of tolerance is at the heart of the incorporation debates and is in many ways embedded in the discourses and national frameworks of incorporation models. Tolerance is fundamental to any functioning society and fostering peace through an internal balance must be an ultimate goal of nations. While various models of incorporation have promoted tolerance by different means, some have certainly been more effective than others. Traditional models of civic nationalism tend to view tolerance as an essential part of the state, one that is fostered through the privatization of differences. That is, by restricting cultures and religions to the private sphere, an open and tolerant public space can be constructed. Concerned with the degree to which this form of integration simply masks intolerance, multiculturalists have argued that the only means to promote a deeper level of tolerance is to foster cultural knowledge, recognition and accommodation.

In *The Multiculturalism of Fear*, Jacob Levy examines the security threats which insufficient models may pose. Agreeing with Kymlicka and other multiculturalists, Levy does recognize the importance of cultural and ethnic groups. However, in contrast to Kymlicka’s interpretation that groups are fundamental to individual identities, Levy offers a morose alternative. Levy argues that the importance of cultural and ethnic communities is “not because of what they provide for individuals,” but rather it is in the threats which they pose to social and political life.<sup>30</sup> While he does not evaluate the effectiveness of national models in the protection

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 239.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 239.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 244.

<sup>26</sup> Bhikhu C. Parekh, *Rethinking multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), 196.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 198.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 198.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 197.

<sup>30</sup> Jacob T. Levy, *The multiculturalism of fear* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 33.

of minority groups, Levy does recognize the history of state imposed violence, oppression and cruelty and thus he urges that an authoritative role must be taken by the state in an effort to protect ethnic and cultural minorities from conflict.

In contrast to Levy, Chandran Kukathas develops a rather challenging theoretical analysis of tolerance and its limitations within the boundaries of liberal political theory. Through a critical evaluation of the national discourses and policies which govern integration, Kukathas is able to place tolerance within these models only insofar as it promotes solidarity and national unity.<sup>31</sup> Regardless of which shape national models take, tolerance is often promoted as a means to an end, but not so much as a means in itself. Through the promotion of tolerance as a means to achieve national solidarity, liberal theory “offers insufficient toleration to minority communities...because it does not give any independent weight to toleration at all.”<sup>32</sup> By placing his theory of tolerance outside the boundaries of contemporary political theory, Kukathas finds that the role of the state in fostering tolerance is limited.

As this review of prominent scholarship should reveal, the debates of incorporation are rather complex. The diversity and sheer size of contemporary migrations is unparalleled and have challenged national models of incorporation. Although citizenship has traditionally been perceived as territorially bound and based on a common allegiance to the state, this perception appears outdated. With the continued integration of the EU and the opening of internal borders established by the Schengen Agreement, Soysal’s construction of a “postnational citizenship” offers a more relevant interpretation of citizenship and how it relates to incorporation. Although Joppke does provide a persuasive analysis of the decline of multicultural policies, he does not recognize that multiculturalism is not inherently at odds with civic integration policies. Here, Parekh provides a compelling position in favor of volunteerism or rather that both the state and the individual should share the burden of incorporation. In addition, both Levy and Kukathas offer compelling assessments of the independent weight given to the concept of tolerance in diverse societies.

As noted, in 2004 Christian Joppke called the convergence towards obligatory civic integration in the EU a “retreat of multiculturalism.” While he has made a strong case for Great Britain and The Netherlands, no case has been made for Sweden. Rather, Sweden has continued to be depicted as a multicultural model, despite recent shifts in policy. This thesis provides an assessment of the process of incorporation in Sweden in an attempt to illustrate that a very real shift away from multiculturalism in discourse and policy is already underway. Through a comprehensive policy analysis of key documents since 1975, I draw upon the foundations of multiculturalism in Sweden and reveal how the most recent initiatives in 1996 and 2008 posit a clear break from former policies. In addition, I illustrate that this shift has occurred in response to the failed system of incorporation in Sweden. In such, my aim is to problematize this incorporation model and to assess its inherent shortcomings.

### ***The Swedish Model of Incorporation***

Since the transition from a country of emigration to one of immigration in the 1930s, the traditional composition of Swedish society has been radically transformed. With no colonial

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<sup>31</sup> Chandran Kukathas, “Cultural Toleration,” in *Ethnicity and group rights*, ed. Shapiro, Ian, and Will Kymlicka, (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 78.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

legacy, the majority of Sweden's history can be characterized by a high degree of isolation and homogeneity. The postwar industrial boom of 1940s set into motion an influx of economic migrations which would come to define the vast majority of immigration for the following thirty years. With the economic downturn in the 1970s however, the Swedish government established the first regulated migration policy which had the effect of virtually halting all economically driven immigration. Nonetheless, immigration proceeded, simply taking a radically new form. With one of the most open, liberal and tolerant asylum policies in the world, migration policy since the 1970s has been largely equated with asylum.<sup>33</sup> Providing protection to refugees from around the world, today Swedish society is characterized by a much greater degree of diversity: culturally, ethnically and religiously.

The increasing diversity in Sweden has augmented the demands for a comprehensive integration policy. Although a largely spontaneous form of assimilation was sufficient to integrate European labor migrants in the postwar years, by the mid 1970s assimilationist practices had been denounced and the government had discerned a growing need to meet the demands of diversity. As a result, by 1974 the government had abandoned its former policies and adopted an active policy of multiculturalism. Since the mid 1970s, policies have been reformulated and revised in an attempt to account for the persistent failures of integration, yet no significant advancements have been made.

Although there is much to be gained from the introduction of diverse languages, religions and cultures, immigrant incorporation in Sweden has been inadequate. While the perceptible differences between the host population and immigrants has presented a visual barrier to unity, the real impediments of incorporation lie much deeper. Rather, the failures of incorporation are deeply correlated to the bureaucratic structure of the welfare state which has prolonged the process of integration, surpassing any protective efforts and actually stifling the process altogether. By advocating a shared responsibility on behalf of the state and society to harbor the "unfortunate" and "oppressed" victims of global conflicts and disasters, the state has unintentionally constructed a power dynamic between "privileged" Swedes and the "victims" of traumatic global conflicts. Through this constructed hierarchy, a great divide has emerged segregating Swedes both physically and psychologically from immigrants.

The level of segregation in Sweden is pervasive, penetrating the most fundamental demands of incorporation. As a result of a highly ambitious housing project sponsored by the welfare state in the 1960s and '70s, immigrants today are overrepresented in government subsidized housing districts, often located in the periphery of major cities. Coming to represent the only true diversity in Sweden, these segregated districts are perpetually stigmatized, marginalized and isolated from the larger population. Reflecting some of the most multicultural neighborhoods in the country, these districts have become traps of alienation through their embodiment of all that which is perceived to be different and "foreign" from Swedish culture, society and norms. For this reason, multiculturalism has been defined against Swedish society rather than within it,<sup>34</sup> transforming multiculturalism from a policy of accommodation and toleration to a microcosm for Oriental perceptions of how to define the relationship between

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<sup>33</sup> Andreas Ollinen (Political Advisor, Swedish Minister of Migration and Asylum, Tobias Billström), in telephone interview with author, March 24, 2009.

<sup>34</sup> Urban Ericsson, Irene Molina and Per-Markku Ristilampi, "Miljonprogram och Media: Föreställningar om människor och föroter," (Riksantikvarieämbetet, Integrationsverket, 2000), 93.

Swedes and immigrants.<sup>35</sup> In this sense, although segregation posits a physical barrier to integration – inhibiting information flows and social exchanges between members of society – the arcane implications of segregation are much more austere.

### ***A Problematic National Identity***

While both the protective efforts of the welfare state and the level of segregation in Sweden have provoked this Catch-22, the ways in which the Swedish national identity has hampered the full realization of multiculturalism must be addressed. The Swedish national identity can largely be defined by two words: egalitarianism and conformity. In contrast to these defining features of national identity, multiculturalism – as the politics of recognition and accommodation – is anything but uniform.

Swedish egalitarianism is largely the product of the welfare state which has taken an active role in dismantling the importance of social class and “old-fashioned” family prestige by fostering a sense of economic equality.<sup>36</sup> Based on the principles of *comprehensiveness*, *social entitlement* and *universalism*, the Swedish welfare system differs greatly from other welfare states through the non-stigmatizing and non-exclusionary nature of the system.<sup>37</sup> Through “an equality of the highest standards” the Swedish welfare system has been able to address even the most hard to please individuals, making the system both comprehensive and universal.<sup>38</sup> By creating a high-quality system accessible to all regardless of how much one contributes, the Scandinavian model inherently fosters a strong base for an egalitarian society.

Although egalitarianism is largely the product of the welfare state, the extent to which the idea of conformity is deeply rooted in the Swedish national identity is best observed through the traditional truisms and unwritten laws which govern society. The concept of *lagom* is one such truism. With no direct translation into English, *lagom* is generally applied to mean “not too much, not too little, but just right.” Although used abundantly in daily discourse, when applied to national identity *lagom* provides the foundation of conformity, advocating that no one should stand out in society; no one should be too rich or too poor, too outspoken or too quiet. The degree to which the concept of conformity governs Scandinavian societies is reflected by author Aksel Sandemose in his 1933 publication of *A Refugee Crosses his Tracks*.<sup>39</sup> Through his formulation of an unwritten social code, *Jantelagen*, Sandemose outlines ten fundamental rules. Through a form of patriarchic suppression, the rules imply a conformist society in which all forms of individuality and expression “are regarded with suspicion and hostility,” and as an

<sup>35</sup> This notion stems from Edward W. Said’s interpretation of “Orientalism” as the ways in which the West has come to exoticize the East, objectifying the “Orient” or the “Other” as something to be studied and interpreted.

<sup>36</sup> Thomas Hammar, “Sweden,” *European Immigration Policy* (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 22.

<sup>37</sup> The three principles of the Swedish welfare system are taken from Harold Runblum, “Multiculturalism in a Comparative European Perspective,” *Sociological Forum* 9 (1994): 635, <http://www.jstor.stable/685004>. The idea that the Swedish system is non-stigmatizing and inclusive is an idea presented in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, “Three Political Economies of the Welfare State,” *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 26 (1989), 26-28, [http://www.drk-fachhochschule.de/gfx/REDAKTION/Esping-Andersen\\_1990\\_Three\\_Worlds.pdf](http://www.drk-fachhochschule.de/gfx/REDAKTION/Esping-Andersen_1990_Three_Worlds.pdf).

<sup>38</sup> Esping-Andersen, 27.

<sup>39</sup> While readers may question the larger forces at work in the rest of Europe in the 1930s, it is important to note that Sandemose, a Danish/Norwegian, was a member of the resistance movement during WWII. In such, his Jante Law is not reflective of the ideology present in neighboring European countries. Rather, the Jante Law is merely an interpretation of the social code which pervades every aspect of Scandinavian life.

attack on the “communal desire to preserve social stability and uniformity.”<sup>40</sup> Despite the apparent austerity of these rules, they accurately reflect the core psychology of Scandinavian societies and the emphasis which is placed on humility, conformity and the “middle way.”

The significance of egalitarianism and conformity is deeply rooted in the Swedish identity, presenting challenges to the multicultural integration model. With a host society which is relentlessly striving to conform to the middle, multiculturalism presents itself as a visible deviation. Largely influenced by the tendency to conformity which pervades the Swedish national identity, multiculturalism – as the politics of accommodation and recognition – has become an exoticized policy whereby “foreign” cultures and religions are juxtaposed against the structure and order of Swedish society.

#### Jantelagen

1. Don't think that you are special.
2. Don't think that you are of the same standing as us.
3. Don't think that you are smarter.
4. Don't fancy yourself as being better than us.
5. Don't think that you know more than us.
6. Don't think that you are more important than us.
7. Don't think that you are good at anything.
8. Don't laugh at us.
9. Don't think that anyone cares about you.
10. Don't think that you can teach us anything.

Source - Eva Stenskär. “It's just so...Swedish: Jantelagen.” *Nordstjernen*. March 20, 2009.

### ***Roadmap and Methodology***

The concept of incorporation is rather complex, deeply embedded within larger theoretical debates on identity and tolerance. Because of this inherent complexity, any study of incorporation is limited by the impossibility of understanding the synergy of forces at work which influence the way that incorporation happens. Acknowledging this inherent limitation, this thesis is an interdisciplinary study of incorporation in Sweden.

Because any study of integration inevitably calls for an overview of immigration patterns, the first chapter of this thesis provides just that. In the first chapter I provide the historical context of immigration to Sweden, outlining how the shift in the patterns of immigration in the 1970s has increased the demand for a more active and comprehensive integration policy. In order to quantify the size and composition of immigration, I draw upon immigration statistics gathered from *Statistiska Centralbyrån* (Statistics Sweden). In addition, in order to qualify the governance of migration, I draw upon the key pieces of legislation and government programs which have framed immigration patterns.

In the second chapter I provide a comprehensive assessment of what I term the Swedish model of incorporation, a model of multiculturalism which is deeply entangled with the welfare state. By examining the origins, principles, and developments of integration policy in Sweden, I present a comprehensive overview of the integration process. My primary focus however, is to problematize the Swedish model and to assess its shortcomings. Drawing upon Christian Joppke's assertion that the EU is currently experiencing a very visible “retreat of multiculturalism,” I conduct a detailed policy analysis of key national legislations between 1975 and 2008 to illustrate that such a shift has recently been initiated in Sweden, as well. The documents analyzed are gathered from the electronic archives of *Regeringskansliet* and *Sveriges*

<sup>40</sup> Eva Stenskär, “It's just so...Swedish: Jantelagen,” *Nordstjernen*, March 20, 2009.

*Riksdag* (Government of Sweden and Parliament). Despite this visible shift away from multiculturalism in official policy, I reveal that this shift has been masked by public discourse and the rhetoric of symbolic declarations such as The Year of Multiculturalism (2006). Moreover, I illustrate that this vicissitude is a reaction to the shortcomings of former policies which have failed to address the persistent problems with structural discrimination, segregation, racism and xenophobia. Finally, I posit that these shortcomings are closely correlated to the scope of the welfare state which has played a role in stifling integration through the engineering of a social hierarchy dividing the host population from immigrants.

In the third chapter I examine the level of segregation in Sweden and how segregation represents the most pervasive impediment to immigrant incorporation in Sweden. In order to identify the ways in which segregation represents more than just a physical barrier to integration, I conduct an empirical study of how the press persistently represents Rosengård, Malmö, a particularly well-known “immigrant ghetto” in southern Sweden. To insure an accurate and balanced analysis, I present a comparative discourse analysis of the leading right and left-wing newspapers, *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Dagens Nyheter*, respectively. I argue that due to the level of segregation which inhibits information flows and social and cultural exchanges, the media plays a crucial role in supplying the public with information. Despite the discrepancies between the right and left-wing coverage of Rosengård, I argue that by persistently painting this housing district in a negative light both papers play a role in perpetuating stereotypes, stigmatization, and fostering traps of alienation.

The conclusion chapter reiterates the primary findings of this thesis while referring back to the larger scope of incorporation in the EU. Examining the potential for harmonization in the areas of immigration and integration, I conclude that the bureaucratic nature of the EU and the national sovereignty of member states will continue to hamper the progress of harmonization. Despite the infeasibility of a comprehensive agenda in the near future, I recommend that a greater balance must be achieved between the policy areas of immigration and integration. Meanwhile, I suggest that despite recent initiatives in the EU, the solution to the rising threats of insufficient integration cannot be restrictive immigration or a “fortress Europe.”<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> This term is frequently applied in immigration studies regarding the EU to symbolize the idea of Europe raising a wall around its external borders to protect itself from third-country nationals. In such, the term denotes the increasingly restrictive immigration controls at Europe’s external borders.

## Chapter One

### From Emigration to Immigration: redefining a nation

**September 11, 2003** – On the two year anniversary of the tragic attacks on the United States, the Swedish nation awoke to a devastating attack of their own. Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh, one of the most well-known political officials had been brutally stabbed to death while shopping in Nordiska Kompaniet in central Stockholm. A political icon and a global leader, Lindh had devoted her entire political career to fighting against “war, hunger, and oppression in the world.”<sup>42</sup> A strong advocate of accepting the Euro in the upcoming election, Lindh’s photo appeared on billboards across the nation on the morning of her death.<sup>43</sup>

As the news of her assassination unfolded, the nation was overcome by feelings of remorse and frustration. Lindh’s murder came as a brutal memory of the assassination of Olof Palme (1986), the leader of the Swedish Social Democratic Party.<sup>44</sup> In a relatively peaceful country, a country where political figures had previously felt no need for the Swedish Security Service, the news of Lindh’s murder served as a reminder for Swedes of a changing nation. For many, this tragedy symbolized a rather “dangerous failure of the system” to address the changing dynamics of the nation.<sup>45</sup> In a country where “people believe in the good and have a hard time to admit the evil and protect (themselves) from it” the assassination was seen as a threat to the “open society” which Sweden has tried hard to preserve through one of the most open and liberal asylum policies in the world.<sup>46</sup> Nearly two weeks after the attack, the police had finally detained a primary suspect. After a DNA test the son of two Serbian immigrants, Mijailo Mijailović, was tried and convicted of assassination. Despite possessing dual citizenship, much of the public reaction emphasized Mijailović’s Serbian background, speculating that Lindh’s assassination was in many ways a consequence of an open immigration policy which overlooked the growing demands of internal security.<sup>47</sup> For many, Lindh’s assassination was a reflection of a changing Swedish society and a tangible representation of the new threats which were beginning to reshape the nation.

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<sup>42</sup> Jonas Broman, “Attentat mot folksjälén,” *Läsarnas Dagens Nyheter*, September 11, 2003, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/läsarnas-dn=tor-119-1.458142>. “Anna Lindh var en drivande kraft i kampen mot krig, svält och förtryck i världen.” Translation mine.

<sup>43</sup> I was studying in Sweden at the time of her assassination and thus much of the descriptive information provided regarding the assassination and the public reaction is anecdotal.

<sup>44</sup> Broman. Olof Palme had been the first and only public figure to be assassinated in Sweden in the twentieth century. No one was ever convicted of his murder and thus the assassination remains a troublesome memory for many Swedes.

<sup>45</sup> Mikael Holmstrom, “Gyrmt Bevis pa en svensk systemfel,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, September 12, 2003, [http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel\\_108659.svd](http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel_108659.svd). “Mordet på utrikesminister Anna Lindh visar att Sverige har ett farligt systemfel i sitt nationella säkerhetstänkande.” Translation mine.

<sup>46</sup> Holmstrom. “I Sverige tror vi människor om gott och har svårt att erkänna ondskan och skydda oss mot den.” Translation mine.

<sup>47</sup> Anders Jonsson, “Den unika öppenheten går förlorad,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, September 12, 2003, [http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel\\_108661.svd](http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel_108661.svd).



### ***A Historical Perspective***

Unlike traditional immigrant countries in the EU, the majority of Swedish history can be defined by a high degree of isolation and homogeneity. With a single national minority – the Sami – traditionally, Swedish society has been united by a single language, religion, culture and ethnicity.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, with no colonial heritage and a remote geographic location, the level of relative isolation compared to other European nations is unique. While a number of European nations have traditionally relied on guest-worker programs and seasonal migrants to fulfill the demands of the labor market, Sweden has never relied on any formalized program.<sup>49</sup> In fact, Sweden has had a dominant history of emigration spanning from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1930s, a period by which approximately one million people or a fifth of the total population left in search of greater economic opportunities abroad.<sup>50</sup> It was not until the mid 1930s that the influx of immigration began to outnumber the outflows of emigration.<sup>51</sup>

Immigration to Sweden is thus a relatively new phenomenon. The transformation from a country of emigration to one of immigration in the 1930s was in many ways a result of the Second World War.<sup>52</sup> During the war, Sweden had harbored thousands of refugees from Finland, Denmark, Norway, and the Baltic states.<sup>53</sup> And in the aftermath of the war, Sweden's war-time neutrality resulted in a postwar industrial boom stimulated by the effort to help rebuild the war-torn nations across Europe.<sup>54</sup> This accelerated economic prosperity drew a number of labor migrants to Sweden, primarily from neighboring Scandinavian nations such as Finland.<sup>55</sup> In 1954 an agreement signed between the Nordic countries to establish a borderless labor market resulted in an influx of Nordic migrants, accounting for about 75 percent of all immigration during the subsequent years.<sup>56</sup> By the 1960s, the persistent demands of the labor market forced companies to look beyond the Nordic countries and begin actively recruiting labor from countries such as Yugoslavia and Greece.<sup>57</sup>

### ***Introduction of Regulated Immigration***

Despite the industrial boom of the postwar years, by the 1970s the global economic downturn had the effect of slowing economic migrations throughout Europe.<sup>58</sup> Following this European trend, Sweden began to curb labor migration in the late 1960s through the introduction

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<sup>48</sup> Hammar, "Sweden," 22.

<sup>49</sup> Charles Westin, "Sweden: Restrictive Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism," (Migration Information Source, 2006) 4, <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=406>.

<sup>50</sup> Thomas Hammar, "Sweden," 17.

<sup>51</sup> Westin, "Sweden," 2.

<sup>52</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sweden in 2000 – A Country of Migration Past, Present and Future* (Stockholm, Sweden: Bull's Printers Ltd., 2001), 14. See Appendix C for a graph depicting this transformation.

<sup>53</sup> Westin, "Sweden," 3.

<sup>54</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sweden in 2000*, 15.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>56</sup> The first part of this sentence comes from Hammar "Sweden," 18. The statistic is taken from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sweden in 2000*, 15.

<sup>57</sup> Westin, "Sweden," 4. Through an agreement between the trade unions and the Swedish government, all foreign workers were guaranteed equal wages and right as native workers.

<sup>58</sup> Westin, "Sweden," 5.

of a regulated immigration policy.<sup>59</sup> The new immigration policy which took effect in 1967 radically shifted the trajectory of future migrations. By requiring that work permits be granted prior to entry, it became sufficiently difficult to obtain entry for economic reasons.<sup>60</sup> In addition to requiring that migrants possess a formal letter of employment, work permits were only granted in industries where the demand for labor could not be met by the existing supply of unemployed nationals.<sup>61</sup> The introduction of this highly regulated immigration policy drew economic migration from non-Nordic countries to a sharp halt by the early 1970s.<sup>62</sup>

With the exception of the most recent initiatives to expand labor migrations in 2008, labor migration remained highly regulated throughout the following decades. In 1995 the strict border controls were lifted slightly upon Sweden becoming a member of the EU and by 1996 the nation had signed the Schengen agreement allowing for the free movement of persons, goods and capital across all member nations.<sup>63</sup> Despite the steady dismantling of internal barriers to transnational migration within the European Economic Area (EEA), these changes had relatively little impact.<sup>64</sup> Labor migrations continued to be nominal, hampered by the regulated policy outlined in the *Aliens Ordinance Act* of 1967 and revised in 1980, 1989, 1997 and most recently in the *Aliens Act* of 2005:

*A permanent residence permit may be granted to an alien who has been offered permanent employment in the country, if the alien has special qualifications and the need for labour cannot be satisfied by jobseekers in the country or by recruitment from another country in the European Economic Area (EEA) or Switzerland.*<sup>65</sup>

The effects of this clause have been twofold: while limiting the number of unskilled labor migrants entering Sweden, the restrictiveness of this policy has not coincided with an overall decline in immigration. Rather than slow migrations in general, the implementation of a regulated policy simply changed the composition of those seeking entry into Sweden. In fact, coinciding with the slow of economic migrations, since the 1970s immigration to Sweden has been largely compelled by the demand for humanitarian protection.

### ***A Commitment to Human Rights, International Law and the Protection of Those in Need***

In an effort to preserve the nation's venerable "tradition of international involvement and human rights," Sweden has taken a leading role in international efforts to safeguard the human rights of all those in need of protection.<sup>66</sup> In addition to the ratification of nearly forty international conventions on human rights, Sweden also played a fundamental part in the initial

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<sup>59</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sweden in 2000*, 16.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>61</sup> Migrationsverket, "History of Swedish Migration," (Norrköping, Sweden: Migrationsverket, n.d.), <http://www.migrationsverket.se/>.

<sup>62</sup> Westin, "Sweden," 5.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>65</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Aliens Act* (2005:716), (Stockholm, Sweden: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005), 13.

<sup>66</sup> Ollinen.

drafting of the 1951 Convention on Refugees (the Geneva Convention).<sup>67</sup> Moreover, the small Nordic nation has persistently been a leading donor to international institutions and efforts, being the fourth largest fiscal contributor to UNHCR in 2008 following countries such as the U.S. and Japan.<sup>68</sup> Thus, despite its relative size, Sweden has revealed a strong commitment to international cooperation and human rights, taking a leading role in the efforts to protect global refugees.

Despite the introduction of a regulated immigration policy in the late 1960s, Sweden has maintained one of the most open, liberal and tolerant asylum policies, accommodating a vast number of refugees and asylum seekers from around the world. The central objectives of the Swedish migration policy reveal the nation's strong commitment to safeguarding the right to asylum and abiding by international standards and the rule of law. Until the most recent changes to labor migration in December of 2008, the four principle aims of Swedish migration policy were:<sup>69</sup>

1. *Ensuring that migration to and from Sweden can take place in an orderly manner*
2. *Safeguarding the right to asylum*
3. *Maintaining regulated immigration*
4. *Ensuring that policy measures are characterized by the rule of law, humanity and respect for the human rights of the individual.*<sup>70</sup>

As outlined in these principles, the right to seek asylum is a fundamental objective of the Swedish migration policy. While safeguarding the right to asylum may not be unique to Sweden, the government has expanded the traditional interpretations of international definitions and criteria for humanitarian protection, offering additional channels through which to be granted protection. The groundwork of Sweden's asylum policy was established by the Geneva Convention of 1951 which formalized a collective definition for the term refugee.<sup>71</sup> According to this internationally recognized definition a refugee is a person who:

*(1) shall be outside the country of his nationality (2) and be unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (3) as a consequence of a well-founded fear of persecution (4) for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.*<sup>72</sup>

Having taken an affirmative role in the drafting of this definition, the term refugee has nevertheless been redefined in order to account for all those in need of protection. The *Aliens Act* of 1989 was the first to revisit this definition and by 2005 it had been amended to broaden the

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<sup>67</sup> The first part of this sentence is from the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, "Conventions Ratified by Sweden," The Swedish Government's Human Rights Website, [http://www.manskligarattigheter.se/extra/pod/?module\\_instance=2&action=pod\\_show&id=4](http://www.manskligarattigheter.se/extra/pod/?module_instance=2&action=pod_show&id=4). For a complete list of these conventions please refer to Appendix D. The second part of this sentence is based on an interview with Political Advisor Andreas Ollinen.

<sup>68</sup> Ollinen.

<sup>69</sup> The most recent revisions to these principle aims will be addressed in the last section of this chapter.

<sup>70</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sweden in 2000*, 34.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

parameters of entry on the basis of humanitarian protection.<sup>73</sup> The current definition of the term refugee as outlined in the *Aliens Act* of 2005 is as follows:

*An alien who is outside the country of the alien's nationality, because he or she feels a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of race, nationality, religious or political belief, or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or membership of a particular social group and is unable, or because of his or her fear is unwilling, to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.*<sup>74</sup>

In addition to broadening the formal interpretation of the term refugee to include gender and sexual persuasion, the *Aliens Act* of 2005 also established two additional channels through which to be granted protection: (1) "persons otherwise in need of protection," and (2) persons subjected to "particularly distressing circumstances." The former channel is broadly defined as:

*An alien who in cases other than those referred to in section 1 is outside the country of the alien's nationality, because he or she feels*

- 1. a well-founded fear of suffering the death penalty or being subjected to corporal punishment, torture or other inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment,*
- 2. needs protection because of external or internal armed conflict or, because of other severe conflicts in the country of origin, feels a well-founded fear of being subjected to serious abuses or*
- 3. is unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster.*<sup>75</sup>

Broadly expanding upon the former definition, this criterion provides a comprehensive legal framework through which to be offered protection. The inherent ambiguity of the latter channel, persons subjected to "particularly distressing circumstances," is almost certainly intended to accommodate any outstanding circumstances. The only guideline offered is that "particular attention shall be paid to the alien's state of health, his or her adaption to Sweden and his or her situation in the country of origin."<sup>76</sup>

Through a broad interpretation of the term refugee and the formalization of two additional avenues through which to seek protection, Sweden has surpassed international standards, providing extensive grounds for humanitarian protection to those who may otherwise not be eligible. While these modifications were in part motivated by the political necessity to "call things for what they really are" and appease public opinion, the efforts to broaden the interpretation of humanitarian protection illustrate Sweden's strong commitment to maintaining a humanitarian approach to immigration.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>74</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Aliens Act*, 9.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>77</sup> Ollinen.

### *Receiving Humanitarian Protection*

In addition to establishing a comprehensive legal framework, there are two avenues through which to receive protection under the categories established by the *Aliens Act* (2005): (1) the Refugee Quota and (2) seeking asylum.

#### *The Refugee Quota*

Since 1950, the Swedish Parliament has been responsible for distributing funds to the Migration Board on behalf of the Swedish Refugee Quota.<sup>78</sup> Through a partnership with the UNHCR, each year the government defines the size of the quota and particular target groups by which the Migration Board sponsors “selection missions” to international refugee camps around the world to seek out those with the greatest need of protection.<sup>79</sup> Through this active form of recruitment, this quota has allowed for the resettlement of between 1,700 and 1,900 refugees annually.<sup>80</sup>

#### *Seeking Asylum*

In addition to this active recruitment of international refugees, a number of aliens arrive each year to seek asylum in Sweden. This entrance channel is a bit more complex, involving more initiative on behalf of the individual asylum seeker. Upon arrival, each asylum seeker must submit an application to the Swedish Migration Board, the institution responsible for management of migration.<sup>81</sup> Each application is reviewed individually by an assigned caseworker who is responsible for determining whether or not the applicant falls under the criteria for protection as established by the *Aliens Act*.<sup>82</sup> The evaluation period is extensive, a process which takes an average 267 days.<sup>83</sup>

#### *Measures of the Welfare State*

Because of the extensive waiting period, the welfare state goes to great lengths to accommodate applicants awaiting decisions. For instance, applicants who arrive with minimal finances are able to receive proper accommodation, health care and daily allowances to support them during the evaluation process. During this time, applicants have the choice between “independent accommodation” with relatives or close friends or to receive proper accommodation allocated by the Migration Board.<sup>84</sup> Such accommodation generally consists of a

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<sup>78</sup> Telephone interview with case worker at the Swedish Migration Board, interview with author, trans. by author, March 25, 2009.

<sup>79</sup> Migrationsverket, “The Refugee Quota,” (Norrköping, Sweden: Migrationsverket, 2009), <http://www.migrationsverket.se/>.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Migrationsverket, “Asylum Rules in Sweden,” (Norrköping, Sweden: Migrationsverket, 2007), [http://www.migrationsverket.se/infomaterial/asyl/allmant/asylregler\\_en.pdf](http://www.migrationsverket.se/infomaterial/asyl/allmant/asylregler_en.pdf)Asylum.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Telephone interview with case worker at the Swedish Migration Board, interview with author, trans. by author, March 25, 2009.

<sup>84</sup> Migrationsverket, “Reception of Asylum Seekers in Sweden,” (Norrköping, Sweden: Migrationsverket, 2007), [http://www.migrationsverket.se/infomaterial/asyl/allmant/mottagandet\\_en.pdf](http://www.migrationsverket.se/infomaterial/asyl/allmant/mottagandet_en.pdf).

privately rented apartment within the municipality where the asylum seeker has applied.<sup>85</sup> In addition to providing accommodation during the evaluation period, all adult asylum seekers are provided with the option of receiving a free medical examination.<sup>86</sup> Should the asylum seeker be in need of any urgent medical or dental treatment there is a small fee of 50 SEK.<sup>87</sup> Children under the age of eighteen receive comprehensive medical and dental care without cost, an assurance that is identical to the care that all Swedish children receive.<sup>88</sup> Apart from accommodation and healthcare, asylum seekers are also eligible to receive a daily living allowance that is intended to cover daily expenses such as food, clothing and transportation.<sup>89</sup> For single adults this allowance is 71 SEK per day and for couples 61 SEK is allotted to each individual.<sup>90</sup> Likewise, children are entitled to between 37-50 SEK per day.<sup>91</sup> The Migration Board specifies that additional allowances may be made under special circumstances such as compensating the cost of winter clothes.<sup>92</sup>

Despite these great protections guaranteed by the welfare state during the evaluation period, the most extensive efforts have been placed on the reception program offered to refugees after a decision has been reached. The Migration Board is responsible for finding a municipality that is willing to accept additional refugees, a decision which may be influenced by the financial incentives provided to compensate municipalities.<sup>93</sup> Each municipality that accepts refugees receives 535,000 SEK the first year and an additional 178,000 per refugee accepted for a period of two years after which the “hope (is) that the refugee can support himself.”<sup>94</sup> Through an individualized process that involves collaborative work between a number of parties including the local authorities of the municipality, the Swedish Employment Service, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency and Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) instructor among others, this money is used to provide individual support during the first two years in Sweden.<sup>95</sup> The ultimate goal of the reception program is to provide “customized support in order to increase his or her opportunities to achieve a longer-term target, self-support and participation as part of a society.”<sup>96</sup>

### ***The New Face of Immigration***

Today, Sweden has been internationally recognized for providing a safe haven to asylum seekers and refugees from around the world. With a relatively liberal asylum policy and the extensive protections available through the welfare state – accommodation, healthcare, daily allowances and SFI courses – Sweden has become an attractive nation for those in need of

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. This fee is the equivalent of just over \$6.00 USD.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. Approximately \$8.00-9.00 USD.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. Approximately \$5.00-6.00 USD.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Telephone interview with case worker at the Swedish Migration Board, interview with author, trans. by author, March 25, 2009.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. \$66, 617 USD and \$22, 164 USD, respectively.

<sup>95</sup> Integrationsverket, “Targets for the Introduction of new Arrivals,” (Norrköping, Sweden: Integrationsverket, 2006), [http://www.lst.se/NR/rdonlyres/46C4AA98-B499-425-8C01-A01E54200ACA/91150/Malforintroduktionen\\_eng1.pdf](http://www.lst.se/NR/rdonlyres/46C4AA98-B499-425-8C01-A01E54200ACA/91150/Malforintroduktionen_eng1.pdf).

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

protection. The ample support during the initial period in Sweden helps to explain why Sweden has continuously received a relatively large share of asylum applicants in the EU.

Unlike former waves of immigration which were primarily motivated by economic means, the majority of contemporary migrations have consisted primarily of refugees and family members from regions such as Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.<sup>97</sup> Since the introduction of a regulated migration policy in the 1970s, the number of refugees and asylum seekers each year has remained relatively high. While the first non-European refugees were from Uganda in 1972, between 1973 and 1989 approximately 22,000 refugees had been granted asylum from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru.<sup>98</sup> In the 1970s and 80s, a large part of refugees from the Middle East sought asylum due to religious persecution and the instability during the Iran-Iraq War.<sup>99</sup> In the early 1990s, Sweden experienced a huge influx of asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia. In fact, the number of asylum seekers to Sweden peaked in 1992 with nearly 85,000 total asylum seekers, of which approximately 70,000 were from the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina).<sup>100</sup> While asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia represent the largest nationality of asylum seekers to Sweden over the past 20 years, the number of Iraqi asylum seekers has recently spiked in response to the war in Iraq.<sup>101</sup> In fact, in 2007 a total of 18,559 Iraqis sought refuge in Sweden, representing approximately 51% of the total asylum applicants to Sweden that year.<sup>102</sup> Following applications from Iraq, Somalia and Serbia comprised the second and third leading nationalities for asylum applicants in 2007, with 3,349 and 2,485 applications respectively.<sup>103</sup>

With the increasing demands for humanitarian protection, Sweden has seen a shift in the types of immigrants that are granted residence permits. Of a total of 83,536 residence permits granted in 2007, 18,414 were granted for humanitarian reasons and 28,975 were granted on the basis of family reunifications.<sup>104</sup> An additional 1,845 were allotted to quota refugees.<sup>105</sup> The sheer number of permits granted on behalf of humanitarian protection and family reunifications illustrates the significance of such migrations in recent years.

Although the level of diversity is consistent with the changing face of Europe, a number of European nations have responded to this increasing diversity with the implementation of restrictive immigration policies. While European nations have tightened border controls, Sweden has maintained its position on safeguarding the rights to asylum. Consequently, Sweden has not only received a greater number of applications for asylum, but the nation has also accepted a greater percentage of those applicants. In fact, in 2007 60 percent of all Iraqi asylum seekers in the EU sought asylum in Sweden of which 75 percent were granted resident permits.<sup>106</sup> Today,

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<sup>97</sup> Westin, "Sweden," 5.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>100</sup> Migrationsverket, "Asylum Seekers to Sweden during 1984-2006," (Norrköping, Sweden: Migrationsverket, n.d.), <http://www.migrationsverket.se/pdfiler/statistik/tabe2>.

<sup>101</sup> Migrationsverket, "Asylum Seekers to Sweden during 1984-2006."

<sup>102</sup> Statistiska Centralbyrån, "Asylum seekers in 2007 and 2006, by citizenship and sex," (Örebro, Sweden: SCB, 2008), [http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart\\_118098.aspx](http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart_118098.aspx).

<sup>103</sup> Statistiska Centralbyrån, "Asylum seekers in 2007 and 2006." See Appendix E.

<sup>104</sup> Migrationsverket, "Statistics on our Activities," (Norrköping, Sweden: Migrationsverket, 2008), <http://www.migrationsverket.se/>.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> Ollinen.

there are four Swedish municipalities that have received more Iraqi refugees than all of the United States combined.<sup>107</sup>

Despite increasingly restrictive policies throughout the European Union, the government has vowed to maintain its humanitarian approach to immigration and asylum asserting that:

*Sweden will operate a humane refugee policy and be a place of refuge for people fleeing from persecution and oppression. Sweden will also safeguard the possibility of seeking asylum and oppose the trends in Europe to close more borders. However, migration policy in Sweden and the world must be more than just an asylum policy.*<sup>108</sup>

The diversity of modern migrations is unparalleled and has challenged the traditional profile of Swedish society. Once an exceedingly homogenous society, Sweden has quickly become a multicultural society. Although in 1960 the foreign-born population was just 4.0%, by 2007 13.4% of the total population was born abroad.<sup>109</sup> In addition, a total of 17.3% of the total population in 2007 was of an immigrant background, distinguished by the fact that both parents were born abroad.<sup>110</sup> This degree of diversity has created great pluralism in society, presenting a number of new nationalities, cultures, languages and religions. From a country of emigration to a country of immigration, Swedish society has achieved great diversity in a relatively short period of time.<sup>111</sup>

### ***The Sustainability of Sweden's Migration Policy***

*When we talk about immigrants, I think most people think about refugees.*

Telephone interview with historian, interview with author,  
trans. by author, March 24, 2009.

In recent years, the sustainability of Sweden's migration policy has come into question. With the sheer volume of refugees being granted protection in Sweden each year, immigration to Sweden has been largely equated with asylum.<sup>112</sup> In addition, despite the extensive efforts of the welfare state, efforts to integrate immigrants have been costly and highly inefficient resulting in inadequate integration. The present situation with Iraqi refugees has had the most severe implications for the future sustainability of Sweden's migration policy. Through the persistent discrepancies between the number of refugees granted residence permits in various countries, many Swedes have begun to discuss the unequal "burden" which Sweden has taken. In an effort to maintain a humanitarian approach, politicians have begun to discuss the necessity of greater cooperation within the EU on the issue of asylum.

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Regeringskansliet, "Migration and Asylum Policy," (Stockholm, Sweden: Ministry of Justice, 2009), <http://www.sweden.gov.se/>.

<sup>109</sup> Statistiska Centralbyrån, "Summary of Population Statistics 1960-2007," (Örebro, Sweden: SCB, 2008), [http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart\\_26041.aspx](http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart_26041.aspx). See Appendix F for a complete breakdown of the ten largest foreign born populations in Sweden in 2008.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> See Appendix F.

<sup>112</sup> Ollinen.



*Sweden will take its share of the responsibility for the international protection of refugees, but if Sweden has to shoulder a disproportionate share of the responsibility for refugee situations around the world in relation to comparable countries, this will eventually raise questions about the sustainability of our asylum system. All EU Member states must share the responsibility for offering protection for refugees. This is why common rules for the countries in the EU are one of the government's main objectives in the area of migration.<sup>113</sup>*

Despite the recent push for harmonization on the EU level, there have been no political initiatives to tighten immigration regulations. Rather, the most recent changes to the migration policy in December 2008 have done just the opposite. Since last December the barriers to economic immigration have officially been dismantled making the Swedish “system one of the most open in the world.”<sup>114</sup> These two fundamental shifts are reflected in the revisions made to the principle objectives of migration policy.

1. *To safeguard the right to seek asylum in Sweden and internationally*
2. *To maintain regulated immigration*
3. *To introduce greater possibilities for labour immigration*
4. *To increase the harmonization of asylum and migration policy in the EU<sup>115</sup>*

Although the first two objectives remain intact, the latter two are fundamentally new. While defining a new direction for migration policy in the future, the correlation between these changes and the increasing difficulty to maintain former policies must be questioned.

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<sup>113</sup> Regeringskansliet, “Migration and Asylum Policy,” (Stockholm, Sweden: Ministry of Justice, 2009), <http://www.sweden.gov.se>.

<sup>114</sup> Ollinen.

<sup>115</sup> Regeringskansliet, “Migration and Asylum Policy.”

## Chapter Two

### The Swedish Model

Despite a long history of geographic isolation and collective homogeneity, over the past four decades Sweden has developed into a multicultural nation with a potpourri of languages, religions, cultures and people. The transformation from homogeneity to heterogeneity unfolded rather quickly, paralleling the diversity of the most recent waves of immigration. Unlike in other European nations, which were exposed to great ethnic and cultural diversity through their colonial empires or their existing national minorities, the degree of diversity in Sweden is a new phenomenon.<sup>116</sup> Directly correlated with the country's relatively open and liberal migration policies since the late 1960s, this new diversity has radically transformed the composition of Swedish society.

Unlike post-war labor migrants from neighboring European countries, the most recent waves of immigrants have been visually and culturally distant. In comparison to former waves which were primarily comprised of labor migrants from other Nordic or European nations, the majority of immigrants since the 1970s have come from regions of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and South America. In addition to perceptible differences in both physical features and cultural backgrounds, recent immigrants are also distinct in the fact that they have, for the most part, been compelled by the need for humanitarian protection as political refugees or asylum-seekers. Fleeing from oppressive regimes, political conflict and environmental disasters, they bring with them an array of experiences that are inconceivable to a population defined by a longstanding history of neutrality and stability.<sup>117</sup>

The increase in ethnic and cultural plurality has augmented the demand for a more formalized system of incorporation. Until the mid 1960s, integration in Sweden had been largely spontaneous, a process of passive assimilation into the labor market.<sup>118</sup> With a booming economy and an exceedingly high demand for labor, this process of passive assimilation supplemented by the social welfare system had been a sufficient means of incorporation in the post-war years.<sup>119</sup> By 1965, however, the government had discerned the growing need for a more active integration policy. Through a government funded handbook titled *New to Sweden*, a series of immigrant newsletters providing information on Swedish society and the establishment of free language courses, the government introduced the first active integration policy.<sup>120</sup> Despite these

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<sup>116</sup> Harold Runblom, "Multiculturalism in a Comparative European Perspective," *Sociological Forum* 9 (1994): 636, <http://www.jstor.stable/685004>. This statement may be contested by the fact that the Sami represent a native minority population. However, the lack of visibility of the Sami due to regional isolation has meant that no minority legislation was established until recently.

<sup>117</sup> Sweden is well known for its decision to maintain a neutral position during the World Wars. Due in part this neutrality, which allowed industries to flourish rather than to be exhausted, and also to the comprehensive welfare state which was created in the 1930s, Sweden has experienced great political and economic stability.

<sup>118</sup> Runblom, 624. Runblom notes the transition from an assimilationist process to a policy of multiculturalism, in what he terms a "model of Swedishization." By referring to this "model" as a process of passive assimilation, my intent is to highlight the responsibility put on immigrants themselves to integrate into the labor market. The idea that integration is a "two-way" process by which both immigrants and the state are responsible is a relatively modern concept. This concept has been standardized across the EU since The Hague Programme in 2004 which outlined this concept as one of the 11 Common Basic Principles.

<sup>119</sup> Thomas Hammar, "Sweden," *European Immigration Policy* (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 33.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

advancements, the economic downturn of the 1970s presented new challenges to the integration process. With an idle economy and the introduction of tightened labor controls in 1967, labor migrations slowed and were replaced by an influx of asylum-seekers and refugees seeking entry on humanitarian grounds.<sup>121</sup> Faced with a radically different composition of migrants and the challenge of addressing the heightened demands of incorporation, by 1974 the Swedish government abandoned its former assimilationist approach and adopted an active policy of multiculturalism (Prop 1974:28).

Immigrant incorporation in Sweden has been patchy at best. While the visible differences between many immigrant populations and the native Swedish population have presented a visual barrier to unity, the real impediments to incorporation lie much deeper than perceptible differences. Rather, the problems with incorporation are deeply correlated with the bureaucratic structure of the welfare state which has prolonged the process of integration, surpassing any protective efforts and actually stifling the process altogether. Exacerbated by the fact that immigration policy has been equated to asylum policy over the past four decades, integration has been overly focused on the concept of protection. Rather than taking an interest in each individual's skills and ambitions, policies appear to have been focused on the responsibility to protect the "unfortunate" and "oppressed" victims of global conflicts and disasters. The emphasis placed on this protective role of the state has engineered a power dynamic between the "privileged" host society and the victims of global conflicts. This constructed power dynamic, inflated by the role of the welfare state, has transgressed the traditional boundaries of humanitarian protection, leading to a great divide between the Swedish host society and its immigrants. Deeply entangled with subtle conceptions of Orientalism, the perceptible differences between the "foreigners" and the host society have further hampered the creation a multicultural state where all cultures are equally valued and respected. Rather, insufficient incorporation in Sweden has created a highly divided society with rather little equality.

In 2004, political scientist Christian Joppke published his rather contentious article, "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy." Just five years after scholar Will Kymlicka announced multiculturalism's victory over former liberal models of privatizing cultures and differences, Joppke's article announced an active "retreat" of multicultural policy in Australia, The Netherlands and Great Britain.<sup>122</sup> Clarifying that while in Canada and Australia multiculturalism was deeply embedded in longstanding history and national identity, multiculturalism in European nations has only recently been necessitated by immigration.<sup>123</sup> For this reason he argues that multiculturalism in European nations is "less nationally rooted than [in] their trans-oceanic precursors, and there is less nostalgia here about policies and labels that are now widely perceived as having run their course."<sup>124</sup> Joppke's article argues that the perceived dangers of multicultural politics highlighted by the 2005 bombings in London and the 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh in The Netherlands have led to an overhaul of multicultural practices and a shift towards obligatory civic integration.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Bryon J. Nordstrom, "The Contemporary Era," *The History of Sweden* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 142.

<sup>122</sup> Joppke, 237.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 247.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 247.

<sup>125</sup> In his article Joppke notes that obligatory civic integration may take the form of mandatory language courses, national civic tests, etc.

In his article, Joppke describes two factors that he claims induced this “retreat” in Europe. The first is the “inherent shortcomings and failures” of multicultural policies, particularly pertaining to the “socio-economic marginalization and self-segregation of migrants.”<sup>126</sup> The second is the “new assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing the liberal minimum on its dissenters.”<sup>127</sup> Through a detailed assessment of the shifts in policy in both The Netherlands and Great Britain, Joppke demonstrates that European integration policies, which had previously promoted a “two-way” process of integration, have begun to shift the burden of responsibility of integration to individual immigrants.<sup>128</sup> He reveals this shift of responsibility through an examination of how recent policy trends have emphasized economic independence, a good command of language and hard proof of the ability of immigrants to uphold the fundamental values of the societies they enter through obligatory civic integration measures. Joppke seems to draw connections between this shift in policy and former assimilationist policies, claiming that mandatory civic integration is “driven by the attempt to commit and bind newcomers to the particular society that is receiving them.”<sup>129</sup> While Joppke makes a very strong argument for the retreat of multiculturalism in The Netherlands and Great Britain, throughout his article he references Sweden only as an exception to these current trends in the European Union. My intent in the following pages is to show that Sweden is, in fact, no exception.

In the following chapter I provide an assessment of what I term the Swedish Model of incorporation, a model of multiculturalism deeply embedded in welfare. Although an overview of integration policies and programs is essential, my primary focus is to problematize this model and to assess its shortcomings. In doing so, I attempt to illustrate that, like The Netherlands and Great Britain, Sweden has very recently begun to see a shift away from multiculturalism in policy. I illustrate this shift through a detailed analysis of key integration policies since 1975. In addition, drawing upon this “retreat,” I attempt to demonstrate that multiculturalism posits a clear break from traditional narratives and identities. In fact, by juxtaposing national identities against the theoretical concepts and ultimate integration goals of multiculturalism, my aim is to reveal that the two may in fact be incompatible. Lastly, I elaborate upon the bureaucratic structure of the welfare state, which has not only stifled integration, but also unintentionally engineered a power dynamic between ethnic Swedes and “foreigners.”

### ***The Origins of Multiculturalism: a look at national policies of integration***

Since 1975, Sweden has practiced an active policy of multiculturalism. Viewed as the progressive alternative to assimilation, multiculturalism has in many ways been a utopian ideal, an attempt to foster a “situation of peaceful coexistence between individuals or groups of diverse origins.”<sup>130</sup> In addition to a comprehensive reception process offered to those who have been granted resident permits on the grounds of humanitarian protection, a number of policies have been promoted as a means to recognize and actively support cultural rights and the equality of all people and cultures. Such policies include the official recognition and support for religious and cultural associations, the promotion of immigrant journals and media, the political right to vote in local elections, the promotion of naturalization, and official support for a policy of

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 244.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 244.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 248.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 253.

<sup>130</sup> Runblom, 624

bilingualism in public schools.<sup>131</sup> Although certain policies are more progressive than others, what is uniform is the amount of financial support the government has invested in programs that encourage immigrants to maintain their cultural customs, values, and languages. Despite the amount of positive recognition and praise that these policies have received, they continually fall short in practice. Before examining the failures of integration, I first provide a comprehensive overview of the integration process in Sweden, commenting on its origins, goals and programs. I follow with an examination of the extent to which these policies fall short of that which they set out to do, ultimately problematizing incorporation and revealing its limitations as evidenced by a high degree of structural discrimination and segregation.

The first active integration policy in Sweden was initiated in 1968 (Rskr 1968:405). With only minor attempts to facilitate integration through a handbook, immigrant newsletters, and language courses, the integration policy was by no means extensive. The purpose of these initiatives was to foster knowledge of Swedish society: its culture, values and language. Thus newsletters were distributed in a number of “common” immigrant languages as well as ones which were written in “easy Swedish” to address those languages that were not explicitly accommodated.<sup>132</sup> The ultimate goal of this first integration policy was to establish a society where “immigrants should have the possibility to live at the same standard level as the host population.”<sup>133</sup> While this policy recognized the importance of preserving immigrants’ cultural traditions, values, and languages, the “initiative to maintain traditions” was seen as a private responsibility.<sup>134</sup> In fact, it should be noted that such state intervention was discouraged for its potential to “generate isolated national groups.”<sup>135</sup> Rather, the general opinion was that it would be “best if immigrants who had no intention of returning to their homeland assimilated as soon as possible.”<sup>136</sup> Thus, despite recognizing the importance of preserving immigrant cultures and languages, the overarching message of this policy was one of assimilation.<sup>137</sup>

By the mid 1970s, policies of assimilation had been denounced and the politics of integration were radically reformed.<sup>138</sup> Breaking from an assimilationist history, three long-term objectives of integration – *jämlikhet*, *valfrihet*, *samverkan* – were outlined in a government bill on integration (SOU 1974:69). Directly translated as equality, freedom of choice and partnership, these central objectives of integration laid the foundation for an active policy of multiculturalism.<sup>139</sup> That is, through these central principles the government paved the way for an integration process that “officially allows, and even invites and expects, cultural diversity.”<sup>140</sup> Equality is the first principle referenced. This principle is rooted in the political notion of equality and a long-term effort to generate a state of egalitarianism. The second principle is freedom of choice. Transcending the traditional conceptions of liberty, the intent of the second

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 631.

<sup>132</sup> Department of the Interior, *Sweden, future and diversity – from immigration to integration* (Prop 1997/98:16), (Stockholm: Government of Sweden, 1997), 35.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 15. “Invandrare skall ha möjlighet att leva på samma standardnivå som den inhemska befolkningen.”

Translation mine.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. Citing (Rskr 1968:405).

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. “Det var bäst om de som invandrade och inte tänkt återvända till hemlandet, assimilerades så snart som möjligt.” Translation mine.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 15

<sup>140</sup> Runblom, “Sweden,” 624.

principle is to actively “assure members of ethnic and linguistic minorities domiciled in Sweden a genuine choice between retaining and developing their cultural identity and assuming a Swedish cultural identity.”<sup>141</sup> The third principle, partnership, refers to the benefits immigrants and the native population can realize through mutual cooperation.<sup>142</sup> It is the second of these principles, freedom of choice, which is the most fundamental to the policy of multiculturalism. By guaranteeing individuals a choice to maintain their cultural identities, the state officially declared a political end to assimilation. While scholars have noted the striking similarities between these three principles and the revolutionary French principles of *liberté, égalité et fraternité*, the integration policies that have evolved from these grounding principles have taken very different paths.<sup>143</sup> In contrast to France, which has tried to establish a form of political equality in the public sphere through the privatization of differences, Swedish integration policies since the 1970s have actively promoted the public recognition and accommodation of differences, “not only letting them survive, but acknowledging their worth.”<sup>144</sup>

Since the formalization of these integration goals, a number of new programs have emerged to facilitate political representation, promote diversity and recognize the equal worth of all languages, cultures and religions. In 1975, third country nationals were granted the right to vote in local elections, a measure viewed by many as a means to increase the political representation of immigrant populations and afford them “access to the advantages of the welfare state, while simultaneously safeguarding their right to autonomous cultural development”<sup>145</sup> (SOU 1974:69). By 1986, a system of financial support for immigrant associations had been established (Rskr 1985/86:307).<sup>146</sup> Viewing this measure as a necessity in a “society with ethnic and cultural pluralism,” this measure promulgated the development of a number of cultural associations and “meeting places” for immigrants.<sup>147</sup> Similarly, by 1989 the recognition that religion can play a role in cultural identities led to the decision to financially support additional religious associations other than the Swedish Church (SOU 1989:271).<sup>148</sup> As of 2006, six official Mosques and a number of other religious associations had been publically funded.<sup>149</sup>

Because Sweden recognizes the importance of citizenship in fostering a national identity and political loyalty, the process of acquiring Swedish citizenship by naturalization is relatively easy.<sup>150</sup> Although the importance of citizenship has lessened over the past few decades due to the fact that third country nationals are guaranteed nearly the same rights as citizens, citizenship has nonetheless been viewed as an important step in the integration process.<sup>151</sup> Swedish citizenship is based on the principle of *Jus Sanguinis* and thus is defined by blood lineage as

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<sup>141</sup> Hammar, “Sweden,” 33.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>144</sup> Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 64.

<sup>145</sup> Aleksandra Ålund and Carl-Ulrik Schierup, *Paradoxes of Multiculturalism*, (Great Britain: Billing & Sons Ltd., 1991), 3.

<sup>146</sup> Department of the Interior, 38.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 38. “I ett samhälle med etnisk och kulturell mångfald...” Translation mine.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>149</sup> Göran Larsson “Muslims in the EU: Cities Report,” (Open Society Institute: EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program, 2007), 15.

<sup>150</sup> Department of the Interior, 43.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 43. There are a few rights/duties which third-country nationals are excluded from including voting in national elections, employment in departments of national security and the duty to serve two years in the Swedish military.

opposed to *Jus Soli* or territorially defined citizenship. Therefore, any child born to a Swedish parent will automatically receive Swedish citizenship, regardless of whether the mother or father is the individual holding Swedish citizenship. The process of acquisition by naturalization is outlined in the Swedish Citizenship Act which states that a person of legal age (18 years) may apply for naturalization if he or she has resided in Sweden for a period of five years and “has led and can be expected to lead a respectable life.”<sup>152</sup> For stateless persons or refugees, the time period is only four years.<sup>153</sup>

Despite the relative ease of acquiring Swedish citizenship, dual citizenship agreements were not established until 2001. With an instrumental view of citizenship, those in opposition to dual citizenship believed citizenship to be a necessary condition for integration.<sup>154</sup> That is, the process of giving up another citizenship in order to become Swedish was seen as a formal affirmation of Swedish identity. On the other hand, those in favor of dual citizenship often referred to the fact that in a highly globalized world, people can and do have multiple identities, and these identities must be accommodated.<sup>155</sup> This “transnational” perspective of citizenship was addressed by the Swedish Minister of Integration Ulrica Messing in 2000 when she declared that dual citizenship allowances were in agreement with Sweden’s integration policies of ethnic and cultural pluralism and that such allowances are not only instrumental, but might even “necessitate a broader understanding of what it meant to be ‘Swedish’.”<sup>156</sup> Following suit with a policy which had been promoted in the European Union as early as the 1970s, dual citizenship was officially accepted in 2001.

Of a number of multicultural integration policies and programs, one of the more noteworthy is the educational policy of bilingualism adopted in 1977 (SOU 1977/78).<sup>157</sup> Under the belief that a child’s native language is “the key to cultural heritage,” official support for bilingualism has been viewed as a political necessity in a plural society.<sup>158</sup> The program is optional, intended to supplement general Swedish courses and contribute to a sufficient command of both the native language and Swedish.<sup>159</sup> The only requirement is that at least one parent speaks a language other than Swedish on a daily basis in the household.<sup>160</sup> Despite this seemingly extensive reach, the program has been limited by the lack of qualified teachers. In fact, in an article published by *The Local*, an English newspaper in Sweden, journalist David Landes reported that over half of Swedish municipalities did not offer mother-tongue instruction due to the difficulty of recruiting qualified teachers.<sup>161</sup> The extent to which this official program

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<sup>152</sup> Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications, *The Swedish Citizenship Act* (Stockholm: Government of Sweden, 2001), section 11, no. 4, 5. A respectable life refers to a person free of any criminal background. If a person does have a criminal background, he/she can still be eligible for citizenship, although the period of time during which he/she must reside in Sweden is prolonged.

<sup>153</sup> Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications, section 11, no. 4.

<sup>154</sup> Per Gustafson, “International Migration and National Belonging in the Swedish Debate on Dual Citizenship,” *Acta Sociologica* 48 (2005), 11.

<sup>155</sup> Hammar, “Dual citizenship,” 447.

<sup>156</sup> Gustafson, 15.

<sup>157</sup> Department of the Interior, 60.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 60. “Nyckel till det kulturella arvet...” Translation mine.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>161</sup> David Landes, “Councils Fail in Duty to Provide Mother-tongue Instruction,” *The Local*, February 25, 2008, <http://www.thelocal.se/10090/20080225/>. These findings are based on a survey conducted by Swedish Radio that surveyed 250 of 290 municipalities in Sweden.

is available is highly problematic; nevertheless, the very existence of this program does reveal a high degree of official advocacy for a multicultural integration policy.

Despite the number of policies that emerged between the mid 1970s and 1980s, by 1996 the government had again recognized the need for a more formalized integration policy. In a government bill titled *Sweden, the future and diversity – from immigration policy to integration policy* (Prop 1997/98:16), the government recognized the shortsighted nature of its former policies. Rather than viewing immigration as a long process that includes not only entry and reception, but also an extensive process of integration, the title of this government document targets the deficit of policy aimed at the latter.<sup>162</sup> This bill was an attempt to fill this void by emphasizing the need for a strong integration policy based on a combination of long-term goals and a formalized integration process.<sup>163</sup> In an attempt to shift the balance of policy and give more weight to integration, this bill laid out a new starting point for integration and defined three long-term goals for the process.

By defining the starting point of integration policy as the existing level of society's ethnic and cultural diversity, this bill was a direct manifestation of multiculturalism in policy.<sup>164</sup> By recognizing the existing diversity in society, it would be possible to ensure that the high level of diversity is "reflected in both how [integration] policy is formulated and how it is implemented."<sup>165</sup> In addition to redefining the starting point of policies, the government also highlighted the importance of recognizing the level of individual diversity, limiting policy that tended to target immigrants as a homogenous group with identical needs.<sup>166</sup> With these two grounding principles in place, three ultimate integration goals were outlined as follows:

- *Equal rights and opportunities for all, regardless of ethnic and cultural background,*
- *A community based on diversity and*
- *A society characterized by mutual respect and tolerance, in which everyone can take an active and responsible part, irrespective of background.*<sup>167</sup>

Although all three goals seem to follow from one another, it is important to highlight the differences between the three. In referring to equal rights and opportunities, the first goal directly targets government actions, policies and legislation. This goal calls for a comprehensive legal framework of equality. In contrast, the second goal is more pragmatic. Although the degree of diversity in Sweden by 1996 was already prevalent and perhaps even irreversible, this second goal seems to advocate that continued diversity is favored over any form of assimilation. Finally,

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<sup>162</sup> *Sverige, framtiden och mångfalden – från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik* (Prop 1997/98:16). Translation mine.

<sup>163</sup> Department of the Interior, 22.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 22. "Mångfalden måste återspeglas både i hur politiken formuleras och hur den genomförs." Translation mine.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 21. "(1) Lika rättigheter och möjligheter för alla oavsett etnisk och kulturell bakgrund (2) en samhällsgemenskap med samhällets mångfald som grund, samt (3) en samhällsutveckling som kännetecknas av ömsesidig respekt och tolerans och som alla oavsett bakgrund skall vara delaktiga i och medansvariga för." Translation mine.



the third integration goal targets society, calling for tolerance of diversity and mutual respect of all individuals, cultures and religions.

While the main purpose of this bill was to shift the direction of policy, the rhetoric of the bill seems to reflect an awareness and advocacy of multiculturalism. Yet perhaps at odds with the rhetoric applied is a brief section devoted to the debates over multiculturalism. In this section, the establishment of the “freedom of choice” principle in 1975 is said to have formulated certain expectations for a set of policy prescriptions that have been highly debated.<sup>168</sup> In addition to the lack of consensus regarding the limits of multiculturalism, the discussion notes that the inherent ambiguity of the term has led to its use in a number of different contexts. On the one hand, multiculturalism has been used by many scholars as a descriptive term, pertaining to the pluralism of ethnicities, cultures and religions present in society.<sup>169</sup> On the other hand, multiculturalism often entails a normative meaning, implying a number of policy proscriptions which recognize and accommodate for society’s diversity. In what appears to be an attempt to escape the debate, the government decided to give up the term altogether. That is, rather than defining the term, “multiculturalism” was simply replaced with the term “diversity”. While this change in discourse marks a clear attempt to safeguard the government from expectations and resulting criticism, it did not translate into any immediate changes in integration policy. It does, however, mark a growing tension in integration politics over the extent to which multiculturalism would be upheld and reflected in national policies.

### ***The Present “retreat of multiculturalism”***

In 2006 the Swedish Parliament experienced a political shift of power from the Social Democrats, which had held a majority for twelve consecutive years, to the Moderate Party. Within two years of this victory, a new integration agenda had been defined. Emphasizing the failures of former policies, the bill called a reformulation of integration policy and goals a necessity. In much the same manner that Christian Joppke had traced the “retreat of multiculturalism” in The Netherlands and Great Britain, the new policy appeared to declare the inherent shortcomings of former policies while affirming the need for an increased responsibility on the individual to learn Swedish and find employment. Although obligatory civic tests have not yet been established, the new integration agenda does appear to synchronize with this existing trend in Europe away from multicultural policies.

Sweden’s shift away from multicultural integration policy is visible in a government bill promoted by the newly elected Minister of Integration and Gender Equality, Nyamko Sabuni. Titled *Empowerment against exclusion – the Government’s strategy for integration* (2008/09:24), this bill overhauled the old process of integration and mainstreamed what used to be the Swedish Model of multiculturalism and welfare.<sup>170</sup> The bill begins with a discussion of the “embarrassing results” and inherent shortcomings of former integration policies.<sup>171</sup> The focus of this discussion is the failure of former policies to integrate newly arrived immigrants into the labor market. The bill describes the extended period of time it takes refugees to find

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<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 18

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>170</sup> *Egenmakt mot Utanförskap – regeringens strategi för integration* (Skr 2008/09:24). Translation Mine.

<sup>171</sup> Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, *Empowerment against Exclusion – the Government’s strategy for Integration* (Skr. 2008/09:24), (Stockholm: Government of Sweden, 2008), 5.

employment, noting that on average this period is seven to eight years.<sup>172</sup> In addition, it notes the persistent discrepancies in the unemployment rate between native Swedes and foreign-born individuals; the unemployment rate for foreign-born residents is more than twice that of native Swedes (11.4% for foreign-born men and 12.4% for foreign-born women).<sup>173</sup> In an attempt to address these shocking statistics, the bill overhauls former integration goals and replaces them with a single overarching objective: “equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all regardless of ethnic and cultural background.”<sup>174</sup> Through this ultimate objective, it becomes evident that a new emphasis has been placed on the idea of responsibility, a concept that was missing from former policy.

The advocacy of individual responsibility is evident not only in this objective, but also in the way that access to the labor market is viewed as the ultimate goal of integration. This primary focus of integration policy is highlighted by the following passage:

*The primary direction lies in actions which aim at increasing the supply and demand for labor at the same time as it makes the matching process between available labor and the market's demand more efficient.*<sup>175</sup>

Although access to the labor market is a crucial element of the integration process, the bulk of the responsibility of integrating into the labor market is placed on immigrants themselves. This shift in responsibility is clearly asserted in a press release written by the Migration Minister Tobias Billstöm:

*We must readily reveal the demands that we place on people who want to live here in Sweden. Accept and be accepted. That is a more reasonable principle for new arrivals than infeasible lies of being supported by those who already live here.*<sup>176</sup>

In this passage Billstöm readily reveals the new shift of responsibility, while emphasizing that if immigrants accept the Swedish way, they will be accepted by society. In addition, he blames the previous lack of emphasis on this individual responsibility to the government's fear of being labeled as xenophobic, claiming:

*The fear of being misunderstood or of being targeted as a xenophobe has made us in politics neglect to give a realistic picture of what demands are required for those who want to live in Sweden.*<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 33. “Lika rättigheter, skldigheter och möligheter för alla oavsett etnisk och kulturell bakgrund.” Translation mine.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 6. “Huvudinriktningen ligger på insatser some syftar till att öka utbudet och efterfrågan på arbetskraft samt att förbättra matchningen mellan tillgänglig arbetskraft och arbetsmarknadens behov.” Translation mine.

<sup>176</sup> Tobias Billström, Ulf Kristersson and Elisabeth Svantesson, “Ställ Tydligare Krav på våra invandrare,” *Regeringskansliet Press Release* August 26, 2008. “Vi måste tydligare klargöra de krav vi ställer på människor som vill leva här i Sverige. Acceptera och bli accepterad. Det är en mer rimlig princip för nykomlingar än ohållbara löften om att bli försörjd av dem som redan bor här.” Translation mine.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid. “Oron för att missförstås eller utpekas som främlingsfientlig gör att vi i praktiken helt avstår från att ge en realistisk bild av vilka krav som gäller för dem som vill leva ett bra liv i Sverige.” Translation mine.

The concept of an increased individual responsibility is also evident in a new proposal initiated during the same time titled *SFI-bonus- an experimentation to stimulate newly arrived immigrants to learn Swedish quicker* (Prop 2008/09:156).<sup>178</sup> Emphasizing the importance of language competence, the focus of this bill is the individual's responsibility to learn Swedish. The bill introduces two new concepts to the existing Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) program: (1) a bonus system to award those who excel in the program and (2) mandatory language tests. Much like the bill previously discussed, this proposal begins by introducing the failures of the program, noting that a more efficient program may "contribute to a quicker learning of Swedish and thereby contribute to enhanced opportunities to find a job."<sup>179</sup> In order to make this program more efficient, a system of bonuses was introduced to increase incentives to successfully complete the program. Such incentives are addressed in the proposal, which notes:

*An SFI-bonus is meant to stimulate the individual to learn Swedish at as high a level as possible so as to find employment and become an active member in the community.*<sup>180</sup>

In addition, obligatory national tests were proposed to begin in the summer of 2009 as a means to measure success in the SFI programs.<sup>181</sup> These changes to the SFI program will cost the state an enormous amount of money. In fact, the bonus structure proposed consists of 12,000 SEK for those who successfully complete the program.<sup>182</sup> However, while investments are being made to promote knowledge and competency of the Swedish language, the continued support for mother-tongue instruction courses seems to be dwindling. In fact, although commenting on the government's continued support for such courses, the government has proposed a program of distance learning to compensate for the shortage of qualified teachers.<sup>183</sup> Thus, rather than investing more money into this program, which would reveal its continued support, the government seems to recognize the possibility that mother-tongue instruction courses may no longer be offered in public schools in the near future. Through this proposal the government has very distinctly put a value on each of these programs, judging the SFI courses to be of top priority.

The extent to which multiculturalism is supported in Sweden today is ambiguous. While in 1975, the groundwork seemed to have been laid for the development of a multicultural incorporation model, since the 1990s multiculturalism has been steadily displaced from policy discussions. The 1996 decision to change the political discourse from "multiculturalism" to

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<sup>178</sup> *SFI-bonus- försöksverksamhet för att stimulera nyanlända invandrare att snabbare lära sig svenska* (Prop 2008/09:156). Translation mine.

<sup>179</sup> Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, *SFI Bonus - an experimentation to stimulate newly arrived immigrants to learn Swedish quicker* (Prop. 2008/09:156), (Stockholm: Government of Sweden, 2008), 1. "(Den föreslagna lagen) kan bidra till att de snabbare lär sig svenska och därmed förbättrar sina möjligheter att få ett arbete." Translation mine.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.* "En SFI-bonus är således att den ska stimulera den enkilde att lära sig svenska på så hög nivå som möjligt för att kunna skaffa sig ett arbete och delta i samhällslivet." Translation mine.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>182</sup> Email Correspondence with SFI instructor, interview with author, trans. by author, March 31, 2009. At present, approximately \$1,500 USD.

<sup>183</sup> Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, *Empowerment against Exclusion – the Government's strategy for Integration* (Skr. 2008/09:24), (Stockholm: Government of Sweden, 2008), 50.

“diversity” was the first sign of this retreat, but it did not lead to any radical changes of the incorporation model. However, by 2008 a new overarching goal clearly put more emphasis on the individual’s responsibilities, particularly to become self-supportive and to learn Swedish, than former policies had done. With only one page devoted to describing the increased diversity in Sweden, the emphasis of integration policy has shifted away from the benefits that diversity can bring, focusing instead on the importance of assimilation. Although years from now, scholars may look back and see how such policy has had transformative effects, it is far too soon to begin evaluating these changes. Rather, my intent is simply to illustrate how these policy changes do reflect a rather visible transition away from a model of multiculturalism.

### *Masking the Retreat with Rhetoric*

Around the same time as this very decisive shift in integration policy, the Swedish government officially declared 2006 to be the Year of Multiculturalism. Although the official website established for this symbolic year has since been removed, the main purpose of the declaration was described in an article published by *Dagens Nyheter* as creating an initiative to “increase everyone's opportunities to participate in cultural life and to have publicly funded cultural institutions to better reflect the diversity of Sweden.”<sup>184</sup> One way in which the government intended to do so was to publically fund institutions and organizations that promoted this message.<sup>185</sup> In addition to outlining the programs purpose, the article also elucidates some stark criticism that was formulated even before the program’s inception. One such criticism came from actress Basia Frydman:

*One year? Do we think that it has done its duty then? Suddenly it is immigrants who are at the forefront and we should be sweet, but after that? I might be impatient, but I went to stage school 33 years ago. Then I was alone in looking like I do. Now we have some ‘blattar’ here and some ‘blattar’ there when it is needed.*<sup>186</sup>

Born in Poland, Ms. Frydman had seemingly no hesitation in voicing her frustration with the persistent lack of diversity in the theatre industry and the fact that one symbolic year would have no long term impact on diversity within the industry.

In a telephone interview with Miguel Benito, Director of the Immigrant Institute in Borås, Sweden, he informed me that the allocation of funding was also quite controversial. While the Immigrant Institute is one of Sweden’s only NGOs, featuring an extensive library of immigrant books, journals and media clips, Mr. Benito told me that the institute received

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<sup>184</sup> Lena Kalmteg, “Critical Voices raised against the Year of Multiculturalism,” *Dagens Nyheter*, June 10, 2005, <http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/kritiska-roster-hojs-mot-mangkulturaret-1.677814>. “Syftet med året är att öka allas möjligheter att delta i kulturlivet och att få offentligt finansierade kulturinstitutioner att bättre spegla Sveriges mångfald.” Translation mine.

<sup>185</sup> Kalmteg.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid. “Ett år? Tycker man att man har gjort sin plikt sedan? Plötsligt är det invandrare som gäller och då ska vi vara gulliga, men sedan då? Jag är kanske otålig. Men jag gick ut scenskolan för 33 år sedan. Då var jag ensam om att se ut som jag gör. Nu har vi några blattar här och några blattar där när de behövs.” Translation mine. ‘Blattar’ is a derogatory term used to denote a person who is not of Nordic decent.

absolutely no federal funding throughout the entire year.<sup>187</sup> Rather than being used to support immigrant organizations, he insisted that funding was allocated to Swedish-run organizations that promoted multiculturalism.<sup>188</sup> Noting the difference between “fancy words in politics” and the reality of the situation, he commented, “Sweden is not multicultural. That is not the reality for us.”<sup>189</sup> He continued to describe a “passive racism” which he found to be rather common among native Swedes, attributing it to overall lack of knowledge of immigrant languages, cultures and religions and a general fear of this unknown.<sup>190</sup> He also made a point to distinguish between those who “count as immigrants,” claiming that “if you pretend to be like Swedes, then you are no [longer] an immigrant, but if you are not integrated you are.”<sup>191</sup> His comments rang loudly against a backdrop of empty statements in official policy. Thus, despite this public declaration of multiculturalism, the Year of Multiculturalism seemed only to mask the actual “retreat of multiculturalism.”

### ***The Failures of Integration***

What is strikingly odd is the amount of international recognition that Swedish integration policies receive. Because of the discrepancies between integration policies and programs across the European Union, it is difficult to compare entire models of incorporation. Nonetheless, the process of benchmarking has been promoted by the European Union as a measure to compare national policies and measure their relative success. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is one such benchmarking tool that is endorsed by the European Union. Assessing the policies of six separate integration categories in 28 European nations, Sweden received the highest score in the integration index.<sup>192</sup> In fact, the index has called four of these six areas “best practice,” giving Sweden’s policies a perfect score.<sup>193</sup>

Although Sweden does have a comprehensive integration policy that accounts for the multidimensional nature of integration, by giving Sweden a perfect score in four of six categories, MIPEX appears to have missed the larger picture. By overlooking the very real indicators of insufficient incorporation, such measures are not only inadequate, but they also present a false picture. One of the categories which MIPEX notes as “best practice” in Sweden is labor market access. Vis-à-vis the structural discrimination that pervades the labor market, this measure does not depict the true nature of the situation. That is, with the persistent discrepancies in the unemployment rate between foreign-born residents and native Swedes and the fact that it takes on average seven to eight years to find a job for refugees in Sweden it seems only logical to presume that these “best practice” policies may have fallen short in practice.

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<sup>187</sup> Miguel Benito (Director of Immigrant Institute) in a telephone interview with author, trans. by author, March 27, 2009.

<sup>188</sup> Benito.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid. “Sverige är inte mångkulturell. Det är inte verkligheten för oss.” Translation mine.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid

<sup>191</sup> Ibid. “Om du låtsas vara svensk då du inte en invandrare, men om du inte är integrerade så är du.” Translation mine.

<sup>192</sup> Migrant Integration Policy Index: Europe’s Integration Policies at Your Fingertips.

<http://www.integrationindex.eu/>. Using over 140 policy indicators, the policy areas measured are: (1) Labour market access (2) Family reunion (3) Long-term residence (4) Political participation (5) Access to nationality and (6) Anti-discrimination.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

Thus, despite international acclaim, a look at the situation in Sweden reveals a very different picture. Rather than upholding the picture of multiculturalism and tolerance that is painted for the world, increasing diversity in Sweden has been met with persistent problems of incorporation. The most obvious case for insufficient incorporation can be made by examining the high level of segregation that pervades every aspect of Swedish life. Ethnically segregated housing has been a huge problem in Sweden, producing regions that are commonly known to be immigrant neighborhoods. The term “ghettoization” is commonly tossed around to describe the phenomenon of immigrant ghettos in the outskirts of major cities. Housed in large concrete structures, these apartment structures were formerly home to working class Swedes who enjoyed the benefits of government subsidized housing. Similar to the American phenomenon of “white flight,” working-class Swedes began to desert these neighborhoods as immigrants began to move in, creating large neighborhoods where upwards of 75 percent of residents are of non-European origin.<sup>194</sup> This process has generated two distinct types of neighborhoods: one of Svenssons, Andersons, and Petersons, and the other of immigrants. In a telephone interview with a student at the University of Kalmar, the effects of housing segregation were commented on:

*In Stockholm, the part of Bromma where I went to school is extremely isolated. My classmates had never spoken with an immigrant in their entire lives. If there was someone dark-skinned then he was adopted. Not a single immigrant lives there. Those who live there should get out to Rinkeby and Akalla to get a reality check.*<sup>195</sup>

Although this comment may appear shocking due to the fact that today one in eight people in Sweden is born abroad, it becomes even more distressing when the geographic proximity of these locations is noted. Bromma, a district in west Stockholm, is located only 8.9 kilometers or less than fifteen minutes by car from Rinkeby and about twenty minutes away from Akalla, two of the more densely populated immigrant districts in Stockholm. Furthermore, Stockholm is the capital city, where (as in most other capital cities) the majority of diversity can be found. The picture that this comment paints is not one of incorporation and integration, but rather one of segregation.

The level of segregation in Sweden plays a large role in hampering integration. The society that has emerged is sharply divided. As a result of this division, a number of stereotypes have emerged depicting immigrant criminality, disrespect for human rights, and economic dependence on the welfare state. This lack of knowledge about one another has bred great uncertainties, fear and at times open hostility towards immigrants who have often become the scapegoats of many of society’s problems.

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<sup>194</sup> Charles Westin, “The Effectiveness of Settlement and Integration Policies towards Immigrants and their Decedents in Sweden,” *International Migration Papers*, (Geneva: Migration Branch International Labor Office, 2000), 38.

<sup>195</sup> Telephone interview with Lund university student, interview with author, trans. by author, March 26, 2009. “I stockholm så är den delen i Bromma där jag gick i skola otroligt isolerad. Min klasskamrater hade aldrig pratat med en invandrare i hela sitt liv. Om det var någon som var mörkhyad så var han eller hon adopterad. inte en enda invandrare bor där. de som bor där skulle behöva komma ut till Rinkeby och Akalla etc för att få en verklighetsbild och det skapas bara mer fördomar om man aldrig har pratat med den andra parten.” Translation mine.

Sociologist Miia Bask has studied immigrant exclusion in Sweden. Noting that exclusion can take a number of forms, she highlights the importance of “feeling safe” as a fundamental part of each individual’s well being.<sup>196</sup> Perceived threats of violence, she claims, contribute to the fact that approximately one third of all non-European immigrants in Sweden refuse to go out in the evenings.<sup>197</sup> Although it is unclear to what extent these perceived threats are justified, it is clear that Sweden has experienced a rather visible rise of hate crimes over the past decade.<sup>198</sup>

While not all hate crimes are a manifestation of xenophobia, the majority of hate crimes in Sweden are. In fact, xenophobia has consistently been the primary motive for these offenses, being responsible for between 67 and 77 percent of all hate crimes in 2004-2007.<sup>199</sup> In 2007, of 3,536 total hate crimes reported, 2,500 cases were reported to have a xenophobic motive.<sup>200</sup>

While hate crimes are not unique to Sweden, the number of offenses is quite puzzling. In a comparative study conducted by University of California Professor Beverly Crawford, the number of violent crimes per 1000 foreigners was compared across five European member states of which Sweden was found to have the highest rate.<sup>201</sup> While statistical comparisons of hate crimes across nations may be limited by the difference in data collection in the respective countries, the increasing rate of offenses with xenophobic motives is nonetheless distressing. Although there is no universal definition for the term “hate crime,” such crimes are recognized as palpable violations of the core values of human rights and of the equal worth of all individuals.<sup>202</sup>

The idea of equality has been a key component of the Swedish social contract. Reinforced by a comprehensive welfare system, the concept of egalitarianism has been the foundation of the Swedish national identity in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Hate crimes however, exhibit a visible break from this utopian identity. Contradictory to this concept of an egalitarian society, the rise in hate crimes in Sweden is closely correlated with the imbalance of power present between the majority and minority populations.<sup>203</sup> By definition, hate crimes are classified as acts committed by a member of the majority group against a member of a minority group.<sup>204</sup> Thus, hate crimes in many ways expose and even reinforce this power dynamic in society.

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<sup>196</sup> Miia Bask, “Welfare Problems and Social Exclusion among Immigrants in Sweden,” *European Sociological Review* 21 (2005), 76.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>198</sup> Klara Klingspor and Anna Molarin, “Hate Crimes 2007: A summary of reports to the police motivated by xenophobia, islamophobia, anti-Semitism and homophobia,” *Brå Report No 2008:15*, (Stockholm, Sweden: Brottsförebyggande Rådet (Brå), 2009), 9. The working definition of a hate crime is defined in this report as a “crime against a person, group, property, institution or representative of these, motivated by fear of, hostility towards or hate of the victim on the basis of skin color, nationality or ethnic origin, faith or sexual orientation, which the perpetrator believes, knows or considers that the person or group has.” See Appendix G.

<sup>199</sup> Klingspor and Molarin, 21.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 21. See Appendix H.

<sup>201</sup> Beverly Crawford, “Globalization and Cultural Conflict: an Institutional Approach,” in *Conflicts and tensions*, ed. Anheier, Helmut K. and Yudhishthir Raj Isar, *The Cultures and Globalization Series* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2007). Austria, France, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland were compared using OECD population statistics and reports on racial violence found through RAXEN.

<sup>202</sup> Klingspor and Molarin, 6.

<sup>203</sup> Klara Klingspor and Anna Molarin, 44.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

### ***Engineering Differences: the role of the welfare state***

Although many countries' incorporation models are defined by a spontaneous process of incorporation, since the 1970s the Swedish Model of incorporation has been defined by a high level of bureaucratic planning and structure. In an effort to promote egalitarianism among all residents – both citizens and third country nationals – the welfare state has played a large role in the integration process. While the bureaucratic structure of integration posits one explanation for the exceedingly long time it takes refugees to enter the labor market, the welfare state has also played a role in defining a social hierarchy between immigrants and native Swedes. By continually emphasizing the protective role that Sweden must play in providing for the victims of global conflicts, the welfare state has unintentionally engineered a power dynamic. Coupled with the degree of segregation in Sweden, this dynamic has played a role in defining immigrants, particularly non-European immigrants, as culturally distant and inherently different from the host society. Immigrants are persistently grouped into one homogenous group, culturally distinct from native Swedes, which fosters oriental sentiments of “us” and “the other.” Miguel Benito noted the degree to which this lack of understanding of “the other” has fostered oriental sentiments:

*It [structural discrimination] comes from the top and the bottom, from all directions. As long as immigrants do something exotic like dance or make flavorful foods then it's all good.*<sup>205</sup>

The concept of incorporation is rather complex, embedded within deeper theoretical debates regarding national identity and tolerance. Although Sweden began promoting an active policy of multiculturalism in the 1970s, following the existing trends in the European Union, this policy has steadily been dismantled since the mid 1990s. Rather, recent shifts of responsibility have emphasized the growing demand on immigrants to integrate or even assimilate into Swedish society. This recent tendency towards greater integration appears to align with traditional narratives and identities in Swedish society that emphasize conformity and uniformity. Although it is far too early to assess the impact of the most recent changes in policy, it has become clear that the process of incorporation in Sweden is insufficient. With the great divide between immigrants and the host society, stereotypes have emerged blaming immigrants for the increased criminality, burdens on the welfare state, and failures to integrate. Moreover, the level of segregation has bred great uncertainties and fear, at times manifesting itself in hate crimes targeting immigrant groups. With the shortcomings of former policies, integration has come to the forefront as a political necessity if Sweden shall maintain its open and liberal policies of immigration.

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<sup>205</sup> Benito. “Det (strukturell diskriminering) kommer från toppen och botten, från alla riktningar. Så länge som invandrarna gör något exotiskt som dansa eller göra god mat är allt bra.” Translation mine.



### Chapter Three

#### **Integration or Segregation: Implications of a polarized society**

*It [structural discrimination] comes from the top and the bottom, from all directions. As long as immigrants do something exotic like dance or make flavorful foods then it's all good.*

Miguel Benito (Immigrant Institute), in telephone interview with author, trans. by author, March 27, 2009.

As noted in the previous chapter, despite a comprehensive integration policy largely funded by the state, the integration process in Sweden has been patchy at best. Although policy may provide the legal framework necessary for integration to occur, policy alone is no magic bullet. In fact, despite the many policy changes initiated between 1975 and 2008, the government's integration agenda has been highly ineffective. Rendered useless through the level of segregation which physically does not accommodate for integration, segregation has come to pose the largest impediment to the realization of policy objectives.

By definition, integration—the process of “incorporation as equals into society”—calls for mutual cooperation through an active partnership—a partnership much like that which was outlined as one of the three fundamental principles of immigrant incorporation in 1975.<sup>206</sup> Nonetheless, this partnership has been largely inconsistent with how the process of integration has played out. Rather, the “partnership” in Sweden has traditionally been comprised of a “privileged” host society and an extensive welfare state by which measures have only further victimized immigrants. For this reason, the partnership is imbalanced, compelled by the “mentality... that we need to feel sorry for them [immigrants] and take care of them.”<sup>207</sup> In place of a multicultural society, the result of this imbalance is a highly segregated society where immigrants are not only physically separated from the host society, but also defined as fundamentally different.

The level of segregation in Sweden is quite distressful. Consistent with the process of urbanization happening around the world, over a third of the Swedish population is aggregated in or near one of the three major cities in Sweden: Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö.<sup>208</sup> For immigrants, this percent is significantly greater.<sup>209</sup> Despite the level of diversity reflected in statistics, much of the diversity has been pushed beyond the cities' limits into the government subsidized housing projects located in the periphery of major cities. While formerly the home of working class Swedes, today these housing blocks represent some of the most diverse neighborhoods in all of Sweden. Densely populated with immigrants and their families, these districts have been endlessly targeted as the hotbeds of some of the most controversial debates surrounding immigration and integration.

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<sup>206</sup> Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integration>. Hammar, 33.

<sup>207</sup> Ollinen.

<sup>208</sup> Urban Ericsson, Irene Molina and Per-Markku Ristilammi, “Miljonprogram och Media: Föreställningar om människor och förorter,” (Riksantikvarieämbetet, Integrationsverket, 2000), 7.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 7.

With the lack of natural interaction and exchange in a highly segregated society, knowledge of different members becomes crucial to counteract the perceived threats and fears of that which is unknown. For a majority of the population, the media serves as the main source of this information. The media thus plays a significant role in integration, helping to frame the perceptions of those who do not have any personal experiences to form their opinions. Despite efforts to maintain accurate and fair representations in the media, it is undeniable that the media does play a role in defining and categorizing people and places.<sup>210</sup> Because media is such a fundamental source of information, particularly in a highly segregated society, the ways in which the media relays information contributes to the general stereotypes and misconceptions regarding less visible members of society. In the most extreme cases, the failure of the media to shed a broad perspective on the subjects it covers can foster inescapable stereotypes, ultimately leading to social exclusion and alienation. This is the case for the majority of immigrants in Sweden. In sharp contrast to the structure and order of Swedish society, immigrants and immigrant “ghettos” are commonly depicted as undisciplined and unsystematic spaces.<sup>211</sup> Exacerbating the divide already existent in society, the aggregation of diverse groups in society under a single category—immigrants—has underscored differences in such a way that parallels Oriental distinctions between “us” and “them.” Through this great divide between “us” and “them,” multiculturalism as a policy of immigrant incorporation, has been geographically defined against Swedish society.<sup>212</sup> In this sense, multiculturalism in Sweden has become a way of defining that which is foreign and fundamentally different from Swedish norms. In a society which is largely characterized by conformist ideology, multiculturalism has been highly exoticized as representing that which is different and diverse in Sweden. Through this reading of multiculturalism, the manifestation of multiculturalism in Sweden has evolved from a progressive doctrine of tolerance to a microcosm for Oriental perceptions of “the other”.

This chapter examines the role of the Swedish press in perpetuating negative stereotypes about immigrants and immigrant neighborhoods. I begin with an introduction to the rise of immigrant “ghettos” in Sweden as part of a government housing program known as the *Miljonprogram* (1965-1974). I then focus on a particular case study of Rosengård, Malmö and examine how this district has come to represent one of the most troublesome regions in all of Sweden in respect to immigrant incorporation. Through a discourse analysis of newspaper articles published over the past year, my intent is to illustrate the role that the press plays in producing the image of Rosengård as a district plagued with high rates of unemployment, criminality and most recently, religious extremism. Contextualizing the role of the press in the larger scope of incorporation, my ultimate goal is to reveal the ways in which the press obstructs incorporation by framing immigrants as “foreign” and fundamentally different from native Swedes.

### ***The Miljonprogram: structured segregation and the rise of “racified” communities***

Urban segregation in Sweden was largely the outcome of a highly ambitious housing program implemented by the Social Democrats between 1964 and 1974. Known as the *Miljonprogram*, the program aimed to construct one million new homes in a period of ten

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<sup>210</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., 262.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., 93.

years.<sup>213</sup> Since the 1940s, proper housing for all had become one of the main priorities of the welfare state.<sup>214</sup> Influenced by economist Gunnar Myrdal's theories on how urban spaces played a role in defining good citizens, the *Miljonprogram* was seen as a way to provide high-quality and affordable housing to working-class Swedes.<sup>215</sup> In the context of modernization theories and urban design, the program was promoted as a means to "build a new society by demolishing the slums and fostering new citizens in the 'Peoples Home'."<sup>216</sup>

Consistent with the bureaucratic nature of the welfare state, the program was well planned and structured. In fact, by 1974 the housing shortages across Sweden had been resolved and the program had attained its goal through the construction of 1,006,000 new homes.<sup>217</sup> Through government subsidies, these new homes became available to the general public, even those who had previously been marginalized by the formal housing market.<sup>218</sup>

The origins of the *Miljonprogram* have been tied to the functionalist ideology and Swiss architect and urban planner, Le Corbusier.<sup>219</sup> In his many visits to Sweden, Le Corbusier had laid out plans for the construction of high-rise buildings in Stockholm.<sup>220</sup> Although his plans were never executed, the influence of his functionalist theories is visible in the physical structures of the *Miljonprogram*. The residential units constructed under this plan all share a number of qualities: they are comprised of high-rise buildings centered around a shared social space with accessibility to good schools, nurseries, churches, and other public areas.<sup>221</sup> Designed in a way so that function could meet the demands of both efficiency and affordability, these residential units became the IKEA version of public housing: simple, monotonous, yet practical.

Despite the initial success of the program, the *Miljonprogram* has come under quite a bit of scrutiny in recent years. Although only 15 percent of the units were constructed with concrete façades, the monotonous characteristics of these housing districts have provoked labels such as *betongförorter* (concrete suburbs) and Swedish ghettos.<sup>222</sup> Unforeseen by the urban planners and politicians was the degree of segregation which these housing projects would create.<sup>223</sup> Because housing was made available and affordable to all Swedish residents, those who had previously been marginalized by the housing market (i.e. people with social problems, criminals, etc.) were able to choose where to reside.<sup>224</sup> Concurrent to the construction of these districts, as immigration increased so did the demand for high quality, but affordable housing. Resembling the American phenomenon of "white flight," as these formally marginalized populations moved

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<sup>213</sup> Although one million new homes may not seem extraordinary, compared to the total population in 1965 (7,772,506) it was a radical project to ensure housing for all of Sweden's residents. Population statistics taken from Statistics Sweden, <http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/SaveShow.asp>.

<sup>214</sup> Richard Turkington, Ronald van Kempen and Frank Wassenberg, "Sweden: High-rise housing for low-density country," *High-rise housing in Europe: current trends and future prospects* (Delft: Delft University Press, 2004), 33.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>217</sup> Michael Lindqvist, "Miljonprogramet-planeringen och uppförandet," NVNA 3 (2000), 9,

<http://miljonprogrammet.micral.se/>.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>219</sup> Turkington, Kempen and Wassenberg, 32.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>222</sup> Lindqvist, 9.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

in, Swedes eventually began to move out.<sup>225</sup> For this reason, these housing districts rapidly began to overrepresent the minority populations in Sweden. Comprised largely of low-income families, the majority with foreign backgrounds, these “ghettos” have been transformed into racial enclaves where those who succeed and have an opportunity to leave usually do.<sup>226</sup> Highly segregated from the rest of the population, these enclaves have been targeted as overcrowded and marginalized immigrant “ghettos,” blamed for inducing criminality and disorder in Sweden.

### ***Case Study: Rosengård as the symbol of failed integration***

The most famous district of the *Miljonprogram* is Rosengård in Malmö. Built between 1967 and 1974, Rosengård was intended to house up to 20,000 people in a total of 7,000 residences.<sup>227</sup> Built in much the same way as other districts, Rosengård consists of a number of three- and eight-floor concrete high-rise structures surrounding a central shopping mall.<sup>228</sup> Forming an autonomous community separate from the larger city, Rosengård is a fully-equipped district featuring access to local shops, restaurants, schools and an official mosque.

Distinct from neighboring communities, the residents of Rosengård represent 111 nationalities and over 50 language groups making it the most multicultural neighborhood in all of Sweden.<sup>229</sup> As of 2007, Rosengård was home to 21,955 residents of which 26 percent of all residents had an immigrant background and 60 percent were foreign-born.<sup>230</sup> The five most common nationalities representing approximately 57 percent of all residents are: Iraqi, Yugoslavian, Lebanese, Bosnia-Herzegovinian, and Polish.<sup>231</sup> In addition to this great diversity, the community is also relatively youthful with over 35 percent under 20 years old.<sup>232</sup>

In addition to the demographic composition of Rosengård, the district is also plagued by income disparities and low employment rates. The average income of wage earners in Rosengård is 71,700 SEK, significantly lower than the citywide average of 118,000 SEK.<sup>233</sup> At the same time, the employment rate is well below average with only 38 percent of residents employed compared to the citywide average of 63 percent.<sup>234</sup> Because the income disparities between

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<sup>225</sup> Turkington, Kempen and Wassenberg, 37.

<sup>226</sup> Between 2002 and 2006 approximately 9,800 people moved to Rosengård in Malmö, while about 10,500 people moved out. Klas Andersson, “Fakta om stadsdelen Rosengård, 2007” Malmö Stad, <http://www.malmo.se/stadsdelar/rosengard/faktaomrosengard.4.33aee30d103b8f15916800046362.html>.

<sup>227</sup> Turkington, Kempen and Wassenberg, 37.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

<sup>229</sup> Andersson, “Fakta om stadsdelen Rosengård, 2007.”

<sup>230</sup> Malmö Stadskontor, “Rosengård – Områdesfakta, 2007,” <http://www.malmo.se/download/18.d2883b106e53ae64c80001627/20.Roseng%C3%A5rd.pdf+2005>.

<sup>231</sup> Malmö Stadskontor

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Andersson, “Fakta om stadsdelen Rosengård, 2007.” The USD equivalents are \$8,750 and \$13,885, respectively. While these numbers appear strikingly low, they are the only numbers reported by the city and are frequently cited in other sources as well.

<sup>234</sup> Malmö Stadskontor; Andersson, “Fakta om stadsdelen Rosengård, 2007.” The discrepancy here may be accounted for by the relatively youthful population that lives in Rosengård. Although the unemployment rate may have been more useful here, I had trouble finding an accurate source to cite from. In fact, news articles commonly stated that the unemployment rate was upwards to 62 percent and even 75 percent in Herrgården, the most marginalized district in Rosengård, but it appears that these articles simply calculated these numbers by subtracting the employment rate from 100 percent. In such, they provide an inaccurate and misleading depiction of the real levels of unemployment.

residents and the remainder of the Swedish population is great, approximately one fifth of residents rely on social welfare, with the average amount of social assistance per household being 42,829 SEK per year.<sup>235</sup> Becoming the national symbol of the *betongförort*, Rosengård has come to represent one of the most troublesome areas for politicians and public alike, and in turn suffers from persistent isolation, alienation and social exclusion.

### ***Fanning the Flame: the role of the media in perpetuating stereotypes and differences***

The media plays a central role in perpetuating the negative stereotypes regarding areas such as Rosengård. Through overused terms and concepts such as overcrowding, unemployment, youth criminality, and extremism, the coverage of specific districts begins to define not only the geographic locations, but also the people who live there.<sup>236</sup> In this sense, people are tied to the geographical locations they reside in and their reputations can easily be affected by extraneous events.<sup>237</sup> Simply referencing Rosengård provokes certain mainstream images.<sup>238</sup> For the majority of Swedes who have never dared to set foot near this housing district the question is where are these images coming from?

Through an examination of how Rosengård is persistently depicted in the press, it is possible to draw a clear correlation between public perceptions of stigmatized areas such as Rosengård and the rhetoric used to describe this district. Although both the right and left-wing newspapers in Sweden are guilty of highlighting the problems of Rosengård and in such, depicting this housing district in a negative light, there are some differences between the reporting. In order to qualify these differences, I have conducted a comprehensive discourse analysis of the articles published regarding Rosengård in the leading right- and left-wing newspapers, *Svenska Dagbladet* (SvD) and *Dagens Nyheter* (DN), respectively. In an attempt to define my parameters, I have conducted a keyword search of all articles published in the past year containing the search term “Rosengård.” The findings of this keyword search were 145 articles regarding Rosengård published in SvD and 118 in DN. Based on a comprehensive review of these findings, I have identified the three key events which drew the most attention during the past year: (1) the December riots, (2) racism within the police force and (3) a controversial study of Islamic radicalization in Rosengård. Through a detailed examination of the rhetoric used in the coverage of these events, my intent is to illustrate the ways in which both the right- and left-wing press play a role in perpetuating stereotypes, stigmatization and social exclusion.

#### *(1) The December Protests*

In November 2008, a primary basement mosque located in the Herrgård region of Rosengård was officially closed. The rental company had terminated the lease on the property, claiming that they needed the space for another purpose.<sup>239</sup> After 15 years of operation, the

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<sup>235</sup> Malmö Stadskontor.

<sup>236</sup> Ericsson, Molina and Ristilammi, 8.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>239</sup> TT, “Polis tömde ockuperad Malmömoské,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 4, 2009, [http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel\\_2202103.svd](http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel_2202103.svd).

unforeseen closure resulted in an uproar of Rosengård's youth.<sup>240</sup> For nearly a month, the location was occupied by local teens attempting to protest the closure.<sup>241</sup> After police officially removed the last of the occupiers on December 14<sup>th</sup>, the unrest shifted to the streets. While the December riots in Rosengård were broadly covered by both SvD and DN, the coverage in each of these papers differs. That is, while both papers highlight the disturbance and disorder provoked by youth delinquents and the clash of these teens against higher authorities, the articles published in DN take a broader perspective in their analysis ultimately grounding the riots within a larger and more problematic context. Despite the differences in coverage, both papers correlated the riots to the geographic location and those who live there, framing a negative image of this "immigrant ghetto." Against the backdrop of core democratic values, the coverage of these youth uprisings came to define them as different – disorderly, chaotic and exotic – from Swedish society.

There is not much of a comparison to be made regarding the ways in which both papers describe how the riots played out. Through the repeated use of words such as "flames," "fire bombs," "homemade tube bombs," "police cars destroyed" and "youth vandals," both SvD and DN sensationalized the turmoil of widespread fires and damage to public property.<sup>242</sup> Likewise, without even reading the articles, headlines such as "Homemade Bombs against the Police" and an entire series of articles linked by the series title "Fighting in Rosengård" immediately serve to foster images of hostility and violence.<sup>243</sup> Emphasizing that these riots were the act of unruly and disobedient youth delinquents, both SvD and DN antagonize the youth through repeated references to the stones and tube bombs which were launched at both the police and the firefighters on the scene. In an article published by SvD on the third night of the riots, the image of defiant teens being chased between high-rise buildings paints a picture of juvenile delinquency and utter disorder.

*Specially trained police arrived to Rosengård yesterday to face the troubles. Videos from the Malmö suburb spread across the web as the riots attract youth from elsewhere. Equipped riot police tried to prevent the youth from escaping among the high-rise buildings and the atmosphere was agitated. Two cars were set on fire, two more were damaged and fire bombs were launched at the police station in Rosengård.*<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> TT.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> These words and phrases were chosen due to their frequent reoccurrence in the press during this time. Nearly every article surveyed used more than one of these explicit words or phrases.

<sup>243</sup> Tobias Olsson, "Hemmagjorda bomber mot polisen," *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 19, 2008,

[http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel\\_2225057.svd](http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel_2225057.svd).

Ole Rothenborg, "Afa backom bråken i Rosengård," *Dagens Nyheter*, December 19, 2008,

<http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/afa-bakom-braken-i-rosengard-1.476051>.

<sup>244</sup> Sofia Strandberg and Simon Bynert, "Tredje våldsamma kvällen i Rosengård," *Svenska Dagbladet*, December 20, 2008, [http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel\\_2229621.svd](http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel_2229621.svd). "Specialutbildade poliser anlände till Rosengård igår för att möta oroligheterna. Filmer från Malmöförorten sprids på nätet och upploppen lockar till sig ungdomar utifrån. Kravallustrustad polis försökte förhindra att de tog sig in bland höghusen och stämningen var tidvis uppjagad. Två bilar sattes i brand, ytterligare två skadades och fyrverkerier avfyrades mot polisstationen i Rosengård."

Translation mine.

Despite the fact that these riots were the act of a relatively small number of teens, the references to the spread of the movement and the need for specially trained forces have the effect of aggrandizing the riots. In addition, the explicit reference to the high-rise architecture draws a connection between the geographic location of Rosengård and the chaos and disorder of the events that unfolded. Within the larger context of the *Miljonprogram*, frequent correlations such as this have an undeniable impact on public perceptions.

In addition to highlighting the utter disorder of the riots, the clash between youth delinquents and officials was a reoccurring theme in both SvD and DN. In such, articles tended to highlight the juvenile tactics (i.e. throwing stones and homemade bombs) employed by the youth rioters against the police:

*During Wednesday evening and into Thursday morning tensions escalated between the youth and the police in Rosengård in Malmö. There were fires in several locations in the residential area and police were attacked with fire crackers and stones. When emergency services arrived to extinguish the fires even they were attacked forcing the police to protect the firefighters.<sup>245</sup>*

Although the clash between the youth and the police may not be overly provoking, the reference to the attack on the firefighters in the preceding passage underscores the unruly youth riots by which the tactics used are not only juvenile and disorderly, but also completely anarchic.

In much the same rhetoric, an article published in DN reports on the tactics used by the youth. While painting a picture of chaos as homemade tube bombs explode between the high-rises, the piece also makes an emotional appeal to other residents in the area who have no involvement with the riots.

*During the night vandals threw more than twenty tube bombs against police officers. The bombs are made of a thick piece of garden hose filled with gunpowder. They detonate with a terrible blow. Many families with young children who had been exposed to traumatic war experiences became terrified when the bombs echoed between high-rises.<sup>246</sup>*

Through this passage, the other residents are victimized as “vulnerable” refugees who harbor traumatic memories of wartime. By drawing a correlation between the war-like environment in Rosengård and the traumatic war-time experiences of other residents, this passage serves to

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<sup>245</sup> Maria Ringbord, “Autonoma grupper deltog i upplopp is Rosengård,” *Dagens Nyheter*, December 18, 2008, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/autonoma-grupper-deltog-i-upplopp-i-rosengard-1.475423>. “Under onsdagskvällen och natten till torsdag eskalerade mötsättningarna mellan ungdomar och polis i Rosengård i Malmö. Det brann på flera platser i bostadsområdet och polisen attackerades med raketer och stenar. När räddningstjänsten kom och skulle släcka bränderna attackerades även den och polisen fick skydda brandmännen.” Translation mine.

<sup>246</sup> Ole Rothenborg, “Afa backom bråken i Rosengård,” *Dagens Nyheter*, December 19, 2008, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/afa-bakom-braken-i-rosengard-1.476051>. “Under natten slängde vandalerna drygt tjugo slangbomber mot poliserna. Bomberna består av en bit tjock trädgårdsslang som fylls med svartkrut. De detonerar med en fruktansvärd knall. Många barnfamiljer med traumatiska krigsupplevelser blev skräckslagna när bomberna ekade mellan höghusen.” Translation mine.

stigmatize Rosengård's residents as "vulnerable" or "fragile" refugees. Through the link between the youth riots and the refugee population, Rosengård and its troubles become entangled with the larger implications of immigration.

While both SvD and DN featured rather similar coverage of the actual riots, DN does nonetheless offer readers a broader perspective on the events. While painting an image of rebellious youth against the authorities, on the second night of the riots DN drew attention to the relatively small scale of the protests commenting, "We must also remember that those who cause trouble are relatively few. If all 8000 teens in Rosengård were out fighting, then we could talk about riots."<sup>247</sup> Unlike the corresponding right-wing articles, this passage recognizes that the protests were not representative of all or even most of the teens in Rosengård, but rather that they were the act of a small minority. In another article published by DN surrounding these events, the riots were reconsidered within the larger context of integration. Rather than stressing disorder or the riots, the following passage takes a step back to examine the events through a broader lens.

*I wonder if we should shift perspectives a bit. Who is really segregated? In the latest issue of the Language magazine I read that Arabic is now the third largest language in Sweden. To hear spoken Arabic and to see Arabic writing are now part of everyday life. But few Swedes even know how the alphabet works, and almost no Swedish students have the opportunity to choose Arabic as a B- or C-language in school.<sup>248</sup>*

Offering a powerful critique of the structure of society, the preceding passage questions the root of segregation, alluding to the fact that segregation must be reinterpreted. The discussion of the Arabic language presents not only a critique of the arrogance of ordinary Swedes, but also a critique of the top-down organization of society which has not adjusted to the "multicultural" society it has for so long aspired to create. By highlighting both the scale and scope of the riots, the preceding passages published in DN offer readers a broader perspective and more complete coverage by grounding the riots within a larger and more problematic context.

## *(2) Racism within the police force*

Months after the December protests, information was released regarding a flood of blatant racism within the police force. In a video that was used by officials as evidence against a 21-year-old who had been arrested during the protests, members of the police force were quoted using very openly racist remarks and assumptions.<sup>249</sup> Through the use of terms such as *blattajävlar* (immigrant bastards) and *apajävlar* (ape bastards), the officers involved directly

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<sup>247</sup> Rothenbord, "Man måste också komma ihåg att det är några få som ställer till bråk. Om Rosengårds alla 8,000 ungdomar varit ute och bråkat, då kunde man talat om kravaller." Translation mine.

<sup>248</sup> Dan Jönsson, "Efter bränderna i Rosengård," *Dagens Nyheter*, December 23, 2008, <http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/efter-branderna-i-rosengard-1.476822>. "Jag funderar på om man inte borde vända lite på perspektiven. Vem är det som är segregerad? I senaste numret av Språktidningen läser jag att arabiska numera är det tredje största språket i Sverige. Att höra talad arabiska och se arabisk skrift är en del av vardagen. Men få svenskar vet ens hur alfabetet fungerar, och nästan inga svenska ungdomar har möjlighet att välja arabiska som B- eller C-språk i skolan." Translation mine.

<sup>249</sup> Jenny Stiernstedt, "Polis kallar ungdomar blatte och apa," *Dagens Nyheter*, February 5, 2009, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/polis-kallar-ungdomar-blatte-och-apa-1.793417>.



targeted the youth with derogatory terms that call attention to them not only as foreigners, but also as “primitive” and thus fundamentally different from native Swedes. Although the tensions were clearly aggravated on both sides during the December protests, the previous coverage presented an image of the youth rebelling against the legal authorities. This news thus offered a rather different interpretation than that which was repeatedly portrayed by the press. In addition to these disturbing comments, information was released during the same time period regarding the use of derogatory names such as Neger Niggersson and Oskar Neger during official police training in spring of 2008.<sup>250</sup> Although these terms had been used at a large conference, somehow they remained concealed until nearly a year later. The use of these openly racist expressions within the police force presented a potential delegitimizing force against the authorities.

While both the right- and left-wing press condemned the use of these names by public officials, the coverage of these stories were distinct. Although SvD by no means justified the use of these openly racist expressions, the articles published focus more on the reaction of police officials rather than the severity of the expressions. Through repeated references to high-rank officials, the articles published in SvD attempt to illustrate the rarity of such expressions, shielding the police from contentious criticism. This can be seen in the following article:

*Expressions like 'apajäveln' and 'blattajävlar' are definitely unacceptable within the police force. Regardless if they were in an internal context and (regardless) of how provoked the police were.*

*The question is instead how representative these policemen really are. Experienced assessors such as police Professor Leif GW Persson and former prosecutor Sven-Erik Alhem say they have never heard anything so harsh from policemen. Hopefully they are right. Malmö police force should not bring down the entire profession. The risk is that it still happens.<sup>251</sup>*

Although the article begins with a denunciation of the use of such expressions, the critique is limited to the specific context of the police force. Moreover, although questioning the extent to which such behavior is representative of the force, the author references Persson and Alhem to assure readers that this is atypical behavior. While it is clear that the author is not entirely convinced through the use of the word “hopefully,” the decision to cite the two officials is understood as a subtle means of shielding the force from disillusionment.

A number of articles published in SvD employ comments by high-rank officials by similar means in an attempt to dampen the effects of these events. By highlighting the police reaction, the following articles lack perspective and accountability.

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<sup>250</sup> Maria Abrahamsson, “‘Apajäveln’ och ‘blattajävlar’ passar inte in,” *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 7, 2009, [http://www.svd.se/opinion/ledarsidan/artikel\\_2438723.svd](http://www.svd.se/opinion/ledarsidan/artikel_2438723.svd).

<sup>251</sup> Abrahamsson. “Uttryck som ‘apajäveln’ och ‘blattajävlar’ är definitivt oacceptabla inom poliskåren. Och det oavsett om de har fällt i ett internt sammanhang och hur provocerade poliserna än har varit. Frågan är istället hur representativa dessa poliser egentligen är. Erfarna bedömare som polisprofessorn Leif GW Persson och före detta överåklagaren Sven-Erik Alhem säger sig aldrig någonsin ha hört något lika grovt från tjänstgörande poliser. Förhoppningsvis har han rätt. Malmöpolisernas agerande borde inte få solka förtroendet för hela yrkeskåren. Risken finns att det ändå blir så.” Translation mine.

*Leif GW Persson is shocked by the racist statements in the police bus. "It is extremely serious, this is not acceptable," he told SvD.se. He thinks that the police officer ... should be fired. (He) points out that racism in the police force has decreased drastically when compared with the past.*<sup>252</sup>

*He does not think that the choice of words used in the police bus in Rosengård reflects a widespread attitude within the police ranks. On the contrary, he says that the news spread dejection in 99 percent of the force.*<sup>253</sup>

Referring to the blatantly racist expressions as "attitude problems," the following article downplays the gravity of these comments and the implications that they pose. In addition, by implying that increased diversity has played a role in decreasing these "attitude problems" within the force, the article diverts attention away from the actual problem to address how the problem is presumably being ameliorated.

*According to Persson the attitude problems in the police force are declining since new young police enter and the share of police with immigrant backgrounds is increasing. If the cops in the video really mean what they say they should be fired, notes Persson. But he thinks that a warning and perhaps pay cut may be enough.*<sup>254</sup>

Through frequent references to high ranks of the force, the articles published in SvD present only one perspective. Rather than addressing the implications of these comments, SvD articles focus on shielding the police force from stark criticism and disillusionment through the confirmation that these expressions were atypical behavior. Although this may be true, the articles present a very one-sided perspective which lacks not only context, but accountability.

In contrast to the protectionary efforts of SvD, DN's publications present a more comprehensive picture of the events and their potential implications. In an effort to contextualize these expressions, the full comments are exposed in the following passage.

*In addition to 'blattajävlar' the men in the car are heard saying the following: 'That little 'apajäveln'. Should I make him sterile when I get hold of him?'*

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<sup>252</sup> Negra Efendic, "Han borde bli av med jobbet," *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 5, 2009, [http://svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel\\_2426009.svd](http://svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel_2426009.svd). "Leif GW Persson är chockad av de rasistiska uttalanden i polisbussen. –Det är utomordentligt allvarligt, så får det inte gå till, säger han till SvD.se. Han tycker att polismannen... borde bli av med jobbet. (Han) påpekar att rasismen inom polisen minskat drastiskt om man jämför med hur de var förut." Translation mine.

<sup>253</sup> TT, "Jag är heligt förbannad," *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 5, 2009, [http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel\\_2427475.svd](http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel_2427475.svd). "Han tror inte att ordvalet i polisbussen på Rosenård speglar någon utbredd inställning inom poliskåren. Tvärtom säger han att nyheten spritt förstämning hos 99 percent av kåren." Translation mine.

<sup>254</sup> TT, "Inga brottsutredningar om polissnack," *Svenska Dagbladet*, February 6, 2009, [http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel\\_2430215.svd](http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/artikel_2430215.svd). "Enlight Persson minskar attitydproblemen i poliskåren allteftersom nya yngre poliser kommer till och andelen poliser med invandrarbakgrund ökar. Om poliserna på filmen verkligen menar vad de säger så bör de avskedas, anser Persson. Men han tror att det slutar med en varning och kanske ett löneavdrag." Translation mine.

*'Yes he should be beat so bad that he cannot stand on his own legs,' says a colleague.<sup>255</sup>*

Unlike the articles published in SvD which reference the expressions *apajäveln* and *blattajävlar* completely out of context, by contextualizing these expressions more magnitude is given to racist statements.

In addition, an article published the following day expanded upon these expressions, questioning what the larger implications of such blatantly racist expressions may be. By asking a local official in the Rosengård district, the remarks centralize around Rosengård rather than the police force.

*Who has been most affected by all of this, the residents of Rosengård or embarrassed Swedes across the country? "I don't actually know. The calls I usually get from individuals are 95 percent racists who believe that we should fence in Rosengård and throw away the key. But these two days people have cried on the phone wondering how the police could say such terrible things."<sup>256</sup>*

Furthermore, later in the same article, a local religious leader is cited. Although the emphasis is on downplaying the significance of such racist expressions, by interviewing local community leaders DN takes a much more localized approach.

*One kilometer from the Rosengård's police station is Islamic Centers CEO Bejzat Becirov in the great mosque. He wants to by any means tone down the matter. 'All people can do wrong. One does not have to be a bad person to say dumb things.' He has himself been the victim of a racist police in Rosengård.*

*'I stood outside and cried when the mosque was burned one night a few years ago. Then I heard a cop behind me say to a firefighter: "serves the svartskallar [literally, black heads] right." I yelled at him to get out of there. I found out later that he had been threatened in result.'<sup>257</sup>*

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<sup>255</sup> Jenny Stiernstedt, "Polis kallar ungdomar blatte och apa," *Dagens Nyheter*, February 5, 2009, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/polis-kallar-ungdomar-blatte-och-apa-1.793417>. "Utöver blattajävlar hörs männen i bilen säga följande: "Den lilla apajäveln. Ska jag göra han steril när jag får tag på honom?" "Ja han ska ha sig duktigt med stryk så han inte kan stå på benen," svarar en kollega."<sup>255</sup> Translation mine.

<sup>256</sup> Ole Rothenborg, "Det kan komma något gott ur det här," *Dagens Nyheter*, February 6, 2009, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/det-kan-komma-nagot-gott-ur-det-har-1.794050>. "Vem har tagit mest illa vid sig av detta, Rosengårdsborna eller generade svenskar i övriga landet? Det vet jag faktiskt inte. De samtal jag vanligen får från privatpersoner är till 95 procent rasister som anser att vi ska hägna in Rosengård och slänga bort nyckeln. Men dessa två dagar har folk gråtit i telefonen över att poliser kan säga så hemska saker." Translation mine.

<sup>257</sup> Rothenborg. "En kilometer från Rosengårds polisstation sitter Islamic Centers vd Bejzat Becirov i den stora moskén. Han vill på alla sätt tona ner saken. 'Alla människor kan göra fel. Man behöver inte vara en dålig människa för att man säger dumma saker.' Han har själv råkat ut för en rasistisk polis i Rosengård. 'Jag stod här utanför och grät när moskén brann en natt för några år sedan. Då hörde jag en polis bakom mig säga till en brandman: "Det kan svartskallarna gott ha." Jag skrek åt honom att försvinna därifrån. Jag fick senare höra att han för detta anmält att han blivit hotad." Translation mine.

In this passage, DN makes no effort to conceal the fact that such expressions may not be all that uncommon. Through the use of comments from local community leaders rather than police officials, DN reflects a completely different perspective than SvD does. In such, DN's coverage of these statements is significantly more comprehensive than SvD's, revealing not only the full context of these expressions, but also reflecting the larger picture.

*(3) Rosengård as the breeding ground for radicalization and extremism*

In late January 2009, a rather controversial study regarding religious extremism in Rosengård was released. Conducted by the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), the study – “Threats to Democratic Values and Principles – the Current Situation in Malmö”- targeted Rosengård as the breeding ground for radicalization and violent extremism.<sup>258</sup> The report was based on 50 hours of interviews with 30 respondents ranging from the County Police Service, Swedish Security Services, Rosengård police, youth leaders, educators and academics.<sup>259</sup> Based on the responses received, the study concluded that overcrowding, social exclusion and alienation fostered frustration and anger in Rosengård, forces which have led to increased radicalization over the past five years.<sup>260</sup> Commissioned by the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, the study was intended to provide the ministry with qualitative data and a number of proposed interventions to help combat the emergence of antidemocratic forces.<sup>261</sup>

The issue of radicalization has come to the forefront of integration studies across the European Union, particularly since 2001. With predictions that one in every five residents in the EU will be Muslim by 2050, European governments and societies have begun to worry about the compatibility of Western values with Islam.<sup>262</sup> Despite the deficit of reliable data on the Muslim population in Sweden, it is estimated that in 2006 there were approximately 400,000 Muslims living in Sweden.<sup>263</sup> In response to this growing Muslim population, studies have revealed that in general, Swedes tend to “hold negative and preconceived views of Islam and Muslims.”<sup>264</sup> In fact, in polls conducted by the Board of Integration's Integration Barometer (2004) regarding issues such as integration, discrimination, equal rights and Islam, two-thirds of respondents thought that Islam was incompatible with fundamental Swedish values.<sup>265</sup> In addition, 65 percent of respondents felt that the practice of Islam should not be facilitated in Sweden and 54 percent felt that Swedish Muslims are different from other Swedes.<sup>266</sup> In general then, the “overall picture suggests that many Swedes perceive that there is a difference between ‘us’ (non-Muslims) and ‘them’ (Muslims).”<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> Magnus Ranstorp and Josefine Dos Santos, “Threats to Democratic Values and Principles – the Current Situation in Malmö,” (Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies, 2009), 4.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid., 12-15.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>262</sup> Esther Pan, “Europe: Integrating Islam,” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html>.

<sup>263</sup> Larsson, 10.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid., 35.

With the growing debates regarding Islam and the West, more and more focus has been directed at this policy area in the press. Because of the inherent contentiousness of the debate, the ways in which the press plays into perceived threats and fosters stereotypes has a fundamental role in framing public opinion. In this sense, it is imperative to integration that the press maintains a relatively neutral position on this topic. Nonetheless, the Swedish press has done just the opposite. In fact, reacting to the recent study published in January 2009, SvD published a series of articles perpetuating stereotypes about Islam and Muslims and exacerbating threats of extremism. Although DN is not innocent of producing particular images of Islam and Muslims, the articles published regarding the controversial study on Rosengård were framed quite differently. Rather than emphasizing the findings, DN focused more on the limitations and existing critiques of the study. In such, DN once again provided a more comprehensive approach to reporting on the issue of radicalization in Sweden.

In late January, SvD published an article detailing the findings of the study. Written in the form of a press release by the researchers who conducted the study, the choice to publish this article illustrates SvD's alignment on the issue.

*The main external factor identified is known as the "single narrative". First, the Iraq war and secondly, what many Muslims see as a Western aggression against Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and other regional conflicts. Frustration and anger combined with fear and anxiety are common in individuals with a background of conflicts such as Iraq, Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Somalia.*

*The main internal factor is the extreme segregation and the exclusion experienced in areas such as Rosengård. Respondents in schools, social services and police repeated examples of young people who, despite their birth and / or growing up in Rosengård have never left their neighborhood and never seen Malmö's inner city – just 20 minutes away.*

*Segregation leads to a vicious spiral of alienation, unemployment, mistrust and bitterness against society, which in turn leads to increased isolation. Some important factors we have found is overcrowding and various forms of enclaves, as well as poor integration of newly arrived immigrants regarding democracy, equality and values.*

*Among others, groups are exposed to ultra-radical Islamist members in the many cellar mosques (unlike the official Islamic Assembly), which are located in the area. They preach isolation and actively control perspectives, while maintaining a strong culture of hate where women are harassed both mentally and physically. Newly arrived families are received by the representatives of radical groups that explain to them what rules apply in Rosengård.<sup>268</sup>*

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<sup>268</sup> Magnus Ransstorp and Josefine Dos Santos, "Kommuner måste hedja extremism," *Svenska Dagbladet*, January 28, 2009, [http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/artikel\\_2385005.svd](http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/artikel_2385005.svd). "Den främsta externa drivkraft som identifierades handlar om det som brukar kallas "the single narrative". I första hand gäller det Irakkriget och i andra hand det som många muslimer uppfattar som Västvärldens övergrepp mot muslimer i Irak, Afghanistan och i andra regionala konflikter. Frustration och ilska i kombination med rädsla och ångest förekommer ofta hos individer med bakgrund från konflikthärdar såsom Irak, palestinska områden, Libanon och Somalia. Den främsta interna

Detailing the findings of the study, this article perpetuates the common stereotypes by referring to immigrants harboring broken memories of their homelands, social exclusion, segregation, unemployment and extremism in a single passage. In addition, the article singles out Iraqis, Palestinians, Lebanese and Somalians, fostering negative sentiments towards particular nationalities. Finally, with words nearly identical to those used in the study, this article perpetuates fear and hostility towards Muslim populations in Rosengård.

In another article published by SvD months later, the threats of radicalization, extremism and a “culture of hate” are used as a means to foster fear and distance between Swedes and Muslims.

*My feelings were split. I support the right to demonstrate. But at the same time, I felt discomfort. There is a nasty smell which arises when boiling a soup of hate, ignorance, anti-Semitism, Islamic extremism, Hamas, naive social democratic politicians, black-clad masked left extremists who are demonstrating under the slogan "It is we who decide", and a grin of Lars Ohly (future Minister of Mona Sahlin if the next election goes poorly).*

*At the head of the train: the Swedish flag, immediately followed by the terrorist organization Hamas' flag accompanied by people chanting anti-Jewish slogans in Arabic.*

*I thought, this must have been how it felt for the Jews in the old Eastern Europe during a pogrom. But now it's Malmö 2009. It is not as bad now as it was then. But the fact is that the situation is continuously deteriorating, particularly in Malmö. Malmö is in many ways a nice city. It has the nation's coolest architecture, the world's most beautiful torso, a mighty bridge, and a dynamic lifestyle. But unfortunately, (Malmö) also has a darkening shadow.*

*The Evening Post's editorial writer Jan-Olof Bengtsson wrote with sensitivity: "Among the inhabitants of Malmö an unpleasant sense has spread for some time, a feeling that many no longer recognize their multicultural, cosmopolitan and tolerant city, but watch as it gradually turns into a battleground for diverse megaphone groups who kidnapped the streets for their own purposes. There is currently something indefinably hateful in this city."*

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drivkraften handlar om den extrema segregation och det utanförskap som upplevs i områden som Rosengård. Respondenter inom skola, socialtjänst och polis återgav exempel på ungdomar som trots sin födsel och/eller uppväxt i Rosengård aldrig har lämnat sitt bostadsområde och heller aldrig sett Malmös innerstad – 20 minuter därifrån. Segregationen leder till en ond spiral av utanförskap, arbetslöshet, misstro och bitterhet mot samhället, som i sin tur leder till ökad isolering. Några viktiga faktorer vi funnit är trångboddhet och olika former av ”enklausering”, liksom bristfällig introduktion av nyanlända invandrare kring demokrati, jämställdhet och värdegrund. Bland annat förekommer grupper av ultraradikala islamistiska medlemmar med hemvist i någon av de källarmoskéer (till skillnad från den officiella muslimska församlingen) som finns i området. Dessa predikar isolering och agerar åsiktskontrollanter samt upprätthåller en stark hotkultur, där främst kvinnor trakasseras psykiskt och fysiskt. Nyinflyttade familjer får besök hemma av företrädare för radikala grupper som talar om för dem vilka regler som gäller i Rosengård.” Translation mine.

*It was this rancor that prompted a Jewish friend to write the following to me: "Malmö is becoming an impossible city for us Jews." But this rancor lays additional tracks. When hateful Islamists throw cobblestones at a lawful demonstration for Israel - the police intervene, but not against the Islamic stone throwers, but by driving away the legitimate demonstration.*

*I think unfortunately that this is only the beginning of a negative development. When police and politicians give in to violence and threats, then it's like trying to use gasoline to extinguish a fire. It becomes what the masked extremists write on their banners: "It is we who decide."<sup>269</sup>*

In the preceding article, the author not only perpetuates stereotypes of hateful and radical Muslims and their incompatibility with Western values, but the author's voice elicits excessive anger and arrogance. By referring to the two flags, the author implies an incompatibility between the two; an incompatibility which is easily translated to the larger context of Islam and the West. In addition, the analogy of Nazi pogroms is not only inappropriate, but it cultivates fear and anger amongst readers who may correlate these pogroms to extremism or simply Muslims in general. Through the depiction of a once peaceful and beautiful city which is now overrun by a "darkening shadow" of extremism and hate, the author draws upon an emotional appeal to a changing city in an attempt to foster frustration and anger amongst native Swedes against those who have "destroyed" local communities. The final sentence is employed in a threatening tone, clearly intended to incite fear amongst readers. Despite the fact that the author is Jewish and in such may have his own motivations behind writing this article, the article is absolutely inappropriate in its depiction of members of Swedish society.

In stark contrast from these articles, articles published in DN appear to reflect a wider perspective. Rather than using the findings of this study to promulgate fear and

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<sup>269</sup> Göran Skytte, "So matt släcka eld med bensin," *Svenska Dagbladet*, March 14, 2009, [http://www.svd.se/opinion/ledarsidan/artikel\\_2593789.svd](http://www.svd.se/opinion/ledarsidan/artikel_2593789.svd). "Mina känslor var delade. Jag är för demonstrationsfrihet. Men samtidigt kände jag obehag. Det uppstår en otäck lukt då man kokar en soppa av hat, okunnighet, antisemitism, islamistisk extremism, Hamas, naiva sossepolitiker, svartklädda maskerade vänsterextremister som demonstrerar under parollen "Det är vi som bestämmer" och en flinande Lars Ohly (blivande minister hos Mona Sahlin om det går illa i nästa val). I tåten av tåget: svenska flaggan. Omedelbart därefter följer terrororganisationen Hamas flagga och människor som skanderar antijudiska slagord på arabiska. Jag tänkte: det måste ha varit så här det kändes för judarna i det gamla Östeuropa när det drog ihop sig till pogrom. Men nu är det Malmö 2009. Det är inte lika illa nu som då. Men faktum är att läget oavbrutet blir allt sämre. I vart fall i Malmö. Malmö är på många sätt en fin stad. Landets häftigaste arkitektur, världens vackraste torso, den mäktiga bron, ett dynamiskt näringsliv. Men dessvärre också en allt mörkare skugga. *Kvällspostens* malmöitiska ledarskribent Jan-Olof Bengtsson skrev med fingertoppskänsla så här (KvP 7/3): "Bland Malmös invånare sprider sig sedan en tid en obehaglighets känsla där många inte längre känner igen sin multikulturella, kosmopolitiska och toleranta stad utan ser den stegvis förvandlad till en tummelplats för diverse tillresta megafongrupperingar som kidnappat gatorna för egna syften. Det ligger numera något odefinierbart hätskt över staden." Det är denna hätskhet som gör att en judisk vän skriver så här till mig: "Malmö håller på att bli en omöjlig stad för oss judar." Men denna hätskhet sätter också andra spår. När hatiska islamister kastar gatsten mot en laglig demonstration för Israel – då ingriper polisen, men inte mot de islamistiska stenkastarna, utan genom att köra bort den lagliga demonstrationen. Jag tror dessvärre att det här bara är början på en negativ utveckling. När polis och politiker ger efter för våld och hot, då är det som att försöka använda bensin för att släcka eld. Då blir det som de maskerade extremisterna skriver på sina banderoller: "Det är vi som bestämmer." Translation mine.

hatred of particular members of society, DN's approach is more objective. In an article published in late January, the author reflects upon the image portrayed by the study, questioning its legitimacy.

*It is a researcher at the Center for Middle East Studies and Human Rights Studies at Lund University who wants to get to the bottom of the attention the report which describes how religious extremism is gaining ground in vulnerable neighborhoods such as Rosengård in Malmö. The researchers at Lund claim to have continuous contact with the various Muslim organizations in Malmö and question the picture which is painted in the report of the National Defense University and the Center for asymmetric threats - and terrorism studies.<sup>270</sup>*

In yet another article published in DN, the author once again highlights the critiques of the study revealing that such studies may be limited and should not be used as a way to foster islamophobia and hatred in society.

*Are the contents of the CATS (Center for Asymmetric Threat and Terrorism Studies) commissioned report on radicalization a bit far stretched? The fact that the sources are no longer available, particularly because of the threat to the interviewees, of course opens the door to criticism from other researchers. But some of the criticism does not account for the opaque substance. Some wonder why more private individuals were not granted a voice (in the study). The focus is however on the radicalization process and in the case of self-selected isolated individuals; one can often get more out of deep interviews with the members of society around them.<sup>271</sup>*

In the preceding passages the differences between the right- and left-wing papers are rather obvious. Nonetheless, my intent in juxtaposing the two has not been to claim that the articles in DN are by any means ideal. Rather, my intent has simply been to show that despite the fact that DN takes a more comprehensive approach to reporting, neither paper is completely objective. Both SvD and DN shed a negative light in general over Rosengård, neglecting to report on positive aspects and events. In fact, through my initial

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<sup>270</sup> TT, "Ifrågasätter rapport om Rosengård," *Dagens Nyheter*, January 29, 2009, <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/ifragasatter-rapport-om-rosengard01.485690>. "Det är forskare vid Centrum för Mellanösternstudier och Männsliga rättighetsstudier vid Lunds universitet som vill gå till botten med den uppmärksammade rapporten, som beskriver hur religiös extremism vinner terräng i utsatta stadsdelar som Rosengård i Malmö. Lundaforsksarna uppger sig ha en kontinuerlig kontakt med de olika muslimska föreningarna i Malmö och ifrågasätter den bild som målas upp i rapporten från Försvarshögskolan och Centrum för asymmetriska hot – och terrorismstudier." Translation mine.

<sup>271</sup> Lisa Bjurwald, "Rosengård: radikaliserings exponerad," *Dagens Nyheter*, January 31, 2009, <http://www.dn.se/opinion/signerat/rosengard-radikaliserings-exponerad-1.486237>. "ÄR INNEHÅLLET i regeringens av CATS (Centrum för Asymmetriska Hot och TerrorismStudier) beställda radikaliseringsrapport för svårsmält? Att källmaterialet inte finns tillgängligt, bland annat på grund av hot mot de intervjuade, öppnar förstås för ris från andra forskare. Men delar av kritiken tar inte hänsyn till det svårigenomträngliga ämnet. Varför får inte fler privatpersoner komma till tals, undrar vissa. Fokus ligger dock på radikaliseringsprocessen, och när det gäller självvalt isolerade individer får man ofta ut mer av att djupintervjua personer från samhället runt omkring." Translation mine.



review of the articles published over the past year, it became clear that the only positive light which has been shed on this district focuses on the local football league.<sup>272</sup> Thus, by persistently depicting Rosengård as a problematic neighborhood filled with crime, youth delinquency, unemployment and extremism, the district has become isolated from the surrounding community. Moreover, through these articles Rosengård and its residents are depicted as utterly different from the rest of the population. In such, the press does play a fundamental role in underscoring the residents of Rosengård as “foreign” and different. In a society that is already highly segregated with little natural interaction between the host population and the “foreigners,” these depictions are extremely problematic and cultivate social exclusion and alienation.

### ***Traps of Alienation: the implications of segregation on integration***

*There is really a considerable amount of segregation in Sweden. There are some neighborhoods which I do not enter, I simply don't dare to. We always hear about Rosengård – it's completely sick there.*

Telephone Interview with Project Leader (Volvo Finance, Bank AB), interview with author, trans. by author, March 22, 2009.

The emergence of racial enclaves through the ghettoization of the *Miljonprogram* housing districts has proved the single largest barrier to successful integration in Sweden. Isolated from the larger society, these districts are perpetually targeted as “at risk” neighborhoods, overcrowded and densely populated with immigrants who often lack language skills and employment opportunities. Through the perpetual discrimination, stigmatization and criminalization of districts such as Rosengård, these spaces have become traps of alienation, isolating rather than integrating people into the larger society.

The degree of segregation in Sweden has had troublesome consequences. Establishing what many consider “two entirely separate worlds,” the lack of interaction between diverse members in society has exacerbated discrimination and racism against those who appear “different” or foreign.<sup>273</sup> Geographical locations and spaces have thus come to define those who live there in a way such that “if you say you live in Rosengård in Malmö, then you are likely to be discriminated against simply because of your address.”<sup>274</sup>

By physically positing a barrier to natural interaction, segregation prevents information flows between members in society. For this reason, the media plays a fundamental role in accounting for the deficit of knowledge about various groups in society. However, when the media plays into existing stereotypes, it plays a role in perpetuating the stigmatization of that which is foreign to native Swedes. In the Swedish press, the “*Miljonprogram* suburbs are presented as an anti-social and uncivilized space, a place without the depth of time and history, forever young and uncouth, an immature environment with residents who must be controlled and

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<sup>272</sup> TT, “Rosengård siktar högt i fotboll,” *Dagens Nyheter*, May 11, 2008, <http://www.dn.se/sport/rosengard-siktat-hogt-i-fotboll-1.617821>.

<sup>273</sup> Telephone interview with Adult Education Administrator, interview with author, trans. by author, March 23, 2009.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid.

taught to reach the same level as the rest of society.”<sup>275</sup> Through depictions like this, segregation becomes more than a physical boundary, evolving into a psychological division between “us” and “them” – the “foreigners.”

In spite of the degree of diversity reflected in statistics, the great divide in society has not led to a multicultural society by which all cultures are equally valued and respected. Rather, through the polarization of cultures, districts such as Rosengård have come to represent all that which is different or foreign from Swedish culture and society. In this sense, multiculturalism has been defined against the norm of Swedish society rather than within it.<sup>276</sup> By failing to place Swedish culture within the multicultural discourse, multiculturalism becomes “a hierarchical order which marginalizes isolates and makes the other into an object.”<sup>277</sup> Through this exoticism of multiculturalism, the very idea of multiculturalism becomes a microcosm for neocolonial perceptions of how to define the continued “relationship of the West to the rest of the world.”<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> Ericsson, Molina and Ristilammi, 28. “I den allmänna debatten framstår miljonprogramsförörterna som en antisocial och ociviliserad rumslighet, en plats utan tidsdjup och historier, evigt ung och ouppfostrad, en omogen miljö med invånare som måste kontrolleras och läras upp, för att fås att nå samma nivå som resten av samhället.” Translation mine.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid., 29. “Det kanske är tydligast ekonomiskt men även i konstruktionen av kulturer, identiteter och texter finns det en hierarkisk ordning som marginaliserar, isolerar och gör de Andra till objekt.” Translation mine.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid., 29. “Kolonialismen tillhör inte det förflutna utan präglar forfarande västvärldens förhållande till övriga världen.” Translation mine.

## Conclusion

This thesis has illustrated the complexities of immigrant incorporation. While an abstract scholarly debate over the best means of incorporating immigrants has already begun to surface, this scholarly debate is limited. Although it does offer a broad theoretical perspective on areas such as citizenship, civic integration and tolerance and the overarching debate between multiculturalism and civic nationalism, the contributions of this scholarship are only useful insofar as they help to understand the synergy of forces at work which may either foster or forge incorporation. The idea of integrating diverse populations, with a number of languages, cultures and religions is complex, deeply embedded within the larger frameworks of national identity, historical perspectives and future ambitions. In such, any scholarship which aims at addressing the issue of incorporation is inevitably limited by the extent to which both geographic location and time are fundamental to defining the resulting situation. In order to compensate for this limitation, I have taken an interdisciplinary approach, drawing upon policy, political structures, statistics and interviews, but also more abstract analyses of national identity and the role that identity politics play in the debates over incorporation.

In the first chapter I presented a historical context of migration in Sweden in an attempt to illustrate how the present patterns of migration are fundamentally different from past. I revealed that the modern waves of immigration to Sweden are characterized by a greater degree of diversity, but that they are nonetheless tied together by a shared motive – humanitarian protection. In addition, I drew upon both policy and political governance in an attempt to familiarize readers with the relative generosity of Swedish policies which are not only open, liberal and tolerant, but also provide ample protections through the extensive measures of the welfare state. My ultimate goal of this chapter was thus to offer a historical context through which to understand the ways in which the present state has amplified the demands of incorporation in Sweden.

Although the initial response on behalf of politicians and policy makers was to address these increasing demands with a progressive policy of multiculturalism, the second chapter has illustrated that a very recent shift away from multiculturalism is underway. To demonstrate this shift, I have conducted a detailed policy analysis of key legislations between 1975 and 2008 and illustrated how the most recent shifts in political discourse and policy objectives parallel the ongoing trends across Europe.<sup>279</sup> In addition, I revealed how this shift away from multiculturalism is in many ways a response to the failures of former policies to sufficiently address the increasing demands of incorporation. In an attempt to illustrate some of these failures I provided a discussion of segregation and social exclusion and the implications of both in fostering hostility, frustration and fear in society. In addition, I showed how the rise in hate crimes with a xenophobic motive is a visible manifestation of the increasing fear and hostility in society and how this rise is closely correlated to the imbalance of power present between majority and minority populations.

In the third chapter I argued that segregation presents the greatest impediment to immigrant incorporation in Sweden. Here I draw upon a case study of Rosengård in Malmö to show that the physical barrier between the host population and immigrants inhibits information flows and social interactions which are crucial to the integration of diverse members into society. In addition, with the assumption that in a physically segregated society the media plays a

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<sup>279</sup> The “retreat of multiculturalism” as proclaimed by Christian Joppke.

fundamental role in framing public perceptions, I have conducted a discourse analysis of two of the leading daily papers in Sweden to illustrate that the Swedish press does contribute to negative stereotypes, stigmatization and the making of traps of alienation. Reflecting some of the most multicultural neighborhoods in the country, I revealed how districts such as Rosengård have come to embody all that is perceived to be different and “foreign” from Swedish culture, society and norms. Because multiculturalism has become “geographically located to specific housing areas in the major cities,” multiculturalism has thereby been defined against Swedish society rather than within it.<sup>280</sup> For this reason I posited that multiculturalism in Sweden has been distorted from a policy of accommodation and toleration to a microcosm for Oriental perceptions of how to define the relationship between Swedes and immigrants.

The failures of immigrant incorporation in Sweden are not unique. Rather, the presence of low socio-economic statuses, labor market discrimination, high unemployment rates and segregation continue to disproportionately affect immigrant populations across the EU. Through infallible stereotyping and stigmatization, immigrants have become the scapegoats of society, being blamed for their unequal burden on welfare systems, increased criminality and their overall failure to integrate into host societies. Moreover, with the perception of new threats such as extremism and terrorism, the “incompatibility” of certain cultures and religions has been seen as a fundamental impediment on the continued security and stability of European nations.

Since the formalization of the Schengen Agreements (1985, 1990) national issues have begun to overflow territorial boundaries presenting the EU with a greater responsibility to monitor over and regulate the 27 member nations. While the removal of internal borders has certainly played a role in boosting economic trade and cooperation within the EU, the ease of internal security measures has been thought to pose great security threats for member nations. Due to the inescapable “spill-over” of national issues into transnational spaces, efforts to harmonize immigration and integration policies have become a top priority of the EU’s Agenda.

### ***The Harmonization of European Integration Policies***

Despite the continued integration dilemma facing a number of European nations, efforts to harmonize a common agenda have been severely stifled by the bureaucratic nature of the EU and the divergences between national interests and supranational ambitions. Nonetheless, through a series of initiatives a set of guidelines and a common framework have been established. Through the Hague Programme in 2004, the importance of developing “supportive measures to help Member States to deliver better policies on integration so as to maximize the positive impact of migration on our society and economy and to prevent isolation and social exclusion of immigrant communities” was emphasized.<sup>281</sup> Following the prioritization of this field, a set of eleven Common Basic Principles outlined a general set of policy objectives and targets.<sup>282</sup> In addition, through initiatives such as the publication of the 2004 and 2007 Integration Handbooks for Policy-makers and Practitioners, basic guidelines for the

<sup>280</sup> The quote is from Westin, “The Effectiveness of Settlement and Integration Policies,” 36. The latter part of this sentence is conceived from Ericsson, Molina and Ristilammi, 93.

<sup>281</sup> Commission of the European Union, *The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice* COM (2005) 184, (Brussels: Commission of the EU, 2005), 6.

<sup>282</sup> European Council, *Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union* 14615/04 (Presse 321), Council of the European Union: Brussels, 2004, 15. See Appendix J.

formalization and implementation of policy have been identified.<sup>283</sup> Regardless of these initiatives however, the guidelines established provide nothing more than a general framework and are for this reason only substantial insofar as they allow for a standard by which to measure advancement. In this sense, to date little more than a standard benchmarking system has been established.

### ***The Harmonization of European Immigration Policies***

*Sweden must maintain open and flexible rules because the solution to the problems on the Southern coastlines and Eastern borders is not in raising the wall.*

Andreas Ollinen, Political Advisor to Tobias Billström, Minister of Migration and Asylum,  
Telephone Interview, March 24, 2009

Since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, “an area of freedom, security and justice” was established under the first pillar of the EU—Justice and Home Affairs—in an effort to raise the policy realms of free movement, immigration and asylum to a supranational level.<sup>284</sup> Despite providing a legal base from which to begin harmonizing a common European agenda, the process has been largely hampered by the intergovernmental structure of governance by which decisions can only be reached through the principle of unanimity.<sup>285</sup> National interests have impeded on supranational objectives, hampering the potential for efficient policy making.

Despite the structural barriers to harmonization, a common agenda – The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum – was ratified at the EU Summit in October 2008. Drawing upon the Common Principles which were outlined in the EU initiative “A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions, and tools” just months before, the European Pact has been widely criticized by human rights activists and “sending countries” as a conservative attempt to restrict immigration to the EU.<sup>286</sup> Initiated by the French Presidency, the pact is in many ways a reflection of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s conservative stance on immigration.<sup>287</sup> In addition to defining five future commitments, the pact outlines a blue card system by which to recruit only highly skilled professionals and a system of “circular migration” to allow European nations to recruit temporary unskilled labor from developing nations.<sup>288</sup> While the promotion of a blue card system is easily read as an effort to change the composition of immigration to attract more qualified individuals, the implications of a system of “circular migration” are much more severe.

<sup>283</sup> Jan Niessen and Yongmi Schibel, “Integration Handbook for Policy-makers and Practitioners,” (European Communities, 2007), [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/doc\\_centre/immigration/integration/doc/2007/handbook\\_2007\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/immigration/integration/doc/2007/handbook_2007_en.pdf).

<sup>284</sup> Andrew Geddes, “Immigration and European Integration: towards fortress Europe?” (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) 110.

<sup>285</sup> The first half of this sentence was derived from Lavenex, 1. The latter half from Geddes, 111.

<sup>286</sup> Commission of the European Union, *On Common Principles for further development of the Common Immigration Policy: A platform for a new European approach* SEC (2008) 2027, (Brussels: Commission of the EU, 2008). See Appendix K for a complete list of these principles. Elizabeth Collett, “The EU Immigration Pact – from Hague to Stockholm, via Paris,” (*European Policy Center*, 2008) 4, <http://www.epc.eu>

<sup>287</sup> Elizabeth Collett, “The EU Immigration Pact – from Hague to Stockholm, via Paris,” (*European Policy Center*, 2008) 2, <http://www.epc.eu>.

<sup>288</sup> Council of the European Union, *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum* (13440/08 ASIM 68), (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2008). See Appendix L for a list of the five commitments.

In many ways a direct reflection of former guest worker policies, a system of circular migration will inevitably lead to the notion of “second-class residents” who provide seasonal work to European nations.<sup>289</sup> Positing a break from the EU’s traditional role in promoting universal human rights and normative influence, the European Pact appears to be in line with increasingly conservative public sentiments across the EU and the perceived threats that immigration allegedly poses.<sup>290</sup>

While the ratification of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum suggests a sharp break from former policies and the normative principles that the EU has traditionally promoted, it appears to be provoked by the growing fears of the threats of terrorism and the current financial downturn. Nonetheless, the approval of this pact does support the growing trend in Europe by which the “limits of the host society’s capacity to integrate foreigners are also frequently used as an important justification for restricting immigration.”<sup>291</sup> Despite the justification of this pact, through the alienation of nations such as Sweden who have just recently dropped all restrictions to immigration, it is clear that the affirmative position taken against immigration will present a challenge to the future of harmonization in the EU. In a telephone interview Political Advisor Andreas Ollinen commented that “the potentials for harmonization of migration appear less likely due to the fact that Sweden has come much further than blue card systems and neocolonial forms of circular migration.”<sup>292</sup> In fact, he asserted that the “solution to the problems on the Southern coastlines and Eastern borders is not in raising the wall.”<sup>293</sup> Nonetheless, he did comment on the importance of harmonization in the area of asylum noting that,

*Cooperation with the European Union is very realistic in the area of common European Asylum policies. It is necessary to make it less important where to seek asylum. In 2007, 75 percent of Iraqi asylum-seekers in Sweden were granted resident permits while a number of other countries granted none.*<sup>294</sup>

Although the momentum for the harmonization of a common asylum system in the EU is already underway, a coordinated asylum system cannot be a means to simply distribute the burden of asylum across the EU. While harmonization can certainly help to promote the normative power of the EU through a European commitment to protect those in need, a harmonized system needs to be more than simply a method for nations such as Sweden, with a longstanding commitment to safeguarding the right to asylum, to push problems beyond national borders. Rather than simply addressing how to ease extensive burdens and rid nations of problems, initiatives must be focused on how to solve the existing problems.

With predictions that immigration to the EU will persist and that by 2050 one in every five Europeans will be Muslim, European nations must begin to recognize both the inevitability

<sup>289</sup> *The Economist*, “Circulate or Integrate?” January 5, 2008. <http://lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/delivery/PrintDoc.do?fromCart=false&dnldFile>.

<sup>290</sup> Collett, 2.

<sup>291</sup> Bimal Ghosh, “The Challenge of Integration: A Global Perspective,” *Managing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities towards Immigrants*, (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2005), 2.

<sup>292</sup> Ollinen.

<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*

of diversity and the permanency of immigration.<sup>295</sup> Immigration should no longer be perceived as a threat to national identities or to the safety and stability of nations. Rather, more attention needs to be drawn to the benefits that immigration can bestow on European nations and societies. In addition, effective measures need to be taken to prevent the continued disparities between host populations and immigrants. So long as there is diversity, racism and xenophobia will persist; however, extensive measures need to be taken to lessen the discrepancies between host populations and immigrants and to curb the rise in such blatant hostility against those who appear different. Although anti-discrimination legislation does provide a legal framework through which to criminalize offenses, such measures are ineffective in addressing the root of the problem. Rather, multicultural educations and dialogue need to become top priorities in nations experiencing a rapid influx of diverse languages, cultures and religions. Through fostering greater knowledge and understanding of the diversity present in society, peaceful coexistence is possible. Conversely, if the EU decides to continue to inhibit entry through the blockade of its borders and realization of “fortress Europe,” the future for the EU will be gray. A “fortress Europe” is not only exclusionary, but also fundamentally unsustainable.

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<sup>295</sup> Pan.

## Appendix

### Appendix A: Terminology

**Asylum Seeker:** a person who arrives in Sweden seeking humanitarian protection.

**Civic Integration:** a set of vertically implemented policies/courses to foster integration. Such policies include language programs, civic and history courses as well as courses to assist in the employment process.

**Foreign born:** a person who was not born in Sweden, regardless of citizenship.

**Immigrant background:** a person who is born in Sweden to two immigrants.

**Incorporation Model:** a comprehensive description of the entire incorporation system including discourses, policies, legislation and institutions.

**Jus Sanguinis:** a principle that refers to the inheritance of citizenship; citizenship is acquired through the citizenship of the parents.

**Multiculturalism:** a doctrine of incorporation that advocates cultural recognition and accommodation in an attempt to foster cultural knowledge, diversity and tolerance.

**Multicultural policies:** vertically implemented policies that promote legal cultural recognition, accommodation and protection through policies such as bilingualism, bilingual education, government funding of group associations, legal recognition of minorities and groups.

**Refugee:** a person who is outside the country of his or her nationality, because he or she feels a well founded fear of persecution on the grounds of race, nationality, religious or political belief, or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or membership of a particular social group and is unable, or because of his or her fear is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. *Aliens Act (2005)*

**The Swedish Model:** the incorporation model adopted in Sweden; a model of multiculturalism, deeply embedded in the welfare state.

**Third country national:** an alien who is not a national of the EU.



**Appendix B: The Hague Programme: ten priorities for the next five years***(1) Fundamental rights and citizenship: creating fully-fledged policies*

Ensure the full development of policies monitoring and promoting respect for fundamental rights for all people and of policies enhancing citizenship.

*(2) The fight against terrorism: working toward a global response*

Focus on different aspects of prevention, preparedness and response in order to further enhance, and where necessary complement, Member States capabilities to fight terrorism, in relevant areas such as recruitment, financing, risk analysis, protection of critical infrastructures and consequence management.

*(3) A common asylum area: establish an effective harmonized procedure in accordance with the Union's values and humanitarian tradition*

Work towards the establishment of a common asylum area taking into account the humanitarian tradition and respect of international obligations of the Union and the effectiveness of a harmonized procedure.

*(3) Migration management; defining a balanced approach*

Define a balanced approach to migration management by developing a common immigration policy which addresses legal migration at Union level, while further strengthening the fight against illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, in particular women and children.

*(5) Integration: maximizing the positive impact of migration on our society and Economy*

Develop supportive measures to help Member States to deliver better policies on integration so as to maximize the positive impact of migration on our society and economy and to prevent isolation and social exclusion of immigrant communities. This will contribute to understanding and dialogue between religions and cultures, based on the fundamental values of the Union.

*(6) Internal borders, external borders and visas: developing an integrated management of external borders for a safer Union*

Further develop an integrated management of external borders and a common visa policy, while ensuring the free movement of persons (people-to-people).

*(7) Privacy and security in sharing information: striking the right balance*

Strike the right balance between privacy and security in the sharing of information among law enforcement and judicial authorities, by supporting and encouraging a constructive dialogue between all parties concerned to identify balanced solutions, while fully respecting fundamental rights of privacy and data protection, as well as the principle of availability of information as laid down in the Hague Programme.

*(8) Organized crime: developing a strategic concept*

Develop and implement a strategic concept on tackling organized crime at EU level. Make full use of and further develop Europol and Eurojust.

*(9) Civil and criminal justice: guaranteeing an effective European area of justice for all*

Guarantee an European area of justice by ensuring an effective access to justice for all and the enforcement of judgments. Approximation will be pursued, in particular through the adoption of rules ensuring a high degree of protection of persons, with a view to building mutual trust and strengthening mutual recognition, which remains the cornerstone of judicial cooperation. Improve the EU substantive contract law.


*(10) Freedom, Security and Justice: sharing responsibility and solidarity*

Give practical meaning to notions of shared responsibility and solidarity between Member States by providing adequate financial resources that can meet the objectives of Freedom, Security and Justice in the most efficient way.

**Source** - Commission of the European Union. *The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice*. COM (2005) 184. Brussels: Commission of the EU, 2005.

**Appendix C: Population Changes, 1850-2007**

**Population and population changes in Sweden by observations and period.  
(number)**



© Statistics Sweden

Source – Statistiska Centralbyrån. <http://www.scb.se>.

**Appendix D: List of Human Rights Conventions Ratified by Sweden**

**United Nations**

9 December 1948

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

28 July 1951

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees

7 March 1965

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

16 December 1966

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

16 December 1966

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

16 December 1966

Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

21 January 1967

Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

18 December 1979

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

10 December 1984

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

20 November 1989

Convention on the Rights of the Child

15 December 1989

Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty

17 July 1998

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

6 October 1999

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women

25 May 2000

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict

**Council of Europe**

4 November 1950

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

20 March 1952

Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention

18 October 1961

European Social Charter

16 September 1963

Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the First Protocol

28 April 1983

Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of death penalty

22 November 1984

Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

26 November 1987

European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

5 May 1988

Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter

21 October 1991

Protocol amending the European Social Charter (not in force)

5 November 1992

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

4 November 1993

Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

4 November 1993

Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

1 February 1995

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

9 November 1995

Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints

3 May 1996  
European Social Charter (revised)

3 May 2002  
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances

## **ILO**

The International Labour Organization has adopted 185 conventions until now, many of which are related to Human Rights. Sweden is presently bound through ratification to apply 76 ILO conventions, amongst others the following eights Conventions on Fundamental Principles at Work:

28 June 1930  
Convention on Forced Labour (No. 29)

9 July 1948  
Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (No. 87)

1 July 1949  
Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (No. 98)

29 June 1951  
Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (No. 100)

25 June 1957  
Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105)

25 June 1958  
Convention concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation (No. 111)


26 June 1973  
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No. 138)

17 June 1999  
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (No. 182)

Government's Human Rights Website. [http://www.manskligarattigheter.se/extra/pod/?module\\_instance=2&action=pod\\_show&id=4](http://www.manskligarattigheter.se/extra/pod/?module_instance=2&action=pod_show&id=4).

### **Appendix E : Asylum Seekers by Country of Citizenship, 2007**

**Asylum-seekers by country of citizenship.  
Period=2007. (number)**




© Statistics Sweden

**Source** – Statistiska Centralbyrån. <http://www.scb.se>


### **Appendix F: Foreign Born Persons by Country of Birth, 2008**

**Foreign-born persons by country of birth.  
Period=2008. (number)**



© Statistics Sweden

**Source** – Statistiska Centralbyrån. <http://www.scb.se>

**Appendix G: Reported Hate Crimes, 1998-2008**

Source - Brå- Brottsförebyggande Rådet. "Hate Crime." Stockholm, Sweden: Brottsförebyggande Rådet, 2008. [http://www.bra.se/extra/pod/?action=pod\\_show&id=53&module\\_instance=11](http://www.bra.se/extra/pod/?action=pod_show&id=53&module_instance=11).

**Appendix H: Number and Percentage of Police Reports, Hate Crime Motive, 2004-2007**

Number and percentage of police reports, with a hate crime motive, 2004-2007								
Motive	Year 2004		2005		2006		2007	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Xenophobia	2,263	75	2,272	77	2,189	67	2,489	70
Islamophobia	..	..	..	..	252	8	206	6
anti-Semitism	151	5	111	4	134	4	118	3
Homophobia	614	20	563	19	684	21	723	20
Total number	3,028	100	2,946	100	3,259	100	3,536	100

Source – Klara Klingspor and Anna Molarin. "Hate Crimes 2007: A summary of reports to the police motivated by xenophobia, islamophobia, anti-Semitism and homophobia," *Brå Report No 2008:15*, (Stockholm, Sweden: Brå-Brottsförebyggande Rådet, 2009), 21.



**Appendix I: Violent Crimes per 1000 Foreigners**

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Austria									0.44
France							0.18		
Germany	0.19	0.11	0.08	0.08	0.1	0.09	0.1	0.13	0.09
Sweden					0.87	1.05	1.20	1.20	1.17
Switzerland									0.08

**Source** - Crawford, Beverly. "Globalization and Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach." In *Conflicts and tensions*, ed. Anheier, Helmut K., and Yudhishtir Raj Isar. *The Cultures and Globalization Series*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2007. Austria, France, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland were compared using OECD population statistics and reports on racial violence found through RAXEN.

## **Appendix J: Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU**

### **1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.**

Integration is a dynamic, long-term, and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident. The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should create the opportunities for the immigrants' full economic, social, cultural, and political participation. Accordingly, Member States are encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in integration policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and responsibilities.

### **2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union. Everybody resident in the EU must adapt and adhere closely to the basic values of the**

European Union as well as to Member State laws. The provisions and values enshrined in European Treaties serve as both baseline and compass, as they are common to the Member States. They include respect for the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Furthermore they include respect for the provisions of the Charter of fundamental rights of the Union, which enshrine the concepts of dignity, freedom, equality and non-discrimination, solidarity, citizen's rights, and justice. Member States are responsible for actively assuring that all residents, including immigrants, understand, respect, benefit from, and are protected on an equal basis by the full scope of values, rights, responsibilities, and privileges established by the EU and Member State laws. Views and opinions that are not compatible with such basic values might hinder the successful integration of immigrants into their new host society and might adversely influence the society as a whole. Consequently successful integration policies and practices preventing isolation of certain groups are a way to enhance the fulfillment of respect for common European and national values.

### **3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.**

Employment is an important way for immigrants to make a visible contribution to Member State societies and to participate in the host society. At the workplace integration of immigrants can be promoted by the recognition of qualifications acquired in another country, by training opportunities that provide skills demanded at the workplace and policies and programmes that facilitate access to jobs and the transition to work. It is also important that there are sufficient incentives and opportunities for immigrants, in particular for those with the prospect of remaining, to seek and obtain employment. The targeting of measures to support immigrants in the European Employment Strategy is an indication of the important influence of employment on the integration process. It is important to make greater use of the European Employment Strategy and the European Social Inclusion Process, backed up by the European Social Fund (ESF), including the lessons learnt from the Equal Community Initiative to reach the Lisbon targets and to promote the combat against all forms of discrimination at the workplace. It is important that Member States, in cooperation with the social partners, pay particular attention to and undertake effective action against discrimination in the recruitment policies of employers on the grounds of ethnic origin of the candidates.

**4. Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.**

The importance of basic linguistic, historical, and civic knowledge is reflected in the increasing emphasis placed by several Member States on introductory programmes that focus on putting together the most appropriate toolkit to start the integration process. Pursuing such programmes will allow immigrants to quickly find a place in the key domains of work, housing, education, and health, and help start the longer-term process of normative adaptation to the new society. At the same time, such programmes become strategic investments in the economic and social well-being of society as a whole. Acquiring the language and culture of the host society should be an important focus. Full respect for the immigrants' and their descendants' own language and culture should be also an important element of integration policy.

**5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.**

Education is an important way to prepare people to participate in society, especially for newcomers. However, lifelong learning and employability are not the only benefits of education. Transferring knowledge about the role and working of societal institutions and regulations and transmitting the norms and values that form the binding element in the functioning of society are also a crucial goal of the educational system. Education prepares people to participate better in all areas of daily life and to interact with others. Consequently, education not only has positive effects for the individual, but also for the society as a whole. Educational arrears are easily transmitted from one generation to the next. Therefore, it is essential that special attention is given to the educational achievement of those who face difficulties within the school system. Given the critical role played by education in the integration of those who are new in a society – and especially for women and children scholastic underachievement, early school-leaving and of all forms of migrant youth delinquency should be avoided and made priority areas for policy intervention.

**6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration.**

If immigrants are to be allowed to participate fully within the host society, they must be treated equally and fairly and be protected from discrimination. EU law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin in employment, education, social security, healthcare, access to goods and services, and housing. Consequently, transparent rules, clearly articulated expectations and predictable benefits for law-abiding immigrants are prerequisites to better immigration and integration policies. Any legal exceptions to this accessibility must be legitimate and transparent. Access also implies taking active steps to ensure that public institutions, policies, housing, and services, wherever possible, are open to immigrants. These steps need to be in accordance with the implementation of the Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. It is important to monitor and evaluate the success of public institutions in serving immigrants, and that adjustments are being made on an ongoing basis. Conversely, uncertainty and unequal treatment breed disrespect for the rules and can marginalize immigrants and their families, socially and economically. The adverse implications of such marginalization continue to be seen across generations. Restrictions on the rights and privileges of non-nationals should be transparent and be made only after consideration of the integration consequences, particularly on the descendants of immigrants. Finally, the prospect of acquiring Member State citizenship can be an important incentive for integration.

**7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.**

Integration is a process that takes place primarily at the local level. The frequency and quality of private interactions and exchanges between immigrants and other residents are key elements of greater integration. There are many ways to encourage interaction. An important aspect is a greater focus on promoting the use of common forums, intercultural dialogue, spaces, and activities in which immigrants interact with other people in the host society, and on the sustained education of the host society about immigrants and immigrant cultures. Good cooperation among the different involved actors is necessary in order to stimulate these processes. Furthermore, implementation of active anti-discrimination policies, anti-racism policies, and awareness-raising activities to promote the positive aspects of a diverse society are important in this regard. The level of economic welfare in neighborhoods, the feeling of safety, the condition of public spaces, and the existence of stimulating havens for immigrant children and youngsters and other living conditions are all aspects that affect the image of the people who live in these areas. In many Member States, immigrant population groups are often concentrated in poor urban areas. This does not contribute to a positive integration process. Positive interaction between immigrants and the host society and the stimulation of this interaction contribute to successful integration and are therefore needed. Therefore, improving the living environment in terms of decent housing, good health care, neighborhood safety, and the availability of opportunities for education, voluntary work and job training is also necessary.

**8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.**

The cultures and religions that immigrants bring with them can facilitate greater understanding among people, ease the transition of immigrants into the new society and can enrich societies. Furthermore, the freedom to practice one's religion and culture is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Member States have an obligation to safeguard these rights. Furthermore, EU law prohibits discrimination in employment or occupation on the grounds of religion or belief. However, Member States also have a responsibility to ensure that cultural and religious practices do not prevent individual migrants from exercising other fundamental rights or from participating in the host society. This is particularly important as it pertains to the rights and equality of women, the rights and interests of children, and the freedom to practice or not to practice a particular religion. Constructive social, inter-cultural and interreligious dialogue, education, thoughtful public discourse, support for cultural and religious expressions that respect national and European values, rights and laws (as opposed to expressions that violate both the letter and spirit of such values and rights), and other non-coercive measures are the preferred way of addressing issues relating to unacceptable cultural and religious practices that clash with fundamental rights. However if necessary according to the law legal coercive measures can also be needed.

**9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.**

Allowing immigrants a voice in the formulation of policies that directly affect them may result in policy that better serves immigrants and enhances their sense of belonging. Wherever possible, immigrants should become involved in all facets of the democratic process.

Ways of stimulating this participation and generating mutual understanding could be reached by structured dialogue between immigrant groups and governments. Wherever possible, immigrants could even be involved in elections, the right to vote and joining political parties. When unequal forms of membership and levels of engagement persist for longer than is either reasonable or necessary, divisions or differences can become deeply rooted. This requires urgent attention by all Member States.

**10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.**

The integration of immigrants is deeply influenced by a broad array of policies that cut across institutional competencies and levels of government. In this context particularly consideration needs to be given to the impact of immigration on public services like education, social services and others, especially at the level of regional and local administrations, in order to avoid a decrease in the quality standards of these services. Accordingly, not only within Member States but also at the European level, steps are needed to ensure that the focus on integration is a mainstream consideration in policy formulation and implementation, while at the same time specifically targeted policies for integrating migrants are being developed. Although Governments and public institutions at all levels are important actors, they are not the only ones. Integration occurs in all spheres of public and private life. Numerous non-governmental actors influence the integration process of immigrants and can have an additional value. Examples in this respect are, trade unions, businesses, employer organizations, political parties, the media, sports clubs and cultural, social and religious organizations. Cooperation, coordination and communication between all of these actors are important for effective integration policy. The involvement of both immigrant and the other people in the host society is also necessary.

**11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.**

Irrespective of the level of integration policy efforts, it is important to know whether these efforts are effective and make progress. Although it is a process rather than an outcome, integration can be measured and policies evaluated. Sets of integration indicators, goals, evaluation mechanisms and benchmarking can assist measuring and comparing progress, monitor trends and developments. The purpose of such evaluation is to learn from experience, a way to avoid possible failures of the past, adjust policy accordingly and showing interest for each other's efforts. When Member States share information about their evaluative tools at European level and, where appropriate, develop European criteria (indicators, benchmarks) and gauges for the purposes of comparative learning, the process of knowledge-sharing will be made more effective. The exchange of information has already proven to be useful within the National Contact Points on integration. Exchanging information provides for taking into account the different phases in which Member States find themselves in the development of their own integration policies and strategies."

**Source** - European Council. *Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union*. 14615/04 (Presse 321). Council of the European Union: Brussels, 2004.

## **Appendix K: Common Principles for Immigration Policy**

### **Principle 1 – Clear rules**

Drawing up clear and transparent rules is a pre-requisite for the definition of an efficient and effective migration policy. Migrants should therefore be provided with objective and clear information on the diverse existing legal channels to be admitted in Europe, on their future rights and obligations, including to respect the basic values of the European Union, and should also be provided, in origin and destination countries, with concrete and realistic possibilities to fulfill the requirements enabling them to be issued with a visa and a residence permit. The objective of better integration will also follow from an enlarged set of rights granted to third-country nationals, who should benefit as far as possible from the same rights as EU citizens.

### **Principle 2 – Economic migration**

Benefits of migration are maximized when the economic needs of the host society are taken into consideration, without, of course, prejudice to forms of migration other than labour migration. As regards economic migration, conditions of admission should, as far as possible, build on a needs assessment – to which the upcoming assessment of the future skills requirement in Europe until 2020 will contribute –, immigration profiles and labour matching policies, using possibly training in countries of origin. This policy therefore accompanies employment and education policies seeking to harness existing potential and to reduce unemployment of third-country nationals already legally residing in the EU, and is also to be carried out in full respect of the principle of Community preference.

### **Principle 3 – Integration**

Integration of third-country nationals is a process of mutual accommodation by both the host societies and the immigrants, and is an essential factor in realizing the full benefits of immigration. The mainstreaming approach based on the Common Agenda for Integration has already been followed and should be further strengthened. Specific integration programmes for newcomers, adaptation of public services to migrants' particularities, fighting against discrimination, promotion of diversity management at the work place and awareness raising amongst all actors concerned, fall under the obligations of the host society. Gender issues should be paid specific attention. Development of indicators and regular evaluation are also indispensable prerequisite for improving the situation.

### **Principle 4 – Political solidarity, mutual trust, transparency, shared responsibility and information**

In order to achieve efficiency and coherence in migration policies at national and EU level, it is necessary further to strengthen coordination between the different competent tiers. Coordination requires that, at Member State level, as well as at the EU level, migration policy is designed and implemented in a transparent manner, and in full compliance with the competencies of each level. To that end, the Mutual Information System mechanism, created in 2006, exchange of information, as well as exchange of best practices, should be further promoted, allowing to establish mutual trust and to send clear and unambiguous messages.

### **Principle 5 – Solidarity**

Financial solidarity is a valuable tool ensuring a similar application of Community legislation and policies without imposing a disproportionate task on individual Member States and promoting mutual trust through cooperation, dissemination of best practice and enhancement of knowledge.

Designed as a flexible instrument, implementation of the Framework Programme needs to be carried out at regular intervals. Total appropriations of the Programme, in the context of the budget review 2009, as well as the distribution key for the allocation of the resources to the Member States, will be questioned, following an evaluation of the implementation, with a view to adapt to new national situations.

#### **Principle 6 – Need for a genuine partnership with third countries**

An effective management of migration flows requires a genuine partnership with third countries. This implies that the EU needs to work much closer during the coming years with partner countries on opportunities for legal mobility, building capacities for migration management, a better matching between labour markets trends and human capital development, protecting fundamental rights and fighting irregular flows. Moreover, more resources will be focused on compliance with good standards at work, and the EU will further develop policies on ethical recruitment, prevention and mitigation of brain drain and brain waste, possibilities for circular migration, harnessing the development potential of remittances, facilitating returnee entrepreneur businesses. Exploratory work is taking place on mobility partnerships, paving the way towards firm arrangements for the management of labour immigration, with selected long-term strategic allies.

#### **Principle 7 – Enhance security and facilitate the entry of bona fide travelers**

It is necessary to build on the achievements currently under way with a greater degree of harmonization, through the proposed visa code and increased cooperation between Member States. Only development towards truly European short-stay visas will ensure an equal treatment of all visa applicants. A logical and necessary development towards managing the visa applications at common European visa centres should accompany the move toward European visas. The pooling of resources and the economies of scale that would be achieved would also ensure easy access of applicants to the premises where such visas would be issued.

#### **Principle 8 – Integrity of Schengen territory**

Diverse responses are needed, including action to develop border surveillance, measures to reinforce the operational coordination between Member States through FRONTEX, and introduction of an entry-exit system to record the dates of entry and exit of each third-country national admitted to the Schengen area. It is also necessary to ensure coherence between internal and external policies in the field of border management. A more strategic approach in selecting key partners for this purpose is needed, with a clearer definition of comprehensive long-term objectives. The mechanisms for ensuring burden-sharing and mutual solidarity between Member States in managing the EU's external borders must also be continuously refined.

#### **Principle 9 – Enhancing the fight against illegal employment and undeclared work**

Initiatives in this area should focus on prevention, sanctions and enforcement and must involve European institutions, Member States and key stakeholders, such as social partners. An important step forward will be made with the adoption of the proposal for a Directive providing for sanctions against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals<sup>1</sup>. Incentives towards declared work should be bolstered and further efforts to enforce sanctions should be undertaken, materializing in additional national financial and human resources, including the establishment of specialized control bodies, risk analysis, enhanced coordination and a better evaluation of controls. Moreover, legislation, monitoring and sanctions schemes must adapt to new kinds of fraud such as sub-contracting and false self-employment.

**Principle 10 – Fighting smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings**

National and Community legislation must be reviewed in order better to reflect new criminal phenomena and to offer an enhanced protection to victims. Accordingly, existing the legal framework on the facilitation of illegal entry and stay as well as the sexual exploitation of children should be strengthened and adapted to today's realities. Moreover, it should be ensured that investigative techniques, funding of civil society organizations and more generally all prosecution and protection measures are endowed sufficient resources by Member States. On the other hand, owing to the cross-border nature of the phenomena, EU action should be stepped up at regional and international level, especially making use of international instruments against human trafficking.

**Principle 11 – Sustainable and effective return policy – regularizations**

An effective readmission and return policy, whilst respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the person concerned, requires an improved operational cooperation among Member States, an enhanced role of FRONTEX in supporting joint return operations, and intensified cooperation and partnership with third countries and the setting up of common standards. Furthermore, experience has shown that is indispensable to go beyond the Council Decision of 5 October 2006 on the establishment of a mutual information mechanism concerning Member States' measures in the areas of asylum and immigration, in particular when it comes to regularization measures, which could have spill-over effects on other Member States.

**Source** - Commission of the European Union. *On Common Principles for further development of the Common Immigration Policy: A platform for a new European approach* SEC (2008) 2027. Brussels: Commission of the EU, 2008.

**Appendix L: The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, five commitments**

1. to organize legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by each Member State, and to encourage integration;
2. to control illegal immigration by ensuring that illegal immigrants return to their countries of origin or to a country of transit;
3. to make border controls more effective;
4. to construct a Europe of asylum;
5. to create a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between migration and development.

**Source**- Council of the European Union. *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum* 13440/08 ASIM 68. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2008.



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