

UC Santa Barbara

UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Gender, State, and Women in Turkey: Intellectual Women's Interactions with the Conservative Consensus, 1935-1960

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6fn2r3d9>

Author

Sözmen, Mesadet Maria

Publication Date

2023

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Santa Barbara

Gender, State, and Women in Turkey: Intellectual Women's Interactions with the
Conservative Consensus, 1935-1960

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Global Studies

by

Mesadet Maria Sözmen

Committee in charge:

Professor Janet Afary, Co-Chair

Professor Paul Amar, Co-Chair

Professor Kevin Anderson

Professor Esther Lezra

Professor Sherene Seikaly

September 2023

The dissertation of Mesadet Maria Sözmen is approved.

Kevin Anderson

Esther Lezra

Sherene Seikaly

Janet Afary, Committee Co-Chair

Paul Amar, Committee Co-Chair

June 2023

Gender, State, and Women in Turkey: Intellectual Women's Interactions with the
Conservative Consensus, 1935-1960

Copyright © 2023

by

Mesadet Maria Sözmen

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee members Janet Afary, Paul Amar, Kevin Anderson, Esther Lezra, and Sherene Seikaly for supporting me during my doctoral education and dissertation project. Janet Afary has been a generous mentor, who guided me with her expertise in gender studies in Iran and the Middle East and compassionately supported me throughout my dissertation project. Paul Amar has pushed me to critically recognize the globally relevant, locally grounded questions in my research. Kevin Anderson, one of the most knowledgeable and generous scholars I met, has guided me in thinking my questions and themes in a more comprehensive way. Esther Lezra has been a mentor since the very first day of my PhD program and always encouraged me to follow my intellectual interests. I am indebted to Sherene Seikaly for being a role model in and outside the classroom and teaching me that genuine critique requires generosity, precision, and brevity. I would also like to thank UCSB Global Studies and UCSB Center for Middle East Studies for providing funding for research and UCSB International Humanities Center for providing funding for dissertation writing. I am thankful for my peers at UCSB Global Studies. Many thanks for their friendship in Santa Barbara to Sylvia Cifuentes, Onur Kapdan, Jesilyn Faust, Javiera Madrid, Katja Siepmann, George Ygarza, Pratik Raghu, Zeynep Saydi and Leila Zonouzi. I am grateful to my always supporting and caring friends Büşra Aktaş, Yakup Başer, Gülfem Çetin, Hilal Dikmen, Burcu Durdabak, Sıla Ersayoğlu, Efe Güzeloğlu, Sinan Kaya, Sena Kaya, İpek Koçak, Özge Kurgan, Ariya Toprak, Gamze Tosun, Kerem Renda, Özge Sever, and Müjde Yılmaz.

I thank to my colleagues at Postane, where I've been working for the last year while finishing up this dissertation. Special thanks to my cousin and director Yaşar Adnan Adanalı, for providing me with the invaluable support by allowing me for time-offs to meet my deadlines.

I am indebted to my family. The unconditional love and trust of my mother Nicole Sözman, my brothers Mithat Fabian Sözman and Ahmet Mustafa Sözman, my aunts Şükran Adanalı and Şeyda Şahin, and my cousin Ayşe Adanalı have supported me all the way through. I thank Fazilet Kurgan and Armağan Kurgan for their warmth, care, and thoughtfulness.

I lost my father Hasan Adnan Sözman at the early stages of my dissertation research. He, like many boys of his generation, was named after Turkey's populist leader of the 1950s. Only after finalizing the dissertation that I realized the funny peculiar coincidence of being drawn to a historical period that deeply marked the men and women in my family. In a way, I've processed my grief, longing, and gratitude for my father in the pages of this work.

I am grateful to have Toni, the funniest, the laziest, and the most in-his-own-way loving cat. He simultaneously did nothing and everything to support me during my PhD.

The brilliance of my partner Sarp Kurgan is ingrained in each and every page of this dissertation. He was my sharpest critique and my biggest support. I am blessed to have the most caring and generous intellectual companion. This work is dedicated to him.

VITA OF MESADET MARIA SÖZMEN

June 2023

EDUCATION

2014 BA: Boğaziçi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences –
Department of Political Science and International Relations

2016 MA: Boğaziçi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences –
Department of Political Science and International Relations

MA thesis: Core Theoretical Debates in the Post-1980 Feminist Movement in Turkey:
The Subject of Feminism and (Im)Possibilities of Feminist Politics

2016-2023: PhD: University of California, Santa Barbara- Global Studies

PhD dissertation title: Gender, State, and Women in Turkey: Intellectual Women’s
Interactions with the Conservative Consensus: 1935-1960

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Turkish (Native), English (Fluent), German (Intermediate)

PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bogazici University

Pols 101 – Introduction to Political Science, Fall 2014

Teaching Assistant, Department of Global Studies, UCSB

Global 2 – Global Socioeconomic and Political Processes, Fall 2016, Winter 2021

Global 1 – Global History, Culture, and Ideology, Fall 2017, Winter 2018, Spring 2021,
Winter 2022

Global 110 – Global Culture and Ethics, Fall 2019, Fall 2020, Fall 2021

Global 120 – Global Ideologies and World Order, Winter 2017

Global 130 – Global Economy and Development, Spring 2017

Global 172 – International Organizations and Global Governance, Spring 2018

Teaching Assistant, Department of Feminist Studies, UCSB

Femst 40, Women, Representation and Cultural Production, Fall 2018

Femst 30, Women, Development and Globalization, Winter 2019

Femst 50, Grassroots Transnational Feminist Movements, Spring 2019

Research Assistant, UCSB

January 2020 - April 2020: “Marriage and Family in the Middle East” supervised by Janet
Afary (UCSB), Roger Friedland (UCSB), Maria Charles (UCSB)

Research Assistant, Bogazici University

June 2015 - August 2015: Project by Prof. Hakan Yılmaz at Bogazici University

PUBLICATIONS

“Global Feminism Must be Anti-Orientalist and Anti-Imperialist: Review Essay on Land of the Unconquerable, Children of Afghanistan, and Underground Girls of Kabul” *Feminist Dissent*. (Forthcoming).

Construction of Gender in The Good Person of Szechwan, Bogazici University Women’s Journal, vol 23. (Fall 2012) <http://www.bukak.boun.edu.tr/?p=826&page=2>

GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

2019: UCSB Global Studies Summer Field Research Grant

2019: UCSB CMES Summer Research Grant

2020: UCSB Global Studies Summer Field Research Grant

2020: UCSB CMES Summer Research Grant

2021: UCSB Global Studies Summer Field Research Grant

2021: UCSB CMES Summer Research Grant

2021: UCSB Humanities & Social Sciences Research Grant

2021: UCSB Interdisciplinary Humanities Center Dissertation Fellowship

CONFERENCES PRESENTED

Annual Meeting of Middle East Studies Association: Paper Title: Gender, Modernization and the Project of State Feminism in Turkey: Women’s Discourses and Practices of Frugality From the 1930s to 1960 (December 2021).

Annual Meeting of Middle East Studies Association: Paper Title: State Feminism in Turkey’s Democrat Party Era: Women’s Political Agency, Feminist Dissidence and Complicity (October 2020).

16th Annual GSA Conference entitled *Global Social Movements: Left and Right*: Paper Title: Arendtian Understanding of Truth, Lying and Action: Defactualization and Dehistoricization of the Armenian Genocide (2017).

2nd Istanbul Critical Theory Conference: Arendt and Critical Theory Today: Paper Title: Arendtian Understanding of Truth, Lying and Action: Defactualization and Dehistoricization of the Armenian Genocide (2017).

ORGANIZING EXPERIENCE

November 2015-June 2016: Istanbul Critical Theory Conference: Adorno and Politics as Conference assistant

2018: The 2nd Annual Society of Global Scholars Conference on Alter Globalizations: Another World is (Still) Possible as conference co-organizer

NON-ACADEMIC PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

June 2022- Present: Head of Operations at Bak Postacı LLC

September 2020 – June 2022: Coordinator at UCSB Iranian Studies Initiative Internship Program

February 2020 – June 2021: Editorial and translation support for print and online journal *beyond.istanbul* published by Center for Spatial Justice based in Istanbul.

MEMBERSHIPS

2017- present: The Society of Global Scholars

2020-present: Middle East Studies Association

ABSTRACT

Gender, State, and Women in Turkey: Intellectual Women's Interactions with the
Conservative Consensus, 1935-1960

by

Mesadet Maria Sözmen

Located at the intersection of Global Studies, Gender Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies, this dissertation looks at Turkey's intellectual women in Kemalist and socialist movements in relation to Turkey's gendered modernization process from 1935 to 1960. The research focuses on how women activists shaped their discourses on economic and moral frugality, nurturing the nation's womanhood, and guarding the homeland. It further attends to the influence of their discourses and practices over Turkey's modernization in these transformative years. This dissertation asks: how did intellectual women contest and negotiate their rights and duties in a nationalist modernization project during its implementation and transformation periods in the case study of Turkish Kemalist and socialist women? The research utilizes qualitative textual analysis, focusing on sources published by Kemalist and independent socialist intellectual women. The sources include newspaper and journal articles, memoirs, interviews, speeches, travelogues, biographies, and literary works such as short stories and novels. Many studies emphasize the gendered nature of modernization processes by emphasizing how nationalist movements situated the women in a 'cultural' or 'spiritual' realm. This dissertation argues that women intellectuals contested this positioning and sought to open new political fields of struggle to expand their influence

even when they rallied behind nationalist projects. This dissertation makes two interventions in extant studies on modernization, gender, and nationalism. First, the dissertation challenges the most significant works on Turkish women's movements that consider the 1935-1960 era as the 'silent years of Turkish feminism.' Challenging the 'conservative consensus' framework, this dissertation reads this period of women's activism as 'contested modernization.' Second, the dissertation adds to studies that analyze anticolonial nationalist politics from a prism of material and spiritual realms by suggesting that the definitions of these two realms were in fact fields of political contestation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	13
----------------------------------	-----------

<u>CHAPTER 1: NATIONALISM, MODERNIZATION, AND WOMEN’S ACTIVISM: A LITERATURE REVIEW.....</u>	22
---	-----------

INTRODUCTION.....	22
PART 1) NATIONALISM & GENDER	23
PART 2) MODERNIZATION AND REMAKING GENDER ROLES.....	35
PART 3) WOMEN’S ACTIVISM	46
CONCLUSION	57

<u>CHAPTER 2: A SHARED MODERNIST MORALISM: WOMEN INTELLECTUALS’ CONTESTED THOUGHTS ON FRUGALITY IN TURKEY FROM THE 1930S TO 1950S.....</u>	59
---	-----------

INTRODUCTION.....	59
PART 1) MEANINGS AND FUNCTIONS OF FRUGALITY.....	63
PART 2) ANTI-FRUGAL WOMAN: THE SPENDTHRIFT, THE ‘GREEDY’ WORKING-CLASS WOMAN, THE DESCENDANT OF OTTOMAN NOBILITY.....	69
SUBPART 2.1) THE FIGURE OF SPENDTHRIFT (PETTY)BOURGEOIS WOMAN	69
SUBPART 2.2) ASPIRING TO-BE SPENDTHRIFT: POOR WOMEN AND WORKING-CLASS WOMEN IN SUAT DERVIŞ’S SOCIALIST-REALIST WRITINGS	79
SUBPART 2.3) OLD ELITES: WOMEN DESCENDANTS OF OTTOMAN NOBILITY.....	90
CONCLUSION	97

<u>CHAPTER 3: NURTURING THE WOMAN TOWARDS A MODERN IDEAL: MISSIONARY INTELLECTUALS, COMPETING GLOBAL MODELS, AND UNFINISHED PROJECTS IN THE EARLY COLD WAR TURKEY</u>	99
--	-----------

INTRODUCTION.....	99
PART 1) GLOBAL SOURCES OF INTELLECTUALS’ IDEAL MODERN TURKISH WOMAN	103
SUBPART 1.1) MODELING THE WEST: INTELLECTUALS’ IDEAS ON THE WEST, DISCOURSES AGAINST ORIENTALISM, AND REPRESENTING MODERN TURKISH WOMAN.....	104
SUB-PART 1.2) LEADING THE EAST: INTELLECTUAL WOMEN AS PIONEERS, ORIENTALISTS, AND DIPLOMATS	113
PART 2) MISSIONARY INTELLECTUALS: URBAN AND RURAL PROJECTS TO NURTURE TURKISH WOMANHOOD.....	120
SUBPART 2.1) INTELLECTUALS’ IDEAS AND PROJECTS ON NURTURING THE VILLAGE	121

SUBPART 2.2) INTELLECTUALS’ PROJECTS TO ENLIGHTEN URBAN WORKING WOMEN.....	128
CONCLUSION	132

CHAPTER 4: TURKEY’S STATE FEMINIST PROJECT UNDONE: COLD WAR, WOMEN’S POLITICS AND GUARDING THE HOMELAND IN THE 1950S 134

INTRODUCTION.....	134
PART 1) NEW SILENCES, NEW NARRATIVES: SHIFTING DISCOURSES OF GUARDIANSHIP IN SOCIALIST AND KEMALIST WRITINGS FROM THE 1930s TO 1950s.....	138
SUBPART 1.1) TERRITORIAL AND DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED GUARDIANSHIP DISCOURSE IN THE EARLY REPUBLICAN PERIOD	139
SUBPART 1.2) THE FIGURE OF COMPASSIONATE URBAN GATEKEEPER AND THE CYPRUS ISSUE	143
SUBPART 1.3) THE FIGURE OF COMPASSIONATE URBAN GATEKEEPERS FOR THE KOREAN WAR	148
PART 2) THE “CAPTIVE” FIGURES: ANTI-COMMUNIST DISCOURSES ON IMMIGRANTS FROM BULGARIA AND SOVIET WOMANHOOD.....	152
SUBPART 2.1) SOVIET WOMANHOOD: FORGING THE FIGURE OF CAPTIVE THROUGH SEX AND RACE	153
SUBPART 2.2) IMMIGRANTS FROM BULGARIA: FORGING KINSHIP THROUGH GENDER, ETHNICITY AND RELIGION	157
PART 3) KEMALIST WOMEN’S LOYALTY TO ATATÜRK AND TURKEY’S STATE FEMINIST PROJECT	160
SUBPART 3.1) POLITICIZATION OF KEMALIST WOMEN IN THE MULTI-PARTY ERA.....	162
SUBPART 3.2) MAKING NEW ALLIANCES AGAINST THE RED AND BLACK THREAT	168
CONCLUSION	173

CONCLUSION 176

BIBLIOGRAPHY 182

Introduction

During the late interwar and early Cold War periods (1935-1960), Turkey experienced major transformations. In 1935, Turkey was an authoritarian single-party state under the CHP (Republican People's Party, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) and its founding leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It embraced a protectionist and statist development policy with the aim of establishing a classless nation. In 1946, Turkey transitioned into a multi-party system under President Ismet İnönü and adopted American development strategies. In 1950, Turkey witnessed the first transfer of power via elections and the new DP (Democrat Party, *Demokrat Parti*) government embraced further economic liberalization and entered NATO in 1952. In 1960, a military intervention toppled down the DP government to launch Turkey's second constitutional order. Despite these tremendous transformations, however, a constant of Turkish politics in this period was the drive for comprehensive pro-western modernization in political, economic, social, and cultural realms. Gender questions occupied a central place in all these realms. The desire to create a modern nation necessitated answering who the ideal modern Turkish men, women, and families were. Turkey's intellectual women actively engaged in public discussion on idealized gender norms and bore active responsibility to realize their vision to create the modern Turkish woman. This dissertation studies Turkey's women intellectuals in Kemalist and socialist movements in relation to Turkey's gendered modernization history from 1935 to 1960. The research focuses on how women activists shaped their discourses on economic and moral frugality, nurturing the nation's womanhood, and guarding the homeland. It further attends to the influence of their discourses and practices over Turkey's modernization in these transformative years. This research further

sheds light on two underexamined topics. The first one concerns the Kemalist women's understanding of and interactions with 'Western' and 'Eastern' women globally and 'peasant' and 'worker' women domestically. The second issue concerns how regime insider Kemalist women and marginalized and silenced socialist intellectuals navigated their difficult relationship with the political elite.

The extant gender and sexuality literature has made significant contributions to Turkey's feminist historiography. The main problem in this literature is that it treats the 1935-1960 period as 'the silent years of feminism in Turkey' due to state pressure on autonomous and oppositional organizing. Related to this narrative, this period remains severely underexamined compared to 1900-1935 and post-1960 periods. The existing works often ignore socialist women, who were forcefully silenced in this period, and characterize Kemalist women as collaborators in what as the 'conservative consensus' narrative. In contrast, this research contends that intellectual women who were able to raise their voice in this period were not merely collaborators with the state elites, nor were they passive pawns who tacitly endorsed the CHP or the DP governments. Rather than an alliance with the state elites, an analysis of intellectual discourses and practices points out to incoherencies, setbacks, and contradictions in women's activism. Despite their self-entitled mission to pioneer women in Turkey and the rest of the Middle East, Kemalist intellectuals lamented the failure of their projects and resented the backlashes in women's rights since the mid 1950s. Moreover, several studies on Turkish modernization treat Kemalist intellectualism as a movement detached from contemporaneous global intellectual trends. In contrast, this dissertation shows how Kemalist women closely shaped their methods and normative visions

with reference to discussions and practices in the Middle East, Europe and increasingly the US, Turkey's new major ally in the early Cold War years. They also aspired to establish meaningful contacts with the women of Muslim nations with a declared hope to spread 'Atatürk's women's revolution' to the rest of the Middle East.

The late Interwar and early Cold War periods saw the suppression of socialist intellectuals with whom Kemalist women had nuanced convergences in their modernist moralism. The dissertation exposes the intellectual popularity of modernist moralism among Kemalist and socialist women intellectuals to highlight the leftist voices in Turkey's gendered modernization process and their interactions with Kemalist voices. The dissertation focuses on one of these least studied eras of Turkish women's activism and reveals how, with the silencing of socialist voices, Kemalist women's middle-class vision targeted spendthrift elites, poor urban working-class women, and peasant women as objects of reprehension, enlightenment, and rehabilitation.

This dissertation is located at the intersection of Global Studies, Gender Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies. It also engages with and contributes to academic studies on modernization, nationalism, women's activism, intellectual history, and diplomacy. The research utilizes qualitative textual analysis, focusing on sources published by Kemalist and independent socialist intellectual women. The sources include newspaper and journal articles, memoirs, interviews, speeches, travelogues, biographies, and literary works such as short stories and novels. Key sources include writings of prominent socialist women Sabiha Sertel and Suat

Derviş, writings of prominent Kemalist women like Iffet Halim Oruz, and prominent TKB (Turkish Women's Federation) members and *Kadın Gazetesi* (Women's Gazette) authors.

This study reads socialist intellectuals Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviş in juxtaposition to prominent Kemalist intellectual women, although the latter group receives a greater emphasis because socialist voices, which were tolerated in the 1930s, were heavily silenced by the late 1940s and 1950s. While the dissertation categorizes the TKB and *Kadın Gazetesi* writers as 'Kemalist' and Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviş as 'socialist,' these categories were not mutually exclusive. Indeed, despite their declared embrace of these two ideologies, their politics cannot be always neatly distinguished from each other. Sertel and Derviş were committed to defining features of Kemalism. They gradually became more disillusioned with Kemalist ruling elites, especially after Atatürk's death. Nevertheless, they had nuanced convergences with the Kemalist TKB members and *Kadın Gazetesi* writers on several issues. Sertel, Derviş, Oruz and other *Kadın Gazetesi* writers agreed upon the main tenets of Kemalism such as anti-imperialism, nationalism, secularism, peopleism, and revolutionism as well as the modernist notion of progress and intellectuals' role to enlighten the people. They differed in their class analysis, which became decisive with rising anti-communist nationalism in the 1940s. Both groups categorized women based on their moralist understanding of 'proper' womanhood.

Several academic studies have long exposed the complicated relation between nationalism and women's agency. Others have also shown how early women activists blended nationalism and feminism but often prioritized the former. In the context of nationalist

modernization movements, women took active roles, and mostly converged with male reformers in political goals such as inclusion in public spaces, and legal reforms in areas of civil law, and women's right to education and employment. However, modernization projects carried out by nationalist elites had complex consequences for women, which escape definitive descriptions like reactionary or progressive. While mostly urban and educated women enjoyed greater freedoms, new gender hierarchies were formed in accordance with novel definitions of 'proper' modern womanhood. Women intellectuals embraced the task of making the ideal modern woman. This project situated popular classes as objects to be modernized.

Through the case study of Turkish Kemalist and socialist women, this dissertation asks how intellectual women contested and negotiated their rights and duties in a nationalist modernization project during its transformation periods. Related to this main question, the dissertation focuses on questions such as: How did women open new political arenas for their struggle? How did women engage with political transformations beyond their control but could sideline their position? How did women seek to promote their modernization visions domestically and regionally? How did women distinguish themselves from their counterparts in the West and the East? How did Kemalist women challenge the political elite 'from within?' How did socialist women challenge the political elite 'from the outside?'

Many studies stress the gendered nature of modernization processes by emphasizing how nationalist movements situated the women in a 'cultural' or 'spiritual' realm. This dissertation argues that women intellectuals contested this positioning and sought to open

new political fields of struggle to expand their influence even when they rallied behind nationalist projects. Specifically in the Turkish context, Kemalist women were *not* passive agents that followed the nationalist line that relied upon state patronage. On the contrary, even though Kemalist women were indeed *Kemalists* who supported Turkey's official nationalism, women intellectuals sought to expand their political and professional agency in addition to their familial roles, promoted their normative visions of the ideal Turkish woman through development and education projects, engaged with and learned from rival ideologies like socialism, and built international networks of women's solidarity. The dissertation suggests that even though women collaborated with nationalist elites in a period when Turkey's elites were seeking to compromise on their state feminism agenda, Kemalist women did not blindly promote official nationalism. Rather, they promoted *their* visions of nationalism at times against official nationalism by exposing its shortcomings and flaws.

This dissertation makes two critical interventions in extant studies on modernization, gender, and nationalism. First, the dissertation challenges the most significant works on Turkish women's movements that consider the 1935-1960 era as the 'silent years of Turkish feminism.' In contrast, the dissertation shows how Kemalist – and socialist women – maintained their autonomy (however partially) and promoted their own politics at a time when Turkey's political and civil society fields became increasingly restricted. Challenging the 'conservative consensus' framework, this dissertation reads this period of women's activism as 'contested modernization.' Secondly, the dissertation adds to studies that analyze the complex relation between nationalism and gender by revealing how the political context played a major role in determining the politics of nationalism and gender. While these studies

are often built upon a distinction between spiritual (as in culture, customs, family, morals, etc.) and material (as in technology, development, military, diplomacy, etc.) dimensions in which gender politics are situated in the former realm, this dissertation suggests that these two dimensions were in fact fields of political contestation. Women intellectuals fully embraced their roles in the spiritual realm but challenged when the political elite when they sought to restrict women exclusively to this realm. Indeed, women's politics often intervened in the material realm, to which Kemalist and socialist women believed they naturally belonged.

This dissertation is organized in four parts. The first chapter reviews the extant literature on modernization, nationalism, women's activism, intellectual history, and diplomacy in Turkey within the frameworks of Global Studies, Gender Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies. Chapter 2, "A Shared Modernist Moralism" analyzes socialist and Kemalist intellectual women's discourses on frugality and women's financial literacy (money know-how) in the context of modernist imaginations of the ideal Turkish woman. The chapter's main research questions are 1) What does the value attached to frugality reveal about the making of modern Turkish womanhood and manhood? 2) What is the relationship between women's money know-how and Turkey's modernization? 3) What are the stakes of divergences between independent women intellectuals and elite Kemalist women? The chapter investigates multiple meanings and moralist connotations of frugality through three main figures in opposition to the ideal frugal professional urban woman. These oppositional figures are the spendthrift, the aspiring-to be spendthrift, and the declassed Ottoman nobility. The chapter argues that money know-how became one of the moral and cultural markers of being modern

in republican Turkey. Turkish intellectual women promoted frugality as a litmus test of reliable, trustworthy Turkish woman, who was expected to duly contribute to Turkey's national development. The chapter further shows how independent socialist women intellectuals and elite Kemalist women overlapped in designating a moral obligation to women. Yet independent intellectuals like Derviş and Sertel also exposed the class dynamics behind Kemalist women's expectations of frugality. Class emphasis partially differentiated them from the Kemalists. Still, frugality remained a constant in their shared modernist moralism that women intellectuals and writers with diverse ideologies utilized to pursue their political beliefs.

Chapter 3, "Nurturing the Woman towards a Modern Ideal" discusses the ways and sources sought by intellectual women to realize their ideal frugal urban professional woman. The chapter's research questions are 1) How intellectual women defined their ideal image of Turkish womanhood in relation to their perception of the west and the east? 2) What methods did they pursue to realize this woman in national and regional context? The chapter shows how in the context of post-World War Two global politics Kemalist women embraced pro-western diplomacy. It argues that the Kemalist women redefined their image of the ideal Turkish woman in relation to western countries and pro-NATO countries in the Middle East. They aimed to carry women's reforms in Turkey, developed several projects to nurture rural and urban working women, and speculated on how to expand these projects to the Middle East. However, none of these projects could be sustained beyond the late 1950s. Neither the Kemalist women's ideal images fit with the actual realities of women they sought to nurture, nor they had the capacity to carry out such projects in the long term.

Chapter 4, “Turkey’s State Feminist Project Undone” discusses shifting discourses of “guarding the homeland” in the context of rising anti-communist nationalism that forced the socialist intellectuals into silence. The research question asks: How did anti-communist nationalism in the mid 1940s and the 1950s influence intellectual debates on women’s role in guarding the homeland and their political activism towards the state elites? The argument is that in the early Cold War period, Kemalist women intellectuals’ discourse on guarding the homeland, which had been territorial and development oriented in the Interwar Period, became more aggressive and assertive, even promoting militant expansionism occasionally, whereas their loyalty towards the political elite became more selective and conditional, and gradually even critical and demanding. The chapter also shows that the shifts in Kemalist women’s discourses occurred simultaneously with the silencing of socialist intellectuals. The chapter highlights that even though “guarding the homeland” had been a major discursive ground in Kemalist women’s politics, an expansionist loyalty to homeland, informed by anti-communist nationalism, emerged in the late 1940s. The chapter traces this transformation in cases that Kemalist women considered as supra-political matters such as the Korean War, the Cyprus issue, and the Bulgarian immigrants of 1951. Finally, the chapter shows that Kemalist women in this period gradually raised their opposition more vocally and openly against the political elite. While Kemalist understandings of nationalism and secularism remained in flux in the new Cold War context, women intellectuals chose to place their loyalty in Ataturk against the political elite who according to women were compromising on women’s rights and secularism – key features of Kemalist revolutions.

Chapter 1: Nationalism, Modernization, and Women's Activism: A Literature Review

Introduction

This dissertation studies intellectual women's ideas and practices on women's participation in Turkey's modernization during the Interwar and early Cold War periods. It builds upon and extends the studies on gendered projects of nationalism and modernization, as well as women's participation in state feminism projects in Turkey and the Middle East. This chapter aims to lay down the key theoretical approaches and historiographies within which this study is located. It is organized around three interrelated parts. The first part looks at how gender intersects with nationalist projects in terms of women's roles and duties in family, domestic management, consumption, and militarization. Moreover, it also engages with activist women's silences and exclusions as a key legacy of gendered nationalist projects. The second part looks at gendered aspects of modernization, particularly at the state-led attempts to modernize women. It further scrutinizes the volunteer role embraced by prominent women as modernizers of the nation. The last part engages with the question of women's activism through their participation in nationalist revolutionary projects with a focus on state feminist projects in Turkey and the Middle East.

The key problem that this dissertation identifies in the extant literature on gendered nationalist modernization (and women's activism within such projects) is twofold. First, studies on Turkish and Middle Eastern gendered modernization overlap to a significant degree in their aims, questions, methods, and arguments. These studies recognize the global impacts and influences over women's ideas and practices. In most cases, however, studies on

Turkish gendered modernization do not seek the transnational sources of these ideas and practices beyond a universal narrative of modernization which is synonymous to western influences. This study draws attention to how Kemalist and socialist women in Turkey sought to define ideal Turkish modern womanhood – a central question of Turkey’s gendered modernization – by critically looking at Eastern and Western sources. Doing so, Turkish activist women challenged the mainstream nationalist distinction between spiritual and material dimensions in which gender politics are situated in the former realm. Several feminist scholars have already challenged the material-spiritual distinction and this dissertation adds to these studies by showing how Turkish women activist challenged their confinement to cultural reproduction and representation of national morals and values. Second, studies on Turkish women’s activism overwhelmingly considers the 1935-1960 period as ‘the silent years of Turkish feminism.’ These studies rightly draw attention to the closure of Turkish Women’s Federation (Türk Kadınlar Birliği, TKB) as an attempt to silence the women’s rights movement which had already accepted the republican male elites’ patronage and leadership. However, this dissertation shows how Kemalist – as well as socialist – women maintained their autonomy (however partially) and promoted their own politics at a time when Turkey’s political and civil society fields became increasingly restricted. In short, this dissertation challenges ‘the silent years’ framework and reads this period of women’s activism as ‘contested modernization.’

Part 1) Nationalism & Gender

Women have occupied a central place in nationalist projects in the anticolonial contexts.

Studying anticolonial nationalisms, Partha Chatterjee identified that nationalisms build two

domains, one being the material and the other being the spiritual.¹ In the material realm, nationalists accepted the necessity to emulate Europe. The spiritual realm, on the other hand, represented the inner domain in which the essence of the nation was located. For Chatterjee, it is in this realm that nationalists detested any foreign intervention and influence. Chatterjee and other postcolonial scholars like Ania Loomba point out how anti-colonial nationalisms located gender at the spiritual or inner core of the nation. This made gender the site for the construction of national identities across a wide political and ideological anti-colonial spectrum.² Such a dual separation has historical accuracy and various streams of Turkish nationalisms also built their versions of material vs. spiritual realms.³ However, these constructed realms were not also fixed across time and space. On the contrary, they were central to political contestations. Twentieth-century state feminism projects sought to increase women's participation and visibility in the public realm.⁴ Women activists, as I show in Chapter 4 in the Turkish context, contested when more conservative streams sought to restrict them exclusively in the spiritual or the private realm and challenged such exclusionary practices.

Gender scholars widely discussed the extent of women's inclusion and exclusion in nationalist projects. Nira Yuval-Davis' classic work on gender and nation is one of the earlier

¹ Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

² Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, Third edition, New Critical Idiom (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 195.

³ For a study on Turkish nationalisms, see Tanıl Bora, *Türk sağının üç hâli milliyetçilik, muhafazakârlık, İslamcılık*, 10. baskı (İstanbul: Birikim Kitapları, 2017).

⁴ See, for example, Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011); Deniz Kandiyoti, *Cariyeler bacılar yurttaşlar: kimlikler ve toplumsal dönüşümler*, trans. Aksu Bora et al., 1. basım, Kadın araştırmaları dizisi 11 (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1997).

interventions to delineate how nationalisms and nation building projects depend on the construction of gender differences.⁵ Yuval-Davis pointed out some of the primary contradictions in the construction and reproduction of gender roles in the national arena. Critically building upon Chatterjee's argument on two domains, Yuval-Davis scrutinized the ambivalent yet central position of gender within anticolonial nationalisms: women's position vis-à-vis men was central to the colonial gaze, which played a determining role in setting the two domains. The ambivalence was that the nationalists detested any foreign intervention or influence in the spiritual realm. But simultaneously, the spiritual realm became a realm of intervention for the nationalist projects. The spiritual/moral realm (and gender politics) assumed a wider symbolic meaning that signaled authentic modernization and true national liberation for the nationalist elites. At the same time, nationalisms saw women as the carriers and reproducers of tradition and cultural codes. Women's 'proper' womanhood embodied the boundaries of the nation. Naturally, 'improper' women were excluded from nationalist projects, which marginalized nonconformist activist and campaigned to 'emancipate' the women from the shackles of tradition and ignorance. Thus, Yuval-Davis points out how nationalist formations are projects of both inclusion and exclusion in terms of women's place in national collectivity. This study builds on this classic work by looking at how nationalist intellectual women in Turkey embodied this contradiction in their discourse and practices.

⁵ Earlier classic studies on nationalism analyze the construction of national identities yet fail to analyze how nation-building projects are also projects towards construction of gender differences. See, for example, Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1992), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521439612>; Ernest/ Breuilly Gellner John (INT), *Nations and Nationalism* (Cornell Univ Pr, 2009).

Post-colonial theorists such as Frantz Fanon and scholars such as Nira Yuval-Davis delved into how nationalist projects intersected with gender as well as race. See Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 1st ed., new ed (New York : [Berkeley, Calif.]: Grove Press ; Distributed by Publishers Group West, 2008); Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation, Politics and Culture* (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 1997).

Beth Baron's analysis of elite women's discourses in Egypt from late nineteenth century to the 1940s provides insights into the paradoxical relationship of women with nationalist projects.⁶ As Baron showed in the case of Egyptian nationalist iconography, nationalist discourse integrated women in the national imaginary as the symbols of the nation and national honor. A central theme in these discourses was the debates on what kind of a woman should represent the nation. Baron's study emphasized that the nationalist elites' preoccupation with the woman question, did not translate into equal recognition of woman as national subjects. Educated middle and upper-class women mostly demanded a more than symbolic role and organized in a variety of organizations such as the Women's Wafd, the Society for Egyptian Ladies' Awakening, Mothers of the Future, and Egyptian Feminist Union.⁷ Their campaigns concentrated on social assistance, girls' education, and civil rights within the anticolonial nationalist framework. Male nationalists and women activists both identified the women as the nurturers of the nation's future, which made education the key for women's and nation's progress.⁸ However, nationalist discourses also limited women's emancipation on the political front, blocking them from political decision making and policy formation. In women's political organizing, Baron emphasized the class alliance across Muslim and Coptic elite women. This further revealed the relationship between gender and nation-building as a vision of society based on class hierarchies as well as gender.

⁶ Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 1. paperback print (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 2007).

⁷ For another study of Baron on a similar topic, see Beth Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

⁸ Margot Badran also advances a similar argument. See Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton university press, 1995).

Anticolonial nationalist ideologies were gendered projects in which the notion of bourgeois family assumed a central place as a nuclear representation of the nation. Omina El-Shakry's work on nationalist Egyptian intellectuals' social scientific programs and social engineering projects showed the entanglement of the demographic question with the women's question. Her work exposed how the effort to improve the quality of the population – meaning more educated, hygienic, but less populous – transformed the family “from being a metaphor to an instrument of governance.”⁹ El-Shakry argues that reproductive politics was one of the key parts of nationalist ideology. Creating a modern family and modern citizens required the modernization of demographic reproduction. Thus, birth control and planning projects encouraged mothers to reproduce less to reproduce better and promoted new habits of hygiene and childbearing as part of women's national duties. In contrast to Partha Chatterjee's analysis of anticolonialism in India, Egyptian nationalist elites' discussions on birth control and planning showed that the woman question was fundamental for both the spiritual and material realms. Nationalist narratives, thus, placed women at the center of national cultural authenticity as well as the nation's backwardness. Women's central role in societal change also made them central for the nation's social, political, and cultural progress.¹⁰ Moreover, El-Shakry exposed the class paradigm in the intellectuals' debate on birth control. Poor classes and peasants were the main objects to be changed in the effort to establish the middle-class heterosexual family as the national norm.¹¹ Chapter 3 of this dissertation builds on this exemplary work by focusing on intellectual women's discourses on

⁹ Omina S. El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 166.

¹⁰ El Shakry, 12.

¹¹ For another study on how the Egyptian peasant emerged as the key object of nationalist modernization, see Samah Selim, *The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt: 1880 - 1985*, 1. publ, RoutledgeCurzon Studies in Arabic and Middle Eastern Literatures 6 (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

nurturing projects as part of their philanthropic efforts, showing 1) how the activist women were eventually excluded from inciting material change, 2) how these women's classed moralism was integral to their projects' failure.

Sherene Seikaly's study on Palestinian businessmen in the mandate period is a critical intervention into Palestinian historiography and the *Nahda*. The alternative ways she proposed to understand politics, settler colonialism, and economic development offered key conceptual tools to engage with the centrality of class difference in nationalist imaginations of new man and woman in Palestine and beyond. Seikaly's analysis of elite Palestinian men's economic journal *Iqtisadiyyat* traced their envisioning of the economy as a separate domain from politics but as an object of social reform. Her reading of a radio program on the ideal Arab home, meanwhile, showed the importance of gendered norms in the shaping of the economy as a social domain. Seikaly showed that Palestinian businessmen wanted a reformed elite family by forging a model middle-class in an authentic eastern framework. This 'model middle' was based on an imagined ethical elite family who cared about the wellbeing of the household.¹² Naturally, the model middle narrative also forged the image of an ideal woman. This woman was to protect the social man, keep him in the house, be good to her maid, and spend her money wisely. Seikaly argued that both the radio program and the journal article treated the workers, peasants, the Bedouin as invisible stock figures.¹³ In the end, Seikaly suggests thinking of Palestinian nationalist politics outside the prism of the

¹² Sherene Seikaly, *Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016).

¹³ Seikaly.

confrontation with Zionism.¹⁴ Informed by Seikaly's work, Chapter 2 of this dissertation conceptualizes frugality as an economic and moral/cultural marker of modernity in Kemalist and socialist intellectual women's narratives, by exposing how frugality served as a category of exclusion.

Above sources indicate that nationalisms had produced novel gender and sexuality norms. Afsaneh Najmabadi's work on Iranian nationalism from the late nineteenth century Qajar Empire to the early twentieth century nation-state emphasized the transformative aspect of nationalist politics in gender and sexuality norms with regards to the heterosexualization of beauty, love, and desire. Her literary and visual analysis drew attention to how modern nationalism feminized and territorialized the concept of homeland (*vatan*). Depicted as the 'mother vatan' particularly under Reza Shah, the feminization of the homeland facilitated women's claim to the patriotic love and citizenship while furthering heteronormalization.¹⁵ Najmabadi revealed the shifting meanings of gender roles behind the campaigns for women's education to be better wives and mothers. These changes had both emancipatory and disciplinary consequences for women. Najmabadi drew attention to the complicated results of women's embracement of the role of 'woman as educator wives and mothers of nation.' On the one hand, education made women the enlightened managers of their houses, which opened the way to further demands. On the other hand, this embracement brought disciplinary mechanisms, which restricted women's education to home management,

¹⁴ In a similar vein, Ruba Salih's ethnographic work on Palestinian refugee women exposed the possibility of gender politics outside the prism of women's contribution to the nationalist project. See Ruba Salih, "Bodies That Walk, Bodies That Talk, Bodies That Love: Palestinian Women Refugees, Affectivity, and the Politics of the Ordinary," *Antipode* 49, no. 3 (June 2017): 742–60, <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12299>.

¹⁵ Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

dismantled the existing female homosocial bonds, and policed their public sociability.¹⁶ This dissertation extends Najmabadi's analysis the transformative role of nationalism by emphasizing the classed and ethno-religious aspects of women's embracement of their roles as frugal nurturers and patriotic guardians of the homeland.

Feminist scholars have long argued against academic analyses that explain away gender relations with reference to unchanging, essentialist, and culturalist frameworks like religion and patriarchal traditions.¹⁷ Deniz Kandiyoti criticized such analyses for their potential to perpetuate cultural imperialism and instead proposed to analyze women's participation in nation-building projects through looking at specific nationalisms and state-building projects as the gateway to understand modern gender relations.¹⁸ Nationalist state-building projects took women's status and behavior as constitutive of national culture, which made women's rights a contested area. Gender politics and women's status were central to the material political realm because the private spiritual realm was not independent of state intervention and political contestation. Kandiyoti noted that Kemalist state feminism encouraged women's public presence as mothers, educators, workers, and heroines. However, women were also forced to remain within the limits of the nationalist discourse, which determined the boundaries of culturally acceptable codes for women's behaviors.¹⁹ This made national identity a bargaining realm over women's bodies, where the women were both active

¹⁶ Najmabadi.

¹⁷ For a classic article on this, see Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," *Boundary 2* 12, no. 3 (1984): 333, <https://doi.org/10.2307/302821>.

¹⁸ Deniz Kandiyoti, "The Politics of Gender and the Conundrums of Citizenship," in *Women and Power in the Middle East*, ed. Suad Joseph and Susan Slyomovics (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 52–58, <https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812206906.52>.

¹⁹ On this issue, also see another major study on Turkey's state feminism in Şirin Tekeli, *Feminizmi Düşünmek*, 1. baskı, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları ; Sosyoloji, 580. 25 (Şişli, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2017).

participants and pawns of Kemalist nationalism.²⁰ Extending Kandiyoti's analysis on women's own agendas in the context of nationalist public discourses, this dissertation scrutinizes Kemalist women's assumed passivity and compliance with the Turkish state in the interwar and early Cold War period.

Turkey's transition from empire to nation-state brought radical changes, but continuities also persisted. Intellectual elite women's activism on education, social assistance, marriage reforms, and political rights dated back to the late Ottoman period and continued into the early republican era. Pluralism in the Ottoman women's movement, however, did vanish in the republican era.²¹

Nation-state building came with silencing and erasures of multiple national, ethnic, and religious identities and practices.²² These practices occasionally turned into outright anti-non-Muslim violence during the republican era. The most infamous instances of anti-non-Muslim violence and racialization of religion in Turkey in the 1940s and 1950s are the Trakya Pogrom of 1934, the Wealth Tax of 1942, and the Istanbul Pogrom of 1955. Marc Baer's study on the Dönme community (a hybrid religion at the intersection of Judaism and Sufi Islam) in Ottoman Salonika and the Turkish Republic gave insights into how Turkey's nationalist state-building reinvented religion as a racialized category, forcing the Dönmes to abandon or hide their identity.²³ Tracing the transformation of the Dönme community's position at a time

²⁰ For a pioneering analysis on the myth of equal citizenship, see Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, Reprint (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).

²¹ Lerna Ekmekçioğlu and Melissa Bilal, *Bir adalet feryadı: Osmanlı'dan Türkiye'ye beş Ermeni feminist yazar, 1862-1933* (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2006).

²² For a study on these erasure practices in the transition from imperial to republican education, see Füsün Üstel, "Makbul Vatandaş"ın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet'ten Bugüne Türkiye'de Vatandaş Eğitimi, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 172 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2004).

²³ Marc David Baer, *The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular Turks* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2010).

when Turkish nationalism started to thrive, Baer stressed the link between nation-state building and the elimination of identities that do not fit into the established identity of the new nation.²⁴ Chapter 4 aims to build on this contextual background through a discussion of Kemalist women's contradictory discourses on religion, secularism, and women's rights in the context of heightened anti-communist nationalism in early Cold War Turkey. Moreover, adding to Baer's work, this dissertation shows that radical and violent exclusionary practices continued well beyond the founding stages of the nation-state and extended to communists after World War Two.

One of the main aims of Turkey's feminist historiography after the 1980s had been to challenge the officially and intellectually accepted dichotomy between the 'enslaved Ottoman women' versus the 'emancipated Turkish woman.' Feminist scholars pointed out the rich history of Ottoman women's activism as well as the nationalist myth regarding the women's emancipation by the republic, to which I attend at Part III. Lerna Ekmekçioğlu and Melissa Bilal's work on Ottoman Armenian intellectual women makes a critical intervention into both official nationalist and post-1980 feminist historiography. Tracing the writings of Elbis Gesaratsyan, Sırpuhi Düsap, Zabel Asadur, Zabel Yesayan, and Hayganuş Mark, Ekmekçioğlu and Bilal emphasized the similarities between Ottoman Armenian and Muslim intellectual women's discourses on the 'modern yet modest woman.'²⁵ The mid-nineteenth century saw calls for 'women's awakening' and 'nation's awakening' within the Ottoman

²⁴ Erasure of national identities is a common theme in the transition from the empire to the nation-state. For a study in the context of the Kurdish identity during the republican era, see Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 82 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999). For a study in the context of Armenian and Greek identities, see Fatma Müge Göçek, *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

²⁵ Ekmekçioğlu and Bilal, *Bir adalet feryadı*.

Armenian community. The Armenian women were also placed at the center of Armenian nationalist discourses. In the writings of intellectual women, the new woman imaginaries emphasized women's duties as mothers of their family and the nation with a particular focus on the love of *vatan*, thriftiness, clothing, education, employment, and homemaking. In the new republic, which was established after the destruction of Anatolia's Armenian population by the Young Turks through a genocide in 1915, the small Armenian community of intellectuals could exist within the Turkish women's movement, if they did not challenge official nationalism. By 1936, the last remaining Armenian women's journal *Hay Gin*, would cease to exist. Its editor-in-chief Hayganuş Mark, who had had established relationships with the TKB members in the 1920s, would never appear in the pages of Kadın Gazetesi after its republication from 1947 to 1960. Ekmekçioğlu and Bilal's work showed the necessity to attend more seriously to silences in the archives and erasures by nationalism because even feminist accounts that challenge the official nationalism could reproduce the official nation-state imaginaries. This dissertation aims to highlight these erasures in intellectuals' writings. It also shows how Kemalist women intellectuals' nationalism after World War Two completely closed the doors to socialist and non-Muslim women.

Finally, women's involvement in nationalist politics also required novel understandings on the relation between militarization and gender.²⁶ In a rare study on this topic in Turkey, Ayşe Gül Altınay explored Turkish nationalism's "military nationhood" concept.²⁷ She pointed out

²⁶ For feminist studies on this, see Cynthia H. Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Cynthia Cockburn, *The Space between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict* (London ; New York : New York: Zed Books ; Distributed in the USA by St Martin's Press, 1998).

²⁷ Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

that military nationhood was so naturalized that a public discussion of militarization was conspicuously absent from public and/or intellectual debate. For Altınay, militarism imbued nationalism and citizenship in Turkey. Altınay examined the women's position in the myth of military nation, with a particular focus on women's presence in the institution of military in the early republican period. She identified the compulsory male conscription law of 1927 as the key to understand how the state defined and administered the (re)production of gender differences in the nationalist project. Altınay showed that in the early republican period women were celebrated as war heroines in exceptional cases and were designated first and foremost as mothers with the responsibility to reproduce and support the nation's militaristic force. In sum, Altınay's work extended the idea of 'women as invitees to national projects' through her focus on militarization and gender.²⁸ This dissertation highlights how nationalist women were entangled in militarization not only through their presence in military. For the nationalist women, war making, homemaking, and nation formation were closely linked, as apparent in their public discourses and practices on frugality, nurturing, and national loyalty.

This part reviewed several key studies on nationalism, with which this dissertation engages. The focus was on gendered imaginaries of nationalisms, transformation of gender roles in nationalist projects, women's participation in nationalist projects in a hierarchically inferior position, and the relationship of gendered nationalism to class, race, and religion. These studies generally focus on the late Ottoman or the early republican periods, leaving a gap on

For another study on militarization and gender in Turkey, see Pinar Selek, *Sürüne Sürüne Erkek Olmak*, 5. baskı, Bugünün Kitapları 114 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011).

²⁸ For another study on terms and limits of women's paternalist invitation to nationalist project in Turkey, see Yeşim Arat, "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, Publications on the Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).

the early Cold War period. This dissertation shows that the general processes in gendered nationalist projects identified by the above reviewed literature – most notably exclusionary and erasure practices – continued in the early Cold War years. The main rupture, meanwhile, regarded the social groups that suffered from these practices, which began to include leftist intellectuals.

Part 2) Modernization and Remaking Gender Roles

Modernization has been one of the key paradigms through which scholars understood the Middle Eastern history and defined the Middle East as a region. Intellectual and political discussions at the domestic level, in which women's place in modernization was integral, were closely linked to global processes of imperialism, wars, and anti-colonial nationalisms. In general, scholars understood modernization in the Middle East as a defensive process against the rise of the global hegemony of Europe.²⁹ The twin revolutions – the Industrial Revolution in Britain and the French Revolution – created a global political-economic system, in which the North Atlantic was the center and the rest was positioned as either periphery or semi-periphery.³⁰ Imperialist encroachment did not only result in economic exploitation over the regions that made periphery or semi-periphery; they went hand in hand with political coercion and encroachment that radically altered extant governance

²⁹ James L. Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East: A History*, Fourth edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

³⁰ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789 -1848*, Repr, History Greats (London: Abacus, 2007).

philosophies.³¹ In response, a varieties of anticolonial nationalisms emerged and aspired to modernize against imperialism.³² In the Middle East, modernization efforts facilitated state centralization and integration into global markets.³³ The projects towards economic growth, army making, and state building in the Middle East significantly altered the lives and experiences of social classes such as craftsmen, workers and peasants, whose mobilization and modernization was deemed integral to modernization projects by the governing elites.³⁴ Women within these social classes received a special attention from the governing elites.³⁵

In the twentieth century, ideologies such as Marxism and liberalism developed their own versions of modernization theories. The Marxist school, which became fused with Bolshevik developmentalism, and the American modernization school, pioneered by social scientists such as W. W. Rostow and Daniel Lerner, identified a universal and linear path to modernization. These political and intellectual traditions understood modernization as a universal path that could be tailored for national and regional peculiarities. Since the 1960s, critical scholars aspired to show that there were diverging paths to modernization influenced by historical, social, and political dynamics.³⁶ These alternative explanations challenged such

³¹ For philosophical implications of imperialism, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New ed, A Harvest Book HB244 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).

³² On this, see Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion, and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism*, 2nd ed (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2009).

³³ For the Turkish context, see Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004).

³⁴ Joel Beinin, *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2001), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612800>.

³⁵ Akşit traces the the government interventionism in women's lives to the late eighteenth century in the Ottoman Empire. See Elif Ekin Akşit, *Kızların Sessizliği: Kız Enstitülerinin Uzun Tarihi*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 187 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005).

³⁶ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1979), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815805>; Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," *Monthly Review* 18, no. 4 (September 2, 1966): 17, https://doi.org/10.14452/MR-018-04-1966-08_3.

universalizing narratives and examined the political-economic dynamics, social structures, class relations, and dependency behind diverging and non-linear paths to modernization.³⁷ These scholarships, however, did not gain intellectual attention in Turkey until the 1980s. The American school of modernization theory became influential since the 1950 in Turkey's mainstream academia. American-educated academics such as Şerif Mardin,³⁸ Niyazi Berkes,³⁹ and Nermin Abadan-Unat⁴⁰ have tremendously influenced Turkish academia, political analyses, and intellectual life. These scholars – and several influential American area specialists such as Bernard Lewis⁴¹ – have identified the military-bureaucratic apparatus as the central tenet of modernization in Turkey. Critical and dissident intellectuals, meanwhile, rallied behind Marxist-influenced national development projects as the gateway to modernization.⁴² Both modernization schools aspired to homogenization and generally downplayed the impact of modernization processes on diverse populations, which has attained greater attention since the 1980s. The literature on gender and modernization in the Middle East constituted a significant section of this intellectual critique. They attended to how modernization processes shaped, and are shaped, by women from different social classes and ethno-religious groups.

³⁷ Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606786>.

³⁸ Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 1. baskı, Makaleler 4 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin siyasi fikirleri 1895 - 1908*, 5. baskı, Şerif Mardin Bütün Eserleri (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994).

³⁹ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de çağdaşlaşma*, 7. baskı, Yapı Kredi yayınları Cogito, 1713 117 (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005).

⁴⁰ Nermin Abadan-Unat, "The Impact of Legal and Educational Reforms on Turkish Women," in *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

⁴¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey / Bernard Lewis*, 3rd ed, Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁴² Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de siyasî ideolojiler*, 1. baskı (Fatih, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017).

Gender reforms were at the center of normative visions within Middle Eastern modernization projects that aspired to create modern national subjects. Several key scholars like Yuval-Davis, Deniz Kandiyoti, and Beth Baron (examined in Part I) analyzed nationalist projects as movements that eventually failed women. Lila Abu-Lughod offered an alternative perspective in her review of feminist scholarship in the Middle East.⁴³ Firstly, Abu-Lughod argued that nationalist modernization movements should not be treated as exclusively political movements but should also be seen as “cultural or discursive projects in which ideals of womanhood and notions of the modern were key elements.”⁴⁴ Secondly, she pointed out the necessity to attend more to women’s own writings and discourses, without dismissing the aspects where they aligned with official nationalist narratives as mere strategies to avoid state control. Lastly, she pointed to the flaws in scholarship that understood women’s relationship to modernizing reforms exclusively as objects of reform or pawns in the hands of political elites. Rather, women were active participants in shaping the ideals of modern womanhood and manhood. A major aim of this dissertation is to analyze the complexities in intellectual women’s writings, the limits of their active participation to gendered projects, and their inherently exclusionary thinking in the ideals of womanhood in the context of Turkey’s modernization discourses during its transformative years of from the Interwar to the early Cold War.

Redirecting the gaze towards women’s experiences of societal changes in modernization projects and the roles they played in such changes have gained academic popularity. Zahra

⁴³ Lila Abu-Lughod, “Introduction,” in *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998).

⁴⁴ Abu-Lughod, 17.

Ali's work on women's place in Iraq's Baath Party modernization and development project is a recent example.⁴⁵ Part of Ali's study traced how the Baathist elites pragmatically utilized gender questions for political purposes in the 1968-1985 period – the heyday of Baathist gender reforms – by critically engaging with Hisham Sharabi's classic work on neopatriarchy.⁴⁶ Ali analyzes legislative measures towards women's participation in the labor force, provision of free childcare, equal pay policy, maternity leave policy, marriage reforms, and literacy and education campaigns in relation to Iraq's social, economic, and political contexts within its regional and global framework. On the one hand, such reforms significantly improved women's lives, as narrated by women activists of the era. On the other hand, these reforms served the political aims of the Baath party and were mixed with a rhetoric on honor, family mores, and superiority over the West. Ali defined the Iraqi Baath regime as an example of Hisham Sharabi's conceptualization of neopatriarchal state, which emphasized the patriarchal nature of the state perpetuated through both the imperialist interferences in the regime's working and the internal factors such as tribalism, internal security apparatus (*mukhabarat*), and patronage system (*mukarimat*). Her critical intervention to Sharabi's influential concept was to apply Kandiyoti's concept of 'patriarchal bargain' to the state level and shift the focus from ahistorical and culturalist emphasis on 'patriarchal culture' towards contemporary political contexts.⁴⁷ This dissertation follows this framework

⁴⁵ Zahra Ali, *Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

⁴⁶ Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992).

⁴⁷ Deniz Kandiyoti, "Bargaining with Patriarchy," *Gender & Society* 2, no. 3 (September 1988): 274–90, <https://doi.org/10.1177/089124388002003004>.

Dicle Koğacioğlu's exemplary work on 'state patriarchy' makes a similar intervention by looking at how 'traditional' gender norms are reproduced by the state institutions, particularly the legal system, through women's encounters with law in Turkey. See, Dicle Koğacioğlu, "Citizenship in Context: Rethinking Women's Relationships to the Law in Turkey," in *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, ed. Thaleia Dragōna and Faruk Birttek (London: Routledge, 2005).

by analyzing intellectual women's gender discourses and their identification with Kemalism, secularism, and nationalism in relation to changing social, political and economic realities of Turkey from the 1930s to the 1950s.

A large body of the existing gendered modernization historiography in the Middle East relies on elite voices to examine class, ethnicity, and religion. Hanan Hammad's study on the social history of Egypt's al-Mahalla al-Kubra (a working-class district) from the 1920s to 1952 was a critical intervention into this body of literature and revealed the complex modernity experiences of the town's non-elite, ordinary population.⁴⁸ Local and migrant inhabitants of al-Mahalla were not solely passively shaped by rapid urbanization and industrialization. On the contrary, Hammad's reconstruction of the daily lives of working-class population in the town showed that the working-class women, men, and children shaped the urban social culture as much as the Egyptian political and economic elites. Following Hammad's argument on the links between class power, social norms, and gender politics, Chapter 2 of this dissertation conceptualizes frugality in relation to the stories of urban women workers and the new rich of the DP period in Suat Derviř's socialist realist novels, informed by her interviews with Istanbul's urban poor on their daily lives. Thus, without denying the transformative impact of Turkey's capitalist modernization on the people that did not exert control upon these processes, this study too aims to explore the popular perceptions of

⁴⁸ Hanan Hammad, *Industrial Sexuality: Gender, Urbanization, and Social Transformation in Egypt*, First edition (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016).

gendered norms, such as frugality, and the responses generated by working-class women (albeit within the methodological restrictions of relying upon Derviş's intermediation).⁴⁹

A fundamental question of Middle Eastern modernization projects was how to be modern without losing the authentic national identity.⁵⁰ Gender and sexuality occupied a central place in these intellectual and political debates. Turkey had long embraced a western-oriented modernization strategy – at least since the early nineteenth century.⁵¹ The question of being modern in the western sense without losing authenticity remained a constant concern in this long process, although the meaning of modern and authentic greatly varied across time and political spectrums. These concerns also marked the modernization debates during the interwar and early Cold War periods. Nevertheless, for the political elite, the pragmatic and material aspects of the modernization projects mattered more, at least compared to intellectuals. From the interwar period to the early Cold War years, Turkey had transitioned from planned statism and single-party government to economic liberalism and multi-party system. Begüm Adalet examined the application of American modernization theory in the 1950s, where Turkey served as a laboratory and an active enabler of modernization theory.⁵² Through an examination of the US and Turkish social scientists' tackling of Turkey's modernization problems, Adalet showed the transformation in the DP years at the intersection

⁴⁹ For an ethnographic analysis of diverse experiences of womanhood and gender norms shaped by class, see Aksu Bora, *Kadınların sınıfı: ücretli ev emeği ve kadın öznelliğinin inşası*, 3. baskı, İletişim yayınları Araştırma, inceleme dizisi, 784 190 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010).

⁵⁰ Meltem Ahiska, *Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting*, Library of Modern Middle East Studies 79 (London New York New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010).

⁵¹ Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, Revised edition 2003 (London: Oneworld, 2014).

⁵² Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018).

of national, regional, and global levels. As in the 1930s although from a different ideological point, Turkey sought a regional model role as a staunch western ally to discredit alternative modernization paths in the region such as socialism, pan-Arabism, and political Islam. Moreover, Adalet successfully revealed that experts' and intellectuals' attempts to define the modernization theory and tailor it for Turkey were full of incoherencies, uncertainties, and disagreements. Indeed, this dissertation shows that Kemalist women intellectuals' engagement in Turkey's Cold War diplomacy were marked by similar incoherencies, uncertainties, and disagreements. In part, these flaws were the result of intellectual attempts to maintain their ideological coherencies and champion their agendas in transforming political contexts.

It should be remembered, however, modernization processes and their impacts on gender relations were beyond grand political questions. Indeed, feminist scholars had long criticized the private-public dichotomy within modernization and gender narratives for downplaying the continuous gender hierarchies in spheres deemed private.⁵³ These processes also transformed the organization of and gender relations within the households, which fell under the private realm. Ferhunde Özbay's work shed light on the impact of modernization reforms on gendered private spaces like kitchens, living rooms, and reception rooms, as opposed to the public domain on which most gender and modernization studies had focused. Özbay argued even though reforms in education, occupation, and political participation did not bring gender equality in these realms even among middle and upper classes, women remained engaged and interested in the notions of modernity by constructing new modes of modern

⁵³ Suad Joseph and Susan Slyomovics, "Introduction," in *Women and Power in the Middle East*, ed. Suad Joseph and Susan Slyomovics (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).

womanhood in the spatial reordering of urban households.⁵⁴ Tracing upper and middle class women's enthusiasm for modernization in the transformation of gender segregated household spaces, she showed that homosocial household gatherings in the mid-twentieth century like the Reception Days (Kabul Günleri) served as modernization schools for this class of women. They received their female guests to discuss modern clothing, child-rearing, marital relations, and daily manners. Yet she also exposed how these processes transformed household labor towards invisibility and efficiency, especially among the middle-class women. Criticizing a predetermined binary view towards public and private spaces with an overconcentration on legal reforms, Özbay's analysis of the transformation of household from the late nineteenth century to the 1950s revealed the importance of gender and class differences in everyday experiences of modernization.

Turkey's modernization process until the mid-twentieth century had remained largely confined to urban areas.⁵⁵ The DP years in the 1950s had witnessed unprecedented domestic economic integration, as well as national integration into global markets. Public education had been one of the key strategies of the republican regime to reach out to the peasantry. Republican Girls' Institutes, established in 1928-29 upon American education expert John Dewey's suggestion, had been the most notable republican project to educate peasant girls. These institutions sought to educate young girls to reorder urban households and become exemplar modern women, as mothers, wives, and embodiments of national identity. Elif Ekin Akşit's study on these institutes identified the 1930s as the formative years for constructing

⁵⁴ Ferhunde Özbay, *Dünden bugüne aile, kent ve nüfus*, 1. baskı, İletişim yayınları Araştırma - inceleme dizisi, 2222 369 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015).

⁵⁵ Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-İnceleme Dizisi 200 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2006).

the link between women's modernization and the nation's modernization.⁵⁶ Akşit also showed that even before World War Two, the American development model had influenced these institutes, as their journals promoted the Taylorist model of efficient homemaking. Yael Navaro-Yaşın also researched these institutes and argued that they were critical in the discursive construction of modern Turkey by detaching the new republic from its 'non-modern' past. She pointed out the dual nature of these institutes, which, on the one hand taught Taylorist efficiency and orderliness in the household, and on the other, taught the tenets of the Kemalist ideology. As such, Navaro-Yaşın argued that these institutes combined Taylorist efficiency with symbols of Turkish nationalism, thus linking modernization to Turkishness while delinking modernity from the pre-republican Ottoman past.⁵⁷

Building on these theoretical and contextual insights, this dissertation looks at intellectual women's responses to these critical transformations in the period before and after World War Two. After the war, Kemalist intellectual women were fully on board with pro-American modernization and Cold War politics. They frequently resorted to American models of childrearing, homemaking, and social assistance. They considered themselves as the representatives of Turkey as the model nation in the Middle East and built contacts with women in other Middle Eastern countries accordingly. However, they also grappled with the unfulfilled promises of the modernization process. 1940s and 1950s witnessed the rise of conservative gender discourses. In one of the very few studies that examined Turkey's

⁵⁶ Akşit, *Kızların Sessizliği*; Elif Ekin Akşit, "Girls' Institutes and the Rearrangement of the Public and the Private Spheres in Turkey," in *A Social History of Late Ottoman Women: New Perspectives*, ed. Duygu Köksal and Anastasia Falierou, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage*, volume 54 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2013).

⁵⁷ Yael Navaro-Yaşın, "'Evde Taylorizm': Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk Yıllarında Evişinin Rasyonelleşmesi (1928-40)," *Toplum ve Bilim* 84 (Spring 2000): 51–75.

gendered modernization in the early Cold War period, Serpil Sancar conceptualized the period as ‘family-centered conservative modernization.’⁵⁸ Sancar differentiated between earlier modernization discourses and reforms and the postwar era in terms of women’s place in the nation’s modernization, drawing attention to a discursive shift in mainstream media and politics. She argued that during the late Ottoman and early republican periods, the main tension was being modern while maintaining authenticity. The multi-party period witnessed the reconciliation of conservative and modernist streams that firmly confined the woman in the household and abandoned the women’s rights agenda. The new ideal modern woman was a middle-class urban housewife, with very few roles to assume outside the household.⁵⁹

Sancar is correct to identify the growing conservatism among the male political and media elite. Yet the period from 1945 to 1960 was more complicated with regards to women’s involvements in this process, which in Sancar’s narrative appears as a silent acceptance. As analyzed in Chapter 4, this period witnessed the simultaneous rise in anti-communist nationalism and silencing of socialist intellectuals. Elite Kemalist women were also sidelined in the mainstream media, which increasingly narrated gendered questions with an anonymous male voice. Yet Sancar falls into a methodological fallacy for remaining confined to mainstream media and politics. A closer scrutiny of women’s voices in this period offers a critical avenue in women’s participation in these processes and challenges the widely accepted notions such as “feminism’s silent years in Turkey.” The last part of this review examines the literature on women’s activism in the Middle East and Turkey.

⁵⁸ Serpil Sancar, *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti: Erkekler Devlet, Kadınlar Aile Kurar*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 302 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012).

⁵⁹ For another study on the new woman images in the 1940s in Turkey see Duygu Köksal, “Yeni Adam ve Yeni Kadın: 1930’lar ve 40’larda Kadın, Cinsiyet ve Ulus,” *Toplumsal Tarih* 51 (March 1998).

Part 3) Women's Activism

Women took active roles in the modernization movements in the Middle East, beginning with the nineteenth century. In the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Iran and Egypt, the woman's question was not only a realm defined and discussed by male reformers. Urban educated elite women agreed with male reformers on issues such as legal reforms on divorce, inheritance, marriage, education, and employment. As anticolonial nationalisms grew stronger with World War One, gender relations and women's status became central concerns in state-building processes.⁶⁰ However, the relationship between women's activism and nation-state building remained complicated. Women became new symbols of the anti-imperialist struggle and the national identity. In the Turkish context, Anatolian peasant and educated urban women embodied these symbols respectively. Gender reforms and consequent transformations in gender relations had both emancipatory and disciplinary consequences for the 'new woman,' who faced categorization in terms of class, ethnicity, and religion. Gender and sexuality scholars of Turkey and the Middle East aimed to explain these complexities and diverse feminisms that developed in response. These studies inform this dissertation contextually and theoretically.

Activist women, who overwhelmingly came from the educated strata, were not oblivious to the complex consequences of modernization reforms, which created variations in their relations to the male nationalist elites. Consequently, central conceptual framework to

⁶⁰ The end of World War One witnessed strong and radical agitations for women's greater participation in public affairs. On this, see Sabiha Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 1. basım, Anı (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2015).

analyze women's activism in nationalist modernization movements had been resistance versus submission. Saba Mahmood's ethnographic work on the women's mosque movement in Egypt challenged this dichotomy in liberal and secular thought by offering an alternative framework to imagine multiple ways of agentive capacity with a focus on subjectivity.⁶¹ The critique of political agency conceptualized along the binary of subversion versus subordination was central to her work. Mahmood showed the limits of the universal approach to the desire for freedom through the case of the *da'wa* movement where resistance was not the only mode of being or agency. Mahmood showed that women participants in the mosques did not fit to an understanding of moral agency that valorized the autonomous interiority and saw the external self as merely an expression of the interiority of the self. Through this case study, Mahmood challenged the key tenets of feminist theory by attending to the complexities of practices and experiences. Ultimately, Mahmood critiqued the overwhelming feminist focus on the position of women vis-à-vis the state and social movements and instead proposed alternative understandings of bodily practices and public interactions in daily life.

Paul Amar's comparative reading of two feminist responses to sexualized state terror during Egyptian revolution of 2010-2011, meanwhile, provided a framework to understand feminist mobilizations in relation to their responses against state sponsored violence.⁶² In this context, the Egyptian state sexualized terror to demonize working class men and to police women's bodies by demobilizing class-conscious de-securitization practices. Amar analyzed these responses by scrutinizing politics of respectability. He explained that certain feminist groups'

⁶¹ Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012).

⁶² Paul Amar, *The Security Archipelago ; Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism*, Social Text Books (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

strategy to place respectable middle-class women at the forefront of the protests subverted the colonial-orientalist ‘Arab mob’ depictions. However, it also gave way to state sponsored sexual assaults through which women protestors were arrested on charges of prostitution to face beatings and rapes by the police. Amar argued that respectability politics could collide with the state’s aims for social control, obscure the state’s deployment of sexualized terror, and moralize the public discourse around sexual harassment. Claims by some feminist groups and NGOs over respectability to escape ‘hypervisibility’ worked to demonize and hypervisibilize the working-class men. In this context, the middle-class feminists, like the state, identified the working-class men as the agents of sexual harassment in the streets and demanded more police presence to protect women. Feminists involved in this campaign did not question the state sponsored sexual assault but dealt with the issue in terms of ‘cultural backwardness’ of working-class Arab men. Amar’s critique of human-security regimes in Egypt was built upon the critiques of Egyptian feminists on respectability and NGOization, which to Amar represented an exemplar de-securitization praxis. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I utilize Amar’s juxtaposition of the two distinct feminist responses to scrutinize Turkey’s Kemalist women’s early Cold War politics, which had combined security and gender discourse in a different geopolitical context.

Mahmood and Amar provided theoretical insights into the complexities of diverse group of women’s ethical practices and political activism. State feminism is another conceptual tool that this dissertation utilizes. Gender and sexuality scholars in the Middle East used this term to understand the specific cases of elite women’s involvement in authoritarian and nationalist regimes. This dissertation builds upon Laura Bier’s conceptualization of this term, which she

analyzed in the context of the postcolonial Nasserist state-building in Egypt.⁶³ For Bier, state feminism in Egypt was the key site where “the politics of gender met the politics of modernity.”⁶⁴ She analyzed state feminism as a project that aimed to make women into modern national subjects through state building programs, social engineering projects, discourses, and legal measures. Adding to El-Shakry’s critique on Chatterjee’s material versus spiritual domains, Bier showed that Nasser’s regime considered household and gendered cultural practices as fundamental to state building. While the Nasserist state included women in the new regime as active modern subjects, this process was also imbued with the construction of new gender and class hierarchies. Bier argued that women were both objects and subjects in the Nasserist state feminist project. The regime used the women’s active participation to support its claims over modernity, secularism, and socialism.

Bier’s study proposed an alternative to resistance versus complicity prism within the context of state feminism. She argued that women activists were neither regime pawns nor feminist heroines against patriarchy. While they championed the vision of bourgeois home, modernized domestic spaces, and incorporation into workforce, they contested the governing of personal status law through religious law. Yet even in such critiques, women activists also converged in the discourses on the ‘backwardness’ and ‘traditionalism’ of the lower class and rural women.⁶⁵ Bier’s study on Egypt is informative on Turkey because state feminisms in these countries greatly overlapped despite major differences in their political orders.⁶⁶

⁶³ Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood*.

⁶⁴ Bier, 7.

⁶⁵ Bier, 139.

⁶⁶ For a study on Middle Eastern women’s movements and state feminisms, see Aksu Bora, “Ortadoğu’da Kadın Hareketleri: Farklı Yollar, Farklı Stratejiler,” *İ. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi* 39 (October 2008): 55–69.

Turkey's male and female modernists also considered women as the symbols of the new nation and the regime's modernity. Albeit in a context of multi-party politics and pro-American modernization, Turkish activist women overlapped with their Egyptian counterparts in their aims of making women into modern subjects, embarking on programs to educate the 'backward' peasant and worker women, and in some cases turned critical against the government.

Studies on state feminisms also analyzed how the political elites and movements instrumentalized women's rights and suppressed autonomous women's organizing. In her study on sexual politics in modern Iran, Janet Afary attended to women activists' motivations and struggles to navigate among competing discourses of nationalism, socialism, and Islamism.⁶⁷ Afary pointed out that even though the state closed down all independent political groups including women's organizations during Reza Shah's rule, many members of the educated middle class rallied behind Iran's state feminism project to achieve some of their objectives.⁶⁸ Parvin Paidar's work on the relationship between women's status and political discourses in the twentieth century Iran similarly pointed out that women activists were organized under the state-sponsored Women's Centre during Reza Shah's regime not because they fully supported the state's gender politics but because it was the only available place to advocate for greater gender equality.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Janet Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁶⁸ Afary, 165.

⁶⁹ Parvin Paidar, *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran*, 1. paperback ed, Cambridge Middle East Studies 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Women's activism and autonomous mobilization faced opposition not only from the governing elites but also from diverse social movements including leftists and dissident nationalists. Afary showed women's support for the nationalist agenda made their demands secondary for the nationalist elite, to be resolved after the resolution of the national question. During the confrontation between Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and Muhammad Reza Pahlavi in the early 1950s, women's suffrage became the prominent dividing issue within Mosaddeq's National Front. Afary noted that the opposition against suffragette extended beyond the Islamists to include many National Front members.⁷⁰ Haideh Moghissi, meanwhile, traced the roots of opposition against women's autonomous organizing to the early twentieth century Iran, stressing its centrality to all major ideologies.⁷¹ Moghissi argued that male politicians and activists tolerated women's organizing for political purposes only if the women did not cross the limits drawn by men. Moghissi's research showed how progressive and emancipatory movements like socialists instrumentalized women's right agenda in a populist manner and considered this agenda to be secondary to their greater anti-imperialist concerns. Anti-imperialist populism offered a framework of convergence for leftists, nationalists, and Islamists with catastrophic consequences for women. In the crucial days of the revolution in 1979, many socialists rallied behind reactionary clerics and condemned women's rights demands as 'bourgeois feminism.'⁷²

⁷⁰ Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*.

⁷¹ Haideh Moghissi, *Populism and Feminism in Iran: Women's Struggle in a Male-Defined Revolutionary Movement*, Reprinted (with alterations), Women's Studies at York Series (Basingstoke, Hampshire London: Macmillan, 1996).

⁷² For the bourgeois feminism narratives among Turkey's socialists, see Şirin Tekeli, *1980'ler Türkiye'sinde kadın bakış açısından kadınlar*, 3. baskı, Bugünün kitapları 7 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995); Ayşegül Devecioğlu, "Kadın Hareketi Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler," *Birikim* 11 (1990); Saadet Arıkan, *Ve Hep Birlikte Koştuk: İlerici Kadınlar Derneği (1975 - 1980)*, 1. baskı (İstanbul: Açı Yayınları, 1996).

Curtailement of women's organizing and instrumentalization of gender questions in nation-state building processes and revolutionary periods stand out as one of the main research areas, as exemplified by the works of Moghissi, Afary, Bier, Ali, Kandiyoti, Sancar, Baron, and Yuval-Davis. Some scholars point out the role of upper- and middle-class women activists' convergence with the political elites. Others emphasize the in-betweenness of women activists, pointing to strategic alliances with the state and resistance to co-optation. The last part of this review looks at these discussions in the case of Turkey. The question of women activists' involvement in nationalist revolutions and projects significantly influenced how scholars understood the history of feminism in Turkey. For the interwar and early Cold War periods, the academic consensus points to state paternalism over women's organizing, which establishes the mainstream historiography on women's movements and gender politics in Turkey.

One of the main tenets of the post-1980 feminist movement in Turkey was its critique of Kemalist nationalism and the persistence of gender inequalities particularly in the realm of family despite the accepted rhetoric of 'emancipated Turkish women' in public discourses.⁷³

Gender and sexuality studies in Turkey flourished together with feminist organizing and sought to rewrite women into the history of modern nation-state building in Turkey.⁷⁴

Scholars challenged the erasure of women's organizing and intellectual writings in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. Serpil Çakır's study on women's journals and groups

⁷³ Deniz Kandiyoti, "Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case," *Feminist Studies* 13, no. 2 (1987): 317, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3177804>.

⁷⁴ İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu and Aylin Özman, "Türkiye'de Akademi-Feminizm İlişkisi," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 10*, 1. Baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 641–50.

in the late Ottoman period pioneered the studies on Ottoman women activists.⁷⁵ Çakır reminded the validity of a complaint by a Turkish-Muslim Ottoman noblewoman, Fatma Aliye over the erasure of women's writings for centuries. Çakır revealed the prevalent theme of women's rebellion against their living conditions due to lack of education, inequalities in marriage and employment, and sociocultural limitations over women's lives. She identified that Ottoman women activists had established many of the key tenets of republican state feminism such as the link between the women's and the nation's progress, women as educated housewives and professionals, bourgeois nuclear family, and state-sponsored education.⁷⁶

Studies on gender and sexuality politics in the early republican era also flourished in the 1980s and challenged the accepted Kemalist historiography, which preached that Atatürk, the greatest champion of women's rights, had singlehandedly emancipated the women. Critical feminist scholarship was built around two events: the establishment of the Turkish Women's Federation (TKB) in 1924, one year after the republican proclamation, and its closure in 1935, after the International Women's Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) meeting in Istanbul⁷⁷. The relations of women activists to the Kemalist state in between these two events symbolized Kemalist paternalism and erasures in Turkey's critical feminist literature. Moreover, the scholarly work on this period heavily influenced how scholars understood the period from

⁷⁵ For another source on Ottoman women's organizing, see Aynur Demirdirek, *Osmanlı Kadınlarının Hayatı Hakkı Arayışının Bir Hikayesi* (İmge Kitabevi, 1993).

⁷⁶ Serpil Çakır, *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi*, 1. basım, Kadın Araştırmaları Dizisi 4 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994).

⁷⁷ For a detailed documentation on the 1935 Congress see Aslı Davaz-Mardin, *Eşitsiz Kız Kardeşlik: Uluslararası ve Ortadoğu Kadın Hareketleri, 1935 Kongresi ve Türk Kadın Birliği*, 1. basım (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014). For a list of the TKB's activities since 1924 see Nurşen Persentili, *Türk Kadınlar Birliği 1923-2013* (Karıncaya Yayınları, 2013).

1935 to 1960, although being severely understudied compared to the early republican era. Critical feminist scholars exposed how the TKB's establishment concretely brought women's political rights into the national agenda and challenged the nationalist elites' sidelining of the issue. Yet the nationalist leadership suppressed women's organizing immediately. The TKB was first established under the leadership of Nezihe Muhiddin as the Women's Party (Kadın Fırkası) in 1923. Under the government's orders, the organization was renamed in 1924 and Muhiddin was gradually marginalized, and finally purged in 1927 by a rival group of TKB members. Yaprak Zihnioğlu's study on the TKB showed how the CHP forcefully co-opted and suppressed women's organizing. Zihnioğlu's analysis pointed out that the TKB and Muhiddin contested the new regime's ideal of 'modern Turkish woman' but eventually failed.⁷⁸

Zihnioğlu pointed to the contrast between Muhiddin's ideal of Turkish woman as active agents in all societal areas and the Kemalist ideal of women as passive spectators and educated mothers without political rights. She argued that the CHP considered the TKB and women like Nezihe Muhiddin as threats to the new regime's authority. Following a similar line of argument, Zafer Toprak analyzed the TKB's closure and early republican women's organizing in relation to the global political developments in the 1930s.⁷⁹ Toprak claimed that organizing an international women's meeting with the theme of international peace concerned the CHP elites. Reminding that several other autonomous and semi-autonomous groups were suppressed by the CHP in the 1930s, Toprak argued that the IWSA meeting

⁷⁸ Yaprak Zihnioğlu, *Kadınsız inkılap: Nezihe Muhiddin, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği*, Dördüncü basım (İstanbul: Metis yayınları, 2019).

⁷⁹ Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935)*, Birinci basım (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015).

served as an excuse to eliminate another autonomous organization. He concluded that women's movement in Turkey "went to a 30 year-long sleep" after the TKB's closure in 1935.⁸⁰ Many other gender and sexuality scholars and historians accepted Toprak's conclusion. These scholars took the TKB's reopening in 1949 by the elite Kemalist women as evidence of their alliance and compliance with the political elite, thereby taking this period as "feminism's silent years in Turkey."

Serpil Sancar's analysis of Turkey's gender regime in the multi-party period and under the DP government supported these claims.⁸¹ According to Sancar, the new nation-state was consolidated on the basis of a consensus among various political groups such as ultra-nationalists, conservatives, and republicans. At the center of this consensus was conservative gender politics with a limited legal reform agenda on family and marital relations, political participation, and employment. She argued that the late 1930s witnessed the full consolidation of the conservative and republican positions on gender conservatism over the figure of educated housewife. Thus, Sancar depicted the 1935-1960 era as a period of official erasures on women's struggle histories. The era of women's revolution came to an end; women were sent back home. The subtitle of her book, *Men Make States, Women Make Families*, signals her argument regarding Turkey's gendered modernization from the viewpoint of nationalist elites.

The common periodization of feminism history in Turkey appears as such: 1) 1908-1935: First wave feminism, 2) 1935-1960: silent years, 3) 1960-1980: feminism under socialist

⁸⁰ Toprak.

⁸¹ Sancar, *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti*.

tutelage, 4) 1980-mid-1990s: Second wave feminism, 5) mid-1990s-2010s: Third wave feminism. This accepted narrative has been influential in rigid portrayals of Kemalist feminists primarily as elite collaborators and beneficiaries of a ‘conservative consensus’ on gender norms in Turkey. In short, it downplays the complexity of Kemalist intellectual women’s discourses and practices and neglects their contributions to Turkey’s feminism. Moreover, it overlooks the silencing of socialist women. Finally, this narrative ignores the fact that associating women almost exclusively with the family had been a European phenomenon too, which Mark Mazower identified in liberal Britain, Nazi Germany, and the Soviets.⁸² Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries had been parts of this trend. Recent feminist scholarship has pointed out the academic neglect on this period. Selin Çağatay, for example, criticized the lack of interest in Kemalist women’s organizing after the TKB’s closure in 1935 in Turkey’s feminist scholarship.⁸³ According to Çağatay, the historical evolution of gender studies, the rise of autonomous feminist activism in Turkey, and the critique of intersectional inequalities raised by Islamist and Kurdish women against Kemalist secular nationalism are among the reasons why feminist researchers were less interested in this period. Çağatay warned against a tendency among some feminist and gender scholars to take Kemalist women as agents of gendered oppression due to their nationalist, secularist, and classist discourses, and to erase Kemalist women’s difficult relationship with the political elites in this period. Ezgi Sarıtaş and Yelda Şahin similarly scrutinized the labeling of post-World War Two period as feminism’s silent years by pointing out to the prolific writings in

⁸² Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*, Penguin Books History (London: Penguin Books, 1999).

⁸³ Selin Çağatay, “Kemalist Feminizm: Kadın Hareketi Tarihinin Göz Ardı Edilmiş ‘Bariz Gerçeği,’” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 10*, ed. Feryal Saygılıgil and Naciye Berber, 1.baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 313–31.

Kadın Gazetesi (Women's Gazette).⁸⁴ This dissertation extends this scholarship through an analysis of Kemalist women's discourses and practices in relation to Turkey's Cold War politics along with the silencing of socialist intellectual women.

As this dissertation shows, Kemalist women's public discourses proliferated with the transition to multi-party regime. This proliferation, however, does not allow them to be neatly categorized neither as regime's pawns nor as feminist heroines. Moreover, history of Turkey's feminism in this period cannot be understood without taking the silencing of socialist intellectuals into account. Socialists like Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviř understood gender inequalities in relation to class inequalities domestically and national inequalities globally. Yet they shared a modernist and secularist vision with Kemalist intellectual women, which partly explains why several gender and sexuality scholars ignored their silencing. The silencing of socialists, along with many other progressive, leftist, and anti-war intellectuals, was crucial in the making of Turkey's official and popular anti-communist nationalisms after the mid-1940s. As this dissertation shows, the rise of anti-communism was not unrelated to the rise of anti-women discourses, on which Kemalist women complained throughout the 1950s.

Conclusion

The main literatures that this dissertation aims to contribute is nationalisms, modernization, and women's activism in the Middle East and Turkey. The dissertation shows, on the one

⁸⁴ Ezgi Sarıtař and Yelda řahin, "50'li Yıllarda Kadın Hareketi," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020).

hand, that nationalist and socialist intellectual women in Turkey understood gender questions as central to the ongoing modernization process, the country's material development, and the making of a national identity. On the other hand, it also shows how Kemalists embraced Turkey's new anti-communist nationalism. In the new political context, they adopted an increasingly voluntarist strategy to modernize Turkey. The eventual failure of these projects created disappointments among Kemalist women against the state elite who were divided between the DP and the CHP. Ultimately, this dissertation critically builds upon the extant literature on Turkey's feminist history and Kemalist feminism by analyzing the complex motivations and contradictions of Kemalist and socialist women in their involvement in Turkey's state feminist project.

Chapter 2: A Shared Modernist Moralism: Women Intellectuals' Contested Thoughts on Frugality in Turkey From the 1930s to 1950s

Introduction

*Citizens! We are waging an economic struggle together as women, men, young and old! In this fight, working five times more than before is our weapon, domestic produce is our bomb, thrift is our artillery, sacrifice is our rifle.*⁸⁵

İffet Halim Oruz, a leading TKB (Turkish Women's Federation) member and the owner and editor-in-chief of *Kadın Gazetesi* (Women's Gazette), makes this call during the TKB's Diyarbakır branch office opening in 1927. Oruz uttered these words shortly after the 1925 Şeyh Sait Rebellion⁸⁶ which erupted in Diyarbakır, Turkey's most populated Kurdish city.⁸⁷ The content exemplified what would become the TKB's main political agenda to progress Turkish womanhood starting with the late 1920s: frugality and putting more women into the workforce. It also showed how, in the eyes of Oruz, the progress of Turkish womanhood was inseparable from national development. It was hardly a coincidence that she gave her first

⁸⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, *Arkadaşlar* (İstanbul: Selamet Basımevi, 1936), 4.

⁸⁶ Şeyh Sait İsyanı is a rebellion, erupted in 1925, and led by Kurdish tribal and religious leaders against the Ankara government, pursuing Islamist and Kurdish nationalist aims. For more, see Martin van Bruinessen, *Ağa, şeyh ve devlet = Agha, shaikh and state: the social and political structures of Kurdistan*, trans. Banu Yalkut, 5. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 387.

⁸⁷ In her memoirs decades later, this is how she recalls her urgency to open a TKB branch in Diyarbakır: "Around this time, Kurdish nationalist struggle (in her words, *Kürtçülük*) has awakened in this city." İffet Halim Oruz, *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye'de Kadın Devrimi* (İstanbul: Gül Matbaası, 1986), 29.

public speech in a place that witnessed a violent challenge to Turkish nationalism and its brutal suppression.⁸⁸

During the same year, there would be a leadership change in the TKB. The new cadres, among whom Oruz was an influential intellectual, would employ a narrative that promoted Turkish women's individual responsibility to contribute to the newly built republic's progress. The TKB's advocacy of women's national political rights under Nezihe Muhiddin's⁸⁹ leadership was abandoned on the grounds that 1) its politics was too parallel to the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA), seen as holding unfavorable views towards Turkey⁹⁰, and 2) men and women should lead the Turkish revolutions together as Turkish revolutionism did not differentiate between men and women.⁹¹

The critique of the IWSA and the emphasis on frugality as an individual duty that dominated the TKB since the late 1920s was not unique to the elite Kemalist women who constituted the TKB cadres. Sabiha Sertel, a socialist intellectual, also wrote on these issues in parallel ways. In 1924, just a year after the Turkish Republic was founded, she wrote about war widows: "It is paramount to turn this parasite class into producers... our most sacred duty towards many martyrs, heroes, is to give these women the opportunity to live an honorable life. No martyr's

⁸⁸ She says, "What would it mean to be silent during such a time!" Oruz, *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye'de Kadın Devrimi*.

⁸⁹ The first TKB leader who was ousted in the 1927 on charges of fraud, although the accuracy of these claims were never established. For more on Nezihe Muhiddin, see Yaprak Zihnioğlu, *Kadinsız inkılap: Nezihe Muhiddin, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği*, Dördüncü basım (İstanbul: Metis yayınları, 2019).

⁹⁰ This is why when *Kadın Gazetesi* announced TKB's reopening in 1949, it emphasized that TKB would not pursue political gains as suffragettes do (*suffragetelilik*, as they called it). Here, the critique of *suffragetelilik* is not only because they believe Turkish women have received every right they need. It is more about their firm belief in the need for a "national" agenda as opposed to what they see as an overtly/wannabe westernized one. See, İffet Halim Oruz, "Türk Kadın Birliği," *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 18, 1949.

⁹¹ Oruz, *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye'de Kadın Devrimi*, 30.

soul would be pleased if their wife is in poverty or make her living out of prostitution.”⁹² And yet, Sertel’s rights-based advocacy of women’s work differentiated her from the TKB. In her early writings in 1919, she argued that World War One and poverty were not the only reasons for women’s increased presence in the workforce. She championed women’s equality in familial relations and women’s recognition as individual members of society.⁹³ Sertel’s approach towards international women’s organizations had an anti-imperialist nationalist emphasis that took an anti-fascist tone with the 1930s. In 1935, she wrote against “women’s groups acting as pawns of imperialists and capitalists”⁹⁴ for they obscured the main source of women’s oppression: class inequality.

By the 1940s, both commonalities and distinctions marked women’s narratives of frugality from the Kemalist women’s press of *Kadın Gazetesi* and Iffet Halim Oruz, to independent intellectuals such as Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviř. The emphasis on frugality was universal among Turkish women intellectuals and central to their political thought, albeit in different terms and meanings. What does the value attached to frugality reveal about the making of modern Turkish womanhood and manhood? What is the relationship between women’s money know-how and Turkey’s modernization? What are the stakes of divergences between independent women intellectuals and elite Kemalist women? This chapter aims to answer these questions, following two routes: 1) the elite Kemalist women’s press primarily focusing on Iffet Halim Oruz’s writings (as well as the news articles and opinion columns in *Kadın Gazetesi*), and 2) independent women intellectuals’ narratives primarily focusing on Suat

⁹² Sabiha Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 1. basım, Anı (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2015).

⁹³ Sabiha Sertel, *Kadınlığa Dair* (Sel Yayıncılık, 2019), 122–23.

⁹⁴ Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 100.

Derviş's journalistic writings, memoirs, and popular novels, (as well as the writings of other independent intellectuals such as Sabiha Sertel). Oruz and Derviş were not the only women who elaborated on frugality, of course. Still, they were prolific and influential writers, who were respectively representative of semi-official and independent gender and development narratives of their era. There are two main parts in the chapter. The first part delineates multiple meanings and functions of frugality as understood by the selected women writers. The second analyzes these differences further through three categories of women that these works explored, often in accordance with the women's class position. These categories were 1) spendthrift (petty)bourgeois woman in Oruz and *Kadın Gazetesi*, 2) aspiring to-be spendthrift poor working-class women in Suat Derviş's socialist-realist novels, and 3) declassed women descendants of the Ottoman nobility as portrayed in Suat Derviş's works. The chapter argues that money know-how became one of the moral and cultural markers of being modern in republican Turkey and frugality has been a litmus test of reliable, trustworthy Turkish woman, who was expected to duly contribute to Turkey's national development. Appeals to women's frugality as a moral obligation intensified in the times of economic depression in the 1930s. After World War Two, these narratives became embedded in the political rivalries between the ruling Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) and the newly established Democrat Party (Demokrat Party-DP). The chapter further shows how independent women intellectuals and elite Kemalist women overlapped in designating women's moral obligations. Yet independent intellectuals like Derviş and Sertel also exposed the class dynamics behind Kemalist women's expectations of frugality. Class emphasis partially differentiated them from the Kemalists. Still, frugality consistently was a

part of a shared modernist moralism that women intellectuals and writers with diverse ideologies utilized to pursue their political beliefs.

Part 1) Meanings and functions of frugality

The way women spend their money and their financial literacy had been a widely discussed theme in popular media such as newspapers, radio talks and novels or novellas. Promotion of women's frugality included a wide range of emphases such as modest public appearance, domestic consumption, professionalization, and efficient and hardworking homemaking, all of which coalesced into a narrative of correct and proper modernization.⁹⁵ For Kemalists and independent intellectuals alike, frugality was a fundamental moral and cultural quality that modern Turkish women were assumed to have. Its gendered attribution was integral to nationalist discourses and practices (with ethnic and religious connotations) and elitist paternalism towards the rural population. This part explores how modern Turkish women's frugality became an inseparable part of the republican developmentalism that sought to create a Sunni Turkish bourgeoisie.

⁹⁵ Some of these attributions regarding the relationship between gender and modernization in the Middle East have been discussed in-depth by other scholars. For Palestinian elite imagination of the ideal Arab home and the role of frugality during the mandate period, see Sherene Seikaly, "Women of Thrift: Domesticity and Home Economics," in *Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 53–77.; for the figure of 'working woman' and modernizing domestic spaces as part of state feminism in Egypt, see Laura Bier, "Between Home and Workplace: Fashioning the 'Working Woman,'" in *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 60–101. On women's home management as a disciplinary mechanism in Iran's modernization, see Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Crafting and Educated Wife and Mother," in *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 181–207. Janet Afary, "On the Road to an Ethos of Monogamous, Heterosexual Marriage," in *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 111–42. for the constitution of Turkish women primarily as wives and homemakers in 1945-1960 in Turkey, see Serpil Sançar, *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti: Erkekler Devlet, Kadınlar Aile Kurar*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 302 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012).

Prior to the publishing of *Kadın Gazetesi* in 1947, İffet Halim Oruz's public speeches revealed how she bound domestic consumption to the progress of the Turkish nation. In her above mentioned 1927 speech, she explored these themes: "...it is us who raise the nation's children...we have a major role in the economic sphere; we are present in society as much as we are in the family. Any mistake we make in these spheres directly influences the good of the nation."⁹⁶ She then invited Diyarbakır women to buy domestic shoes and to sew their summer dresses with domestic fabrics. In another speech in 1932 in Ankara on the 3rd "Saving, Investment and Domestic Goods Week", she asked the audience: "Dear friends, what did you do this year? How many of you wore the reverse of your clothes? Where did you get your food? How much did you save? What did you teach your child?... Are you aware of İzmir's fig, Trabzon's hazelnut, Manisa's grape?"⁹⁷ Oruz believed that citizens could contribute or harm Turkey's industrialization, development, and international status through their consumption choices. For her, frugality was not limited to supporting statist economic policies. Frugality was also a matter of culture and morality. Being a modern Turkish woman meant a balanced combination of retaining 'the essence of Turkishness' "while getting rid of the flawed ideas of the past."⁹⁸

Veiling is one example. Another womanly duty in Oruz's Diyarbakır speech was getting rid of *çarşaf*,⁹⁹ "an attire that is far from the essence of Turkishness and about which the

⁹⁶ Oruz, *Arkadaşlar*, 6.

⁹⁷ Oruz, 37.

⁹⁸ Oruz, *Arkadaşlar*, 7. When Oruz here refers to past, she implies the Ottoman Empire.

⁹⁹ Oruz and *Kadın Gazetesi* always use the term "çarşaf," for the type of veiling that they consider un-Turkish. *Çarşaf* is a specific type of veil that covers the lower part of the face, similar to *chador*; widely worn by Ottoman urban women.

Anatolian peasant knows nothing”¹⁰⁰ A news article on *Kadın Gazetesi* in 1947 on ‘veiled’ black marketeers can further explain the cultural and moral connotations of frugality, sharpened in the context of post-World War Two economic devastation. For Oruz and *Kadın Gazetesi*, the black veil was not only a symbol of backwardness or a premodern remnant of the Ottoman Empire. It was also un-Turkish. Referring to a group of black marketeer veiled women, selling coupons in a public market, Oruz wrote in *Kadın Gazetesi* that “...It is almost as if this group, covering the streets like a black cloud, are unaware of the National Defense Law,¹⁰¹ that the selling and buying of coupons at that place or selling goods at exorbitant prices are prohibited... We must save Istanbul from the coal-black image of these women, who are neither rural nor urban. Turkish peasant women are loyal Turkish mothers. Although they are under the cloak of the peasantry, these black marketeer women are none of these.”¹⁰²

The emphasis on frugality and money know-how as an individual responsibility in *Kadın Gazetesi* and Oruz’s writings was a classed one despite their ostensible class blindness.¹⁰³

The novels of Suat Derviş offer a different approach to frugality and money know-how that is

¹⁰⁰ Oruz, *Arkadaşlar*, 7. Writing about her experience in Diyarbakır later in her memoirs, she says “smart Diyarbakır men did not force the *çarşaf* on their wives and allowed them to wear *yeldirme*, which is a loose clothing that women usually wear with a headscarf, instead, made of famous Diyarbakır fabric.” Oruz, *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye’de Kadın Devrimi*, 25. However, this line of interpretation is not included in the 1936 published collection of her public speeches. Although a speculation, her emphasis on *yeldirme* can be more related to post-1980 differentiation between turban versus authentic Turkish headscarf.

¹⁰¹ National Defense Law, legislated by the CHP in 1940, gave the government the power to exert measures including pricing, confiscating produce, and even forced labor. The law created a lot of public discontent, especially among peasants. See Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “Turkey’s Return to Multi-Party Politics: A Social Interpretation,” *East European Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 89–107.

¹⁰² İffet Halim Oruz, “Kara Borsacı Kadınlar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 8, 1947.

¹⁰³ The main premise of Kemalist principle of peopleism is that there are no class divisions in the Turkish nation. The slogan of classless society has been criticized for disguising class inequalities. For example, Sertel argues that “the word ‘classless society’ implies the development of bourgeoisie and the oppression of working-class. They constrain the working-class from developing and organizing. Low-income civil servants, shopkeepers and craftsman are in great financial difficulty.” Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 109–10.

more grounded on a class analysis. Suat Derviş novels, particularly her socialist-realist novels from the 1930s onwards, reflected a different worldview, in which prodigality, frugality, or stinginess was dependant on one's social class. The lack of money know-how of women characters such as Celile in *Çılgın Gibi* (Crazy In Love-1945) was due to their privileged background from a wealthy Ottoman family that gradually lost its fortune with the empire's demise. In other novels, Derviş portrayed the lives of poor working-class and unemployed women. She depicted young women characters such as Nazlı in *Olan Şeylerin Romanı* (The Novel of What Happened-1937), who quits her labor-intensive and underpaid factory job and becomes a sex worker in the pursuit of a prodigal life after years of poverty, or Zeynep in *Ankara Mahpusu* (The Prisoner from Ankara-1944), whose frugality is associated with her transformation into a cruel capitalist shopkeeper.

Meanwhile, Safiye Erol, an independent women writer with conservative convictions, described money know-how in her novel *Ciğerdelen* as a criterion for proper Turkish manhood, who should neither be prodigal nor stingy. The main male character disparages another one for keeping his money to himself instead of giving some of it as charity: "I am not that kind of a Turkish man...I donated three quarters of my money to two institutions; one serving my nation's healthy development and the other serving Turkish children's education and discipline."¹⁰⁴

Frugality was a gendered citizenship duty. It promoted consuming domestic goods, avoiding luxury, and being a philanthropist, which overall made the indispensable parts of being

¹⁰⁴ Safiye Erol, *Ciğerdelen*, 7. baskı (İstanbul: Kubbealti, 2008), 49.

modern Turkish citizens. Moreover, socialist intellectuals such as Sabiha Sertel and elite Kemalist intellectuals such as Oruz and other *Kadın Gazetesi* writers converged in their support of frugality as a fundamental means for developing the nation. In her column in *Resimli Ay* during the early 1920s, Sertel celebrated professional working women and criticized prodigal elite women.¹⁰⁵ Sertel became a socialist as a journalism student at Columbia University in the early 1920s. Yet in the context of the national liberation war and the republican revolution, Sertel partially supported Kemalist statist policies, which aimed at state-led industrialization within a narrative of nationalist egalitarianism.¹⁰⁶ Sertel advocated national industrialization to remain independent from foreign capitalists and native non-Muslim capitalists (predominantly Armenian, Greek, Jew and Dönme).¹⁰⁷ She later explored in her memoirs how statist policies failed. Rather than creating a national industrial bourgeoisie, statism in Turkey produced “a mercantile bourgeoisie that accumulated great wealth in collaboration with foreign capitalists and to people’s disadvantage.”¹⁰⁸ Sertel’s comments on the notorious 1942 Wealth Tax, which exclusively targeted native non-Muslim businesses, was informed by this analysis of early Republican statist economic policies. She argued that a tax on the mercantile bourgeoisie was indeed necessary to redistribute the unfair profits made by war profiteers, landowners, and black marketeers. Sertel criticized the ethnoreligious implementation of the Wealth Tax.¹⁰⁹ She argued that the Wealth Tax was “an

¹⁰⁵ Aylin Özman and Ayça Bulut, “Sabiha (Zekeriya) Sertel: Kemalizm, Marksizm ve Kadın Meselesi,” *Toplum ve Bilim* 96 (2003): 184–218.

¹⁰⁶ For more information on Kemalist statism, see Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de devlet ve sınıflar*, 17. baskı, İletişim yayınları Araştırma - inceleme dizisi, 77 14 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011).

¹⁰⁷ Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 16.

¹⁰⁸ Sertel, 182.

¹⁰⁹ Sertel supported a tax on wealth for those black marketeers, commissioners, merchants, big landowners who exploited the war conditions and became richer during the World War Two. She thought such a tax policy should not differentiate between religious allegiances. See, Sertel, 232.

injustice...smacking fascism”¹¹⁰ and extremely dangerous in the context of growing fascist and pro-Nazi intellectual currents in Turkey before and during World War Two.

Intellectuals’ ideas on frugality reveal the gendered and classed thinking on spending money and money know-how in general. Regular advice on home economics, advice to buy domestic goods, critiques of extravagance and stinginess should not imply a non-political endeavor. These notions did not reflect an abstract ideal about proper womanhood. They were closely related to contemporaneous political-economic conditions and were embedded in nationalist developmentalist discourses. State practices like the Wealth Tax, which was originally passed against unnational economic behavior such as black marketing and war profiteering were not unrelated to popular intellectual narratives on frugality. These narratives offered moral justifications for politically sponsored dispossessions of selected bourgeoisie strata, which in practice were not black marketers and war profiteers but native Christians and Jews. Kemalist women intellectuals’ self-entitled role was to make the frugal woman. Independent women writers also paralleled these aims, though under diverging political narratives. The depictions of the anti-frugal woman further illuminate frugality as part of the project of creating ‘modern Turkish womanhood.’ Independent intellectual writings, meanwhile, emphasize the classed dimensions that went unmarked in *Kadın Gazetesi*’s critiques of spendthrift women.

¹¹⁰ Sertel, 222.

Part 2) Anti-frugal woman: The spendthrift, the 'greedy' working-class woman, the descendant of Ottoman nobility

In the writings of *Kadın Gazetesi*, Sabiha Sertel, and Suat Derviş there are three categories of women through whom they discussed the meaning and function of frugality. These were 1) spendthrift (petty)bourgeois women, heavily criticized by *Kadın Gazetesi* as well as socialist writers like Sertel for their luxurious and foreign goods consumption, 2) poor and/or working-class women as portrayed in a non-romanticized way in Suat Derviş novels, and 3) women descendants of Ottoman nobility in Derviş novels who lacked any money know-how.

Subpart 2.1) The figure of spendthrift (petty)bourgeois woman

News articles and opinion columns in *Kadın Gazetesi* frequently advised their audience to spend their money wisely and avoid luxury. They also offered tips on domestic management from dressing on a budget to cooking easy and budget-friendly family meals. At the same time, *Kadın Gazetesi* was a staunch critique of upper-middle-class women for their public extravagance and prodigality. They considered the spendthrift bourgeois women mostly as a minority, compared to what was perceived as the actual mass of Turkish womanhood composed of professional working women,¹¹¹ peasant women, and housewives.¹¹² The critique of this stereotyped group of spendthrift women was not unique to writers in *Kadın Gazetesi*. Nationalists and socialist intellectuals (men and women), or mainstream daily press

¹¹¹ Poor, working-class women are almost never included in *Kadın Gazetesi*'s moral comparisons of the spendthrift women with what is perceived as the actual mass of Turkish womanhood.

¹¹² "Gazeteler İçinden," *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 1, 1947.

also severely criticized spendthrift bourgeois women.¹¹³ However, comparisons of *Kadın Gazetesi* and socialist intellectuals like Sertel and Derviş reveal that despite convergences in their objections to prodigal elites, the underlying logic did not always align.

There were two interrelated lines of critiques against the spendthrift (petty)bourgeois woman. The first involved objections against her perceived laziness, lust for luxury, and being almost a parasite of the nation. The second one added a moral dimension concerning the impact of these women on the morals of their children, husbands, and society in general. A *Kadın Gazetesi* writer described the spendthrift woman as “ladies babbling on about gowns, coats, fur, diamonds, jewellery, cars, perfumes, gambling, and nightclubs...”¹¹⁴ They were defined in relation to their black marketeer, smuggler, profiteer husbands, brothers and fathers who talked like “we hit a 100k there, paid 7k key money here, rented a summer house for a 10k.”¹¹⁵ The emphasis on male relatives or husbands pointed to another common critique, prevalent since the late Ottoman period, which targeted upper classes who were over/falsey westernized and did not contribute to their people.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ For example, a well-known nationalist intellectual Halide Edib argues that the majority of Turkish women are laborers and criticizes the lazy minority is no use to the nation. Halide Edib Adivar, *Turkey Faces West*, The Middle East Collection (New York: Arno Press, 1973). Nazım Hikmet, a socialist intellectual, writes in daily press *Akşam* under pseudonym ‘Orhan Selim’ making a similar critique, saying “You’re wearing too much makeup, my woman, too much... You are the minority... I am afraid the majority will look at you and do the same.” Nazım Hikmet, “Çok Boyanıyorsun Kadınım,” *Akşam Gazetesi*, December 14, 1934.

¹¹⁴ Şukufe Nihal, “Cezamızı Çekiyoruz,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 1, 1947.

¹¹⁵ Nihal.

¹¹⁶ For example, Halide Edib Adivar, in daily press *Yenigün*, criticizes this class for getting rich thanks to their close ties with the ruling regimes but not contributing to the nation. Halide Edib Adivar, “Üniversite Şehrinde,” *Yenigün*, February 24, 1937. In an earlier nationalist novel, Adivar described Istanbul’s upper-class women who were alienated from their society as “puppets, nationless, jobless, aimless, polished puppets.” Halide Edib Adivar, *Yeni Turan*, 1. basım (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2014).

According to *Kadın Gazetesi*, the ways women could support their nation were mediated through their roles as wives and mothers. Claiming that “one should trust in kneading hands instead of polished nails,”¹¹⁷ Oruz recommended women to become more hard-working and reduce their husbands’ burden in financially difficult times¹¹⁸. Becoming more hard-working homemakers included cutting consumption as well as excellent domestic management. An expert invited to *Kadın Gazetesi* to analyze marital conflicts diagnosed the problem: “contemporary womanhood demands too much from their husbands.”¹¹⁹

Thus, the figure of spendthrift (petty)bourgeois women represented the opposite of who they should have been, namely the actual majority of Turkish women “who [were] absorbed by their responsibilities in caring of their children, husband, daily subsistence, and their job.”¹²⁰ This group of upper-class women “could not digest their wealth properly.”¹²¹ Moreover, these criticisms also exposed the anxiety of Kemalist writers of *Kadın Gazetesi* in the late 1940s over the majority’s succumb to consumerism and luxury, which they understood as the disease of contemporary marriages.¹²²

¹¹⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, “Pastırma Yazı,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 6, 1947.

¹¹⁸ A parallel discourse on frugality, specifically as it relates to the makeup and clothing of urban women took place in Iran starting with the 1930s. Afary and Friedland argue that just as urban women had more access to public spaces their morals were questioned on the basis of their prodigal clothing and makeup. They note unveiling, rising authoritarian political tendencies and Islamism as three main reasons behind this discourse of frugality. For more see, Janet Afary and Roger Friedland, “Critical Theory, Authoritarianism, and the Politics of Lipstick from the Weimar Republic to the Contemporary Middle East,” *Critical Research on Religion* 6, no.3, (2018), 243-268.

¹¹⁹ “Büyük İctimai Anketimiz: Kadın Erkek Münasebetleri ve Aile,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 26, 1947.

¹²⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “Çıkış Amacımız,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 1, 1947.

¹²¹ Füzûzan R. Eksat, “Hesapsızlık,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 15, 1947. This article compares the elite women of Izmir to Istanbul and praises elite Izmir women’s modesty compared to extravagant Istanbulite elites.

¹²² Eksat.

The laziness, consumerism, and lack of contribution to national development was one line of criticism towards the spendthrift (petty)bourgeois woman. The other line argued how she had dangerous moral consequences for the nation's good. The moralist argument pointed to Turkish women's primary role as mothers and wives. It ridiculed what it deemed as over/false modernization. Especially the satirical statements¹²³ on this caricature spendthrift woman as an admirer of Europe resembles post-Tanzimat era novels and one of its most criticized figures, namely the snob male admirers of Europe.¹²⁴ As opposed to silent or slave-like images of women in the post-Tanzimat novels,¹²⁵ the critique of spendthrift (petty)bourgeois women in *Kadın Gazetesi* in the late 1940s and contemporaneous novels situated women's public presence as a sign of correct/proper modernization.

Children's upbringing was another aspect that legitimized moralist critiques of prodigality. An article in *Kadın Gazetesi* explained the danger that spendthrift (petty)bourgeois woman posed for her daughter by endangering the young girl's happiness in her future marriage: "What a pity that a young girl will enter into her marriage, her biggest ideal, with all her wants are already satisfied and thus without any dreams, desires...Children are the nation's property, the sturdier this foundation the more trust we have for the future."¹²⁶ In matters of

¹²³ From Halide Edib to Nazım Hikmet to *Kadın Gazetesi*, these women are depicted as grotesque figures with too much make up, ratty clothing, speaking Turkish with a splash of foreign words in English or French. For *Kadın Gazetesi* example see, "Gazeteler İçinden." For Nazım Hikmet example see footnote #32.

¹²⁴ The first and most classic example is *Araba Sevdası* by Recaiade Mahmud Ekrem. For an analysis, see Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 1. baskı, Makaleler 4 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991)., Deniz Kandiyoti, "Cariyeler, Fettan Kadınlar ve Yoldaşlar: Türk Romanında Kadın İmgeleri," in *Cariyeler bacılar yurttaşlar: kimlikler ve toplumsal dönüşümler*, trans. Aksu Bora et al., 1. basım, Kadın araştırmaları dizisi 11 (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1997).

¹²⁵ See Kandiyoti, "Cariyeler, Fettan Kadınlar ve Yoldaşlar: Türk Romanında Kadın İmgeleri."

¹²⁶ G. E., "Evladlarımızı Kaprislerimiz Uğruna Zehirlemeye Hakkımız Yoktur," *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 15, 1947. *Kadın Gazetesi*, in general, is full of examples that emphasizing mothers' primary and almost full responsibility in raising their children.

excessive and luxury consumption, Kemalist writers in *Kadın Gazetesi* also promoted the women's responsibility to their husbands. A story by Şukufe Nihal, a popular writer and regular contributor *Kadın Gazetesi*, told the tragic account of a hardworking civil servant family man and how his grotesquely spendthrift wife and daughters led him to vice. Over the years, this old man became unable to meet his wife's and daughter's unending demands for new clothes and accessories and steal from his department's money. The poor man ended up in jail, while the spendthrift daughters cried over their lost chances to find a good husband.¹²⁷

Gendered ideals of frugality as portrayed in *Kadın Gazetesi* were directly related to Turkey's contemporary political and economic developments. They wrote in turbulent times that witnessed postwar realignments globally and the transition from single-party to multi-party regime domestically. The credibility of the incumbent CHP was deteriorated due to economic discontent across all social groups, elite and popular, urban and rural alike.¹²⁸ Despite the editorial announcement on *Kadın Gazetesi*'s determined position to stay away from party politics,¹²⁹ the writers made implicit critiques or suggestions for the ruling elite. Yet, even their subtle critiques or suggestions glossed over the CHP's responsibility for economic failures since *Kadın Gazetesi* promoted frugality as the ultimate solution to economic difficulties.¹³⁰ Their main object of critique was not the ruling elite. In the face of decreasing

¹²⁷Şukufe Nihal, "Erkeğin Ahlakı Üzerinde Kadının Ekonomik Rolü," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 22, 1947. Şukufe Nihal has written several poems in this line. A striking one, Duymayan Kadına, in her book *Gayya*, was first published in 1930. The poem contrasts the spendthrift woman with the image of a starving child on the streets. She blames the woman for starving a child by spending her money for clothes, jewelry etc. Şukufe Nihal, *Gayya* (Muallim Ahmet Halim Kütüphanesi, 1930).

¹²⁸ Karaömerlioğlu, "Turkey's Return to Multi-Party Politics: A Social Interpretation."

¹²⁹ In their first issue, İffet Halim Oruz explains that *Kadın Gazetesi* will not be interested in gender equality as she believes this is not an issue for the country anymore. See Oruz, "Çıkış Amacımız."

¹³⁰ This is particularly accurate for the transition to multi party politics period and in the early years of the DP government. *Kadın Gazetesi* will become much more openly political towards the late 1950s.

purchasing power and economic difficulties, *Kadın Gazetesi* did not direct its gaze on the CHP government. It severely criticized women's overconsumption and instructed the housewives on how to make ends meet. Frugality had been one of the long-held ideals of Turkey's state feminism's making of the new woman. The late 1940s saw the reutilization of austerity and budgeting narratives that targeted the working middle classes in the face of the post-World War Two economic crisis.

A series of articles in *Kadın Gazetesi*, mostly written by Oruz, promoted the importance of austerity and budgeting. *Kadın Gazetesi* and Oruz acknowledged the economic crisis and the public unrest it created. Celebrating the public's interest in economic matters, Oruz expressed her trust in "[Turkish] womanhood who would gladly contribute to austerity efforts and domestic goods consumption with a sense of mission if they [were] given the task."¹³¹ Oruz argued that the primary measure against economic crisis should be frugality where Turkish womanhood could lead the nation. Yet *Kadın Gazetesi* writers were mostly concerned about the amount of money women spent on fashionable clothing. These concerns did not reflect the widespread socioeconomic impoverishment due to inflation, food shortages, and a decline in real wages. *Kadın Gazetesi*'s calls to abstract Turkish womanhood obscured from whom they expected austerity, and from whom they expected leadership.

In one article, Oruz authoritatively instructed housewives to prepare for winter by saving money for food and heating, just like "our grandmothers had done with great joy."¹³² She criticized the buying of new winter mantles or fur coats which drained the family budget. She

¹³¹ İffet Halim Oruz, "Son Günlerin Siyasi Olayları ve Kadınlığımız," *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 22, 1947.

¹³² İffet Halim Oruz, "Kış Gelirken," *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 8, 1947.

ended the article reprehensively: “The coat can be renewed if one sews a new velvet neck and well wear it for two more years, but no one can do without food.”¹³³ Oruz’s embrace of Kemalism’s classless society discourse obscured the reality of a small social group, as opposed to the entirety of Turkish women that the *Kadın Gazetesi* claimed to represent.

In addition to locating the root of the problem in individuals’ irrational spending behavior, this reprehensive tone also aimed to divert the public attention away from class relations. Reflecting on a public discussion about a CHP legislation to raise MP salaries in January 1948, Oruz emphasized “the duty befallen on our womanhood by showing the benefits of austerity measures instead of [arguing about] fruitless attempts to raise civil servant salaries.”¹³⁴ Oruz suggested that Turkey was “indeed as comfortable and as prosperous as a heaven compared to Europe where prices for even basic goods [were] so high.”¹³⁵ The main culprit for decreasing purchasing power in Turkey was not high prices, but the fact that “[Turkish women] have never learned to live within [their] means...[and] what devastated [Turkish families’] income [was] wearing silk clothes, fur coats, gold and colorful jewelry.”¹³⁶ By resorting to assumed gender differences and stereotypical gendered traits, Oruz glossed over income gaps and the incumbent government’s failures of economic governance.

As a possible remedy to what she called a “textile waste,” Oruz resorted to a particular segment of upper-class women as saviors, whom she considered more modest and cultivated

¹³³ Oruz.

¹³⁴ İffet Halim Oruz, “Geçim Güçlüğü’nün Sebepleri,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 5, 1948.

¹³⁵ Oruz.

¹³⁶ She exclusively means women even she talks in first-person, as she argues that women are the ones who primarily overspends and harm the family income, Oruz.

compared to her spendthrift sister. She suggested that they could play a pioneering role in promoting frugality to others. Complaining that the people were spending too much instead of fitting their budgets in accordance with their economic conditions, Oruz criticized those who “did not hesitate to buy another coat and carp at wearing off their clothes” and asked, “why we did not take more precautions to prevent textile waste.”¹³⁷ She argued that the British people¹³⁸ walked around in patchy clothes to recover from the war and Turkey should adopt this behavior according to its own values. The way to start, according to Oruz, was to “wage a war against textile waste under the leadership of prominent well-dressed urban ladies.”¹³⁹ Kemalist narratives of frugality revealed the abstractness of ‘modern Turkish woman’ as a social category that the republican order hoped to create. Silences in Oruz’s narrative, with regards to the richest segments, further revealed that she expected little if any austerity from this social group. Unlike socialist intellectuals who expected the rich to carry the burden of the crisis,¹⁴⁰ Oruz pointed to the urban middle classes’ consumption habits.

As the DP’s opposition and public discontent against the CHP intensified particularly on economic matters, analyses in *Kadın Gazetesi* on specific government policies further reflected their classed frugality understanding. These articles’ silences on poor working-class men and women revealed another aspect of their class blindness. Two of these policies concerned a Road Tax proposal and political debates on new taxes on luxury and import

¹³⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, “Bizdeki Giyim İsrافی,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 8, 1947.

¹³⁸ Another article suggests that Britain can be a model as people have to show their worn off clothes to buy new ones. The suggestion is based on demand and supply law in a market economy. Füzuan R. Eksat, “Yapabilsek!,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 12, 1947.

¹³⁹ Oruz, “Bizdeki Giyim İsrافی.”

¹⁴⁰ For example, Sabiha Sertel emphasizes that with the 1930s economic policies, the comprador bourgeoisie is getting richer and richer and having a luxurious life, while the working class is being put under more burden. Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 109.

consumption. Road Tax, which was implemented in various ways since the 1930s, had long witnessed intellectual and public criticisms. Proposals to revise the Road Tax for its unfairness, especially for the urban and rural working people, had been on the public agenda for years. The CHP brought a new proposal to the parliament in 1947, which planned to collect taxes not as a fixed tax but from earned income, which also included working women.¹⁴¹ In 1948, Oruz explained that she agreed with women’s becoming taxpayers—because there is gender equality in the Turkish Republic. But she argued that the tax would be unfair if it only subjected the working women while leaving out those who actually corroded the roads, namely the unemployed spendthrift women, who were “in front of shop windows, movie theaters, gossiping, and meddling in others’ business.”¹⁴² Hasene Ilgaz, a woman MP and a regular writer at *Kadın Gazetesi*, wrote an article about the benefits of Road Tax. She claimed that additional tax collection from those who had more wealth and income would be “the only way to differentiate affluent middle-class from the wealthy class, and thus establish social justice.”¹⁴³

When a similar Road Tax proposal was being debated in 1936, Sabiha Sertel explained why this formula would not bring social justice and severely criticized women MPs for remaining silent. In *Projektör*¹⁴⁴, Sertel quoted her conversation with a woman MP, who justified

¹⁴¹ Collecting road tax from women has been a matter of discussion since the 1930s. Both Suat Derviş and Sabiha Sertel remarks about the issue in 1936. In 1947, the CHP government proposes that road tax would no longer be universal and instead collected on the basis of individual income. Also, similar to unrealized road tax regulation proposal in the 1930s, by conditioning road tax on income, working women becomes taxpayers too. See, Nuray Özdemir, “Cumhuriyet döneminde Türkiye’de yol vergisi,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 32, no. 53 (2013): 213–47, https://doi.org/10.1501/Tarar_0000000541.

¹⁴² İffet Halim Oruz, “Yol Vergisi,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 23, 1948.

¹⁴³ Hasene Ilgaz, “Yol Vergisi ve Kadınlarımız,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 17, 1949.

¹⁴⁴ The monthly journal would be closed down by the government after only one issue was published. Sertel was reprimanded for this article by the incumbent Ministry of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, for communist propaganda.

subjecting exclusively the working women to the Road Tax because otherwise, it would put the entire burden on middle-income families. Sertel, in contrast, argued that protecting the middle classes and privileging the upper classes would put the entire tax burden on the working-class women. Moreover, she objected to the gender equality discourse to justify the proposed revisions by pointing to practical inequalities between men and women such as gender pay gap, unpaid care work, unequal working conditions, seeking husband's approval for women to work, and husbands being the head of the family. In the face of this reality, Sertel asked the women MPs: "we would expect you to advocate for oppressed woman, working woman, abused woman...why are you silent?"¹⁴⁵

On the proposed tax on luxurious goods in late 1948, two articles at *Kadın Gazetesi* stood out, one being slightly critical and the other explaining the new tax's merits. Lamia Onat¹⁴⁶, a regular contributor, claimed that the proposed tax was a reflection of "[Turkish] people's, particularly the Turkish womanhood's, committed stance against the luxury goods."¹⁴⁷

Girizan Tunara, meanwhile, expressed concerns about the government's classification of luxury goods and the unintended consequences of increasing the cost of living.¹⁴⁸ Still, *Kadın Gazetesi* continued to prioritize individual responsibility over holding the government accountable and almost never include the poor working people in their analysis.

¹⁴⁵ Sabiha Sertel, "Mebus Bayanlar Neye Bağırılmıyorsunuz," *Projektör*, March 1936.

¹⁴⁶ Lamia Onat is within the close circle of the incumbent ruling party CHP.

¹⁴⁷ Lamia Onat, "Mali Kararlar ve Siyasi Durumumuz," *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 3, 1949.

¹⁴⁸ Girizan Tunara, "Lüks Vergisi Bir Lükstür," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 13, 1948.

Subpart 2.2) Aspiring to-be spendthrift: poor women and working-class women in Suat Derviş's socialist-realist writings

A prolific writer since the 1920s, Suat Derviş became a journalist and radically changed the subject and characters in her fiction in the early 1930s after returning to Turkey from Germany. Derviş's encounters with socialism, the rise of Nazism in Germany, and her family's worsening economic conditions influenced this transformation.¹⁴⁹ As a journalist, Derviş started to address the challenges faced by poor working-class and social outcasts, while sharply criticizing the nouveau rich and aspiring to-be spendthrift men and women.

Derviş' analysis of frugality and spendthrift women came to the forefront in different novels such as *Kendine Tapan Kadın* (Self-worshipping Woman-1947), *Bu Roman Olan Şeylerin Romanıdır* (The Novel of What Happened-1937), *Ankara Mahpusu* (The Prisoner from Ankara-1944), and *Aksaray'dan bir Perihan* (A Perihan from Aksaray-1962). These books depicted several poor working-class and unemployed and/or houseless characters through their relationship to capitalist employers, middle-class professionals, nouveau rich, and the old elites. The interviews she conducted in the 1930s and early 1940s in *Cumhuriyet*, *Tan*, *Son Posta* and *Haber*¹⁵⁰ with working-class and unemployed people in Istanbul informed her fiction. To a significant extent, Derviş shared the Kemalist ideal of republican Turkish woman: a frugal professional urbanite. Yet, she also exposed how this was a failed Kemalist

¹⁴⁹ See Emine Seda Çekin Işık, *Eylemi Kaleminde Bir Muharrir: Suat Derviş: Siyaset, Toplum ve Kadın Üzerine Röportajlar - Yazılar (1935-1942)*, 1. basım, Kültür İncelemeleri 65 (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2021).; Liz Behmoaras, *Suat Derviş: Efsane Bir Kadın ve Dönemi* (İthaki Yayınları, 2022).; Suat Derviş, *Anılar; paramparça*, İthaki yayınları 1282 (İstanbul: İthaki, 2017).

¹⁵⁰ For a discussion on selected articles from these interviews, See Çekin Işık, *Eylemi Kaleminde Bir Muharrir*.

promise due to deepening class inequalities and Turkey's capitalist modernization from the 1930s to the 1950s. Moreover, a closer look at Derviş's portrayal of characters from poorer backgrounds, whose ideal is not necessarily to become the frugal and professional urbanite that Kemalism idolized, also tells a story of changing class relations and the transfer of capital from Ottoman to Republican elites.

In 1936, Derviş conducted a series of interviews with people from different professions to assess the impact of the Great Depression on living conditions. Derviş's interpretation of people's responses reveals how her analysis of frugality differed from elite Kemalist women. This interview series showed Derviş that the depression significantly decreased purchasing power. She interpreted this situation in relation to the changing expectations of the necessities for a good life as required by the modern civilization, which she expressed as "a break from tradition, the desire to live a neater, cleaner, more comfortable and a modern life."¹⁵¹ For Derviş "[women] want to live just like the rest of the civilized people in the world. It is not only the rich who is civilized; the working-class is civilized too and has these needs. It is a consequence of this pressing need that [women] get a perm on [their] hair on credit. Low-income people too want to wear nice clothes and live a good life."¹⁵² Derviş did not expect the poor working-class to embrace frugality as a patriotic duty. Nevertheless, Derviş illustrated a moralist understanding of frugality too, albeit critical of Kemalism's moralist frugality expectations for its classism.

¹⁵¹ Suat Derviş, "Düne Nazaran Nasıl Yaşıyoruz - Anketten Çıkan Netice," *Cumhuriyet*, January 17, 1936.

¹⁵² Derviş.

In *Olan Şeylerin Romanı* (The Novel of What Happened-1937), Derviş portrayed Turkey's 1930s in its global context of post-World War One, Great Depression, and increasing threats of Nazism through the lives of male, female, and child workers in a textile factory in a poor Istanbul neighborhood. For Derviş this was an era of capitalist exploitation in which "the wife stripped her husband of his job, the child stripped her mother of her job."¹⁵³ Indeed, the novel's main character, Nazlı, is a young factory worker woman who takes care of her family including her unemployed father and disabled sister.

The category of women that Nazlı represents provides an insight into Derviş's approach to frugality. Nazlı and other women in the neighborhood are overworked in this factory and earn much less compared to male workers. Their earnings barely keep the families alive. Malnutrition of mothers and children is a major health challenge.¹⁵⁴ In the face of these conditions, Derviş depicts Nazlı as a rebellious young woman who loathes her life and aspires to leave her poor neighborhood, stop working, enjoy her days, and buy clothes and accessories of her desires. Taking her cue from a former coworker who became a sex worker, Nazlı thinks that "That's it! One should be a bad person"¹⁵⁵ and repeatedly suggests that "I'll go bad...I'll become a prostitute!"¹⁵⁶ Derviş is sympathetic to Nazlı's desire to enjoy her life and agrees that a dignified life includes one's ability to buy things and enjoy free time. Yet, she finds Nazlı naïve for thinking of sex work as a gateway to upward social mobility.

¹⁵³ Suat Derviş, *Bu roman olan şeylerin romanıdır*, 1. baskı (Kadıköy, İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2018), 118. Derviş probably acquires this analysis from one of the interviews she conducted with a woman factory worker in 1937, the same year the novel was published in *Tan*. For the interview excerpt, see Çekin Işık, *Eylemi Kaleminde Bir Muharrir*, 141.

¹⁵⁴ For an example, see, Derviş, *Bu roman olan şeylerin romanıdır*, 2. Here, Derviş depicts a mother who does not have enough breastmilk to feed her newborn. She says "Oh poor child, what can I give to you. Working whole day on an empty stomach, how can my breasts have any milk for you."

¹⁵⁵ Derviş, 83.

¹⁵⁶ Derviş, 93.

Neighbors' surveillance and harassment of sex workers, the danger of getting caught by police, and prevalent sexual violence are major justifications for Derviş to define sex work as a "wrongdoing out of which no good can come."¹⁵⁷

Except for survival, Derviş considered sex work as morally questionable but did not accuse women who became sex workers.¹⁵⁸ Derviş diverged from republican moralism that called women to consume domestic products, support their husbands by consuming less, or enter the workforce while remaining as good homemakers simultaneously. In Derviş's depiction, Nazlı thinks that she must avoid marriage, which represented "working like a horse...feeding the men...God forbid..."¹⁵⁹ Attempts to develop the nation or alleviate the burden of economic difficulties by putting the responsibility onto women had little relevance to the urban working-class women whose existence went ignored by the republican elites. Derviş used literature as a tool to point out the deepening class inequalities. She offered implicit criticisms of Kemalist developmentalism that rejected the existence of classes in Turkey and promoted solidarism as a middle ground between capitalism and socialism.¹⁶⁰ To socialists like Derviş, these were futile paradigms and pushed the Turkish women's actual problems and demands beneath the surface.

¹⁵⁷ In the novel, the opposition to Nazlı's enthusiasm for "going bad" is shown through her stepsister whose mother was a sex worker in the same neighborhood until she married their father. The quote that defines-foresees- Nazlı's challenges in sex work belongs to Nazlı's stepsister. Derviş, 83.

¹⁵⁸ In the parts that tell the story of Nazlı's sex worker stepmother, Derviş explains that she did this "to be able to live and only for that." Derviş, 116.

¹⁵⁹Derviş, 145.

¹⁶⁰ For Kemalist application of solidarist economic principles, see Zafer Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2020), 132–33.

Still, there was a limit to Derviş's sympathy for poor women's desire to enjoy their lives which included spending money for personal wishes like clothes, shoes, haircuts, and free time. Her novels *Kendine Tapan Kadın* (Self-worshipping Woman-1947), *Ankara Mahpusu* (The Prisoner from Ankara-1944) and *Aksaray'dan bir Perihan* (A Perihan from Aksaray-1962) offered anti-capitalist critiques in which the main characters are women who come from poor families and attain a higher social status through marriage and consume excessively. Exploring political and economic conditions in the background,¹⁶¹ these novels show how Derviş's socialism shared a kind of modernist moralism with her elite Kemalist contemporaries.

The main character in *Kendine Tapan Kadın* (Self-worshipping Woman-1947), Sara, represents the spendthrift woman, of whom *Kadın Gazetesi* and Derviş were equally critical: women from poorer backgrounds whose only wish is to experience upward social mobility and consume luxurious goods like their upper-class counterparts whom they envy. To realize her wishes, Sara decides to leave her fiancé, a middle-class law student, and marry one of the wealthiest nouveau riche men in Istanbul named Nurullah Yurdakul. Sara's breakup speech to her fiancé closely parallels the critiques in *Kadın Gazetesi* regarding frugality: "I want to have a good life. I want a luxurious life, jewelry, mansions, automobiles, trips to Europe, fur coats...I want what any woman would madly want. You cannot give me these."¹⁶² Sara's disappointment with "a modest gold ring, a small apartment tastefully decorated by a middle-

¹⁶¹ *Kendine Tapan Kadın* and *Ankara Mahpusu* tell the story of rising new bourgeoisie, who acquired their wealth by capitalizing on World War Two. The old elites are depicted as culturally and morally superior to these newly emerging riches. *Aksaray'dan bir Perihan*, on the other hand, deals with the DP era in which the new bourgeoisie has already become the hegemonic culture as opposed to fading old elites.

¹⁶² Suat Derviş, *Kendine tapan kadın*, 2. Baskı, Mart 2020 (Kadıköy, İstanbul: İthaki, 2020), 114.

class family, her mother-in-law's black coat with a fur line only in the neck"¹⁶³ further exemplifies the Republican middle-class professional urbanite that was at the center of Derviş's moralist approach to frugality.

The nouveau riche, which accumulated its wealth through war profiteering and politically sponsored confiscations of non-Muslim properties, was another social class that exemplified the importance Derviş attached to frugality. Elite Kemalist women were largely silent on this social class. Derviş represents this group with the character of Nurullah Yurdakul, also known as the 'Meat King,' a rich rural notable and a proponent of economic libertarianism who "suddenly improved his status after working for the army in the war years... and advanced from a simple butcher to a supplier"¹⁶⁴ of unlicensed meat to Germany, hence the nickname. Despite Yurdakul's immense wealth, the novel emphasizes the status hierarchy between the old elites and the nouveau riche.

Derviş's use of extravagance and prodigality as the main markers of the class difference between this newlywed couple and old Istanbulite elites reveal how the urban/rural divide was integral to her class and gender analysis. On the one hand, Sara's wedding with the Meat King, the most extravagant wedding of Istanbul, is talked about among the guests as "the new rich wedding"¹⁶⁵ due to its vulgarity. The gossip about the bride emphasizes her poor background and ambition to "have everything that she saw in the movies and magazines at her wedding."¹⁶⁶ Still, Derviş portrays Sara as a tasteful and beautiful woman who always

¹⁶³ Derviş, 198.

¹⁶⁴ Derviş, 200–201.

¹⁶⁵ Derviş, 24.

¹⁶⁶ Derviş, 25.

looks elegant despite her extravagance. Another character, an opportunist snob intellectual, describes his admiration of Sara's beauty by comparing Sara to her imagined rural counterpart: "none of us would imagine Nurullah Yurdakul's wife to be such a tasteful woman. We'd expect wives of men like Nurullah Yurdakul to wear cheap clothing with loads of gold jewelry on their breast. However, Sara..."¹⁶⁷ Derviş shared this elitism towards the rural rich to a certain extent.¹⁶⁸ However, her critique of snob intellectuals, for whom the rural woman was the ultimate marker of sociocultural inferiority, was more paramount.

Derviş's class analysis comes forward also in her portrayal of the relations and comparisons between the nouveau riche and old elites. Sara's newly acquired wealth, her acclaimed 'refined' taste, and her grandiose mansion by the Bosphorus "was once occupied by sultans...that now all belonged to her, those Venetian mirrors, chandeliers, large sofas, silver dinnerware, maids..."¹⁶⁹ do not suffice to realize her only wish, that is to become a prominent upper-class elite,¹⁷⁰ and "blending in"¹⁷¹ with her guests at a party that she organized. Derviş describes Sara's party as "such an extravagance that [the] mansion did not witness even in the time of sultans."¹⁷² Indeed, Sara cannot blend in among her guests, not due to her looks or wealth, but due to her differences with her guests' "concerns, languages, manners, eating and drinking styles."¹⁷³ The book is a critique of both upper classes, namely

¹⁶⁷ Derviş, 256.

¹⁶⁸ Emine Seda Çeken Işık argues that Derviş's remarks on problems such as family planning in poor neighborhoods in Istanbul reflects an elitism as Derviş wrote how she found these issues as incompatible with being an Istanbulite. According to Işık, this is due to Derviş's elite background and distance from the poor. See Çekin Işık, *Eylemi Kaleminde Bir Muharrir*, 72.

¹⁶⁹ Derviş, *Kendine tapan kadın*, 222.

¹⁷⁰ Derviş, 306.

¹⁷¹ Derviş writes, "She waited her whole life for this. Not only to become one of them, but to become the best of them." Derviş, 306.

¹⁷² Derviş, 323.

¹⁷³ Derviş, 328.

the old elite and the new rich, which pitifully envies the former. It is the critique of the latter where Derviş's modernist moralism came forward most clearly.

Derviş's moralist critique towards the aspiring spendthrift woman revolved around the question of sex work and modesty. Derviş likens Sara's pragmatic marriage with the Meat King to prostitution. Sara's unhappiness over the unbridgeable cultural capital gap between herself and the elites exacerbated by the fact that "she cannot be around these people unless she offers her body to Nurullah every day."¹⁷⁴ Derviş's lack of sympathy for Sara comes to the forefront in the words of Sara's former fiancé, "who loves Sara so much that he does not see class differences," when he accuses Sara of prostitution as she breaks up with him to marry Nurullah.¹⁷⁵ Thus, what was not acceptable for Derviş was not to have desires, needs, and wishes to enjoy life; it was the crossing of an ambiguous, undefined limit of modesty—in this case, Sara's refusal of a modest yet respectable middle-class lifestyle with a prospective lawyer husband due to Sara's parasitic, narcissistic prodigality.

Derviş utilized the critique of aspiring to-be spendthrift woman also as a tool to build her anti-capitalist critique. *Ankara Mahpusu* (The Prisoner from Ankara-1944)¹⁷⁶ and *Aksaray'dan bir Perihan* (A Perihan from Aksaray-1962) are two examples with two main women characters from poor backgrounds who experience upward social mobility through marriage. They eventually become representative of the dominant capitalist ethics and shifting class dynamics with the burgeoning capitalist modernization since the mid-1940s.

¹⁷⁴ Derviş, 330.

¹⁷⁵ Derviş, 114.

¹⁷⁶ Suat Derviş republished *Ankara Mahpusu* in French during self-imposed exile in France in 1957.

Albeit in different ways than *Olan Şeylerin Romanı* (The Novel of What Happened-1937) and *Kendine Tapan Kadın* (Self-worshipping Woman-1947), Derviş again utilized women's bodies to offer her political analysis.

Aksaray'dan bir Perihan (A Perihan from Aksaray-1962) is centered on Perihan, born, and raised into a poor family in Aksaray, a working-class Istanbul district. Derviş's description of class differences between Perihan and her husband Nuri reveals Derviş's ambivalent attitude towards nationalist egalitarianism and solidarism, which Kemalism's peopleism (*halkçılık*) principle expressed. What was not ambivalent for Derviş was the failure to realize this principle, revealed by her critique of Perihan's prodigality and consumerism.¹⁷⁷ In the background, Derviş portrays social, political, and economic conditions of the 1950s such as rural-to-urban migration, urban transformation, Cold War, and pro-American modernization.¹⁷⁸ The main character Perihan, possibly inspired from Derviş's earlier newspaper interviews,¹⁷⁹ starts working at an early age. She dreams of leaving her family house and quitting work by marrying a higher-income man to entitle herself to a modern apartment with modern house appliances.¹⁸⁰ Her dreams came true when she marries Nuri, a

¹⁷⁷ The promotion of frugality due to economic crises in the 1930s and 1940s by the ruling party CHP and its affiliates (such as *Kadın Gazetesi* analyzed in this chapter) left itself to the promotion of consumerism with favorable economic conditions in the Democrat Party era in the 1950s. For more see, Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Soğuk Savaş'ın Toplumsal, Kültürel ve Günlük Hayatı İnşa Edilirken," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020).

¹⁷⁸ On the relationship between Democrat Party era industrialization and urban transformation see, Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018).; Ferhunde Özbay, "Gendered Space: A New Look at Turkish Modernisation," *Gender & History* 11, no. 3 (November 1999): 555–68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.00163>.; Mete Kaynar, ed., *Türkiye'nin 1950'li yılları*, 2. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020).

¹⁷⁹ Emine Seda Çeken Işık too shows this connection in her analysis on Derviş's journalism. See Çekin Işık, *Eylemi Kaleminde Bir Muharrir*, 46.

¹⁸⁰ In one of her interview series in the 1930s, Derviş talks to young women. Derviş is disappointed and critical towards the fact that these young women are individualists and do not have dreams or ambitions other than marrying to a rich man. Çekin Işık, 133.

modest government official, who is a descendant of a Young Turk¹⁸¹ father and an elite Ottoman mother. Perihan's efforts during their flirtation to disguise her class distinction remains futile since "her language, the words she uses, her thinking, her manners, her clothes and everything gives away explicitly where she actually comes from."¹⁸² Nuri, meanwhile, exemplifies Kemalist peopleism at its excellence by refusing to mind Perihan's family, neighborhood, and clothes.

Derviş portrays Perihan as a woman with an endless desire for more goods such as sewing machine, radio, vacuum cleaner, not because "they are useful appliances, but because they symbolize affluence."¹⁸³ Eventually, Perihan convinces Nuri to become involved in a 'petty' drug smuggling. This would expand enough to get Perihan her dream apartment building, through which "she separated herself away from that modest class for good...and this apartment...[would] soon teach everyone that she is not a poor commoner, but an affluent bourgeois."¹⁸⁴ Derviş derides this lust for affluence by mocking Perihan's changing physical appearance. While Perihan is complaining about her children's joining an anti-government protest at the end of the book, her skirt gets unzipped as "she recently gained a little bit weight again."¹⁸⁵ The plot of spendthrift bourgeois woman pulling the family man into crime is reminiscent of moralist prodigality critique in *Kadın Gazetesi*. What differentiated Derviş is her almost equally critical approach toward Nuri, who represents a decaying class of elites. According to Derviş, neither the new class of bourgeoisie represented by Perihan's

¹⁸¹ For an analysis of Young Turks' political thought see, Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin siyasi fikirleri 1895 - 1908*, 5. baskı, Şerif Mardin Bütün Eserleri (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994).

¹⁸² Suat Derviş, *Aksaray'dan Bir Perihan*, İthaki Yayınları 934 (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2014), 44. A very similar class analysis can be found in *Kendine Tapan Kadın*, analyzed above.

¹⁸³ Derviş, 44.

¹⁸⁴ Derviş, 150.

¹⁸⁵ Derviş, 155.

prodigality, nor the old elites represented by Nuri's corruption and inertia should be the future. The book's ending heralds the end of DP regime and the coming of a new generation.¹⁸⁶

Derviş's antipathy against the category of aspiring to-be-spendthrift women went beyond modernist moralist critique of prodigality. She utilized gender to make an anti-capitalist critique of Turkey in the 1940s and 1950s. Another example is *Ankara Mahpusu* (The Prisoner from Ankara-1944) which describes the lives of outcasts in a changing Istanbul through the story of a man, Vasfi. Vasfi is a promising medicine student raised by a poor single mother, who spends 12 years in prison after tragically killing his neighbor for speaking ill about the love of his life, Zeynep, a young divorced mother. Zeynep chooses a pragmatic marriage with Vasfi's elderly uncle, one of the wealthiest men in the neighborhood. Returning to Istanbul after imprisonment in Ankara, Vasfi finds his old neighborhood and city transformed. Most of his neighbors reside elsewhere and old houses are turned into modern apartments. Unable to find a job, Vasfi spends his nights in the streets and survives thanks to Istanbul's homeless. When he finally finds Zeynep as a shopkeeper in her shop under her new apartment building, Derviş depicts the physical transformation of Zeynep who is "horribly overweight with a disgusting, dry and mean look in her eyes and mouth with gold teeth."¹⁸⁷ Zeynep's transformed character represents those "who wish to be rich not even to reach a higher status and a flamboyant life...who want money not to spend and live but to save and hoard."¹⁸⁸ By juxtaposing Zeynep's newly acquired wealth and status to Vasfi's and

¹⁸⁶ Democrat Party was toppled down by a military coup on May 27, 1960.

¹⁸⁷ Suat Derviş, *Ankara mahpusu*, 1. Baskı (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2013), 147.

¹⁸⁸ Suat Derviş, *Ankara mahpusu*, 1. Baskı (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2013), 147.

other outcasts' "freedom to starve"¹⁸⁹ Derviş makes a political claim about prodigality that directs the gaze away from individual morality more towards class inequalities.

Subpart 2.3) Old elites: Women descendants of Ottoman nobility

Upper-class women, mostly descendants of late Ottoman nobility, had been widely written characters in popular novels and novellas in the 1930s and 1940s by women intellectuals, including Suat Derviş.¹⁹⁰ This part looks at three novellas by Suat Derviş, namely *Çılgın Gibi* (Crazy In Love-1945), *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz* (A Woman Can't Live Without Love-1934), and *Kendine Tapan Kadın* (Self-Worshipping Woman-1947). These novellas are almost exclusively about the lives and loves of upper-class women, as opposed to her socialist-realist novels which dealt with class antagonisms. Still, Derviş's portrayal of this category of women characters' relationship to money and spending played an integral role to lay out her gendered class and modernization analysis, as well as the republican establishment's duty towards women.

Derviş's upper-class elite and educated women characters in her post-1930 novels lack money know-how and are carefree in matters about money. Although this category of women is not the ideal frugal professional urbanite, they are also not criticized for their prodigality.

¹⁸⁹ Derviş, 154.

¹⁹⁰ Derviş's earlier novellas almost exclusively portrays Ottoman nobility or their descendants, women living in mansions in the late Ottoman period and early Republican period. Some well-known examples include Suat Derviş, *Hiçbiri*, 1. baskı (Kadıköy, İstanbul: İthaki, 2018).; Suat Derviş, *İki kadın iki aşk* (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2021).; Suat Derviş, *Kara kitap* (İstanbul: İthaki, 2014).; Suat Derviş, *Ne Bir Ses, Ne Bir Nefes*, 1923. Yet, her post-1930 novels also include these characters such as in Suat Derviş, *Hiç* (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2013)., Suat Derviş, *Dirilen Mumya* (İthaki Yayınları, 2021).; Derviş, *Kendine tapan kadın*.; Suat Derviş, *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz* (İthaki Yayınları, 2019).

Rather, Derviş thought that these women's incapability of dealing with money disables them from living their lives for themselves, without being dependent on their husbands or lovers, and pulls them into an unreal life, a fantasy.¹⁹¹ Celile, the main character in *Çılgın Gibi* (Crazy In Love-1945), illustrates the close relationship Derviş attributed to women's autonomy, modernization, and money know-how. Raised in a grand vizier mansion on the Bosphorus, Celile spends most of her childhood with her grandmother, Çeşmiahı Hanım. For Derviş, Celile's modest, silent, and amenable character is beyond a character trait. She is not a "little philosopher"¹⁹² as her teachers call her; but unable to adapt neither to the "decaying, rotting, destined to collapse"¹⁹³ era, nor "to the youth of the emerging era."¹⁹⁴ This category of women "does not participate in life but only observe it from afar."¹⁹⁵ Derviş situates Celile's inability and indifference regarding the mansion's finances after her grandmother's loss within the shifting class dynamics in the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican period.

Derviş's designation of the old elite to extinction and her critique of elite women as observers but not agents of their lives find its expression in Celile. Her child-like character with no skills and experience in neither money nor working destines Celile to dependent life. Derviş shows sympathy to Celile by attributing her lack of money know-how to indifference to money and status. Compared to greed and opportunism that is associated with the nouveau riche and non-Muslim Ottomans, Derviş attributes respectability to the declassed descendants

¹⁹¹ The duality of life versus fantasy is a very common theme in Derviş's novels. According to her, the old elites described in her novels are not actually involved in life, but they are detached from it, living a soon to be decaying fantasy.

¹⁹² Suat Derviş, *Çılgın gibi* (İstanbul: İthaki, 2015), 54.

¹⁹³ Derviş, 55.

¹⁹⁴ Derviş, 55.

¹⁹⁵ Derviş, 55.

of Ottoman nobility, a tiny social group that also included Derviş's family. During Celile's childhood, Derviş explains Celile's grandmother's loss of family wealth through a stereotyped figure, a greedy Ottoman Armenian banker and a family friend.¹⁹⁶ As a wife, Celile is indifferent towards the wealth his husband acquires through war profiteering during World War Two.¹⁹⁷ Her pure emotions and passion in her later love affair is juxtaposed to her lover's—a rich nationalist bourgeois—constant doubts about Celile's immodesty and her desire for money and status.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, Derviş contrasts Celile to women, who “run over everything else to grab what they desire.”¹⁹⁹ As opposed to greed and prodigality, Derviş emphasizes Celile's beauty and attractiveness that comes out of her civility, nobility, modesty and tranquility.

Derviş's sympathy for elite women's pursuit of their emotions over material gains and social status compared to her overt critiques towards the aspiring to-be spendthrift woman should not imply elitist conservatism. Derviş's characters diverted from idolized modest yet modern women who chose communal and familial loyalty over their personal wishes and emotions.²⁰⁰ By celebrating these women, Derviş simultaneously promoted a conservative ideal and women's acknowledgment of their agency over their emotions. Derviş's pity and

¹⁹⁶ Derviş, 36. Çeşmiahü Hanım transfers the entire management of her husband's wealth, who was killed during the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, to one of their family friends, banker Mardirosyan Effendi. Mardirosyan Effendi undersells, and thus, the money soon dries up. Derviş emphasizes that with the WWI, most of the items from the mansion, and later the mansion itself, was sold to foreigners (ecnebi) and nouveau riche. Mardirosyan Effendi appears as a character who is good to Çeşmiahü Hanım, but also greedy and opportunist.

¹⁹⁷ Derviş, 63–67. Her husband, Ahmet, who was a son of middle-class family and a bank official with a modest income, gets richer after inheriting some wealth and using this capital for further business transactions with WWII.

¹⁹⁸ Derviş, 148.

¹⁹⁹ Derviş, 168.

²⁰⁰ For example, the main character, Rabia, in Halide Edib Adıvar's *Sinekli Bakkal*. Halide Edib Adıvar, *Sinekli Bakkal* (Galatasaray, İstanbul: Can, 2007). In the 1940s, socialist intellectuals began criticizing these characters as conservative role models. See Behice Boran, “Halide Edip'in Yeni Romanları,” *Yurt ve Dünya*, no. 5 (May 1941).

sympathy towards this category of elite women reveal her own ambivalences regarding Turkey's gendered modernization project. In the example of *Çılgın Gibi*, Celile's glorified moral qualities are useless without acquiring the freedom and ability to subsist herself. Being a descendant of "the class of people who for centuries have been living in debauchery, all sorts of prodigality...getting rich and falling down through bribery and tribute"²⁰¹ plays a determining role in Celile's inability to leave her lover in the novel's end. Through Celile's example in both her marriage and affair, Derviş emphasizes the disabling of women's agency in life. As Derviş put it, "a man such as a father, a brother, an uncle, a husband always stands like a wall between a woman and life and a woman can only have access to life through these men."²⁰² Celile, the remnant of the 'old woman,' cannot take her due part in the 'new society' without becoming the 'new woman.'²⁰³

Derviş's promotion of the republic's frugal and modest new woman converged with the Kemalist women's writings in *Kadın Gazetesi* in the late 1940s. In *Kendine Tapan Kadın* (Self-Worshipping Woman-1947), a parallel story takes place in stark contrast to the prodigality of the nouveau riche couple Sara and Nurullah Yurdakul. This parallel story involves an upper-class woman, Nazan, and Sara's former fiancé, Demir, a middle-class law student. Like *Çılgın Gibi*'s (Crazy In Love-1945) Celile, Derviş depicts Nazan as a woman with exceptional qualities that sets her apart from other upper-class women, as well as from aspiring to-be spendthrift woman like Sara. Nazan is selfless, silent, and disinterested in

²⁰¹ Derviş, *Çılgın gibi*, 65. See p.168 for a further emphasis on how the "lack of rationality" in the Ottoman nobility impacted Celile's life.

²⁰² Derviş, 239.

²⁰³ When Derviş republishes this book in her self-imposed exile in France in 1953 she changes the end of the book. Instead of leaving Celile in a desparate condition, having lost her baby and stuck with Muhsin, Celile refuses Muhsin's demand for an abortion. She decides to keep the baby, leave Muhsin, and find a job.

extravagancy or social status unlike others in her social class.²⁰⁴ She is also compassionate, generous and sensitive to others' feelings,²⁰⁵ as opposed to Sara, "who is like a stone-like, lifeless and soulless object."²⁰⁶ Derviş further attributes feminist qualities on Nazan, who counters her boyfriend Vahdet's misogynist statements that equate women to objects with a price tag.²⁰⁷ Nazan and Demir are the only characters who experience a major transformation throughout the novel. As they get closer, Nazan's indifference, silence, passivity turns into an ambition to get outside of her upper-class bubble and get to know public matters. By the novel's end, Nazan wants "to live with the world, in the world and belong to the world to live a full life."²⁰⁸ As both Nazan and Demir free themselves from their former relationships and start their romantic relationship, Derviş portrays an idealized upper-middle-class couple, a rarity in her fiction. Their story in the novel ends with a happy scene, where they heat the meal prepared by Nazan's maid.²⁰⁹ Derviş completes the happiness of the modest, companionate couple with a conveniently invisible maid, perfectly illustrating the modernist vision of an ideal middle-class Turkish family with the new man, woman.

Putting women into the workforce was central to the modernist ideal of the 'modern yet modest' Turkish woman. Most of the working women characters in Derviş's literature are poor working-class women, who practically remained outside the scope of republican modernism and state feminism. Many of her elite characters, meanwhile, often do not work

²⁰⁴ Derviş, *Kendine tapan kadın*, 19.

²⁰⁵ Nazan saves Demir's reputation in Sara and Nurullah Yurdakul's wedding by preventing him making a scene in the wedding, and accidentally injures herself with Demir's gun. As a result, Demir becomes absolutely grateful to Nazan and they gradually become very good friends.

²⁰⁶ Derviş, *Kendine tapan kadın*, 240.

²⁰⁷ Derviş, 31.

²⁰⁸ Derviş, 313.

²⁰⁹ Derviş, 315.

professionally. An exception in her fiction, *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz* (A Woman Can't Live Without Love-1934), depicts Cavide, who descends from a prominent Ottoman pasha and works as a translator at an oil company. Derviş scrutinizes the idolized republican woman through Cavide, who rents the *selamlık*²¹⁰ portion of a mansion, which once belonged to her own father. The challenges confronting Cavide such as workplace gossip, poor wages, and labor exploitation reveal the problems even for the tiny minority of women who had accomplished the nationalist modernist ideal.

Derviş highlighted class inequalities in her critique of prodigality as opposed to the Kemalist elites' emphasis on frugality to progress the nation and elevate its morality. Often, she developed this critique through poor working-class men and women, aspiring to-be spendthrift women,²¹¹ non-professional descendants of the old elites,²¹² and middle-class urban men.²¹³ In contrast, *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz* (A Woman Can't Live Without Love-1934) depicts the educated, middle-class, urbanite professional, Cavide, who is a woman with the experience of "living in the world, with the world."²¹⁴ The novel brings forward frugality against prodigal elite women through Cavide's voice. Cavide's unrest about class inequalities primarily targets not her male employer, but his spendthrift wife. Cavide says "we all work so that pretty and elegant woman can travel to Vienna and be pretty and elegant...what an injustice is this that this parasite puppet can travel and enjoy at the expense of my and others'

²¹⁰ The portion of a residential place that is reserved for men's use only. *Harem* is the name given to the portion reserved for women.

²¹¹ Nazlı in *Olan Şeylerin Romanı*, Zeynep in *Ankara Mahpusu*, Perihan in *Aksaray'dan bir Perihan*, Sara in *Kendine Tapan Kadın*.

²¹² Celile in *Çılgın Gibi*, Nazan in *Kendine Tapan Kadın*.

²¹³ Demir in *Kendine Tapan Kadın*, Nuri in *Aksaray'dan bir Perihan*, Vasfi in *Ankara Mahpusu*.

²¹⁴ Derviş, *Kendine tapan kadın*, 313.

fatigue.”²¹⁵ Cavide desires not “a fancy automobile, a fur coat, a cruise trip, a breed horse,” but “to put her head on a sofa...to get rid of these contract clauses from her mind for half an hour and just get some rest.”²¹⁶ As opposed to a spendthrift bourgeois woman’s beauty which according to Cavide is thanks to “fox fur...silk tights, best quality shoes,” a co-worker praises Cavide’s superior beauty in her “simple yet classy dresses and cheap shoes.”²¹⁷

Like some other novellas of Derviş,²¹⁸ *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz* (A Woman Can’t Live Without Love-1934) explores a woman who follows her heart as opposed to following paths that may seem safer or more rational, yet also drier. Unlike *Çılgın Gibi* (Crazy In Love-1945), *Hiç* (Nothing-1935) and *Hiçbiri* (Neither-1923), *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz* (A Woman Can’t Live Without Love-1934) ends happily for its main woman character, Cavide. Instead of marrying her employer to end the rumors that erupted in her office, Cavide chooses to marry her childhood sweetheart, a proud military officer like her father. She is aware that this might not be a life “as comfortable and safe as the other, but it will surely be a happier life.”²¹⁹ Afterall, “wealth, comfort, silk, and diamond” cannot make one happy forever and, more importantly, “how can a woman live without love.”²²⁰ What differentiates Cavide from other descendants of the old elite is her professional work experience. Still, both Cavide’s independent life as a professional working woman and her modest middle-class life that comes with companionate

²¹⁵ Derviş, *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz*, 299–300.

²¹⁶ Derviş, 322.

²¹⁷ Derviş, 299.

²¹⁸ Such as *Çılgın Gibi*, *Hiç*, and *Hiçbiri*.

²¹⁹ Derviş, *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz*, 376.

²²⁰ Derviş, 376.

marriage is built upon the labor of a ‘loyal’ maid, a Circassian woman servant, who served Cavide’s family and then Cavide for her entire life.²²¹

Conclusion

The elite women’s press and independent intellectuals examined in this chapter produced different meanings and functions of frugality as a value. This did not save these intellectuals from criticisms against how they spent their money. Suat Derviş, who became a socialist in the 1930s, was criticized by other socialists for her extravagance, through which her revolutionary ideas and practices were also questioned.²²² Similarly, Sabiha Sertel, another socialist, was mocked for being a “*salon komünisti*,”²²³ due to her having a maid and living a rather affluent life in a nice Istanbul neighborhood.²²⁴ As a response to a mockery of her clothing in a daily press article, İffet Halim Oruz had to explain that she was not possessed by “the European fantasy...and the disease of luxury that many were succumbed to”²²⁵ and that her suits and hats were all produced domestically using domestic fabrics. The TKB members, including Oruz and many other *Kadın Gazetesi* writers, would be criticized as

²²¹ These women were called “halayık” in Ottoman Turkish and most of them were enslaved by wealthy Ottoman families after they were abducted from their native lands. After slavery ended in the Ottoman Empire, most *halayıks* continued to work for these families. For more on slavery in Ottoman Empire, see Madeline C. Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Design of Difference*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

²²² Behmoaras, *Suat Derviş: Efsane Bir Kadın ve Dönemi*, 226–27.

²²³ The literal translation would be “ballroom communist.” It implies a contradiction between Sertel’s socialist writings and her affluent lifestyle.

²²⁴ Yıldız Sertel, *Annem: Sabiha Sertel kimdi neler yazdı*, 3. baskı (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2001), 178..

²²⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, “Tayyör ve Şapka,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 4, 1948.

hypocrites and elitists in the daily press *Cumhuriyet*, based on their flamboyant clothing, and specifically for some TKB women's wearing of expensive fur coats.²²⁶

This chapter showed how prominent women intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s crafted frugality as part of a shared modernist moralism that became a factor in drawing the contours of acceptable womanhood. While doing so, they were responding to the political and economic conditions of Turkey. Yet these narratives went beyond interventions in daily politics. Women intellectuals also defined the function and meaning of frugality, gave advice on how women should spend their money, and condemned those who diverged from the category of 'modern yet modest' women. The shared modernism of Kemalist women like İffet Halim Oruz, Şukufe Nihal or Hasene Ilgaz and independent intellectual women like Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviş should not hide their differences. As opposed to an imagined unified Turkish womanhood that *Kadın Gazetesi* writers put forward, socialist intellectuals' analysis of frugality, women's money spending, and their contribution to Turkey's economic development revealed deepening class inequalities and shifting class relations from the 1930s to the 1950s. As such, intellectual narratives on frugality were also means to political activism. Moreover, they too were subjected to the litmus test of frugality based on their own consumption practices, which was a marker of their reliability and trustfulness within their own social circles. Overall, reading these sources together shows that the constitution of frugality, as part of gendered norms on what modern Turkish women should be, was a contested and unfixed category. They were influenced but not determined by the ruling elites' economic policies or political ideologies.

²²⁶ "Tedbir," *Cumhuriyet*, December 16, 1954.; "İzmirli Kabzımallar Kadınları ve İstanbullu Kabzımalları İtham Ediyorlar," *Cumhuriyet*, May 10, 1955.

Chapter 3: Nurturing the Woman towards a Modern Ideal: Missionary Intellectuals,
Competing Global Models, and Unfinished Projects in the Early Cold War Turkey

Introduction

*For the past 15 years, we nurtured ourselves. Now, it is our social duty to nurture others.*²²⁷

*Turkish womanhood is not pregnant with the future; it is nurturing the future.*²²⁸

Kemalist intellectuals had diverging, complex, and sometimes paradoxical answers to the question of the ideal modern Turkish woman, as the first chapter discussed in relation to frugality and modesty from the late 1940s to the 1950s. On the one hand, they had straightforward ideals, shaped in accordance with Turkey's modernization project. On the other hand, they claimed that the ideal woman already existed in spirit in true Turkish womanhood, while also claiming that it was necessary to 'make' this woman. This chapter builds upon this intellectual tension and exposes 1) how Kemalist women sought to define their image of the ideal Turkish woman in relation to western and Middle Eastern cases; and 2) how they pursued to nurture the ideal woman in the national and regional contexts in practice as national or post-colonial enlightenment projects. In the early republican period, Kemalists and socialists alike embraced the duty of enlightening the people of Turkey, initiated projects to develop the nation as a whole, and lamented the failures in these endeavors in the 1940s and 1950s. This chapter contributes to the fields of literature that study gender politics and women's activism in the Middle East by analyzing the writings and

²²⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, "Kadın Birliği," *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 5, 1947.

²²⁸ İffet İnan, "Türk Kadınlığı Yarınlar Hamile Değil, Yarınları Yetiştirmektedir," *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 16, 1950.

activisms of Kemalist and socialist women intellectuals from the late 1940s and early to mid-1950s to nurture the Turkish woman into modern life.

Socialist intellectuals, who had a difficult relationship with the Kemalist government in the 1930s, were mostly dismissed from the political arena by the government in the post-World War Two period. Kemalist intellectual women, however, actively pursued projects, mostly concerned with charity and nurturing. Meanwhile, their mission to make the modern Turkish woman took a new face. The Turkish woman, who elevated herself with the Kemalist revolutions to be fit for its nation-state, was now to rise as a global example. In the context of post-World War Two global politics, Kemalist women fully embraced pro-western diplomacy and redefined their image of the ideal Turkish woman in relation to 1) western countries, and 2) pro-NATO countries in the Middle East. Kemalist women defined the superiority of the Turkish woman against both examples but sought to export their ideal only to the Middle East. They aimed to carry women's reforms in Turkey, developed several projects to nurture rural and urban working women, and speculated on how to expand these projects to the Middle East. However, none of these projects could be sustained and was abandoned by the late 1950s. Neither the Kemalist women's ideal images fit with the actual realities of women they sought to nurture, nor they had the capacity to carry out such projects in the long term.

Male and female modernists in the Middle East had long agreed on the importance of modernizing women to modernize and develop the nation.²²⁹ The fields of marriage,

²²⁹ Lila Abu-Lughod, "Feminist Longings and Postcolonial Conditions," in *Remaking Women*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (Princeton University Press, 1998), 1–32, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831203-003>; Parvin Paidar, *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran*, 1. paperback ed, Cambridge Middle East Studies 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Deniz Kandiyoti, "Some Awkward Questions on Women and

education, hygiene, eugenics, employment, homemaking, and clothing saw several projects aiming to make the modern woman of the new nation-state.²³⁰ Feminist historiography in Turkey focused on the nationalist and patriarchal contract between the elite Kemalist women and the Turkish state. In this literature, Kemalist women considered themselves as equal citizens, stripped of any reference to their gender identity, and agreed to serve the nationalist ideology by carrying modernizing discourse into the rural areas.²³¹ While Turkey's feminist historiography mainly focuses on the alliance between Kemalist women and the state, this chapter exposes how Kemalist women's nurturing projects were fraught with setbacks, disappointments, and resentment. Turkey's state feminism defined the modern woman as the bearer of cultural superiority and symbol of material development, yet it fell short of producing sustainable methods and projects to realize this mission. In the mid-1950s, they began to criticize the state elites for their indifference to the women's advancement agenda, key to the Kemalist revolutions for women intellectuals. Novel ideals of womanhood that

Modernity in Turkey," in *Remaking Women Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998); Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 1. baskı, Makaleler 4 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideology of Contemporary Iran," in *Women, Islam, and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 48–76.

²³⁰ Janet Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Laura Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011); Nermin Abadan-Unat, "The Impact of Legal and Educational Reforms on Turkish Women," in *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Zahra Ali, *Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Mona Russell, *Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity, 1863 - 1922* (New York: palgrave macmillan, 2004).

²³¹ Fatmagül Berktaş, "Dünden Bugüne Nafile Biraderlik Sözleşmesi," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 10*, ed. Feryal Saygılıgil and Naciye Berber, 1. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 560–79; Elif Ekin Akşit, *Kızların Sessizliği: Kız Enstitülerinin Uzun Tarihi*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 187 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005); Ayşe Durakbaşa, *Halide Edib: Türk Modernleşmesi ve Feminizm*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 100 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2000).

began to circulate and compete in civil society after the 1960s were often built on the critiques of earlier Kemalist ideals and methods discussed in this dissertation.²³²

The chapter is structured in two parts. The first part looks at how Kemalist women depicted the ideal modern Turkish woman in relation to regional and global sources. Kemalist intellectual women shared the conviction that the Turk was superior to the west as well as to the east. They criticized Western orientalist discourses, praised the superior Turkish mores, and celebrated the institution of family, which they believed to be decaying in western nations. However, they still diligently sought to make their superiority visible to the west. Moreover, they continued taking the west as a model to shape their ideal image of the frugal and professional Turkish woman. At the same time, they took it as their duty to spread Atatürk's revolutions to other Middle Eastern countries. Yet the Cold War context detached their ideology from its history. Kemalist women detested Algeria's national liberation struggle, Egypt's republicanism, Baath parties' secularism. In contrast, they claimed countries like Iran (a monarchy), Pakistan (a monarchy that later became an Islamic republic), and Tunisia (that gained independence via negotiation) to be followers of Atatürk's footsteps. Kemalist women also remained silent on Palestine's disaster (*Nakba*) in 1948, except for a few commentaries on the refugees. They utilized Kemalist discourses oriented towards freedom, westernization, and modernization. Kemalist women embraced a self-entitled exemplary role for Middle Eastern women. Their discourses often reflected the very orientalist and civilizing views for which they condemned the west. The second part of the

²³² Nükhet Sirman, "Feminism in Turkey: A Short History," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 3 (1989): 1–34, <https://doi.org/10.15184/S0896634600000704>; Feryal Saygılıgil, ed., *Kadınlar Hep Vardı: Türkiye Solundan Kadın Portreleri*, 1. baskı (Kızılay, Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2017); Emel Akal, *Kızıl feministler: bir sözlü tarih çalışması* (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, 2011).

chapter looks at the projects and discourses of women intellectuals – mostly Kemalists – to realize their socio-economic role of nurturing in the domestic arena. Considering the village, the rural town, and the factories as the main sites of intervention, intellectual women initiated projects to develop and enlighten the rural woman and the urban working women. Like their attitudes towards Middle Eastern women, Kemalist women also embraced an orientalist civilizing narrative regarding the rural and urban working women.

Part 1) Global Sources of Intellectuals' Ideal Modern Turkish Woman

Kemalist and socialist intellectual women's perspective on the east-west distinction and their positioning of the Turkish people and women among other nations shaped their self-understanding. They looked up to the west, while claiming superiority over the west in the cultural realm due to Turkey's post-independence national consciousness. Yet, they also aspired for Turkey to be recognized as a part of the west and harshly criticized the orientalist views prevalent among western visitors and journalists – not for their orientalism but their positioning of Turkey in the Orient. On the eastern front, Kemalist women aimed to carry Atatürk's legacy to the broader Middle East. They worked to establish networks with women in the region, especially with pro-western countries like Pakistan, a close ally of Turkey in the late 1940s. In addition, they also desired to 'explore' and 'understand' neighboring Arab countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia. Kemalist women's orientalism was visible in their statements and discourses on the Middle East, which were contingent on Turkey's contemporaneous Cold War politics.

Subpart 1.1) Modeling the West: Intellectuals' Ideas on the West, Discourses Against Orientalism, and Representing Modern Turkish Woman

Modernist ideologies like nationalism and socialism, and their inherent east-west dichotomies, greatly influenced women intellectuals' thoughts and projects to define and make the ideal woman. The ideal modern Turkish woman imagery converged with the ideal of making a modern society. Modernist intellectuals had a paradoxical view of the west. On the one hand, they aspired to building a modern nation-state as the only viable defense against western imperialism. On the other hand, they considered the newly built republic as a proper member of the western civilization, stripped of its Ottoman past with its Islamic and Arab elements.²³³ Modernist ideologues resolved this paradox by differentiating culture and civilization, the former signifying the spiritual essence of national unity and the latter signifying material development and power (civilization).²³⁴ The Young Ottomans had sought to adopt western technology and science while keeping the Islamic essence of the empire.²³⁵ By the 1900s, Young Ottomans' intellectual distinctions between Christian and Muslim civilization had gradually transformed into an ontological east-west distinction.²³⁶ After the 1908 revolution, the Young Turks and leading nationalist ideologues like Ziya Gökalp

²³³ For the literature on this topic, see M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, Revised paperback edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London ; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010).

²³⁴ This is a legacy of late Ottoman thinker Ziya Gökalp, who is "the father of Turkish nationalism" according to many scholars. Partha Chattarjee universalizes this point for all non-Western nationalisms, which were split into two domains: material and spiritual. The first realm signified western superiority that was to be emulated. The second realm signified authenticity, which claimed spiritual superiority against the West. See Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

²³⁵ Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, 1st Syracuse University Press ed, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000).

²³⁶ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de çağdaşlaşma*, 7. baskı, Yapı Kredi yayınları Cogito, 1713 117 (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005).

attributed pragmatic importance to religion as a unifying and civilizing force for the nation. The new republic emphasized religion less compared to an ancient Turkish essence.²³⁷ Ditching the religious Ottoman past, Kemalist modernism claimed to be “the authentic westernizer” by embracing a new mythic essence.²³⁸ For the Kemalists, in their war of liberation and revolution, “the west was defeated and westernization had won.”²³⁹ In their newly found confidence, Turkish intellectuals and statesmen reproduced the east-west analyses to position Turkey among the civilized nations of the west, harshly contested when their European counterparts positioned Turkey in the east, but continued to claim a national essence that made the Turkish people distinct from and superior to the west.

This idea was also shared by socialist (and anti-imperialist) intellectuals like Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviş. In their earlier writings in the late 1920s and 1930s, their ideal modern Turkish woman imaginaries rested upon their understanding of the east-west distinction. In 1926, Sabiha Sertel argued that Europe and the US tormented and captivated all nations of eastern civilization in order to possess all resources in the world and that westernization was the only viable path to avoid colonization. To Sertel, the east represented tradition, and the west represented science and technology. She summarized the Kemalist revolutions as the move to leave the eastern civilization and join western civilization. National unity, as opposed to a religious one, was a key marker of civilized nations. While Sertel argued that Turkey had only recently joined the western civilization, Turkey was still superior to Europe because of its astounding national consciousness. A strict separation between the materially

²³⁷ Erik Jan Zürcher, “Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought,” in *Late Ottoman Society The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga, 1st ed (London: Taylor and Francis, 2013).

²³⁸ Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar: Türkiye’de siyasî ideolojiler* (Fatih, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), 88.

²³⁹ Bora, *Cereyanlar*.

superior west and the inferior and traditional east marked Sertel's thinking. Yet, like her Kemalist counterparts, she stressed that Turkey was superior to the west in spirit.²⁴⁰

Socialist author Suat Derviş reflected on the east-west distinction in her novels by associating the old riches of the Ottoman nobility with the east as a decaying and dependent class, contrasted to the emerging professional, urban working class associated with the west. The heroine of *Çılgın Gibi* (Crazy in Love, 1945), Celile was only able to achieve her independence when she broke her dependency to male partners like Ahmet and Muhsin by becoming a working woman.²⁴¹

In her reflection on Turkey's "authentic westernization," Derviş aligned with modernist intellectual streams when she too identified a cultural essence that made Turkey superior to western nations. In *İki Kadın İki Aşk* (Two Women Two Romances -1946), she contrasted an urban musician woman with a degree in western art to a male village teacher, who had 'authentic' knowledge of Anatolia and its people, the true address of national development and Turkish civilization according to Derviş. The young musician, Perihan, meets the teacher on a train trip to Anatolia to collect folk songs and rework them with the western music techniques to create the perfect national art composition. The male teacher questions Perihan's method and proposes his own definition of true national art, which could only be the product of "[the] people, in their fields, homes, villages, towns, and workbenches...trying to support their inclination towards good...engrain the acceleration in them to lead them into

²⁴⁰ Yıldız Sertel, *Annem: Sabiha Sertel kimdi neler yazdı*, 3. baskı (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2001).

²⁴¹ Celile is married to Ahmet and has an affair with Muhsin, both men are educated and representatives of the growing merchant bourgeoisie in modern Turkey. Derviş changed the book's ending in its French translation. In the original version, the book ends with Celile's helplessness in the face of her lack of occupation and independence. In the revised version, she decides to find a job, sever ties with dominating men in her life and stand on her feet.

emancipation and victory.”²⁴² The professional musician, enlightened by the critique, reshapes her work. The dialogue between Perihan and the male teacher is an exemplar of the convergence between socialist and Kemalist intellectuals in the early republican era on the question of national authenticity. Moreover, it also shows the socialists’ diagnosis of the failures of these missions. Beyond western science and technology, national development required dedicated missionaries to develop and enlighten Anatolia. In sum, socialist women defined the ideal modern Turkish subject through a strict duality of west and east, critically embracing the former over the latter, while claiming authentically distinct qualities from both.

Kemalist intellectual women also compared Turkish women to women in western countries. Kadın Gazetesi authors looked upon the west as a model, especially in frugality, modesty, and childcare. İffet Halim Oruz put European women’s modest clothing as an example to spendthrift Turkish women whom she thought misrepresented Turkey. In awe with the modest wife of the British ambassador to Turkey, Oruz complained that “we [Turkish women] are so busy with wearing shiny trinkets that we fail to properly represent ourselves to foreigners.”²⁴³ Other writers praised the modesty in clothing and daily life in countries like Sweden.²⁴⁴ At the opposite side of spendthrift Turkish woman stood her traditional counterpart in *çarşaf*, which Oruz equally disliked and again took the west as an example. When discussing women MPs’ legislative proposal to ban the wearing of *çarşaf* in 1956,

²⁴² Suat Derviş, *İki kadın iki aşk* (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2021).

²⁴³ İffet Halim Oruz, “Memleketini Temsil Eden Kadın,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 15, 1948.

²⁴⁴ Makbule Dıblan, “İsveç’ten Notlar:3,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 24, 1956.

Oruz lamented that “despite initiating far more progressive reforms compared to western countries, we [Turkey] still carry the burden of this symbol.”²⁴⁵

In child rearing, *Kadın Gazetesi* writers identified street kids as an urgent problem and sought philanthropic solutions. After returning from a trip to the US, a frequent *Kadın Gazetesi* writer and well-known lawyer Süreyya Ağaoğlu argued that Turkey should follow the examples of Britain and the US in taking child rearing as an issue of social utility. The first step was “to find a solution to kids on the street.”²⁴⁶ Ağaoğlu pointed to the juvenile correctional facilities and courts in the west as examples that Turkey should follow. Building upon Ağaoğlu’s arguments, İffet Halim Oruz called all women to work for philanthropic causes to solve “the issue of street kids” and pointed to the “need and space for civil initiatives” to assist the state.²⁴⁷ In the late 1940s, *Kadın Gazetesi* frequently promoted the work of charity institutions such as Çocuk Dostları Derneği (Children’s Friends Association), Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu (Turkish Society for the Protection of Children), and Yardımsevenler Derneği (Association of Philantropists) for nurturing and educating orphan and poor kids. Yet several women also hinted at the inefficiency and inadequacy of these institutions. Oruz would complain about partisanship within these institutions, lack of women in managerial positions, lack of transparency in the use of donation money, and lack of coordination in the management.²⁴⁸ These institutions could not function in the way idolized

²⁴⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, “Çarşafın Yasak Edilmesi Hakkında,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 24, 1956.

²⁴⁶ Süreyya Ağaoğlu, “Kimsesiz Çocukları Kurtarmak İçin Harekete Geçiyoruz,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 17, 1947.

²⁴⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, “Kimsesiz Çocuklar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 19, 1947.

²⁴⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, “Çocuk Davamız,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 22, 1948.

by Kemalist women, who began to show their resentment and disillusionment more openly in the mid-1950s.²⁴⁹

A major concern in *Kadın Gazetesi* in this period was to properly represent Turkish society and the modern Turkish woman to the west.²⁵⁰ Intellectual women utilized their trips to the allied western countries as opportunities to promote the Turkish woman. They also took initiatives to strengthen Turkish women's ties to their sisters in western countries. Turkish and American Women Culture Meetings was one of these civic initiatives where urban professional women – or “Turkey's elite women” in the words of *Kadın Gazetesi* – engaged with their American counterparts in Ankara, Turkey in December 1949.²⁵¹ The initiative's founders planned to organize monthly meetings to facilitate cultural exchange and bi-monthly workshops on topics such as language education, social assistance, cooking, and embroidery.²⁵² The opening speech by Nezihe Türegün succinctly showed how the US was emerging as the primary western model for the elite Turkish women; whereas her American counterpart Russell Dorr's speech shows how Turkey was the emerging eastern model of development for the elite American women. Türegün stressed how Turkish women changed drastically with the new republic's establishment but added that they could learn from American women about social assistance and charity. Meanwhile, Dorr expressed her admiration for “Anatolia's pristine lands and naïve people with a great potential to develop soon with western agricultural technique.”²⁵³ These speeches indicate how Turkish

²⁴⁹ “Türk Kadınlığı Büyük Atasının Açtığı Yolda Başarıyla Yürüyor,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 3, 1954.

²⁵⁰ An example opinion column belonged to Girizan Tunara. See Girizan Tunara, “Garplılara Kendimizi Tanıtma Yolunda,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 25, 1949.

²⁵¹ “Türk-Amerikan Kadınları Kültür Toplantılar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 12, 1949.

²⁵² “Türk-Amerikan Kadınları Kültür Toplantılar.”

²⁵³ Nermin Abadan, “Türk-Amerikan Kadınlığının Kültürel Çalışmaları,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 19, 1949.

intellectuals saw a new kind of western model in the US and how American intellectuals' modernization and development thinking combined both traditional orientalist narratives with novel modernization and development aspirations.²⁵⁴

Elite Kemalist women presented western women as models to take examples, especially on thriftiness and childcare but stressed Turkish women's superior potential. Kemalist women celebrated American institutions and magazines that teach women about homemaking and nuclear family mores.²⁵⁵ Turkey during the 1940s and 1950s imported several Taylorist homemaking methods to make the women more efficient and enlightened housekeepers, wives, and mothers. Like the US, Turkey sought to spread these values through education and media such as Republican girls' institutes and women's magazines.²⁵⁶ Still, *Kadın Gazetesi* writers emphasized the superiority of Turkish women for having the potential to be both professional women in public and efficient housewives in private. This contrasted the American women who, according to İffet Halim Oruz, primarily desired to be good housewives. During a Turkish and American Women's Culture Meeting, Oruz suggested that Turkish women's desire to work was not because of economic hardships. As revolutionary daughters of Atatürk's republic, Turkish women's innate ideal was to reconcile professional life with family life.²⁵⁷ In another article, Oruz critically remarked on her encounter with an

²⁵⁴ Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606786>; Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018).

²⁵⁵ Lamia H. Gerede, "Amerika'da Kadın," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 6, 1950.

²⁵⁶ Ferhunde Özbay, "Gendered Space: A New Look at Turkish Modernisation," *Gender & History* 11, no. 3 (November 1999): 555–68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.00163>; Yael Navaro-Yaşın, "'Evde Taylorizm': Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlk Yıllarında Evişinin Rasyonelleşmesi (1928-40)," *Toplum ve Bilim* 84 (Spring 2000): 51–75.

²⁵⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, "Türk-Amerikan Kadınları Kültür Toplantısı Hakkında," *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 16, 1950.

American journalist who had to find a job due to economic difficulties after her husband's death. For Oruz, the women of modern Turkey were proud breadwinners as well as nurturers.²⁵⁸

For Kemalist women, Turkish women's revolutionary character made them "the authentic westernizers." The goal was to be western without losing the national spirit. They remained alert to orientalist statements and behaviors that belittled Turkey and contrasted the idealized Turkish woman imagery in *Kadın Gazetesi*. İffet Halim Oruz criticized the Turkish and American Women Culture Meetings for presenting stereotypical images of urban and rural women. Oruz warned the organizers to recognize Turkey's geographic diversity and not to accept the image of "a mass living on onion and bread in brick houses and spinning."²⁵⁹ She criticized the organizers of both countries for bringing "a rural woman with a ball of wool in her hands instead of a woman worker."²⁶⁰ Another frequent *Kadın Gazetesi* writer, Mualla Anıl, likewise criticized the presented image of the miserable Turkish woman and suggested that the majority of Turkish women had much more modern and content lives than what was represented in the meeting.²⁶¹ While *Kadın Gazetesi* writers fiercely criticized Turkish women who "misrepresented" their nation, they were equally critical towards westerners who made these remarks. Perihan Çambel, who frequently wrote on the US, condemned the sentiment among the Americans that "it was only thanks to Marshall Aid that Turkish people were introduced to bean stew and democracy."²⁶² Similarly, İffet Halim Oruz

²⁵⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, "Amerikalı Kadın Gazeteciden Alınan İntiba," *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 12, 1955.

²⁵⁹ Oruz, "Türk-Amerikan Kadınları Kültür Toplantısı Hakkında."

²⁶⁰ Oruz.

²⁶¹ Mualla Anıl, "Kadınlığımızı Tanıyalım ve Tanıtalım," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 6, 1950.

²⁶² Perihan Çambel, "Amerika'da Türkiye Hakkında Propaganda," *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 1, 1951.

criticized a Swedish newspaper that claimed Turkish women were imprisoned in their homes.²⁶³ Oruz proudly stated that “Turkey [was] not only equal to Sweden but it [was] also an example to other nations in the Middle East.”²⁶⁴

In response to such ‘misrepresentations’ of the Turkish woman, Kemalist women emphasized the revolutionary gains of Turkey’s women. To disallow misrepresentation and misinformation, they thought Turkish women must communicate with the west more often.²⁶⁵ Participation in international women’s meetings was a critical avenue. *Kadın Gazetesi* widely discussed and evaluated Turkish delegates’ performances and western delegates’ attitudes towards Turkish women at the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) meetings in 1952 and 1958. As a delegate to the 1952 meeting, İffet Halim Oruz wrote an opinion letter and a TKB report, both stressing how little other countries’ delegates knew of the Turkish women. Oruz evaluated the meeting as a success because the TKB conveyed “the advanced status of Turkish women”²⁶⁶ and “that they [had] been granted all their rights.”²⁶⁷ TKB’s involvement in IWSA was not independent of Turkey’s international politics, as well as TKB’s internal politics. Contrasting the celebratory tone regarding the 1952 Italy meeting, the 1958 meeting in Greece and the TKB delegation received criticism from Oruz. She complained about the lack of Turkish delegates’ response to the Cyprus question, the inexperience of the TKB delegates, the lack of post-meeting reports from the delegates, and

²⁶³ İffet Halim Oruz, “Kadınlığımıza Dair İsveç’ten Akseden Sesler,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1953.

²⁶⁴ İffet Halim Oruz, “Türk Kadınlığı Hakkında Yanlış İsnatlar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1953.

²⁶⁵ Oruz, “Memleketini Temsil Eden Kadın”; Tunara, “Garplılara Kendimizi Tanıtma Yolunda”; Anıl, “Kadınlığımızı Tanıyalım ve Tanıtalım”; İffet Halim Oruz, “Altıncı Yıla Girerken,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 3, 1952.

²⁶⁶ İffet Halim Oruz, “Başkan Ester Graff İle Bir Mülakat,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 29, 1952.

²⁶⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, “Milletlerarası Kadın Birliği,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 6, 1952.

the former IWSA president Ester Graff's close relationship with the Greek-Cypriot leader Makarios (future president of Cyprus).²⁶⁸ While the Korean War and Turkey's NATO membership turned the 1952 meeting into a mission to introduce the Turkish woman to their western counterparts, *Kadın Gazetesi*'s excitement had turned into to resentment to the IWSA and the TKB in 1958.

Sub-part 1.2) Leading the East: Intellectual Women as Pioneers, Orientalists, and Diplomats

Comparisons with the outside world heavily influenced how Turkey's modernist intellectuals defined their national identity. In addition to their concerns over how the west saw Turkey, Kemalist women stressed their distinctions from other non-western countries thanks to the Kemalist revolutions' modernizing and civilizing accomplishments.²⁶⁹ Socialists like Sabiha Sertel and Kemalists like İffet Halim Oruz took pride in Turkey's revolution and advised a similar path to other nations. In the late 1940s and 1950s, Kemalist intellectual women strove to establish close relationships with the Muslim majority and postcolonial countries like Pakistan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Their solidarity discourses, however, were reminiscent of the 1930s' modernization and westernization discourses that rested upon a strict east-west duality and how to find the right balance between westernization and authenticity. İffet Halim Oruz succinctly remarked on Beirut: it was "not quite there yet," but

²⁶⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, "Kim Sorumlu," *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 4, 1958; İffet Halim Oruz, "Bir Garip Merak," *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 27, 1958; İffet Halim Oruz, "Milletler Arası Kadınlar Kongresi," *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 6, 1958.

²⁶⁹ Meltem Ahiska, "Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2 (2003): 351–79; Meltem Ahiska, *Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting*, Library of Modern Middle East Studies 79 (London New York New York: Tauris Academic Studies Distributed in the United States and Canada exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

it could become an eastern city “with its historical structures, authentic cuisine, hospitable natives, traditional coffee houses being intact yet still a clean one.”²⁷⁰ Kemalist women remained aloof if not outright hostile to Third World liberation movements. Their diplomatic efforts targeted friendly western countries, towards which Kemalists utilized the western Cold War narrative of freedom vs. captivity by building it upon their extant orientalism and Turkish exceptionalism.

Although the Cold War irrevocably divided socialists and Kemalists, socialists too shared Kemalists’ orientalism and exceptionalism to some degree. Suat Derviş's earlier works like “*Dirilen Mumya* (The Reincarnated Mummy- 1934) and *Bir Haremağasının Hatıraları* (Memoirs of a Eunuch-1933), which were written in Germany for a European audience, closely reflected exceptionalism and orientalism prevalent in the early republican intellectuals’ worldviews. *Dirilen Mumya*, a mystery novel, depicts the adventurous trip of Seza, an Ottoman noblewoman, to the Arabian Peninsula. Derviş incorporates several sexualized orientalist elements in this novel including Saharan wilderness versus civilizational law and order; bestial Bedouin men versus elegant Turkish women; snow-white female versus naive but wild male.²⁷¹ The love affair between Seza and Ömer Bin Osman, a Bedouin, ends unhappily for “they belonged to different worlds.”²⁷² In *Bir Haremağasının Hatıraları*, meanwhile, Derviş depicts the court life during Sultan Abdulhamid II from the perspective of an enslaved harem eunuch, Hayrettin. The story incorporates various orientalist narratives such as enslaved women and eunuchs, monstrous oriental despot, and

²⁷⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “Beyrut’ta Bir Gün,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 5, 1951.

²⁷¹ Suat Derviş, *Dirilen Mumya* (İthaki Yayınları, 2021), 42, 48, 76, 89.

²⁷² Derviş, 102.

exotic harem.²⁷³ In a 1953 reprinting, Derviş intervened in the narrative to add a prologue on Hayrettin’s enslavement from “an African village” but did not alter the novel’s orientalist tone. Both the Kemalists and socialists continued to reproduce orientalist discourses – particularly against the Arab people – despite their growing ideological differences.

During the Cold War, Kemalist women depicted themselves through their difference from Middle Eastern women and assumed a self-entitled mission to enlighten, nurture, and emancipate them.²⁷⁴ Proud of Turkey’s secular reforms, Kemalist women were convinced that Muslim majority countries needed the guidance of Turkish womanhood.²⁷⁵ Women intellectuals aspired to building contacts with elite Muslim women. In one example, İffet Halim Oruz wrote that “women’s associations, media professionals, teachers’ associations should send their professional enlightened women” to countries like Libya “since awakening nations are showing great interest in us [Turkey].”²⁷⁶ It was in this spirit that the TKB organized many trips to pro-western Middle Eastern countries and became agents of Turkey’s Cold War diplomacy.

Cold War politics shaped the Kadın Gazetesi and TKB discourses regarding Turkey’s neighbors. In the spring 1951, Kadın Gazetesi writers visited Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut. Their reports emphasized the historical connection between Turkey and the places they visited, lamented the lack of networks, prided Turkey’s and Atatürk’s influence in the

²⁷³ For a discussion on this novel and its republication, see Serdar Soydan, “Sonsöz,” in *Dirilen Mumya*, by Suat Derviş (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2021).

²⁷⁴ Oruz, “Kadın Birliği.”

²⁷⁵ This particular statement was a response to a news from Egyptian women’s groups about their opposition against veiling. However, Kadın Gazetesi did not specify their source for this news. See İffet Halim Oruz, “Mısır Kadınları ve Otuz Yıl Önceki Hatıralar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 17, 1949.

²⁷⁶ İffet Halim Oruz, “Libyalı Kadına Dair,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 21, 1952.

independence movements, and advised their Middle Eastern counterparts to follow Turkey's course in diplomacy and modernization. Celebrating Syria's negotiated independence from the French mandate, İffet Halim Oruz gave a highly acclaimed speech at an event with Syrian state officials, at least according to *Kadın Gazetesi*, in which she pointed to the historical connection between Turkey and Syria.²⁷⁷ Another *Kadın Gazetesi* author Hasene Ilgaz proudly remarked how the "Arab countries followed the pioneering course of Atatürk"²⁷⁸, whereas Oruz celebrated Syria for "confirming the course of history and the effect of Turkish Republic's breakthrough after a quarter-century."²⁷⁹ She advised the Syrian officials to "work for global interest just like Turkey [was] doing in Korea."²⁸⁰ Retelling the story to her Turkish audience, Oruz expressed her regret in not establishing contact with the Arab region sooner, considering "their huge sympathy towards Atatürk and the Turkish example."²⁸¹ She advised Turkish people to "go there, see there and understand each other."²⁸² Just like how prominent Europeans and Americans 'explored' the developments in Turkey in their visits, *Kadın Gazetesi* embraced a similar attitude in their assessments and expressed their patronizing awe with how modernized and progressed Syrian women were.²⁸³

Soon after its creation in 1947, *Kadın Gazetesi* and the TKB established contact with Pakistani elites, published several articles that praised Pakistani women's role in the

²⁷⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, "Gazeteciler Heyeti Halep'te," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 21, 1951.

²⁷⁸ Hasene Ilgaz, "Mustafa Kemal ve Baron Oteli," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1951.

²⁷⁹ İffet Halim Oruz, "Suriye Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü'nün Ziyafetinde Verdiği Demeç," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1951.

²⁸⁰ Oruz.

Turkey's entrance to Korean War next to the US was a critical symbol of Turkey's changing foreign relations and signalled its NATO membership in the near future. For a detailed discussion on the TKB's and *Kadın Gazetesi*'s discourses on the Korean War, see chapter 4.

²⁸¹ İffet Halim Oruz, "Arap Memleketlerinde Bir Gezi," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1951.

²⁸² Oruz.

²⁸³ İffet Halim Oruz, "Suriye Kadınlığı," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1951.

independence movement, and considered relations with Pakistan as a critical step to establish leadership globally among Muslim women. Kemalist women like İffet Halim Oruz, Hasene İlgaz, Mevhibe İnonü, and Latife Bekir Çeyrekbaşı often visited Pakistani ambassadress Begum Geeti Ara Bashir Ahmad and *Kadın Gazetesi* frequently published the ambassadress' messages. *Kadın Gazetesi* warmly appreciated the remarks by Begum Geeti Ara Bashir Ahmad and Begum Liaquat Ali Han, who called upon the “Turkish womanhood to lead all Muslim women in the world” as daughters of Atatürk, “the first leader to win the war of Islam who was followed by Iran and now by Pakistan and Indonesia.”²⁸⁴ *Kadın Gazetesi* brought the “active political presence of women in Pakistan and the rarity of veiling despite the large Muslim population” to its audience’s attention.²⁸⁵ Authors advised Pakistani women “to follow Turkish nation’s path that prioritized national and civilizational criteria in their development.”²⁸⁶ *Kadın Gazetesi*'s coverage of Pakistan, however, was often constrained to a few elite portraits. Moreover, in the Cold War context, Kemalist women did not mind that Pakistan was not a secular state but an Islamic republic, let alone the association of Atatürk with a “war of Islam.”

In February 1951, *Kadın Gazetesi* writers İffet Halim Oruz and Leyla Kara went to Pakistan as the invitees of Pakistan Women’s Association. Oruz’s reports in *Kadın Gazetesi* about the three week-long-visit exemplified elite Kemalist women’s attitudes of superiority and orientalist benevolence towards Pakistan. Oruz informed her readers that she “could not help but to exoticize... and imagine Pakistani women in colorful saris, harem pants, and

²⁸⁴ “Pakistan Sefiresinin Türk Kadınlığı Hakkındaki Görüşleri,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 5, 1950.

²⁸⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, “Pakistan Hakkında Konferans,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 5, 1951.

²⁸⁶ “Türk Kadınlığının Pakistan Kadınlığına Mesajı,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 2, 1950.

ghararas.” She remarked on her surprise to realize that “the Pakistani women were actually quite beautiful when you see them all together.”²⁸⁷ To Oruz, the whole trip felt like “they were living in a Thousand and One Nights fairy tale.”²⁸⁸ Like her remarks on elite Arab women, Oruz resembled elite women in Karachi to Turkish women in the early republican period – which marked a clear modernization hierarchy. She appreciated “how well Karachi women adapted to the modern life and actively involved in public life just like Ankara’s elite and intelligent women.”²⁸⁹ *Kadın Gazetesi*’s orientalist lens towards Pakistani women closely paralleled how *Kadın Gazetesi*’s western guests examined Turkish women.

Oruz’s reports about the Pakistani people were not always positive and her remarks on anti-imperialism and secularism were often conflicting. She stated that the progress of the Pakistani people required “unity in language and land reform in addition to the existing religious unity.”²⁹⁰ Oruz celebrated Pakistani independence and condemned British colonialism. At the same time, Oruz attributed the intelligence and high culture of the elite Pakistani women to their British education.²⁹¹ During their trip, Oruz and Kara attended the women’s session in The World Muslim Congress. While Oruz spoke highly of the session in *Kadın Gazetesi*, she differentiated Turkey from others. She met several people in Pakistan who “were misled with propaganda that Turkish people had left their religion.”²⁹² Oruz reassured her Turkish audience that her speech in the congress was about “the necessity to

²⁸⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, “Pakistan Kadınlığı Arasında,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 12, 1951.

²⁸⁸ “İffet Halim Oruz’un Karacı Radyosundaki Konuşması,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 26, 1951.

²⁸⁹ Oruz, “Pakistan Kadınlığı Arasında.”

²⁹⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “Pakistan’ın Kalkınması,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 19, 1951.

²⁹¹ Oruz, “Pakistan Kadınlığı Arasında.”

²⁹² “İffet Halim Oruz’un Karacı Radyosundaki Konuşması.”

embrace our religion without bigotry,”²⁹³ and “without mixing it into daily politics.”²⁹⁴ For Oruz, Turkey and Turkish womanhood were ahead of newly independent Muslim majority countries like Pakistan and Syria in secularization and westernization. Advising Turkish women to reciprocate the sympathy of Pakistani women, Oruz proudly claimed “the duty of Turkish people to be the tiger of the Islamic world.”²⁹⁵

Cold War politics directly influenced Kadın Gazetesi’s perspective on sisterhood with other Muslim majority countries. They considered socialist advances in the Middle East as captivation to imperialism. The Cold War altered how Kemalist women understood and used terms like independence and freedom. They looked upon the Free Officers’ Coup in Egypt in 1952 with worry and disappointment. For Oruz, the developments in Egypt were “worrisome for free nations... [that] people are led into a class war in the name of independence.”²⁹⁶ Sympathetic statements to the USSR on the death of Stalin in 1953 were signs that “some nations [were] just accustomed to captivity.”²⁹⁷ Kadın Gazetesi presented Iraq’s proclamation of republic in 1958 as rebels taking over power²⁹⁸ and received the overthrow of Iraqi monarchy with suspicion. Iraqi republicanism was “steering away from the realm of democracy like Syria and Egypt and moving in another direction in the name of nationalism.”²⁹⁹ In Fall 1958, the TKB went to Tunisia as the Tunisian Women’s Association’s invitees and spoke highly of Tunisian president Habib Bourgiba in their report.

²⁹³ “İffet Halim Oruz’un Karaçi Radyosundaki Konuşması.”

²⁹⁴ İffet Halim Oruz, “İslam Kongresi,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 26, 1951.

²⁹⁵ A statement by a Pakistani intellectual woman according to Oruz’s reports. See İffet Halim Oruz, “İslam Konferansının Kadınlar Celseesi,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 26, 1951.

²⁹⁶ İffet Halim Oruz, “Dünyanın Hali,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 4, 1952.

²⁹⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, “Stalin’in Ölümü ve Akisleri,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 12, 1953.

²⁹⁸ “Asiler Irak’ta Cumhuriyet İlan Etiler,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 19, 1958.

²⁹⁹ İffet Halim Oruz, “Orta Doğu Hadiseleri,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 19, 1958.

The TKB particularly appreciated Tunisia's negotiated path to independence and Bourguiba's negative statements on the Algerian independence movement.³⁰⁰ Cold War politics had detached Kemalist women's ideology from its history of the Independence War, secularism, republicanism, and revolution – like Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in the 1950s – and became contingent on their assessment of international political developments.

Intellectual women constructed their ideal image of the modern Turkish woman based on their perception of differences both from the west and the east. They asserted the superiority of the Turkish woman for her national consciousness as well as progressive rights. While they sought acclaim and recognition from the western woman, they aimed to nurture the eastern woman. They condemned western orientalism but utilized similar orientalist discourses. Their attitudes towards political developments in the Middle East were shaped by Turkey's Cold War politics, which detached their ideology from its history.

Part 2) Missionary Intellectuals: Urban and Rural Projects to Nurture Turkish Womanhood

Since the early republican period, modernizing state elites and intellectuals attributed great importance to rural development as the gateway to the nation's progress. The Republican People's Party (CHP) launched various initiatives since the 1930s, including the establishment of Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) and People's Houses (Halk Evleri). However, the efforts to transform Turkey's villages did not go beyond the surface until the 1950s. Scholars attribute the CHP's failure to resolve the peasant question to factors like its

³⁰⁰ "T.K.B. Tunus'ta," *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 11, 1958.

conservative "classless society" visions,³⁰¹ alliances with large landowners,³⁰² and preoccupation with urban and cultural concerns.³⁰³ Others attribute the Democrat Party's (DP) electoral victory in 1950 to the peasant discontent with the CHP.³⁰⁴ The DP's development strategies, on the other hand, like agricultural mechanization, foreign trade liberalization, and distribution of state-owned land were initially popular but in the medium term created new class inequalities, dispossessions, rural unemployment, and unprecedented rural-to-urban migration.³⁰⁵ This sub-part looks at the debates among women intellectuals on rural development and their nurturing projects from the late 1940s to the 1950s. The part exposes the women's frustration by the lack of progress and initiative from the state and political parties. It also shows how Kemalist women developed their peasant nurturing and empowerment projects in response.

Subpart 2.1) Intellectuals' Ideas and Projects on Nurturing the Village

Socialist intellectuals like Sabiha Sertel had long exposed the major flaws in rural modernization, where she especially problematized the peopleism principle. Sertel encountered socialism as a university student in the US, where she later organized Kurdish and Turkish immigrant workers in the early 1920s. Her experience led Sertel to argue that the best service to the homeland was to "enlighten [the peasants and the workers], to educate

³⁰¹ Asım Karaömerlioğlu, "The People's Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 4 (1998).

³⁰² Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye iktisat tarihi: 1908-2015*, Genişletilmiş ve gözden geçirilmiş 23. baskı (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2018).

³⁰³ Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003).

³⁰⁴ Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: tarihi ve ideolojisi* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2014).

³⁰⁵ Şevket Pamuk, *Uneven Centuries: Economic Development of Turkey since 1820* (Princeton, New Jersey ; Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2018).

them so that they can defend their own rights.”³⁰⁶ She identified Kemalism’s classless society discourse behind the dismissal of the village question.³⁰⁷ She further pointed to the unscientific and unplanned nature of Kemalist rural developmentalism.³⁰⁸ She blamed the dominant conservative forces within the CHP for blocking structural reforms on rural development.³⁰⁹ For socialists like Sertel, republican revolutions did not translate into structural change that was necessary to establish a modern society.³¹⁰ Decades after the revolution, Sertel complained, the village “remained backward with no mechanization, education and land reform...whereas the headmen exploit the peasantry.”³¹¹ By the mid-1940s, however, the political elite no longer tolerated socialistic critiques, forcing Sertel to silence and eventually exile in 1950.³¹²

Kemalist women in the post-World War Two period partly shared their socialist counterparts’ views on planned rural development. The TKB and Kadın Gazetesi discourses and projects closely reflected İffet Halim Oruz’s statements from the early 1930s: “this womanhood, who is forced to hide under a veil, tricked into superstitions, struggled under the most difficult economic conditions, emerged in today’s republic by carrying ammunitions in her ox cart to the war front...while the urban women progressed thanks to reforms, the rural woman remained where she was 200 years ago.”³¹³ In fact, Oruz had explained the TKB’s dissolution in 1935 on the grounds that urban women, who gained her rights and nurtured herself, now

³⁰⁶ Sabiha Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 1. basım, Anı (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2015), 61.

³⁰⁷ Sertel, 70.

³⁰⁸ Sertel, 109.

³⁰⁹ Sertel, 69.

³¹⁰ Sertel, 108.

³¹¹ Sertel, 109.

³¹² Silencing of dissident voices in the context of anti-communist nationalism in Turkey in the post World War Two period will be discussed more in detail in the last chapter of this dissertation.

³¹³ İffet Halim Oruz, *Arkadaşlar* (İstanbul: Selamet Basımevi, 1936), 31–32.

needed to nurture her peasant sisters and no longer needed an association like the TKB. Oruz reported that Atatürk had personally advised to her to “go each and every village in this homeland and nurture its women so that she does not fall behind the men.”³¹⁴ Elite Kemalist women perceived the rural woman as “the essence of Turkish womanhood,”³¹⁵ “her husband’s most precious treasure,”³¹⁶ who “like a jewel, she needs to be processed.”³¹⁷ Kemalist women acknowledged the urban-rural gap as a major issue that enlightened urban women must tackle.³¹⁸ Unlike socialist intellectuals like Sertel who attributed responsibility to the political elite, Kemalist women, at least until the mid-1950s, promoted nurturing via charity and attributed responsibility to a vague class of elites, “the spendthrift woman who enjoy herself and gambles all day.”³¹⁹

The TKB and *Kadın Gazetesi* writers agreed with socialist intellectuals that the peasant majority did not benefit from the revolution and remained underdeveloped. İffet Halim Oruz considered the DP era as an opportunity and argued that “we were mistaken to think the village school as a palace; we disappointed the realist peasant with all this talk.”³²⁰ She argued that all work towards rural development, especially concerning peasant women, remained a phantasy, except health and education. Oruz called for an economic plan to reconsider rural division of labor, because “if a peasant woman spends her entire time in the fields, she cannot raise enlightened children.”³²¹ Kemalist women believed that material

³¹⁴ Oruz, “Kadın Birliği.”

³¹⁵ Mehmet Gülşen, “Dünkü ve Bugünkü Köylü Kadını,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 12, 1955.

³¹⁶ Nezihe Köksal, “Anadolu Kadını,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 2, 1955.

³¹⁷ Mehçure Sezer, “Kadınlar Birliğinin Erzurum Köylerindeki Gezisinden İntibalar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 14, 1954.

³¹⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, “Köy Anneleri,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 16, 1951.

³¹⁹ Melahat F. Gökmen, “Köy Kalkınması ve Köy Kadını,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 20, 1953.

³²⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “Köylü Davası,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 2, 1951.

³²¹ İffet Halim Oruz, “Köylü Kadınımızın Kalkınması,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 17, 1951.

development should be coupled with nurturing the mindset. Even though the “Turkish peasant is the peasant par excellence...they need a guide in village life after spending all these years in wars.”³²² Women’s ‘investigation’ visits to villages informed their ideas on changing and nurturing the peasant mindset. Receiving news of increasing veil wearing in villages, the TKB women organized a visit to Erzincan in eastern Turkey. Cahide Altan wrote a series on urban and rural Erzincan in 1952 where she identified the major problems: male domination, ignorance, hygiene, traditions, and lack of cooperation among the villagers.³²³ Kemalist women’s comprehension of the peasant question included several points like government inattention and peasants’ laziness. In response, they encouraged enlightened urban women to take responsibility in nurturing peasant women.³²⁴

By the early 1950s, the TKB and Kadın Gazetesi came to the gradual realization of their class and spatial distance from the majority of Turkish women and decided to “be closer with the general public in the cities and peasant women in villages.”³²⁵ Kadın Gazetesi moved its Istanbul office into a more popular district and the TKB’s Istanbul office established a village branch for nurturing projects. The branch conducted regular trips to villages in the Marmara region, kept track of their developments, and contributed to mobile village schools conducted by Republican Girls’ Institutes.³²⁶ Kadın Gazetesi published on the mobile schools in

³²² Hasene Ilgaz, “Köyde Şahsiyet Terbiyesi,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 18, 1949.

³²³ Cahide Altan, “Erzincan Notları,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 11, 1952; Cahide Altan, “Erzincan Notları: 2,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 18, 1952; Cahide Altan, “Erzincan Notları: 3,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 25, 1952; Cahide Altan, “Erzincan Notları: 4,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 8, 1952; Cahide Altan, “Erzincan Notları: 5,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 15, 1952.

³²⁴ Altan, “Erzincan Notları: 5”; Hasene Ilgaz, “Yine Köy ve Köylü Davası,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1952; Oruz, “Köylü Kadınının Kalkınması.”

³²⁵ “Kadın Gazetesi Yeni İdarahanesine Taşınıyor,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 12, 1950.

³²⁶ “TKB İstanbul Merkezinin Köycülük Hareketleri,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 5, 1952; Bedia Küçükaksoy, “TKB İstanbul Merkezi Başkanlığı Köycülük Kolu Köy Gezileri Röportajı,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 12, 1952.

different cities.³²⁷ Oruz highly praised the girls' institutes for effectively establishing a tangible relationship with villages and teaching peasant women productive skills.³²⁸ In their trips, İffet Halim Oruz complained of the lack of fundamental necessities. Her solution was urban Kemalist women to encourage the peasants to their own cause.³²⁹ She expressed her disappointment to see "Greek speaking Turkish-Muslim peasantry" due to lack of education.³³⁰ For Oruz, the peasants were distrustful towards outsiders but were "the most effective safety valve against communism."³³¹ The TKB considered the rural areas as a national source and a threat. They argued that the society should not expect everything from the state and championed voluntarist civil initiatives in rural development projects. Absent of state support, however, these initiatives quickly failed. The mid-1950s saw first outright criticism by the TBK against the political elites.

In 1951, the TKB initiated the Social Nurturing Program which combined urban and rural development projects. The program was modeled after European and American programs. The TKB women received UN support and guidance.³³² The project had a dual goal: rehabilitating young urban women inclined to moral degeneracy and educating urban and rural women as nurturers.³³³ Prominent TKB members regarded social rehabilitation as key to national development in the 1950s and this program was one of their first attempts to that end.³³⁴ Oruz also remarked that it was the first social welfare program organized by a civil

³²⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, "Köy Gezici Kursu Öğretmenleri Arasında," *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 5, 1951.

³²⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, "Köy Kadınları Gezici Kursları," *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 25, 1951.

³²⁹ İffet Halim Oruz, "Köy Davası," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 12, 1952.

³³⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, "Köylerin En Büyük Meselesi," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 26, 1952.

³³¹ İffet Halim Oruz, "İnsan Hakları ve Köylülerimiz," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 12, 1953.

³³² "T.K. Birliği İstanbul Merkezi'nin İdare Kurulu Raporu," *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 19, 1953.

³³³ İffet Halim Oruz, "Sosyal Himaye," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 22, 1954.

³³⁴ Oruz, "Köy Anneleri."

initiative. For Oruz, developing the village required turning intellectuals into missionaries. The TKB Istanbul office also established a ‘social branch’ within its organization to oversee this program.³³⁵ The pilot program focused on language, cooking, nursing, and mental health classes.³³⁶ Kadın Gazetesi regularly promoted the program and printed lecture notes for its audience.³³⁷

In the early 1950s, the TKB and Kadın Gazetesi launched several new initiatives under the motto of “nurturing 40.000 village mothers for 40.000 villages in Turkey.”³³⁸ The TKB’s village branch established a Social Nurturing House in a village near Istanbul, Ahmediye, in 1953. The TKB hoped these houses to spread and serve as intellectual centers for nurturing the peasantry.³³⁹ In contrast to earlier attempts to open public houses in villages, the center was unprecedented for being a civil initiative. The TKB’s Istanbul branch collected donations to sustain the project. The means of the project signaled Kemalist women’s perspective on social welfare. As Oruz wrote in Kadın Gazetesi, it was neither necessary nor reasonable to expect the state to assume all responsibility.³⁴⁰ Oruz acknowledged the potential problems like partisanship and lack of full-time staff but stressed the Turkish citizenry’s willingness to support positive initiatives. Ahmediye Social Nurturing House proved that “if [the women] could find 5000 citizens to donate 1 Lira, it was possible to establish such a center.”³⁴¹ The TKB envisioned the Social Nurturing Houses to be all-purpose centers where “villagers could visit for any issue and enlightened urban Turkish mothers could take shelter during

³³⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, “Asistans Sosyal,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 16, 1951.

³³⁶ “TKB’nin Açacağı Kurslar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 2, 1951.

³³⁷ “Asistans Sosyal Ruh Sağlığı Dersleri,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 13, 1951.

³³⁸ Oruz, “Köy Anneleri.”

³³⁹ “TKB Sosyal Himaye Evi Temel Atma Töreni,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 29, 1953.

³⁴⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “Sosyal Çalışmalar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 21, 1953.

³⁴¹ Oruz.

their service.”³⁴² The TKB planned to raise the enlightened staff with social courses in its urban centers to run the rural houses. Each social house was to have a female doctor, teacher, and housewife.³⁴³ Oruz declared the first goal to “reduce the distance by working idealistically,”³⁴⁴ and promised to “stay in the village until the village could raise its own nurturers.”³⁴⁵

Neither the TKB’s commitment to nationwide social nurturing houses nor raising enlightened village missionaries lasted beyond 1955. It became one of the many unrealized projects that the TKB enthusiastically launched and promoted in *Kadın Gazetesi*. What looked like a naïve initiative from the beginning, in fact, reflected structural shortcomings, miscalculation of government support, and organizational incapacity masked by ideological commitments. Contrasting her earlier emphasis on donations and civil initiatives, İffet Halim Oruz stressed the need for government involvement to sustain such projects in 1955.³⁴⁶ Soon after, she declared, budgetary constraints had failed the project. Oruz reported on the TKB’s failure to place the social assistance program graduates to relevant jobs.³⁴⁷ Moreover, she turned critical against the government after it rejected the TKB member and MP Nazlı Tlabar’s budget proposal for the TKB’s social programs. Oruz complained that only half the budget reserved for religious shrines would suffice to sustain the TKB’s rural and urban nurturing projects.³⁴⁸ The TKB’s aims to mobilize public support and funds for their projects also failed. By the mid-1950s, their village cause became an unfinished project. Beyond

³⁴² İffet Halim Oruz, “Köy Çalışmaları,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 30, 1953.

³⁴³ İffet Halim Oruz, “Mutlu Gün,” June 19, 1954.

³⁴⁴ Oruz..

³⁴⁵ “Kadınlar Birliği Sosyal Himaye Evinin Temel Atma Töreni,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 5, 1953.

³⁴⁶ Oruz, “Sosyal Himaye.”

³⁴⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, “15 Günün Olayları,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 12, 1955.

³⁴⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, “Rivayete Göre,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 12, 1955.

government inattention, their failure also reflected wedge between the TKB and the realities of rural problems.

Subpart 2.2) Intellectuals' Projects to Enlighten Urban Working Women

Turkey's women's labor history has not attracted much academic interest and especially women's paid labor in the early republican period remains understudied.³⁴⁹ Socialist women in the early republican period problematized the working conditions of urban women and their unpaid household labor. Kemalist intellectuals, meanwhile, championed women's right to work and their responsibility to raise enlightened, patriotic children. They launched education projects for working women particularly in industrial sectors. However, even though Kemalist women were almost exclusively urban residents, their urban projects drastically lagged behind their rural projects.

Sabiha Sertel encountered feminism and socialism in the early 1920s as a journalism student in the US.³⁵⁰ August Babel had been a major influence on Sertel. In the foreword of her translation of Babel's *Woman and Socialism*, Sertel wrote: "I want to tell the woman who is exploited at home, work, factory, and office, that she has the power to destroy this life once she understands where her interests lie, and that this life is not her destiny."³⁵¹ Challenging Kemalism's triumphant narratives regarding the realization of gender equality in the 1930s,

³⁴⁹ Ahmet Makal, "Türkiye'de Kadın Emeği'nin Tarihsel Kökenleri: 1920-1960," in *Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye'de Kadın Emeği*, ed. Ahmet Makal and Gülay Toksöz (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2015), 35.

³⁵⁰ Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 43.

³⁵¹ Sabiha Sertel, "Önsöz," in *Kadın ve Sosyalizm*, by August Bebel, trans. Sabiha Sertel (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019), 14.

Sertel stated that “there was no equality between men and women...the working women in particular, was completely deprived of such an equal position,”³⁵² She was especially critical of women politicians who ignored women workers’ needs.³⁵³ Suat Derviş’s journalism, meanwhile, focused on social inequalities experienced by Istanbul’s workers. Her investigative interviews revealed several issues such as long working hours, gender pay gap, arbitrary dismissals, and sexual harassment, which later informed her socialist-realist novels.³⁵⁴ Derviş’s work also exposed the shortcomings of Turkey’s first Labor Law in 1936 due to extra-economic, gendered factors, especially under the economic conditions of the World War Two period.³⁵⁵

In the post-World War Two period, Turkish women’s share in the workforce decreased.³⁵⁶ Although Turkey did not enter the war, it still mobilized vast segments of young males in preparation.³⁵⁷ The TKB began to problematize public discourses against women’s employment, women’s dismissal from their jobs, and lack of government attention for women’s labor conditions.³⁵⁸ Kemalist women defended women’s right to work at a time when the CHP embraced social conservatism, which made women’s narratives more radical. Iffet Halim Oruz compared those who objected women’s participation in the labor force to

³⁵² Sertel, *Annem*, 170.

³⁵³ See, Sertel’s criticisms on the Road in Tax in Sertel, 169.

³⁵⁴ Suat Derviş, “Türk Kadınları Nasıl İş Bulur? – Bir Genç Kız Anlatıyor,” *Tan*, January 1, 1937; Suat Derviş, “Büro İle Fabrika Arasında Ne Fark Vardır,” *Tan*, January 5, 1937.

³⁵⁵ Makal, “Türkiye’de Kadın Emeği’nin Tarihsel Kökenleri: 1920-1960,” 92.

³⁵⁶ Ahmet Makal, “Türkiye’de 1950-1965 Döneminde Ücretli Kadın Emeğine İlişkin Gelişmeler,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 56, no. 2 (2001).

³⁵⁷ Ahmet Makal, “Türkiye’de Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kadın Emeği,” *Çalışma ve Toplum* 25, no. 2 (2010).

³⁵⁸ Kadın Gazetesi writers also criticized rising conservative discourses among the political parties in the 1950s and associated this with giving way to reactionary Islamism. Their criticisms towards politicians will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

“parasites swarming on women’s development, the backbone of Turkish revolutions.” and asked whether the next step was to “remove women from the fields, teachers from schools, or MPs from the parliament.”³⁵⁹ Şükufe Nihal harshly critiqued the dismissal of women civil officials, complaining that “women’s employment was still considered a luxury and they were the first ones to be dismissed.”³⁶⁰ Kemalist women’s emphasis on the right to work were always accompanied by narratives stressing women’s familial responsibilities. Oruz reminded that “employing women did not mean removing them from household duties.”³⁶¹ Hasene Ilgaz took a pragmatic approach and claimed women’s employment contributed to their performance of household duties.³⁶² Kazım Nabi Duru, an exceptionally frequent male writer in *Kadın Gazetesi*, meanwhile took a gendered approach by emphasizing women’s better mores compared to men and their malleability in workplaces.³⁶³

The TKB and *Kadın Gazetesi* took a few projects specifically targeting women factory workers. The TKB aspired to provide cultural enlightenment through education, especially for working mothers. Soon after its reestablishment, the TKB formed a working women’s branch in 1949, while *Kadın Gazetesi* promoted the project of enlightening workers and establishing day care centers in major industrial cities. Similar to their motto “enlightened women to villages,” *Kadın Gazetesi* also called upon urban educated women to serve in factories and form women’s clubs.³⁶⁴ The TKB aimed to increase women’s productivity at home and work through education.³⁶⁵ The TKB’s education agenda included literacy,

³⁵⁹ İffet Halim Oruz, “Kadınlığımızın Kalkınması,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 7, 1948.

³⁶⁰ Şükufe Nihal, “Kadın Memurlar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 26, 1948.

³⁶¹ Oruz, “Kadınlığımızın Kalkınması.”

³⁶² Hasene Ilgaz, “Halide Edip’e Cevap,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 27, 1948.

³⁶³ Kazım Nabi Duru, “İşçi Kadın,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 20, 1948.

³⁶⁴ Hasene Ilgaz, “İşçi Kadınlarımız İçin Kadın Kulüpleri,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 21, 1948.

³⁶⁵ N. Selen, “İşçi Kadınlarımız ve Çocukları,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 27, 1948.

homemaking, health, hygiene, childcare, thrift, and handcraft. In addition to educating women workers, these clubs would also encourage them for marriage. Hasene Ilgaz, a vocal supporter of women's right to work, stated the need to promote marriage because the majority of women workers perceived family life as an unbearable burden.³⁶⁶ Kemalist women considered workplaces as education sites for women, whose enlightenment was key to social development.

Moreover, Kemalist women demanded better working conditions for industrial workers, again emphasizing working mothers³⁶⁷. The TKB reported on working mothers' urgent need for day care centers. It aimed to mobilize workers and Kadın Gazetesi readers and lobbied with state officials and local governments.³⁶⁸ Yet prominent writers like Oruz continued to champion civil solutions for working mothers.³⁶⁹ The TKB and Kadın Gazetesi's campaigns regarding the urban working women also carried a concern for social discipline. Ensuring better working conditions was not unrelated to the TKB campaigns on street children and their concerns over the youth's moral degeneration.³⁷⁰ Throughout the early 1950s, the TKB established and run a few day care centers and Kadın Gazetesi positively reported on similar centers established by republican girls' institutes or local governments.³⁷¹ However, by 1955, like their rural campaigns, the TKB's projects regarding working women remained unrealized. Oruz, who had originally championed civil initiatives, again complained about

³⁶⁶ Ilgaz, "İşçi Kadınlarımız İçin Kadın Kulüpleri."

³⁶⁷ Hasene Ilgaz, "Hastalık ve Analık Sigortası," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 26, 1949.

³⁶⁸ Leyla Kara, "Çalışan Anne," *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 14, 1950.

³⁶⁹ İffet Halim Oruz, "Çalışan Kadınların Derdi," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 5, 1949.

³⁷⁰ Şukufe Nihal, "Sokak Çocuklarını Kurtarmalıyız," *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 19, 1948; Şukufe Nihal, "İnkılap Kadını Böyle Mi Evlat Yetiştiriyor," *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 28, 1948.

³⁷¹ İffet Halim Oruz, "İstanbul'un Çocuk Davası," *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 6, 1950; Mesadet Yarkın, "Çocuk ve Yuva," *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 19, 1954.

political disinterest and partisanship within charity institutions.³⁷² The TKB's initiatives for working mothers mostly disappeared after the mid-1950s except for sporadic news on children summer centers or a few factory lectures on health and hygiene.³⁷³

Compared to the reports on the TKB's village projects, there are much fewer reports on initiatives towards urban working women in *Kadın Gazetesi*. Despite being an urban organization with urban-educated members, the TKB showed strikingly little interest in urban working people and rather promoted professional women as model figures for Turkish womanhood. Kemalist women were not completely dismissive of the urban poor but rather considered them as objects of their nurturing projects. While they recognized the social inequalities in rural areas, their commitment to Kemalist classless society visions led them to ignore urban class inequalities. They understood urban working women's issues as a matter of education and social hygiene and their methods and perception remained limited to charity and enlightenment, which ultimately failed in its declared aims.

Conclusion

Kemalist and socialist intellectual women since the early Republican period had their ideals of what featured a modern Turkish woman. They believed this woman must be made. They drew inspiration from their conception of western and eastern women. Such conceptions were often fraught with contradictions. While especially the Kemalists idolized the Western

³⁷² İffet Halim Oruz, "Cibali Tütün Fabrikasında Çalışan Kadınlar," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 13, 1950; İffet Halim Oruz, "Kreşler Meselesi," *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 15, 1955.

³⁷³ Oruz, "15 Günün Olayları"; İffet Halim Oruz, "İşçi Kadınları Aydınlatma Yolunda Çalışmalar," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 11, 1956; İffet Halim Oruz, "Karıncı Yuvaları," *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 29, 1957.

woman for her frugality, modest public femininity, and child-rearing practices, they also rejected orientalist views about Turkey and asserted the superiority of the Turkish woman. At the same time, they saw themselves as the pioneers and carriers of Atatürk's revolutions in the Middle East, towards which they adopted an orientalist and paternalizing approach. Intellectual nurturing discourses and projects in the Middle East and Turkey in the late 1940s and 1950s were informed by these global sources through which Turkey's women intellectuals differentiated and defined themselves.

Kemalist intellectual women developed their urban and rural nurturing projects with the commitment to contribute to Turkey's social revolution. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the TKB and Kadın Gazetesi aimed to mobilize intellectual women to this end and developed projects towards urban and especially rural areas. Despite being urban residents, the TKB efforts for urban working women remained limited compared to rural projects. Overall, however, neither rural nor urban projects were sustained beyond the mid-1950s due to several reasons such as lack of planning, organizing, and discrepancies between their idealized imagery and the realities on the ground. These unfinished projects left them with resentment towards the government about which they made sporadic complaints that did not turn into straightforward critiques. By the late 1940s, the new Cold War context had already silenced socialist women, who could only marginally contribute to these debates. The next chapter looks more closely at intellectual women's discourses on "guarding the homeland" in the early Cold War Turkey.

Chapter 4: Turkey's State Feminist Project Undone: Cold War, Women's Politics and Guarding the Homeland in the 1950s

Introduction

*There is a need for a women's organization in this country. Not for suffrage as in the past, but to uplift our womanhood and the rest of the Middle Eastern women.*³⁷⁴

*Women understood they will never have another Atatürk again. Suffrage awakens in the homeland.*³⁷⁵

Why and how did the TKB and its main media organ *Kadın Gazetesi* (Women's Gazette) radically alter its political discourse from 1947 to 1957? During the decade between these quotes, the Turkish republic abandoned militant secularism in favor of anti-communist nationalism.³⁷⁶ Simultaneously, the discursive space for socialist intellectuals became severely restricted.³⁷⁷ *Kadın Gazetesi* editors, who were loyal to the republican revolution, had understood their main mission as to guide Turkish women towards modern womanhood in the 1920s and 1930s. While in the 1940s they considered women's rights as an accomplished – and therefore obsolete – aim, republican women activists shifted back their attention to women's rights gradually throughout the 1950s. The story of these shifting

³⁷⁴ İffet Halim Oruz, "Kadın Birliği," *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 5, 1947.

³⁷⁵ "Kadınlar Atatürk'ü Bir Daha Bulamayacaklarını Anladılar," *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 19, 1957. In the rest of the article, President of the Kadınları Koruma Derneği (Women's Protection Association) Mediha Gezgin heralded that a women's party will be established for 1962 elections.

³⁷⁶ Cangül Örnek, *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı: Antikomünizm ve Amerikan Etkisi* (İstanbul: Can Sanat Yayınları, 2015); Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018).

³⁷⁷ Sabiha Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 1. basım, Anı (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2015).

discourses is also the story of new narratives of nationalism and new silences in Cold War Turkey. In line with official nationalism, "national sovereignty" and "guarding the homeland" constituted the primary themes in intellectual women's writings in the early republican period and the first decade of the multi-party regime. Only a few studies look at women's politics in Cold War Turkey, which often offer little agency to women's politics until the 1960s and understudy the changes in intellectual women's discourses around loyalty to nation against designated internal and external enemies in the context of changing national and global political conditions from the mid-1940s to 1950s.³⁷⁸ This chapter contributes to this field by following the discursive shifts in intellectual women's writings on the theme of "guarding the homeland" in early Cold War Turkey. It mainly asks: how did anti-communist nationalism in the mid 1940s and 1950s influence intellectual debates on women's role in guarding the homeland and their political activism towards the state elites? The key argument is that in the early Cold War period, Kemalist women intellectuals' discourse on guarding the homeland, which had been territorial and development oriented, became more aggressive and assertive, even promoting militant expansionism occasionally, whereas their loyalty towards the political elite became more selective and conditional, and gradually even critical and demanding.

³⁷⁸ Serpil Sancar, *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti: Erkekler Devlet, Kadınlar Aile Kurar*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 302 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012); Ezgi Sarıtaş and Yelda Şahin, "50'li Yıllarda Kadın Hareketi," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020); Selin Çağatay, "Kemalist Feminizm: Kadın Hareketi Tarihinin Göz Ardı Edilmiş 'Bariz Gerçeği,'" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 10*, ed. Feryal Saygılıgil and Naciye Berber, 1.baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 313–31; Şirin Tekeli, *Feminizmi Düşünmek*, 1. baskı, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları ; Sosyoloji, 580. 25 (Şişli, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2017).

As scholars have long remarked, nationalism and feminism were integrally linked in twentieth century postcolonial contexts, and thus the dichotomy of nationalism versus feminism is historically inaccurate.³⁷⁹ The late Ottoman and early republican periods confirm these studies, even though Turkey was not directly colonized. Since the late nineteenth century, Ottoman-Turkish intellectual women have attributed a critical role to women in national independence and understood their fate as directly linked to the independence and sovereignty of their nation³⁸⁰. Early women activists, as well as modernist men, emphasized the connection between national sovereignty and progress and progress in women's societal status.³⁸¹ Socialists and Kemalists converged in the importance of modesty, frugality, education, efficient management of the household, and childcare as the markers of a modern and developed nation. The transition to multi-party regime and global Cold War politics altered the weight of importance of those qualities. Socialist intellectuals like Suat Derviş and Sabiha Sertel were unable to publish in the new anti-communist context, faced prosecution and purges, and were forced to choose between exile and silence. In their absence, Kemalist women became more and more involved with Cold War and national politics, and championed women's decisive role in national security. As statist economic policies and

³⁷⁹ Kumari Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, The Feminist Classics (London ; New York: Verso, 2016); Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation*, Politics and Culture (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 1997); Ayşe Gül Altınay, *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Janet Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Lila Abu-Lughod, "Feminist Longings and Postcolonial Conditions," in *Remaking Women*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (Princeton University Press, 1998), 1–32, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831203-003>; Ayşe Durakbaşı, *Halide Edib: Türk Modernleşmesi ve Feminizm*, 1. baskı, Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 100 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2000).

³⁸⁰ See, Serpil Çakır's analysis on *Kadınlar Dünyası* journal, women's presence in the Committee of Union and Progress, and Teal-i Nisvan Cemiyeti formed by Halide Edib Adıvar. Serpil Çakır, *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi*, 1. basım, Kadın Araştırmaları Dizisi 4 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994).

³⁸¹ See, for example, Halide Edib Adıvar, *Turkey Faces West*, The Middle East Collection (New York: Arno Press, 1973); Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Medeniyet Tarihi* (Ötüken, 1925).

political neutrality of the 1930s gave way to capitalist modernization and NATO membership in the 1950s, elite Kemalist women shifted their focus from making modest frugal homemakers to making Cold Warrior women. The DP government's aggressive Cold War stance often found support among Kemalist women, especially in the early 1950s. However, these transformations also brought state-sponsored Islamism and backlashes in women's rights and societal roles, issues critical to Kemalist women. Hence, their loyalty to the political elites declined throughout the 1950s.

The chapter highlights that even though "guarding the homeland" has been a major discursive ground in Kemalist women's politics, an expansionist and militant loyalty to homeland, informed by anti-communist nationalism, emerged in the late 1940s and can be best observed in cases that these women considered as supra-political matters such as the Korean War, Cyprus issue and the Bulgarian immigrants of 1951. This study of women intellectual responses to these crises reveals that more than the wording of their discourse, what changed was the content of Kemalist women's message. In other words, women intellectuals added new meanings to national sovereignty and guarding the homeland but still rallied under those terms. Kemalist women carefully followed and supported the official state discourses in these crises. However, their support in these matters did not reflect or result in full obedience to the political elite. Women clashed with the political elite when they considered them to be enabling Islamism and anti-women discourses and practices. Thus, the core of their politics, that is full loyalty and indebtedness to Atatürk and his state feminist project, reproduced in new conditions. Women intellectuals' loyalty to the political elite who were in power was conditional upon the political elites' adherence to Atatürk. The chapter

also shows that the shifts in Kemalist women's discourses occurred simultaneously with the silencing of socialist intellectuals, including women intellectuals like Suat Derviř and Sabiha Sertel.

The chapter is structured in three main parts. The first part looks at socialist and Kemalist narratives on "guarding the homeland" in the 1930s and the silencing of socialist intellectuals in the Cold War period. It then analyzes Kemalists' militant loyalty in the Cold War through the female figure of "compassionate urban gatekeeper" by following their writings on the Korean War and Cyprus issue. In the second part, the chapter turns to the opposite of this female figure, namely the "disgracefully pitiful captives," with the cases of Kemalist women's take on women in the Soviet Union and the Muslim-Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria in 1951. The last part discusses Kemalist women's loyalty to Atatürk as the ultimate site of indebtedness through women's critique of political elites against the rise of Islamism and the backlash in women's rights.

Part 1) New Silences, New Narratives: Shifting Discourses of Guardianship in Socialist and Kemalist Writings from the 1930s to 1950s

National and global political developments in the mid 1940s resulted in the silencing of socialists and the emergence of new narratives in terms of intellectuals' ideas on guarding the homeland among the Kemalist women. Growing anti-communist nationalism and Turkey's aspirations to join the western bloc shrunk the discursive space for socialist intellectuals such as Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviř, who vigilantly criticized Cold War divisions and imperialist

war making during and right after the World War Two.³⁸² Elite Kemalist women's earlier skepticism on Turkey's involvement in global economic and territorial rivalries transformed in line with the official discourses that propagated anti-communist threats of internal and external enemies. By the early 1950s, socialists were to a large extent silenced, while prominent TKB figures who established Kadın Gazetesi as a non-political newspaper enjoyed greater freedom and to become involved in national debates which they considered as supra-political matters. In the 1950s, the figure of compassionate urban gatekeeper was forged along with the Korean War and the Cyprus issue which represented the dominant shift towards militant and expansionist anti-communist nationalism.

Subpart 1.1) Territorial and Development Oriented Guardianship Discourse in the Early Republican Period

The meaning of guarding the homeland for socialist intellectuals like Sabiha Sertel was shaped in the context of war experiences of the First World War and Turkey's War of Independence, as well as the looming threat of the Second World War. She pointed to the imperialist powers' incapacity to subdue to their colonies any longer in the face of the rising national liberation movements after the Second World War. In this new context, Sertel believed that the primary threat against Turkey's independence was compromising its economic sovereignty and aspiring for imperialist expansion.³⁸³ Indeed, she thought

³⁸² For some examples, see Sabiha Sertel, "Dünyanın İçinde Bulunduğu Buhran," *Tan*, June 10, 1943; Sabiha Sertel, "Üçüncü Bir Harbin Çıkmasını Önlemek Mümkün Mü?," *Tan*, April 22, 1943; Sabiha Sertel, "Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşları," *Tan*, April 24, 1945; Suat Derviş, "Harbin İkinci Yılına Tarihe Gömüyoruz," *Haber*, August 28, 1941.

³⁸³ Sabiha Sertel, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi* (Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 2009), 180–87.

“guarding a nation’s culture, language, or its flag even, would not secure its independence”³⁸⁴ if economic sovereignty was compromised. She warned against expansionist claims under the mask of nationalism, drawing attention to the catastrophes that followed the mistakes of the Young Turk revolutionaries in the early twentieth century.³⁸⁵ Just like she criticized Nazi sympathizer political elites and nationalist intellectuals for dragging Turkey into a global war in the late 1930s, she would warn against Turkey’s pro-American politics after the war for making the country vulnerable to Cold War conflicts. She condemned nationalist Turanists and racist intellectuals and politicians for compromising Turkey’s economic sovereignty through examples such as the Wealth Tax and NATO membership. For socialists like Sertel, these policies proved that Turkey’s national interests were compromised for the interests of its economic and political elites.³⁸⁶

A prolific socialist journalist and author, Suat Derviş shared the global socialist analysis, writing that the war was a consequence of imperialist expansionism and competition.³⁸⁷ In her journalistic writings before 1939, she particularly emphasized the devastating consequences of occupation and bombardments in war zones such as Ethiopia, Spain and China.³⁸⁸ In domestic politics, similar to Sabiha Sertel, Derviş was wary of emerging Turanism which could potentially result in Turkey’s involvement in war on Germany’s side. For Derviş, war was unacceptable if it meant “joining hands with foreign armies out of political lust and inflicting hunger, diseases and mass immigration.”³⁸⁹ As some intellectuals

³⁸⁴ Sertel, 180.

³⁸⁵ Sabiha Sertel, *İlericilik ve Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 2006).

³⁸⁶ Sertel, *Roman gibi*.

³⁸⁷ Suat Derviş, “Büyük Hadiselerin Arifesindeyiz!,” *Haber*, May 11, 1940.

³⁸⁸ Derviş, “Harbin İkinci Yılına Tarihe Gömüyoruz.”

³⁸⁹ Suat Derviş, “Yirminci Asırda Milletlerin Aldığı En Büyük Ders,” *Haber*, February 11, 1939.

in Turkey grew more and more supportive of fascist camp's war victories, Derviş condemned them as paving the way for Turkey's economic and political captivity. Moreover, she fiercely critiqued German and Italian fascist intellectuals for misrepresenting the expansionist Nazi idea of Lebensraum as a tool for national defense and defended Turkey's right to a defensive war in the face of a possible fascist invasion of Turkey.³⁹⁰

Despite short, intermittent periods of relative freedom, socialist voices did not enjoy freedom of speech neither in the single party nor in the multi-party era. Intellectuals like Sertel and Derviş, had to write under significant pressure from the Turkish state as well as fascist mobs in the 1930s and early 1940s. By the early 1950s, socialists were self-exiled, jailed, dismissed, or murdered.³⁹¹ In her memoirs, Sabiha Sertel detailed how she was banned from writing three times during World War Two, as a result of the Turkish government's and commercial bourgeoisies' desire to appease the Nazi government.³⁹² These dissident intellectuals had to struggle against rising anti-communism after the war which became the official state policy with Turkey's pro-American politics. They criticized the government for giving way to imperialism, compromising Turkey's independence, and acting against the interest of the masses.³⁹³ By 1950, not only journalists/intellectuals such as Sertel and Derviş but also prominent left-leaning academics were excluded from intellectual life, and politicians with progressive sensitivities were mostly dismissed from their offices.³⁹⁴

³⁹⁰ Suat Derviş, "Karşılıklı Hayat Sahası," *Haber*, June 27, 1939.

³⁹¹ A notable political murder in the 1940s was committed against Sabahattin Ali, a socialist-realist author who was killed when he was trying to flee to Bulgaria. On this murder and the reaction of socialist intellectuals, see Sertel, *Roman gibi*.

³⁹² Sertel.

³⁹³ Sertel, *İlericilik ve Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*.

³⁹⁴ The most notable example and the later rallying banner of progressive nationalists was İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, the brain behind the republican rural education campaigns. He was dismissed in the late 1940s and prosecuted in the 1950s.

Prior to Turkey's involvement in the Cold War conflicts such as the Korean War, Kemalist intellectual women's remarks on "guarding the homeland" converged with those of leftist intellectuals such as Derviş and Sertel in terms of the importance they gave to economic sovereignty and territorial integrity. During the 1935 International Women's Conference held in Istanbul in the context of rising Nazism in Germany, one of the TKB participants, Mihri Pektaş asserted that all peace efforts would be in vain if it does not address "the hegemony of a certain nation or group of nations...(or) the success of one group of nations at the expense of others."³⁹⁵ Similarly, Esmâ Nayman expressed her concerns over a possible war in Europe and urged delegates "to find a way to live together in equality, safety and peace."³⁹⁶ While narratives of peace and territorial integrity dominated the official Kemalist discourses in the 1930s, such remarks did not necessarily exclude expansionist and militant discourses in Kemalists' public speeches. A notable example is the Hatay question of the late 1930s, a southern Turkish province which had remained in French-controlled Syria. A leading TKB figure and one of the first women MPs, Nakiye Elgün, remarked on Turkey's annexation of Hatay in 1939 after a plebiscite and called its women "to always remember their Turkishness, to respect Turkish women's achievements, and to always work towards peace and to be ready to die for their homeland if necessary."³⁹⁷ When it came to Turkey's own territorial disputes and aspirations, prominent Kemalist women applauded the annexation of Hatay with a

³⁹⁵ Libal Kathryn, "Staging Turkish Women's Emancipation: Istanbul, 1935," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 41.

³⁹⁶ Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935)*, Birinci basım (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015), 494.

³⁹⁷ Nakiye Elgün, "TBMM Tutanak Dergisi," *TBMM Yayınları* 15, no. 30 (1939): 173.; Yeşim Arat, "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, Publications on the Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 101.

predominantly Arab population and took it as an opportunity to assert the superiority of Turkish womanhood. Two decades later, İffet Halim Oruz would remind Ottoman influences in Hatay's city structure and called mothers in Hatay to wipe off Arabic from "such an original and purely Turkish community."³⁹⁸

Subpart 1.2) The Figure of Compassionate Urban Gatekeeper and the Cyprus Issue

Turkey's "Cyprus Cause" was among the primary foreign policy issues that dictated Cold War discourses domestically. The United Kingdom (UK) occupied the island in 1878. Demographically made by a Greek majority and a Turkish minority, Cyprus became a leading country in the decolonization movement under Greek nationalist leadership. Turkey's position on the issue saw various shifts along global political developments in the 1950s. While in the early 1950s, Turkey supported the UK's protectorate over the island with rather peaceful relations with Greece, by 1954 Turkey claimed the right to full control with accompanying discourse of "Cyprus is Turk." In the mid-1950s, Cyprus dominated Turkey's agenda as a national cause. Anti-Greek mass protests were held, and the state officials promoted the slogan "Partition or Death." In the late 1950s, following other regional developments such as the 1951 nationalization of Iran's oil, 1956 Suez Crisis when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, and the 1958 Iraqi revolution, which cut off Iraq's remaining ties with Britain, Turkey began supporting an independent Cyprus.³⁹⁹ From its early years of publication, leading TKB figures in the Kadın Gazetesi organized trips to the Turkish

³⁹⁸İffet Halim Oruz, "Hatay'da Kadınlık," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 18, 1957.

³⁹⁹Gencer Özcan, "Ellili Yıllarda Dış Politika," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020).

inhabited parts of Cyprus regularly and devoted pages to Anatolia's centuries old relations with the island, emphasizing its Turkishness. Yet even though İffet Halim Oruz retrospectively wrote about "communist infiltrations in the island already present in 1948", such anticommunist remarks only gained prominence with the 1950s in *Kadın Gazetesi* pages in line with the official discourses.⁴⁰⁰ *Kadın Gazetesi* condemned the communist Greek Cypriots for provoking the Greek government and the people,⁴⁰¹ who in their eyes failed to recognize "the mutual enemy,"⁴⁰² while threatened "those abandoned themselves to communist provocations,"⁴⁰³ and condemned the people of Greece for "offering Cyprus to the servants of communism."⁴⁰⁴ Anti-communist nationalism laid the foundation for *Kadın Gazetesi* to carve the Cyprus as a patriotic matter and Turkish women as its gatekeepers.

Kadın Gazetesi authors started to write regularly on the issue of Cyprus in 1950 and carefully paralleled the official stance, although they leaned towards the more militant nationalist discourses. When the British control over the island was the normative status quo, İffet Halim Oruz agitated Cyprus' mandate status to continue and called for peaceful relations between the UK, Greece, and Turkey.⁴⁰⁵ Still, such remarks did not go without arguing about the Turkish elements of the island, which, for example, according to *Kadın Gazetesi*, even smelled like Anatolia.⁴⁰⁶ By 1954, this carefully crafted discourse gave way to a blend of expansionist remarks that paralleled Turanist accounts on Turkey's unequivocal territorial right to Anatolian Cyprus as *Kadın Gazetesi* clearly stated: "the island is Turkish; its people

⁴⁰⁰İffet Halim Oruz, "Kıbrıs," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 21, 1959.

⁴⁰¹ "Kıbrıs'tan Sesler," *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 12, 1950.

⁴⁰² İffet Halim Oruz, "Gene Mi Kıbrıs," *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 14, 1952..

⁴⁰³ İffet Halim Oruz, "Kıbrıs Adasına Dair," *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 11, 1953.

⁴⁰⁴ İffet Halim Oruz, "Meydanların Sesi," *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 21, 1958.

⁴⁰⁵ "Kıbrıs'tan Sesler."

⁴⁰⁶ Oruz, "Gene Mi Kıbrıs."

are Turkish; Greek friends should know that Cyprus belongs to us [Turks].”⁴⁰⁷ Even when the Turkish state was opting for an independent Cyprus by 1957, *Kadın Gazetesi* emphasized their loyalty to the island as a national matter and that “despite their vigilant determination to fight for Cyprus, they would always wait their cue from their leaders.”⁴⁰⁸ Even though Turkish state abandoned its militant discourse on Cyprus by the late 1950s due to developments in the Middle East, the slogan “Partition or Death” continued to be greeted in *Kadın Gazetesi* pages.⁴⁰⁹ Moreover, in its special issue on Hatay, *Kadın Gazetesi* represented Hatay as a living example for Cyprus as the third milestone after Samsun (where Mustafa Kemal launched the War of Independence in 1919) and Hatay (annexed to Turkey in 1939 shortly after Atatürk’s death).⁴¹⁰

Kemalist women’s obedience to state discourses on Cyprus and the frequency of Cyprus articles seem contradictory considering their statements about the non-political character of *Kadın Gazetesi* and the TKB. While the trajectory of the issue paralleled contemporaneous political relations among Greece, the UK and Turkey, *Kadın Gazetesi* firmly defined Cyprus as a supra-political matter. Within such a framework, *Kadın Gazetesi* authors and leading TKB women crafted themselves a role of “compassionate urban gatekeeper” that embodied militancy, motherly compassion, and imperial sisterhood. They asserted their gatekeeper role with analogies to Greece’s defeat in Turkey’s War of Independence with not-so-subtle warnings that a similar fate awaited Greece unless it abandoned all aspirations for Cyprus.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁷ “Kıbrıs Bir Asya Parçasıdır,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 10, 1954.

⁴⁰⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, “Yurdun Bağrına Sinen Kıbrıs,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 24, 1957.

⁴⁰⁹ İffet Halim Oruz, “Kıbrıs Bizimdir,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 8, 1958; Oruz, “Meydanların Sesi.”

⁴¹⁰ “Hatay Sayımız,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 11, 1957.

⁴¹¹ İffet Halim Oruz, “Komşunun Tavuğu,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 18, 1954.

The TKB women depicted Cyprus as Turkey’s foster-land that was “detached from the heart of the homeland.”⁴¹² Accordingly, they utilized maternal discourses towards Cyprus through Turkish mothers’ greetings, their compassion towards its children, and their proud with its youth⁴¹³. As the TKB women considered themselves as motherly figures for Cyprus, they also aspired to be models for women in Cyprus. To that end, they pioneered a new TKB branch in Cyprus in 1953, invited and welcomed them during their trips to Turkey and appreciated the Turkish-Cypriot women’s loyalty to Atatürk.⁴¹⁴

A central component of anti-communist nationalism in the 1950s was the adjacent anti-minority discourses and practices.⁴¹⁵ *Kadın Gazetesi* writings on the Cyprus issue shows that Kemalist women understood national belonging in terms of religion, ethnicity, and culture but their writings also show the thinness of nationalist claims such as “Cyprus is Turk.” Indeed, in one of TKB’s regular trips to Cyprus, İffet Halim Oruz complained about the existence of several Muslim villages with Greek-speaking residents.⁴¹⁶ During the 1950s, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were subjected to mob violence from the other side, which made *Kadın Gazetesi* to liken the Cyprus issue to the crusades with a contemporary anti-communist twist in which the main enemy were the “red priests.”⁴¹⁷ Claims over Cyprus as a foster-land coexisted with threats against designated internal enemies such as Turkish Greeks as well as silences towards crimes such as September 6-7 anti-Greek Pogrom in

⁴¹² Oruz, “Gene Mi Kıbrıs.”

⁴¹³ “İzmir’den Kıbrıs’a Anaların Selamı,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 9, 1954; “Kıbrısta Nefret ve İğbirar Yaratan Haber,” November 27, 1952..

⁴¹⁴ İffet Halim Oruz, “Hareketli Bir Hafta,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 27, 1954.

⁴¹⁵ Foti Benlisoy, “Ellili Yıllar Türkiye’sinin Tarihi: Azınlıklar Tarihi,” in *Türkiye’nin 1950’li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020).

⁴¹⁶ İffet Halim Oruz, “Yeşil Kıbrıs,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 18, 1950.

⁴¹⁷ Oruz, “Kıbrıs Bizimdir.”

Istanbul in 1955.⁴¹⁸ Despite the several opinion letters, articles, and news on Cyprus, not a single line was published in *Kadın Gazetesi* on the destruction of countless homes and businesses owned by Istanbul Greeks.⁴¹⁹ Moreover, *Kadın Gazetesi* authors voiced their critiques about the minority situation of Turkish Cypriots by resenting the supposed freedom and equality enjoyed by minorities in Turkey.⁴²⁰ In response to Istanbul Greeks fleeing the city after the pogrom, they accused Turkish Greeks of being ungrateful and particularly called Turkey's Greek mothers to speak up about the free and equal status of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey.⁴²¹ The silence about the Istanbul pogrom and anti-minority discourses were to a large extent shared by socialist intellectuals such as Derviş and Sertel, who were in exile throughout the majority of the 1950s. Sertel criticized the Wealth tax of 1942 levied mostly on non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, retrospectively, yet remained silent on the September 6-7, 1955 pogrom; whereas Derviş only slightly referred to discrimination against non-Muslims through minority side characters in her novels.⁴²² In short, socialist intellectuals did not offer support for openly discriminatory policies, but they also often failed to condemn them even while they lived in exile. Potentially, they continued to share some nationalist sentiments with their Kemalist counterparts, even in the Cold War context in which Kemalists condemned the socialists as enemies.

⁴¹⁸ For Istanbul Pogrom see, Dilek Güven, "Riots against the Non-Muslims of Turkey: 6/7 September 1955 in the Context of Demographic Engineering," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 12 (November 13, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.4538>.

⁴¹⁹ *Kadın Gazetesi* did not mention about the pogrom neither when it happened nor even retrospectively in its issues between 1955 and 1960.

⁴²⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, "Kıbrıs Meseleleri," *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 8, 1952.

⁴²¹ Nagehan Orbay, "Rum Vatandaşlar Neden Susuyorsunuz," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 7, 1957.

⁴²² Fosforlu Cevriye and non-Muslim landlady and her warm friendship with the main character Cevriye is the prime example in Suat Derviş novels. See Suat Derviş, *Fosforlu cevriye* (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2013).

Subpart 1.3) The Figure of Compassionate Urban Gatekeepers for the Korean War

The DP government's foreign policy was shaped in the Cold War context of US-Soviet competition. The government aimed to develop and preserve close relationship with the US and other major NATO countries such as the UK and France against the Soviet Union.⁴²³ The Korean War, as one of the major foreign policy issues of the 1950s, was also the first conflict that Turkey fought outside its borders after World War I. To legitimize its decision to enter the war in July 1950 along with the US, the newly-elected DP government embraced a narrative that depicted the Korean War as a national security issue to protect the country against the global communist danger.⁴²⁴ Like the DP, former-President Ismet İnönü's CHP, now in opposition, also wholeheartedly supported the decision of sending soldiers to Korea in the parliament and in its major media organs.⁴²⁵ The only anti-war voice was Turkish Peace Lovers' Association (TBC)⁴²⁶, which was closed by the government very soon after its establishment and its founders were imprisoned, accused of anti-communist charges.⁴²⁷ Anti-communist nationalism was also the ground for Kadın Gazetesi to present the Korean War as a matter of national security as well as a heroic arena for Turkey's contribution to free world against the threat of totalitarianism. Both for the government and Kemalist women, Cold War

⁴²³ Barış Doster, "Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri," in *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düzeni: Ordu, Sermaye, ABD, İslamizasyon*, ed. Tolga Gürakar and Behlük Özkan (Ankara: Tekin, 2021); Egemen Bezci, *Turkish Intelligence and the Cold War: The Turkish Secret Service, the US and the UK* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2021).

⁴²⁴ Özcan, "Ellili Yıllarda Dış Politika," 99.

⁴²⁵ Mete Kaynar, "Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları Üzerine Bazı Notlar," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 29.

⁴²⁶ TBC was established by a group of intellectuals to oppose Turkey's entrance to the Korean War on July 15, 1950, in Istanbul. Behice Boran, a prominent socialist intellectual, was the founding president of the group. After sending an anti-war telegram to the Turkish Parliament, TBC was closed by the government on July 29, 1950, only after two weeks and its founders were arrested.

⁴²⁷ Özcan, "Ellili Yıllarda Dış Politika," 106.

politics led to a merging of global and domestic concerns. In this new context, the war in Korea, Stalin's demands over the Turkish straits, or communist propaganda and underground organization in Turkey were all part of a global communist agenda, which had to be dealt with domestically and globally.

Kadın Gazetesi presented the decision to send soldiers to the Korean War as a supra-political matter, giving it full support. They understood the war both as a global and a national matter of life and death; a collective concern for "all freedom supporters against the totalitarian regime of red Russia."⁴²⁸ Moreover, İffet Halim Oruz further justified the entrance into war and congratulated Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, referring to the DP's cooperation with the West as the party's loyalty to Atatürk's legacy.⁴²⁹ The discourses employed in the articles remained firmly militant throughout the war. In these narratives, war against the communist bloc was the only means towards a peaceful world. The articles reminded the readers that Turkey remained a military-nation with quotations from an Ottoman prose that stated, "one ought to be ready to wage war to restore peace."⁴³⁰ Moreover, the Korean War became a useful instrument of threat for Turkey's other diplomatic concerns such as the Cyprus issue. Articles on Cyprus heralded Turkish superiority reminding how the "Turkish soldiers spreading fear to whole world"⁴³¹ in the Korean War and "triumphing among the great powers with the support of Turkish mothers' and wives' prayers."⁴³²

⁴²⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, "Nalına Mıhına," *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 31, 1950.

⁴²⁹ İffet Halim Oruz, "Atlantik Paktı," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 25, 1952.

It should be noted that early republican foreign policy was to establish close relationship both with Western Powers and the Soviet Union. İffet Halim Oruz distorts this historical fact. For more on this, see William M. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 3rd edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013).

⁴³⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, "Defne Çelenkli Kız," *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 30, 1953.

⁴³¹ Oruz, "Gene Mi Kıbrıs."

⁴³² İffet Halim Oruz, "Türk Anasının Duası," *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 1, 1951.

Taking anti-communism as a supra-political matter of life and death, Kemalist women promoted two roles for the Turkish women in this new context. These were compassionate motherhood and proud gatekeeping. These were, of course, propaganda that contradicted the realities of war. In response to the news of Turkish soldiers killed in the Korean war, *Kadın Gazetesi* writers declared that “patient and enduring Turkish mothers give their blessing for their sons’ blood shed for the good of their nation.”⁴³³ Against politicians whom they considered as dismissive of women’s role in politics and public life, they wrote about the heroic Turkish mothers “looking for ways to send her winter supplies to soldiers in Korea.”⁴³⁴ At the same time, they emphasized the readiness of “Turkish women demanding to serve as soldiers in Korea”⁴³⁵ and of “Turkish mothers [who] were more vigilant than ever...to serve for their homeland.”⁴³⁶ This compassionate gatekeeping did not reflect what war meant for the majority of women. Activists within the left-leaning TBC’s *Journal Barış* (Peace), for example, printed letters that showed how guarding the homeland against faraway enemies or agendas such as Turkey’s NATO membership translated as breaking families, fear of death and complaint for never ending wars.⁴³⁷ Kemalist women were harshly critical of such accounts. İffet Halim Oruz, for example, criticized a young woman who was looking for ways to prevent her fiancé’s enlistment. Arguing that guarding the homeland knew no borders anymore, Oruz criticized the young woman and expected sacrifice for “the most sacred feeling of Turkish nation, that is the rage against the enemy in Moscow.”⁴³⁸ Any

⁴³³ İffet Halim Oruz, “Şehit Evlatlar,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 27, 1950.

⁴³⁴ İffet Halim Oruz, “Kadın Aleyhtarlığı,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 15, 1951.

⁴³⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, “Atatürk’ün Yolu,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 13, 1950.

⁴³⁶ Bedia Küçükaksoy, “Türk Kadınlığı İşbaşında,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 11, 1950.

⁴³⁷ “Okuyucularımızdan Bir Türk Anasının Mektubu,” *Barış Gazetesi*, August 1950, 10.

⁴³⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, “Nişanlı Kız,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 7, 1950.

realistic account of the war's impact on the families of enlisted men was sure to meet with anti-communism charges, both from the government and the civil society.

Socialist women like Suat Derviş and Sabiha Sertel, who remained mostly silent in the Cyprus issue and anti-Greek sentiments and politics domestically, retrospectively voiced their critiques against Turkey's involvement in the Korean War. Having been long associated with socialism, Derviş and Sertel were heavily censored by the time of the Korean War. In her anonymous opinion letters to the TBC's journal *Bariş* (Peace) Sabiha Sertel paralleled her earlier analysis of World War Two. She warned against alignment with Western imperialist interests and harshly criticized the DP leadership for outselling Turkey to the US.⁴³⁹ Suat Derviş, on the other hand, addressed the meaninglessness and tragedy of the Korean War from the perspective of one of the leading characters, Gülder, in *Aksaray'dan Bir Perihan* (A Perihan from Aksaray-1962). In contrast to *Kadın Gazetesi*'s aloofness towards war grievances, Derviş sympathized with deep tragedies that the wars left on individuals. The character Gülder, who herself was displaced from her home and became a servant to a wealthy family in Istanbul in the early 1900s, had struggled with war realities throughout her life. In her youth, she was separated with her husband and lost her livestock during the World War I where "it was impossible to distinguish the enemy from the ally."⁴⁴⁰ Derviş's implication is that in no war one can truly distinguish the enemy from the ally. In her old age, the Gülder character tries to understand the transformations in her village as men goes to cities to work in factories, yet still cannot feed their families. In addition to such already existing economic hardships in families' lives, a soldier killed from her village in the Korean

⁴³⁹ Yıldız Sertel, *Annem: Sabiha Sertel kimdi neler yazdı*, 3. baskı (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2001), 236.

⁴⁴⁰ Suat Derviş, *Aksaray'dan Bir Perihan*, İthaki Yayınları 934 (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2014).

War left Gültür confused, for she did not even know where Korea was.⁴⁴¹ Indeed, few among the enlisted men and their families would know where Korea was before Turkey decided to join the war effort. Sertel and Derviş firmly opposed, contemporaneously under pseudonyms or retrospectively, to all wars that were not in national self-defense. Yet, they did not voice their minds on some of Turkey's long-standing issues based on religion and ethnicity, such as the repressions against non-Muslim minorities especially after the Cyprus issue heightened the tensions between Greece and Turkey.

By the 1950s, the divergence between socialist and Kemalist intellectual women's analyses on external enemies of Turkey had become more clearly established. The discourse of guarding the homeland existed from the 1930s to 1950s, yet its content had clearly differed for various intellectual camps since the mid-1940s. This divergence is less clear in the case of Turkey's long-standing internal divisions based on religion and ethnicity, which remained to a large extent in the shadow of class and imperialism analyses for socialists. Elite Kemalists, meanwhile, became acutely antagonistic against Turkey's non-Muslims and socialists. Indeed, the TKB writers were either silent about extralegal violence or were provocatively supportive of such violence against their designated enemies, perceived through an anti-communist lens.

Part 2) The "Captive" Figures: Anti-Communist Discourses on Immigrants from Bulgaria and Soviet Womanhood

⁴⁴¹ Derviş, 137.

Elite Kemalist women shaped their role of compassionate urban gatekeeper in opposition to the figure of captive and pitiful woman in their writings, exemplified by Soviet women and Bulgarian immigrants. Their derisive comments on women in the Soviet Union rested upon the pro-NATO Cold War discourse of captive versus free nations. *Kadın Gazetesi* sexualized and racialized their claims of captivity by remarking on Soviet women's sexual subordination and the degenerate nation raised by these women. Their review reflected Turkey's changing foreign policy and is striking when compared to Suat Derviş's much more positive accounts on gender relations in the Soviet Union in 1937, published in Turkish daily newspapers. As opposed to the Soviet women, about whom *Kadın Gazetesi* writers only remarked from afar, Muslim-Turkish immigrant women from Bulgaria in the early 1950s represented a much more real, tangible case. *Kadın Gazetesi* authors considered these women as their pitiful protectorate, Turkey's racial and religious brethren in desperate need of motherly care and uplifting of Turkish women. Their discourse of uplifting and care was blended with religious as well as secular statements.

Subpart 2.1) Soviet Womanhood: Forging the Figure of Captive Through Sex and Race

The figure of compassionate urban gatekeeper, which the *Kadın Gazetesi* writers forged as the defining feature of Turkish women in the context of Cold War conflicts, coexisted with its opposite figure, "the captive woman of the USSR". Communist women generally and women living under the Soviet regime specifically represented the captive par excellence that served as an unequivocal proof against and the epitome of the red threat. *Kadın Gazetesi*'s fierce critiques against the Soviet Union delegate Popova at the January 1948 meeting of the UN

Commission on the Status of Women shows how gender served as a major tool in framing global anti-communist discourse of captivity in Turkey's domestic context. In response to the Soviet delegate's claims on women's unequal status in Muslim countries, *Kadın Gazetesi* pointed to the harsh manual labor of women workers in Russian mines and quarries.⁴⁴² In addition, İffet Halim Oruz pointed to male domination over Soviet women, who had to "carry stones wearing pants with a man carrying a whip walking behind her."⁴⁴³ Their analysis of captive Soviet woman also extended to childcare in the Soviet Union. For *Kadın Gazetesi*, the danger of toiling Soviet woman was that children grew unattended in dirt and infectious diseases at day care centers.⁴⁴⁴ Since the early twentieth century, Turkish nationalism and feminism had converged in the importance they attributed to the nuclear family.⁴⁴⁵ In the Cold War context, Kemalist women revitalized these arguments to agitate that the absence of a proper nuclear family life would necessarily mean the absence of a proper nation.

Kemalist women's remarks against women under the Soviet regime were at the intersection of moralism and racism. They passionately wrote about the extent of Soviet women's captivity which included economic as well as sexual exploitation. In response to the Soviet delegate at the UN meeting, *Kadın Gazetesi* remarked on how communism lacked the notion of family, derogatively commenting on Russian women serving men sexually, being forced to have multiple sexual partners, and bearing children outside marriage.⁴⁴⁶ These moralist remarks had a racist component as well since they were coupled with comments on how

⁴⁴² "Rus Kadınlığı Hakkında," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 2, 1948.

⁴⁴³ İffet Halim Oruz, "Kamçısız Kadınlık," *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 2, 1948.

⁴⁴⁴ "Sovyetler Birliğinde Kadınların Acıklarının Hali," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 30, 1949.

⁴⁴⁵ Nükhet Sirman, "The Making of Familial Citizenship in Turkey," in *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, ed. Emin Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu (London: Routledge, 2012); Toprak, *Türkiye'de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935)*.

⁴⁴⁶ "Rus Kadınlığı Hakkında."

extramarital relations and children born into such relations with unknown fathers threatened the purity of the nation.⁴⁴⁷ Indeed, İffet Halim Oruz counted “trafficked woman” as among one of the major disgraces for the woman of Turkish Republic together with “beaten woman” and “veiled woman.”⁴⁴⁸

As opposed to the disgraceful captivity of Soviet womanhood, *Kadın Gazetesi* praised the superiority and freedom of Turkish woman together with a discourse of Turkish exceptionalism. Responding to the Soviet remarks on the inferior status of women in Muslim countries at the above-mentioned UN meeting, İffet Halim Oruz further derided the Soviet delegate Popova by contrasting Soviet and Turkish women through a captivity and freedom prism. The stock figure of heroic rural woman came to Oruz’s rescue. She argued that women in Anatolia were undertaking the heaviest manual tasks yet unlike the Russian woman “she did not have a man controlling her with his whip and she was not forced to labor like a blind herd,” which clearly implied Russian women.⁴⁴⁹ Moreover, *Kadın Gazetesi* also claimed Turkish women’s exceptionality by arguing that “Turkish Islamic womanhood within and outside the lands of Turkey cannot be equated to Muslim women elsewhere since Turkish women were revolutionaries who were already enjoying their rights and did not need to struggle for any further rights.”⁴⁵⁰ In a similar vein, *Kadın Gazetesi* harshly criticized a pro-Soviet Turkish radio show broadcasted from Moscow because its hosts had compared the communist women in the Greek Civil War with Turkish women during the War of Independence on the grounds that they both fought for their homeland. For *Kadın Gazetesi* writers, communists and Turkish women were simply incomparable. *Kadın Gazetesi* replied

⁴⁴⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, “Ruslar ve Türk Kadınlığı,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 23, 1948.

⁴⁴⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, “Cumhuriyet Kadını,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 31, 1954.

⁴⁴⁹ Oruz, “Kamçısız Kadınlık.”

⁴⁵⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “Rus Delegatesine Cevap,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 2, 1948.

that although a communist woman and an Anatolian woman could never be equal, “they were not offended because no captive or slave could offend the superior Turk.”⁴⁵¹ Indeed, the very existence of communist women in Turkey was an anomaly for *Kadın Gazetesi* since “no Turkish mother could give birth to such girls.”⁴⁵²

Kadın Gazetesi's portrayal of communist women as disgraceful captives in the late 1940s and 1950s was directly related to the rise of anti-communist nationalism in Turkey. Anti-Soviet attitudes were not officially sanctioned prior to Turkey's pro-American foreign policy that dated to the end of World War Two. Much more positive portrayals of public life in the Soviet Union could be published in Turkish newspapers in the 1930s despite the prevalence of anti-communist intellectual strands. One such positive Soviet account was written by Suat Derviş, who published a series of Soviet Union travel articles in *Tan* after a long trip in 1937. Derviş was particularly interested in and impressed by Soviet social policy on women and children. At length, she praised the public institutions for children's care and education, maternal leave for women workers, egalitarian marriage and divorce laws, and women's wide employment opportunities.⁴⁵³ In addition to her pro-Soviet accounts after this trip, Derviş published another article in 1944, after being accused of socialism in an anti-communist journal. In her article, entitled “Why am I a friend of the Soviets?” Derviş defended her previous writings⁴⁵⁴. She argued in favor of Soviet's familial and public policies on childcare

⁴⁵¹ “Moskova Radyosuna Cevap,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 22, 1948.

⁴⁵² İffet Halim Oruz, “Bu Bayanlar Kim,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 22, 1953.

⁴⁵³ Suat Derviş, “İstanbul – Moskova – Tahran Seyahat Notları – Sovyet Rusya'da Çocuk Meselesi ve Çocuk Müzesi,” *Tan*, June 25, 1937; Suat Derviş, “Sovyet Rusya'da Küçükler İçin Büyük İşler Başarılıyor,” *Tan*, June 28, 1937; Suat Derviş, “Sovyet Çiftçileri Nasıl Evlenirler, Nasıl Ayrılırlar,” *Tan*, July 8, 1937.

For a discussion on Derviş's views, see Emine Seda Çekin Işık, *Eylemi Kaleminde Bir Muharrir: Suat Derviş: Siyaset, Toplum ve Kadın Üzerine Röportajlar - Yazılar (1935-1942)*, 1. basım, Kültür İncelemeleri 65 (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2021).

⁴⁵⁴ Suat Derviş, *Niçin Sovyetler Birliğinin Dostuyum* (İstanbul: Arkadaş Matbaası, 1944).

and education, especially in contrast to Turkey where the state assumed little accountability or responsibility regarding social policy.⁴⁵⁵ Irrespective of the factuality of positive or negative accounts on the Soviet women, either by Kadın Gazetesi or Suat Derviş, it is important to realize the changes over the years like the shrinkage of discursive space for such discussions and the transformation of the role gender politics play in shaping ideological accounts.

Subpart 2.2 Immigrants from Bulgaria: Forging Kinship Through Gender, Ethnicity and Religion

Shortly after the DP's first election victory in 1950, the new government faced a political and economic challenge with the arrival of a quarter of million immigrants from Bulgaria. In 1950-51, land collectivization policies resulted in a wave of mass expulsion of Muslim-Turkish populations of Bulgaria towards Edirne (Turkey's border town to Bulgaria). The DP government utilized this challenge politically as anti-communist propaganda and warmly welcomed immigrants who were framed as Turkey's poor racial kins and the victims of the communist anti-Turkish government in Bulgaria.⁴⁵⁶ Accordingly, the TKB and the leading Kemalist women intellectuals of Kadın Gazetesi immediately greeted immigrants as pitiful victims of communism. As such, the image of the pitiful racial kin became another

⁴⁵⁵ On social policy during the early republican period in Turkey, see Ayşe Bugra, "Poverty and Citizenship: An Overview of the Social-Policy Environment in Republican Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39, no. 1 (February 2007): 33–52, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743807212528>.

⁴⁵⁶ Ayşe Parla, *Precarious Hope: Migration and the Limits of Belonging in Turkey* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019); Gözde Emen Gökatalay, "A Crisis of Legitimacy or a Source of Political Consolidation? The Deportation of Bulgarian Turks in 1950-1951 and the Democratic Party," *Middle Eastern Studies* 57, no. 6 (November 2, 2021): 920–34, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2021.1917394>.

constituting block for the figure of compassionate urban gatekeepers, the other being the disgraceful communist women. *Kadın Gazetesi* framed the settlement and care for the immigrants from Bulgaria as the second warfront after Korea, with the conviction that “victories could be gained not only in wars but also in national and social realm.”⁴⁵⁷ Emphasizing the critical role of Turkish mothers in this second front, an article in *Kadın Gazetesi* wrote that while “*Mehmetçik*”⁴⁵⁸ was sacrificing his life in the mountains of Korea for his homeland, his mother opened her arms to the immigrants driven to Turkish borders by the pitiless enemy.”⁴⁵⁹ A religious discourse accompanied *Kadın Gazetesi*’s militant anti-communist nationalism. İffet Halim Oruz, a staunch Kemalist and a leading figure in the TKB, depicted Edirne “their [women’s] second Kaaba after the Bulgarian Turks’ expulsion”⁴⁶⁰ and TKB’s charity visits to the border city as their pilgrimage.

In October 1950, İffet Halim Oruz, detailed the extent of immigrants’ basic daily needs. She argued that the state’s and Edirne people’s capacity would be overwhelmed in the face of such a massive immigrant population. Thus, Oruz suggested that it was “not reasonable to expect everything from the government” and called the “blessed Turkish mother whose compassion can heal the ills of the entire homeland” to run for help to Turkey’s border with Bulgaria, Edirne.⁴⁶¹ In response to the DP governments’ calls for fundraising, İffet Halim Oruz from the TKB, Hasene Ilgaz from *Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu* (Turkish Society for the Protection of Children) and a group from *Yardımsevenler Derneği* (Association of

⁴⁵⁷ Tevfik Maral, “Yeni Bir Kore Zaferi Lazım,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 29, 1951.

⁴⁵⁸ Generic name for Turkish military and its soldiers.

⁴⁵⁹ Küçükaksoy, “Türk Kadınlığı İşbaşında.”

⁴⁶⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “İkinci Hac,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 22, 1951.

⁴⁶¹ “Edirne,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 23, 1950.

Philanthropists) were among the first to act. They collected donations to build an immigrants' guesthouse in Edirne and to meet daily needs for immigrants in Istanbul.⁴⁶² These efforts won them the state's official approval as President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes congratulated women in a philanthropists' meeting in early 1951.⁴⁶³ As recognized gatekeepers at Edirne, Kemalist women assured their immigrant sisters and extended gratitude to all Turkish mothers for their sensitivity and benevolence.⁴⁶⁴ At the same time, *Kadın Gazetesi* consoled immigrant women in several articles as "generous Turkish women thinking of them."⁴⁶⁵

As opposed to the Soviet women about whom *Kadın Gazetesi* only remarked from afar, Muslim-Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria represented a much more tangible case. These messages implied a patronizing guardianship assumed by the Turkish mothers as well as the Turkish nation in general. In addition to being Turkish nation's racial brethren, immigrants were also mentioned as "children from foreign lands" for whom "Turkey should organize as a nation and look after our [its] children."⁴⁶⁶ Compassionate reactions to immigrants' hardships in the face of forced displacement were accompanied with concerned messages for secular integration. Despite the frequent religious discourses such as pointing to kinship with immigrants or designating Edirne as the new Kabaa, *Kadın Gazetesi* also remarked that "thousands of modernized caps were needed to make those who got off the trains in turbans

⁴⁶² Küçükaksoy, "Türk Kadınlığı İşbaşında."

⁴⁶³ "Göçmen ve Mültecilere Türkiye Yardım Birliği Toplantısı," *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 15, 1951.

⁴⁶⁴ Kınalı, "Göçmenlere Yardım," *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1950.

⁴⁶⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, "İşte Türk Kadınlığının Vicdanı," *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 29, 1950; İffet Halim Oruz, "Tehcir Olunanların İztırabı," *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1950; İffet Halim Oruz, "Göz Nuru Gönül Buyruğu," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 18, 1950.

⁴⁶⁶ İffet Halim Oruz, "Dış Ellerden Gelen Evlatlar," *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 9, 1950.

and fez into the citizens of the Turkish Republic.”⁴⁶⁷ In line with the shifts in official state discourses in the 1950s, elite Kemalists too resorted to a mixture of secular and religious discourses that infused anti-communism into official Kemalism.

In the early 1950s, elite Kemalist women forged their role as the compassionate urban gatekeepers against its opposite, the disgraceful and pitiful category of captive communist women. Anti-communist nationalism, which for *Kadın Gazetesi* was the supra-political matter with both global and national urgency, became the backbone in forging these opposing categories of women. They thought of the Soviet women as a group of disgraceful captives raising a degenerate nation, whereas they considered the Muslim-Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria as the pitiful captives and brethren victims of the communist threat. When contrasted with earlier positive accounts on Soviet Union in the 1930s, these comments in the 1950s show how the Cold War politics mobilized gender in shifting discourses with novel racialized and sexualized emphases.

Part 3) Kemalist Women's Loyalty to Atatürk and Turkey's State Feminist Project

Transition to multi-party system in 1946 and the DP government in the 1950s brought radical changes in Turkey including its domestic and international politics. The abandonment of militant secularism and the embrace of anti-communist nationalism were the most notable of these transformations that this chapter traced in Kemalist and socialist intellectual women's discourses in the cases of the Korean War, the Cyprus issue and the Muslim-Turkish

⁴⁶⁷ Oruz, “İkinci Hac.”

immigrants from Bulgaria. As Turkey positioned itself within the western bloc after World War Two, the then-ruling CHP increased the oppression against the leftist intelligentsia while becoming more lenient towards political Islam as a bulwark against socialism. From 1946 to the elections in 1950, the CHP allowed religious sects and monasteries, established theological seminaries in universities, and suppressed the Kemalist village institute projects. After its electoral victory in 1950, the DP government intensified the CHP's turn towards conservatism and embrace of religion. It reverted the prayer calls from Turkish to Arabic, established and increased the number of religious schools, frequently resorted to religious discourses in political rallies, gave Quran sermons in public radiobroadcasts, increased the budget and staff for directorate of religious affairs, made religious classes compulsory in schools, closed village institutes, granted financial sponsorship for pilgrimages, and arrested leftist intellectuals in masses.⁴⁶⁸ At the same time, religious discourse accompanied Turkey's discourse in foreign affairs as well. The anti-communist propaganda to justify Turkey's involvement in Korean War next to the US included a religious component that defined "the path to Korea is the path to Allah" and "the US is the guardian of mores and freedom."⁴⁶⁹ Many among the political elite in the 1950s considered the militant secularism of the 1930s as dangerously to the Soviet position and an insufficient bulwark against socialist agitation.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁸ Bayram Koca, "Ellili Yıllarda Merkez Sağ: Demokrat Parti'nin Özgürlük İle İstismar Arasındaki Dini Politikaları," in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 303–4.

⁴⁶⁹ Özcan, "Ellili Yıllarda Dış Politika," 101.

⁴⁷⁰ Örnek, *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı*.

The liberalization in the religious freedoms did not extend to leftist intelligentsia. On the contrary, all political parties weaponized Islam as communism's cure.⁴⁷¹ Yet this lenient attitude also brought radical religious activism. Incidents such as attacks against M. Kemal statues and assassination of a well-known Kemalist journalist led to the formation of Kemalist fronts formed by civil initiatives such as Milli Tesevüt Birliđi (National Solidarity Union) and legislative measures such as Atatürk'ü Koruma Kanunu (Atatürk Protection Law).⁴⁷² Amidst these developments, socialist intellectual women such as Suat Derviř and Sabiha Sertel were under pressure, and both had to leave the country in the early 1950s while others were either jailed or purged from their offices. The elite Kemalist cadre in the TKB and Kadın Gazetesi, on the other hand, had a complex relationship to the dominant discourses and practices of anti-communism and Islamism. While elite Kemalists fully adhered to anti-communist cause of the Turkish state, they gradually developed a more oppositional stance. Conservative discourse increasingly targeted women's enfranchisement, employment, and public presence. Despite having never experienced the political pressure and oppression that socialist intellectuals did, elite Kemalist women shifted their object of loyalty from the Turkish state and its political parties to Atatürk himself. Towards the late 1950s, guarding the homeland in the eyes of this group of women had become equivalent to guarding the legacy of Atatürk and his project of state feminism against political Islam.

Subpart 3.1 Politicization of Kemalist Women in the Multi-Party Era

⁴⁷¹ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, The Making of the Middle East Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993).

⁴⁷² Cem Erođul, *Demokrat Parti: tarihi ve ideolojisi* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2014).

In the early 1950s, *Kadın Gazetesi* and the TKB advocated for increased presence of women in politics in addition to their urgent and supra-political agendas of the Korean War and immigrants from Bulgaria. For the TKB and *Kadın Gazetesi*, elections were a test for political parties' commitment to the Kemalist revolutions, in which women's political participation was a major component. During the electoral campaigns in 1949 and 1950, Kemalist women wrote extensively about what type of candidates they would like to see, women politicians within the ruling CHP, and women's expectations from politicians.⁴⁷³ Soon before the elections, they expressed their disappointment with the CHP for betraying Turkey's state feminist project as the CHP nominated only six women MPs, three times less than 1935 when they first ran for parliamentary seats.⁴⁷⁴ A week before the elections, the TKB declared at its Istanbul Congress that "there was a triple regress at CHP's revolutionism."⁴⁷⁵

Only a day after the election, Halide Nusret Zorlutuna, a regular writer at *Kadın Gazetesi*, quoted an anonymous friend who called upon the Turkish women "not to vote for the party that was paving the way to gradually take away [women's] right to hold office."⁴⁷⁶ In the early months of the DP government, *Kadın Gazetesi* continued to question anti-woman practices within the CHP as an astonishing sign of giving way to Islamism. İffet Halim Oruz criticized several CHP executives belittling women politicians and accused them of disrespecting the Turkish mothers' "struggle to send her winter supplies to soldiers in

⁴⁷³ *Kadın Gazetesi* published a series of interviews with elite Kemalist women, titled, "What do women voters want?" every week from April 1950 to July 1950.

⁴⁷⁴ Women gained the right to vote in 1934 in Turkey. Out of 6 nominations, only one women MP from the CHP held Office after the 1950 elections. In total, there were three women MPs in the parliament. In 1935, there were 18 women MPs.

⁴⁷⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, "Üç Misli İleri Üç Misli Geri," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 8, 1950.

⁴⁷⁶ Halide Nusret Zorlutuna, "Kadın İnkılabımıza Dair," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 15, 1950.

Korea.”⁴⁷⁷ Moreover, Oruz accused the CHP of opportunism. She pointed out the CHP’s hypocrisy of resorting to the discourse of women’s rights while decreasing the number of woman members in its party congress and municipal councils.⁴⁷⁸ Discourses against women’s political participation and the decreasing number of women politicians became a critical front of politicization for the Kemalist women. In their minds, their contribution to the revolution and its survival over the years granted them the right to take their well-deserved parts in state affairs as loyal and altruistic mothers, wives, citizens, and politicians.⁴⁷⁹

Kemalist women’s critiques in the early 1950s involved a warning to the CHP, built around a dichotomy between the real Turkish nation versus anti-woman Islamist minority. Their analysis was that the abandonment of secularism to appease Islamist tendencies fueled women’s marginalization from politics. As an Istanbul-based newspaper mostly connected to major urban centers with periodic trips to Anatolian cities and towns, *Kadın Gazetesi* prided itself with having genuine knowledge of the people of Turkey. In their critiques against the CHP’s anti-woman discourses and practices, they often emphasized the innate pro-woman attitude of the Anatolian people. Moreover, they further criticized the CHP for giving way to “fanatics, mullahs and aghas” as opposed to the “real Anatolian people.”⁴⁸⁰ For example, Halide Nusret Zorlutuna argued right after the 1950 election that while the CHP wrongly agitated that “the people does not want a woman MP” for propaganda purposes; it was the ‘aghas’ that were anti-women, not the real Turkish people.”⁴⁸¹ İffet Halim Oruz, on the other

⁴⁷⁷ Oruz, “Kadın Aleyhtarlığı.”

⁴⁷⁸ İffet Halim Oruz, “Kurultaya ve Kadınlığımıza Dair,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 3, 1951.

⁴⁷⁹ Oruz, “Kadın Aleyhtarlığı.”

⁴⁸⁰ Similar to *Kadın Gazetesi*’s writings on un-Turkishness of *çarşaf*, they made several comments on un-Turkishness of religious fanatics, mullahs and aghas.

⁴⁸¹ Zorlutuna, “Kadın İnkılabımıza Dair.”

hand, argued that the CHP's appeals to religious discourses proved to be in vain as the DP won the elections in a landslide. She added that "leaning back against the fanatics and aghas by marginalizing women from politics gave no result; the CHP lost anyway, and the DP would have won even if it nominated fifteen women instead of only two."⁴⁸² In addition to showing Kemalist women's disapproval of political parties, Oruz's analysis of the 1950 elections and women's status in Turkey was also significant as it contained a political call to action as early as two weeks after the elections. Oruz wrote that "the situation taught us [the women] that we were unable to act in concert as a group...to use our power to send our representatives to the parliament."⁴⁸³ Thus, she added that there was an urgent need for a non-partisan autonomous women's organization. The 1950 elections proved how futile it was to expect the party principles to support women's rights to turn into action.⁴⁸⁴ Although she did not comment explicitly, these statements forewarned her later critiques on partisanship within the TKB, which was newly reestablished after being closed from 1935 to 1949.

While *Kadın Gazetesi* writers openly criticized party cadres and political parties' media organs during the 1950 elections, they had a cautious optimism about the newly elected DP leaders such as Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar and continuous respect for long-standing CHP leader Ismet İnönü.⁴⁸⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, in her first article after the elections, declared that the DP's victory as women's victory due to the large numbers of women voting for the DP⁴⁸⁶. Moreover, Oruz also suggested that the elections meant a double failure for the CHP:

⁴⁸² İffet Halim Oruz, "Kadınların Zaferi," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 22, 1950.

⁴⁸³ İffet Halim Oruz, "Bir Mücadele Yolunda," *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 5, 1950.

⁴⁸⁴ Oruz, 2.

⁴⁸⁵ Hasene Ilgaz, "İnönü ve D. Parti," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 29, 1950.

⁴⁸⁶ Oruz, "Kadınların Zaferi."

“The party which supported legislations to improve women’s status yet those party administrators who did not continue to work on these idealistically and eventually lost women’s sympathy, which now concentrated only on the grand existence of our beloved Ataturk.”⁴⁸⁷ To Oruz, this was a warning for the DP government to not to step back from women’s rights, the epitome of Kemalist revolutionism in their eyes.⁴⁸⁸ In line with this immediate warning, Kadın Gazetesi welcomed the election results. Their initial writings showed optimism for the newly elected government particularly because they considered the DP leaders as loyal followers of Ataturk.⁴⁸⁹ On the anniversary of Ataturk’s death in 1952, İffet Halim Oruz quoted Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’ eulogy and expressed her sympathies for his devotion to Ataturk’s revolutionism that “confirmed our [Kadın Gazetesi’s] impressions about him.”⁴⁹⁰

For the Kemalist women, the 1950 elections and the following political developments became critical milestones that unequivocally determined the address of their loyalty. They were disappointed by the CHP for not upholding the Kemalist revolutions and put other political parties to the test of Kemalist commitment. For İffet Halim Oruz, “having only three women MPs in the parliament meant a deviation from Ataturk’s path,” which came together with subtle complaints regarding non-acknowledgment of the women’s support to the Korean War or the decision to revert the call to prayer from Turkish back to Arabic.⁴⁹¹ Their disappointment in political parties’ majoritarian concerns extended to the CHP leader İsmet

⁴⁸⁷ Oruz.

⁴⁸⁸ Oruz. She ended the article with a call to the DP government that she hoped the DP understand the message.

⁴⁸⁹ İffet Halim Oruz, “Kadınlık Alemimize Dair Müşahadeler,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 29, 1950.

⁴⁹⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “Atatürk ve İnkılapları,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 13, 1952.

⁴⁹¹ Oruz, “Atatürk’ün Yolu.”

Inönü as Oruz wrote that they defended him as the backbone of women’s revolutions after Atatürk, yet the number of women MP nominations proved their belief in Inönü was wrong.⁴⁹² Similarly, Halide Nusret Zorlutuna suggested that the CHP leadership was indebted to Atatürk and Turkish women’s loyalty to their state in battlefronts, classrooms, family, and workplace deserved a better commitment from political parties to uphold women’s political rights.⁴⁹³ These discussions in 1950 seem striking considering that Iffet Halim Oruz’s clique within the TKB in the early 1930s purged Nezihe Muhittin for her insistence on suffrage rights.⁴⁹⁴ Oruz and others firmly stood behind the CHP and M. Kemal within the limits of state feminism when the government decided to close the TKB right after women won the right to enfranchisement. In the late 1940s, as the political system transformed into multi-party competition, the CHP and the DP had gradually converged in their verbal support for women’s political participation but embraced contrary practices. Kemalist women were disappointed in the ruling CHP and initially more optimistic about the DP in opposition. In response to derisive comments for her shifting statements on political parties, Oruz responded that: “I had been a Kemalist forever...such a Kemalist that I would raise the voice of my faith against Atatürk himself if he had deviated from the path of Atatürk’s revolutions.”⁴⁹⁵ In the new political system of the 1950s, Iffet Halim Oruz and Kemalist writers of *Kadın Gazetesi* carved themselves a supra-political position based on their loyalty to Atatürk. Yet, it was indeed a political position that was fueled by their anti-Islamism and anti-communism.

⁴⁹² Oruz wrote “We wish we did not get to this place in the eyes of everyone, Mr. Inönü!” Oruz, “Üç Misli İleri Üç Misli Geri.”

⁴⁹³ Zorlutuna, “Kadın İnkılabımıza Dair.”

⁴⁹⁴ Yaprak Zihnioğlu, *Kadınsız inkılap: Nezihe Muhiddin, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği*, Dördüncü basım (İstanbul: Metis yayınları, 2019).

⁴⁹⁵ Oruz, “Nalına Mihna.”

Subpart 3.2 Making New Alliances against the Red and Black Threat

Their moralist and exclusionary definitions of the modern Turkish woman notwithstanding, Kadın Gazetesi and the TKB were rightly observing a rise in conservative discourses towards women in terms of employment, political participation, and public presence.⁴⁹⁶ In line with the 1950s official state policy, their main opposition was twofold: anti-reactionary Islamism (including the politicians who failed to prevent Islamist appeals nationally) and anti-communism (in a national and global sense).⁴⁹⁷ Thus, their major political cause was to prevent the rise of these two political currents. The TKB and Kadın Gazetesi counted on the young people the most to guard the nation “against the outside enemies in Korea as well as the internal enemies.”⁴⁹⁸

Moreover, the TKB joined hands with Kemalist organizations established in the mid-1950s. They were among the founders of Türkiye Milli Gençlik Komitesi (Turkey’s National Youth Committee) and Milli Tesanüt Birliği (National Solidarity Union) as well as an active observer within Türk Devrim Ocakları (Turkish Revolutionary Houses). These organizations were established in defense of Kemalist secularism and nationalism in the mid 1950s. Women intellectuals appreciated the DP leaders’ support for these organizations and reminded them in the eve of 1954 elections that they should not give in to Islamists who propagated against secularism and warned all political parties against political

⁴⁹⁶ Sancar, *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti*.

⁴⁹⁷ Oruz, “Kadın Aleyhtarlığı.”

⁴⁹⁸ “Evlatlarla Beraber,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 15, 1951; İffet Halim Oruz, “Atatürk Gençliği,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 12, 1951.

instrumentalizations of religion.⁴⁹⁹ In articles regarding these civic formations, women intellectuals criticized the lack of women founders and participants, and emphasized that a true Kemalist path would require a cooperation between men and women. In 1952, İffet Halim Oruz reminded the experience of the TKB's closure in 1935 and explained why they decided to re-establish the TKB in 1949. They believed that women were again being marginalized in political, civil, and intellectual fields. These concerns revitalized their embrace of Turkey's state feminism project in the mid-to-late 1950s.⁵⁰⁰

For the TKB and *Kadın Gazetesi*, “women in dark veils and priests in dark cloaks”⁵⁰¹ were the embodiment of urgent domestic threats in the 1950s. Several articles identified *çarşaf* as the primary indicator of Islamist threat against women's interests and the women's revolution in the Kemalist republic. The Kemalist women had seen the wearing of *çarşaf* mostly as an enlightenment issue confined to the rural areas. Their writings in the 1950s showed how it became a security issue as the *Kadın Gazetesi* writers started to observe women wearing *çarşaf* in the cities as well.⁵⁰² As the nation's guardians and nurturers, the TKB claimed itself as a leading actor to address the threat. An article by Nezihe Muhittin, who was purged from the TKB due to her suffrage politics, appeared in *Kadın Gazetesi* and questioned the Turkishness of *çarşaf*. Muhittin asked what was it that made women to be ashamed of their faces.⁵⁰³ İffet Halim Oruz in the same issue promised to “save [our] women from extravagance and backwardness” referring to both women in bikinis and women in veil.⁵⁰⁴ As

⁴⁹⁹ “Milli Tesevüt Birliđi Laiklik Beyanatu,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 17, 1954; İffet Halim Oruz, “Milli Tesevüt Çalışamlarına Tutulan Işık,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 6, 1955.

⁵⁰⁰ İffet Halim Oruz, “Devrim Ocakları,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 3, 1952.

⁵⁰¹ İffet Halim Oruz, “Çifte Bela,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 20, 1957.

⁵⁰² Hikmet Omay, “Türk Kadını Kendi Haklarına Suikast Mı Hazırlıyor?,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 21, 1952..

⁵⁰³ Nezihe Muhittin, “Yüzlerimizi Peçelemek İçin Bir Utancımız Mı Var?,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 28, 1952.

⁵⁰⁴ İffet Halim Oruz, “Bikini Mayoları,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 28, 1952.

much as they considered themselves as an authority in this matter, the TKB women also criticized the Turkish state for compromising secularism. İffet Halim Oruz condemned the government for putting a veiled woman's face on a Turkish Lira bill and claimed that the TKB should be the ones "to claim moral compensation for [Turkish] womanhood."⁵⁰⁵ The politics of the TKB had to navigate difficult positions in terms of their relationship to the ruling elites throughout the 1950s. Despite being careful not to make direct attacks and rather criticize all political parties generally, their discourse became more and more militant, particularly regarding the women's revolution, what they considered as the major legacy of Atatürk.

The TKB women's address of loyalty was Atatürk. They became more determined and vocal in the 1950s as a result of their diagnosis of increasing attacks against secularism and women's rights, major legacies of Atatürk for the TKB.⁵⁰⁶ Guarding the homeland also meant guarding Atatürk and his legacy for these women, who identified themselves as the major beneficiaries of Turkey's modernization project. In the spring of 1951, the TKB and *Kadın Gazetesi* were quick to politicize a series of attacks by religious fanatics against Atatürk statutes. *Kadın Gazetesi* wrote that numerous women applied to the TKB and volunteered to guard Atatürk statutes all around the country. *Kadın Gazetesi* writers praised the youth and the women determined to fight back against Islamists and politicians who compromised Atatürk for election gains.⁵⁰⁷ In addition, their anti-Islamist and anti-communist politics in

⁵⁰⁵ İffet Halim Oruz, "Asıl Dava Mevzuu," *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 18, 1952.

⁵⁰⁶ Nermin Abadan-Unat, "The Impact of Legal and Educational Reforms on Turkish Women," in *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

⁵⁰⁷ İffet Halim Oruz, "Atatürk," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 14, 1951; "Kadınlarımız Diyor Ki," *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 16, 1951; "Türk Kadınları Atalarının Heykellerini Beklemek İçin Nöbet Almak İstiyor!," *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 9, 1951.

the 1950s, applied to these incidents as well. İffet Halim Oruz connected socialist Nazım Hikmet's "Toppling Down Statues" writings in 1929, which advocated realist writing for a true nationalist literature, with attacks against Atatürk statues in 1951⁵⁰⁸. Oruz wrote that "Nazım Hikmet tried to topple down national sacred and failed; those who attack Atatürk, and his legend would similarly fail too."⁵⁰⁹ Their discourse of guarding Atatürk remained in compliance with the anti-communist discourse of the 1950s.

The role the TKB women crafted for themselves though went beyond guardianship and reclaimed women's active role in the history and present of state feminist project of modern Turkey. In this sense, their discourse became gradually more assertive throughout the 1950s. In 1951, *Kadın Gazetesi* claimed that "Turkish women were entitled to their own rights."⁵¹⁰ This was a bold statement, given that it granted primary political agency to women in the Turkish revolution. İffet Halim Oruz wrote about women's efforts since the late Ottoman era to progress their status. She stated that that "it was a great error to assume that a great social revolution could occur without the existence of a great social mass."⁵¹¹ In the following weeks, the TKB organized a major gathering where they declared that "our [Turkish] womanhood would not tolerate fake Atatürkists and opportunist politicians giving in to dark powers."⁵¹² In Republic Day celebrations in 1955, İffet Halim Oruz criticized both male and female politicians for not safeguarding women's rights. She complained that there were only a handful of women delegates in the ruling DP and called on women to protect their rights:

⁵⁰⁸ Mutlu Konuk Blasing, *Nâzım Hikmet: The Life and Times of Turkey's World Poet* (New York: Persea Books, 2013), 82–87.

⁵⁰⁹ Oruz, "Atatürk."

⁵¹⁰ {Citation}

İffet Halim Oruz, "Kadın," *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 2, 1951.

⁵¹¹ Oruz.

⁵¹² "Kadınlarımız Diyor Ki."

“ladies, shame on you! Atatürk will not return to life and make these revolutions again.”⁵¹³ By 1957, their discourse of Kemalist women being above daily political matters left itself to the promotion of suffragist moves, an unthinkable discourse in Kadın Gazetesi just ten years ago.⁵¹⁴ Kadın Gazetesi wrote that: “Suffrage awakens in the homeland... women understood that they will never have Atatürk again;” and speculated about a women’s political party would be established for 1962 elections.”⁵¹⁵ A women’s political party was what Nezihe Muhittin had desired in 1924. The CHP rejected the idea and purged Muhittin.⁵¹⁶ The speculations regarding a women’s party in the 1950s, now promoted by the TKB and Kadın Gazetesi, did not go beyond speculations either, this time due to the transformed political landscape after the 1960 military coup.

In the multi-party political context of the 1950s, Kadın Gazetesi connected the decrease in women’s political representation to the political parties’ opportunistic appeals to religious narratives. They criticized the parties for sacrificing women’s rights in a bargain for votes. In their analysis, both major parties gave in to an Islamist minority and betrayed one of the most fundamental aspects of modern Turkey: women’s rights. In response, they built alliances with like-minded Kemalist civic organizations which were also formed against the twin threat of reactionary Islamism and communism. Politicians’ public speeches against women’s rights, attacks against Atatürk statutes, and women intellectuals’ observation that the wearing of *çarşaf* had increased all over the cities constituted the catalysts for Kemalist women’s

⁵¹³ İffet Halim Oruz, “Yazıklar Olsun,” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 29, 1955.

⁵¹⁴ Oruz, “Kadın Birliği.”

⁵¹⁵ “Kadınlar Atatürk’ü Bir Daha Bulamayacaklarını Anladılar.”

⁵¹⁶ Zihnioglu, *Kadınsız inkılap*.

shifting opinion regarding Turkey's political elites. Their initial optimism towards the DP gradually faded and left itself to a non-partisan but political loyalty to M. Kemal Atatürk

Conclusion

This chapter traced the shifting discourses of “guarding the homeland” from the 1930s to the late 1950s in the marginalized writings of socialist women intellectuals like Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviş and the TKB leadership cadres and its media organ, Kadın Gazetesi. The chapter argued that since the early Cold War years Kemalist women intellectual discourses on guarding the homeland became more aggressive and assertive in line with the nascent anti-communist nationalism. Such discourses occasionally promoted militant expansionism as well. Simultaneously, the Kemalist women's loyalty to the political elite became more selective and conditional. Occasionally, their political agitations turned critical and demanding. Anti-communist nationalism widened the gap between elite Kemalist women and socialist women intellectuals, most of whom were already silenced, with respect to the ideas of national sovereignty and independence. Yet despite their full commitment to anti-communist nationalism, Kemalist women problematized the abandonment of militant secularism and the related abandonment of the women's rights cause. In response, women intellectuals agitated for a more autonomous political role, in line with their revolutionary contributions.

Elite Kemalist women of the TKB and Kadın Gazetesi fully supported Turkey's Cold War politics in the Korean War, Cyprus issue, and Muslim-Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria. They crafted ideal female figures for the novel anti-communist nationalism. As compassionate urban gatekeepers, they supported expansionist discourses regarding Cyprus and made the Korean War as a matter of national security. Despite their staunch support for

Kemalist secularism, their anti-communist nationalism did not exclude occasional religious appeals. At the same time, they crafted inferior female figures in line with the anti-communist discourse of free versus captive nations. Kemalist women asserted their superiority through derisive comments on women in the Soviet Union and rescue efforts for immigrants from Bulgaria whom they considered as their racial and religious brethren. In contrast to feminist scholarship on Kemalist women, this study showed that the Kemalist women did not share a very coherent discourse. They utilized religious discourses to promote war and anti-communism, while they passionately argued for the negative impacts of religious discourses in the public on women's status. Nevertheless, commitment to Kemalist secularism became one of the main determinants of the TKB's support for the political elite in the late 1950s, the other being commitment to Kemalist state feminism. Moreover, this chapter further reveals that in contrast to the extant literature on women's activism in the early republican period, Kemalist women intellectuals by the end of the 1950s were hardly in a conservative consensus with the mainstream media and political parties.⁵¹⁷ In many cases, the Kemalist women were asserting their hard-won political rights against these very institutions, even when they continued to collaborate with these institutions around supra-national concerns such as anti-communism. In response to politicians who opportunistically instrumentalized religious narratives for electoral gains and promoted anti-woman discourses in the public, *Kadın Gazetesi* placed its loyalty in Atatürk. While they remained within the limits of state feminism and refrained from open opposition against the ruling elites throughout most of the 1950s, they added a third enemy to the official formula of reactionary Islam and communist threat: the opportunist politicians of the DP and CHP, who

⁵¹⁷ Sancar, *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti*; Toprak, *Türkiye'de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935)*; Tekeli, *Feminizmi Düşünmek*.

compromised what the Kemalist women considered the most sacred legacies of M. Kemal Atatürk: secular and women's rights revolutions.

Conclusion

Many socialist women acclaimed the 1960 military coup that toppled the DP government as an intervention of young, patriotic officers against a corrupt system.⁵¹⁸ Kadın Gazetesi writers also acclaimed the coup and celebrated Turkey's military "for reestablishing democracy in the homeland, in the footsteps of M. Kemal Atatürk."⁵¹⁹ The TKB's weekly newspaper continued its publications until 1973 and the TKB still exists today. Many Kemalist women moved to leftist circles with the 1960s as the CHP turned to a 'left of center' position within Turkey's political spectrum. The period from the 1960s to another coup in 1980 witnessed renewed interactions between Kemalist and socialist women who found common ground against rightwing political parties. The 1980s saw another decimation of socialists by the state, this time at a mass level. The Islamic Revolution in Iran had firmly put political Islam in Turkey's agenda and in the 1980s Kemalist feminists designated Islamists as their chief enemy. They engaged in a long battle around the symbolic headscarf issue. According to Selin Çağatay, it was in this period that "the Kemalist feminist discourse of modern Turkish woman was replaced with secular Turkish woman."⁵²⁰ Many others, who identified Kemalism as a defining feature of their feminist activism but estranged from the CHP, organized in various secular and leftist leaning feminist organizations in the 1990s. The dominant exclusionary discourses on Kurdish women and Muslim women activists in the

⁵¹⁸ Sabiha Sertel, *Roman gibi*, 1. basım, Anı (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2015).

⁵¹⁹ "Türk Ordusu Milli İradeyi Eline Aldı," *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1960..

⁵²⁰ Selin Çağatay, "Kemalist Feminizm: Kadın Hareketi Tarihinin Göz Ardı Edilmiş 'Bariz Gerçeği,'" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 10*, ed. Feryal Saygılıgil and Naciye Berber, 1.baskı (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020), 313–31.

1990s and the 2000s, the question of difference and categorization of women constituted a major theoretical debate among Turkey's feminists, with major political implications.⁵²¹

The 1935-1960 period, and Kemalist women's activism in this period, is among the least studied eras in Turkey's rich feminist historiography. Independent feminist mobilizations flourished in Turkey in the mid-1980s in small consciousness raising gatherings of educated and leftist women. Many of these women had previously organized within Turkey's leftist movement before the 1980 military coup dismantled it. The firmly anti-communist focus of the military regime and their declared adherence to the Kemalist revolutions (including women's emancipation) provided a tolerated open space for critical feminist circles, which grew through publications, protests. These movements began to institutionalize in the 1990s. Challenging the official narrative of Atatürk's women's revolution has been a fundamental challenge for the new feminist movement. They exposed gender inequalities, particularly in the family. The Civil Code of 1924 that secularized the legal framework for family relations had been a cornerstone of the official Kemalist narrative. Feminists exposed the prevalence of domestic violence in the private realm of family and campaigned against the civil laws that perpetuated gender hierarchies, such as the designation of the man as the household chief. The global second wave feminist motto, 'the private is political' entered Turkey's feminist discourses through these issues. Moreover, Kurdish, Islamist, and LGBTI+ groups further challenged the official nationalist narrative by exposing the discriminatory and exclusionary category of 'the modern Turkish woman' from different ideological narratives.

⁵²¹ For an overview, see Yeşim Arat, "Contestation and Collaboration: Women's Struggles for Empowerment in Turkey," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 388-418, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.016>.

These emerging feminist and women's movements scrutinized Kemalist feminism and the first generation of women of the new republic, namely, 'the daughters of the republic.' Critical feminist scholars were less interested in studying a group, who were rather 'the winners' of Turkey's nation-state building process. However, as this dissertation showed, elite Kemalist women had a complex and tense relationship to the Kemalist state, in which they were so invested. Moreover, this period also coincided with the suppression of socialist intellectual women like Sabiha Sertel and Suat Derviř. This study attended to the consequences of their silencing in Turkey's gendered modernization.

This dissertation examined the late interwar period and early Cold War years (1935-1960) in terms of intellectual women's engagement with public discussions on gender norms and their voluntarist projects to realize their normative vision of the modern Turkish woman. The study focused on how these activist women shaped issues such as economic and moral frugality, nurturing, and guarding the homeland as central gendered aspects of Turkey's nationalist modernization project. Through these issues, Kemalist women – and socialist women to a certain extent – perceived, classified, and established networks with 'other' women, globally with with 'Eastern' and 'Western' women and domestically with 'peasant' and 'worker' women. In doing so, they contested and negotiated their rights and duties in Turkey's modernization during its implementation and transformation periods.

Intellectual women considered their roles as political activists, and thus, contested when the political elites and the mainstream media positioned women in the moral/cultural/spiritual

realm exclusively. This did not mean that they always contested conservative gender norms, which were part of the Kemalist state feminism project. For Kemalists, this contestation also did not translate into an open opposition against an incumbent government. As Chapter 2 showed, both Kemalist and socialist intellectuals understood frugality as a moral and cultural marker of being a modern woman in republican Turkey through three main figures in opposition to the ideal frugal professional urban woman. These demonized oppositional figures were: the spendthrift, the aspiring-to-be spendthrift, and the declassed Ottoman nobility. Chapter 3 argued that Kemalist women, who embraced pro-western diplomacy and redefined their image of the ideal Turkish woman in relation to western and pro-NATO countries in the Middle East, carried out ultimately unsustainable projects to nurture rural and urban working women. Chapter 4 showed that in the early Cold War period, Kemalist women intellectuals' discourse on guarding the homeland, which had been territorial and development oriented in the Interwar Period, became more aggressive and assertive, even promoting militant expansionism occasionally, whereas their loyalty towards the political elite became more selective and conditional, and gradually even critical and demanding.

In contrast to accepted narrative on the 1935-1960 period as 'the silent years of feminism in Turkey,' and the portrayal of Kemalist feminists as pawns of the Turkish state, this study argued that Kemalist women were *not* passive agents that followed the nationalist line by relying upon state patronage. On the contrary, Kemalist women were indeed *Kemalists* who supported Turkey's official nationalism. Yet women intellectuals sought to expand their political and professional agency in addition to their familial roles, promoted their normative visions of the ideal Turkish woman through development and education projects, engaged

with and learned from rival ideologies like socialism, and built international networks of women's solidarity.

This research challenges the periodization of feminist history in Turkey through a simultaneous reading of selected Kemalist and socialist intellectual women. Improving this intervention necessitates expanding the scope of this research in terms by including more intellectual women from different ideological commitments. For example, further research on conservative intellectual women such as Safiye Erol and Halide Nusret Zorlutuna could shed more light on similarities and differences among the intellectuals, the extent of official nationalism's hegemony in gender discourses, and intellectuals' relationship to the state elites. Secondly, prominent Kemalist women were mostly organized in charities after the TKB's closure in 1935. Although not a charity institution, the TKB was also reestablished as a non-political organization in 1949. The TKB members and Kadın Gazetesi writers remained active in philanthropic efforts and utilized the TKB facilities in these efforts. Analyzing intellectual discourses with more emphasis on their involvement in philanthropic efforts could add to the studies on intellectual volunteerism and intellectual-state relations. Lastly, this research ends with the political turmoil in the late 1950s and does not include the aftermath of the 1960 military coup. The evolution of Kemalist women's political commitments with the 1960s and their relationship to growing leftist movement would further challenge the extant feminist literature in Turkey that exclusively analyze these activists from a nationalism prism.

The post-1960 period witnessed the flourishing of leftist groups, workers syndicates, and socialist women's organizing. Suat Derviş, for example, returned from an exile and wrote one of her monumental critiques of capitalist modernization in the 1950s in her socialist-realist novel, *Aksaray'dan Bir Perihan* (Perihan From Aksaray). She continued her activism and pioneered the establishment of Türkiye Devrimci Kadınlar Derneği (Turkey's Revolutionary Women's Association) right after another military coup in 1971.⁵²² During one of the first meetings of the group, Derviş responded to being introduced as 'the wife of Reşat Fuat Baraner' – the general secretary of Turkey's Communist Party – with "I am Suat Derviş, the author"⁵²³. Her response has become an icon among Turkey's feminists in later decades. Leftist women from the TKP would later establish İlerici Kadınlar Derneği (Progressive Women's Association, IKD) in 1975.⁵²⁴ Like nationalists, socialists too preached to emancipate the woman but in practice did not grant the women an equal or autonomous status, considered the gender questions as secondary to their agenda, and instrumentalized women's activism. Socialist women's challenges to these practices would facilitate the rise of autonomous feminist organizations with the 1980s. These women's critiques on Kemalist nationalism and male-dominated socialist movements had later constituted the core of Turkey's contemporary feminist scholarship.

⁵²² Liz Behmoaras, *Suat Derviş: Efsane Bir Kadın ve Dönemi* (İthaki Yayınları, 2022), 298.

⁵²³ Behmoaras, 299.

⁵²⁴ Emel Akal, *Kızıl feministler: bir sözlü tarih çalışması* (İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, 2011); Saadet Arıkan, *Ve Hep Birlikte Koştuk: İlerici Kadınlar Derneği (1975 - 1980)*, 1. baskı (İstanbul: Açı Yayınları, 1996).

Bibliography

- Abadan, Nermin. "Türk-Amerikan Kadınlığının Kültürel Çalışmaları." *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 19, 1949.
- Abadan-Unat, Nermin. "The Impact of Legal and Educational Reforms on Turkish Women." In *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, edited by Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila. "Feminist Longings and Postcolonial Conditions." In *Remaking Women*, edited by Lila Abu-Lughod, 1–32. Princeton University Press, 1998.
<https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831203-003>.
- Adalet, Begüm. *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey*. Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018.
- Adivar, Halide Edib. *Turkey Faces West*. The Middle East Collection. New York: Arno Press, 1973.
- . "Üniversite Şehrinde." *Yenigün*, February 24, 1937.
- . *Sinekli Bakkal*. Galatasaray, İstanbul: Can, 2007.
- . *Yeni Turan*. 1. basım. İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2014.
- Afary, Janet. *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Afary, Janet, and Roger Friedland. "Critical Theory, Authoritarianism, and the Politics of Lipstick from the Weimar Republic to the Contemporary Middle East." *Critical Research on Religion* 6, no. 3 (December 2018): 243–68.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/2050303218800374>.

- Ağaoğlu, Süreyya. “Kimsesiz Çocukları Kurtarmak İçin Harekete Geçiyoruz.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 17, 1947.
- Ahıska, Meltem. *Occidentalism in Turkey: Questions of Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting*. Library of Modern Middle East Studies 79. London New York New York: Tauris Academic Studies Distributed in the United States and Canada exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- . “Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern.” *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102, no. 2 (2003): 351–79.
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. The Making of the Middle East Series. London ; New York: Routledge, 1993.
- . *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2003.
- Akal, Emel. *Kızıl feministler: bir sözlü tarih çalışması*. İstanbul: İletişim yayınları, 2011.
- Akşit, Elif Ekin. *Kızların Sessizliği: Kız Enstitülerinin Uzun Tarihi*. 1. baskı. Araştırma-İnceleme Dizisi 187. İstanbul: İletişim, 2005.
- Ali, Zahra. *Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Alkan, Mehmet Ö. “Soğuk Savaş’ın Toplumsal, Kültürel ve Günlük Hayatı İnşa Edilirken.” In *Türkiye’nin 1950’li yılları*, edited by Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.
- Altan, Cahide. “Erzincan Notları.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 11, 1952.
- . “Erzincan Notları: 2.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 18, 1952.
- . “Erzincan Notları: 3.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 25, 1952.
- . “Erzincan Notları: 4.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 8, 1952.

- . “Erzincan Notları: 5.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 15, 1952.
- Altınay, Ayşe Gül. *The Myth of the Military Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- , ed. *Vatan, millet, kadınlar*. 3.baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Amar, Paul. *The Security Archipelago ; Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism*. Social Text Books. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.
- Amin, Samir. *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion, and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism*. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2009.
- Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.
- Anıl, Mualla. “Kadınlığımızı Tanıyalım ve Tanıtalım.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 6, 1950.
- Arat, Yeşim. “Contestation and Collaboration: Women’s Struggles for Empowerment in Turkey.” In *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, edited by Reşat Kasaba, 1st ed., 388–418. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521620963.016>.
- . “The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey.” In *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba. Publications on the Near East. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New ed. A Harvest Book HB244. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.
- Arıkan, Saadet. *Ve Hep Birlikte Koştuk: İlerici Kadınlar Derneği (1975 - 1980)*. 1. baskı. İstanbul: Açı Yayınları, 1996.

Badran, Margot. *Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*.

Princeton: Princeton university press, 1995.

Baer, Marc David. *The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular*

Turks. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2010.

Barış Gazetesi. “Okuyucularımızdan Bir Türk Anasının Mektubu.” August 1950.

Baron, Beth. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*. 1. paperback print.

Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 2007.

———. *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press*. New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2010.

Behmoaras, Liz. *Suat Derviş: Efsane Bir Kadın ve Dönemi*. İthaki Yayınları, 2022.

Beinin, Joel. *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*. 1st ed. Cambridge University

Press, 2001. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612800>.

Benlisoy, Foti. “Ellili Yıllar Türkiye’si’nin Tarihi: Azınlıklar Tarihi.” In *Türkiye’nin 1950’li*

Yılları, edited by Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.

Berkes, Niyazi. *Türkiye’de çağdaşlaşma*. 7. baskı. Yapı Kredi yayınları Cogito, 1713 117.

İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005.

Bezci, Egemen. *Turkish Intelligence and the Cold War: The Turkish Secret Service, the US*

and the UK. London: I.B. Tauris, 2021.

Bier, Laura. *Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser’s*

Egypt. Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford,

California: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Blasing, Mutlu Konuk. *Nâzım Hikmet: The Life and Times of Turkey’s World Poet*. New

York: Persea Books, 2013.

Bora, Aksu. *Kadınların sınıfı: ücretli ev emeği ve kadın öznelliğinin inşası*. 3. baskı. İletişim yayınları Arastırma, inceleme dizisi, 784 190. İstanbul: İletişim, 2010.

———. “Ortadoğu’da Kadın Hareketleri: Farklı Yollar, Farklı Stratejiler.” *İ. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi* 39 (October 2008): 55–69.

Bora, Tanıl. *Cereyanlar: Türkiye’de siyasî ideolojiler*. Fatih, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017.

———. *Türk sağının üç hâli milliyetçilik, muhafazakârlık, İslamcılık*. 10. baskı. İstanbul: Birikim Kitapları, 2017.

Boran, Behice. “Halide Edip’in Yeni Romanları.” *Yurt ve Dünya*, no. 5 (May 1941).

Boratav, Korkut. *Türkiye iktisat tarihi: 1908-2015*. İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2018.

Bruinessen, Martin van. *Ağa, şeyh ve devlet = Agha, shaikh and state: the social and political structures of Kurdistan*. Translated by Banu Yalkut. 5. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008.

Bugra, Ayse. “Poverty and Citizenship: An Overview of the Social-Policy Environment in Republican Turkey.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39, no. 1 (February 2007): 33–52. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743807212528>.

Çağatay, Selin. “Kemalist Feminizm: Kadın Hareketi Tarihinin Göz Ardı Edilmiş ‘Bariz Gerçeği.’” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce Cilt 10*, edited by Feryal Saygılıgil and Naciye Berber, 1.baskı., 313–31. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.

Çakır, Serpil. *Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi*. 1. basım. Kadın Araştırmaları Dizisi 4. Çağaloğlu, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994.

Çambel, Perihan. “Amerika’da Türkiye Hakkında Propaganda.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 1, 1951.

Çekin Işık, Emine Seda. *Eylemi Kaleminde Bir Muharrir: Suat Derviş: Siyaset, Toplum ve Kadın Üzerine Röportajlar - Yazılar (1935-1942)*. 1. basım. Kültür İncelemeleri 65. İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2021.

Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Cockburn, Cynthia. *The Space between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict*. London ; New York : New York: Zed Books ; Distributed in the USA by St Martin's Press, 1998.

Cumhuriyet. "İzmirli Kabzımallar Kadınları ve İstanbullu Kabzımalları İtham Ediyorlar." May 10, 1955.

Cumhuriyet. "Tedbir." December 16, 1954.

Davaz-Mardin, Aslı. *Eşitsiz Kız Kardeşlik: Uluslararası ve Ortadoğu Kadın Hareketleri, 1935 Kongresi ve Türk Kadın Birliği*. 1. basım. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014.

Demirdirek, Aynur. *Osmanlı Kadınlarının Hayat Hakkı Arayışının Bir Hikayesi*. İmge Kitabevi, 1993.

Derviş, Suat. *Aksaray'dan Bir Perihan*. İthaki Yayınları 934. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2014.

———. *Anılar, paramparça*. İthaki yayınları 1282. İstanbul: İthaki, 2017.

———. *Ankara mahpusu*. 1. Baskı. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2013.

———. *Bu roman olan şeylerin romanıdır*. 1. baskı. Kadıköy, İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2018.

———. "Büro İle Fabrika Arasında Ne Fark Vardır." *Tan*, January 5, 1937.

———. "Büyük Hadiselerin Arifesindeyiz!" *Haber*, May 11, 1940.

- . *Çılgın gibi*. İstanbul: İthaki, 2015.
- . *Dirilen Mumya*. İthaki Yayınları, 2021.
- . “Düne Nazaran Nasıl Yaşıyoruz - Anketten Çıkan Netice.” *Cumhuriyet*, January 17, 1936.
- . *Fosforlu cevriye*. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2013.
- . “Harbin İkinci Yılına Tarihe Gömüyoruz.” *Haber*, August 28, 1941.
- . *Hiç*. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2013.
- . *Hiçbiri*. 1. baskı. Kadıköy, İstanbul: İthaki, 2018.
- . *İki kadın iki aşk*. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2021.
- . “İstanbul – Moskova – Tahran Seyahat Notları – Sovyet Rusya’da Çocuk Meselesi ve Çocuk Müzesi.” *Tan*, June 25, 1937.
- . *Kadın Aşksız Yaşamaz*. İthaki Yayınları, 2019.
- . *Kara kitap*. İstanbul: İthaki, 2014.
- . “Karşılıklı Hayat Sahası.” *Haber*, June 27, 1939.
- . *Kendine tapan kadın*. 2. Baskı, Mart 2020. Kadıköy, İstanbul: İthaki, 2020.
- . *Ne Bir Ses, Ne Bir Nefes*, 1923.
- . *Niçin Sovyetler Birliğinin Dostuyum*. İstanbul: Arkadaş Matbaası, 1944.
- . “Sovyet Çiftçileri Nasıl Evlenirler, Nasıl Ayrılırlar.” *Tan*, July 8, 1937.
- . “Sovyet Rusya’da Küçükler İçin Büyük İşler Başarılıyor.” *Tan*, June 28, 1937.
- . “Türk Kadınları Nasıl İş Bulur? – Bir Genç Kız Anlatıyor.” *Tan*, January 1, 1937.
- . “Yirminci Asırda Milletlerin Aldığı En Büyük Ders.” *Haber*, February 11, 1939.
- Devecioğlu, Ayşegül. “Kadın Hareketi Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler.” *Birikim* 11 (1990).
- Dıblan, Makbule. “İsveç’ten Notlar:3.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 24, 1956.

- Doster, Barış. “Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri.” In *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düzeni: Ordu, Sermaye, ABD, İslamizasyon*, edited by Tolga Gürakar and Behlül Özkan. Ankara: Tekin, 2021.
- Durakbaşı, Ayşe. *Halide Edib: Türk Modernleşmesi ve Feminizm*. 1. baskı. Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 100. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2000.
- Duru, Kazım Nabi. “İşçi Kadın.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 20, 1948.
- E., G. “Evlatlarımızı Kaprislerimiz Uğruna Zehirlemeye Hakkımız Yoktur.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 15, 1947.
- Ekmekçioğlu, Lerna, and Melissa Bilal. *Bir adalet feryadı: Osmanlı'dan Türkiye'ye beş Ermeni feminist yazar, 1862-1933*. İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2006.
- Eksat, Füzuran R. “Hesapsızlık.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 15, 1947.
- . “Yapabilsek!” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 12, 1947.
- El Shakry, Omnia S. *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Elgün, Nakiye. “TBMM Tutanak Dergisi.” *TBMM Yayınları* 15, no. 30 (1939).
- Emen Gökatalay, Gözde. “A Crisis of Legitimacy or a Source of Political Consolidation? The Deportation of Bulgarian Turks in 1950-1951 and the Democratic Party.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 57, no. 6 (November 2, 2021): 920–34.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2021.1917394>.
- Enloe, Cynthia H. *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
- Eroğul, Cem. *Demokrat Parti: tarihi ve ideolojisi*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2014.
- Erol, Safiye. *Ciğerdelen*. 7. baskı. İstanbul: Kubbealtı, 2008.

- Fanon, Frantz. *Black Skin, White Masks*. 1st ed., new Ed. New York : [Berkeley, Calif.]:
Grove Press ; Distributed by Publishers Group West, 2008.
- Gellner, Ernest/ Breuilly, John (INT). *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell Univ Pr, 2009.
- Gelvin, James L. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. Fourth edition. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016.
- Gerede, Lamia H. "Amerika'da Kadın." *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 6, 1950.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge. *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the
Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
- Gökalp, Ziya. *Türk Medeniyet Tarihi*. Ötüken, 1925.
- Gökmen, Melahat F. "Köy Kalkınması ve Köy Kadını." *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 20, 1953.
- Gülşen, Mehmet. "Dünkü ve Bugünkü Köylü Kadını." *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 12, 1955.
- Gunder Frank, Andre. "The Development of Underdevelopment." *Monthly Review* 18, no. 4
(September 2, 1966): 17. https://doi.org/10.14452/MR-018-04-1966-08_3.
- Güven, Dilek. "Riots against the Non-Muslims of Turkey: 6/7 September 1955 in the Context
of Demographic Engineering." *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. 12 (November
13, 2011). <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.4538>.
- Hale, William M. *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*. 3rd edition. New York, NY: Routledge,
2013.
- Hammad, Hanan. *Industrial Sexuality: Gender, Urbanization, and Social Transformation in
Egypt*. First edition. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016.
- Hanioglu, M. Şükrü. *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2017.
- Hikmet, Nazım. "Çok Boyanıyorsun Kadınım." *Akşam Gazetesi*, December 14, 1934.

Hobsbawm, E. J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. 2nd ed.

Cambridge University Press, 1992. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521439612>.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789 -1848*. Repr. History Greats.

London: Abacus, 2007.

Ilgaz, Hasene. "Halide Edip'e Cevap." *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 27, 1948.

———. "Hastalık ve Analık Sigortası." *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 26, 1949.

———. "İnönü ve D. Parti." *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 29, 1950.

———. "İşçi Kadınlarımız İçin Kadın Kulüpleri." *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 21, 1948.

———. "Köyde Şahsiyet Terbiyesi." *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 18, 1949.

———. "Mustafa Kemal ve Baron Oteli." *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1951.

———. "Yine Köy ve Köylü Davası." *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1952.

———. "Yol Vergisi ve Kadınlarımız." *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 17, 1949.

İnan, İffet. "Türk Kadınlığı Yarınlar Hamile Değil, Yarınları Yetiştirmektedir." *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 16, 1950.

Jayawardena, Kumari. *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*. The Feminist Classics.

London ; New York: Verso, 2016.

Joseph, Suad, and Susan Slyomovics. "Introduction." In *Women and Power in the Middle*

East, edited by Suad Joseph and Susan Slyomovics. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.

Kadın Gazetesi. "İffet Halim Oruz'un Karaçi Radyosundaki Konuşması." February 26, 1951.

Kadın Gazetesi. "Asistans Sosyal Ruh Sağlığı Dersleri." August 13, 1951.

Kadın Gazetesi. "Büyük İçtimai Anketimiz: Kadın Erkek Münasebetleri ve Aile." July 26, 1947.

- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Edirne." October 23, 1950.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Evlatlarla Beraber." January 15, 1951.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Gazeteler İçinden." March 1, 1947.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Göçmen ve Mültecilere Türkiye Yardım Birliği Toplantısı." January 15, 1951.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Kadın Gazetesi Yeni İdarahanesine Taşınıyor." June 12, 1950.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Kadınlarımız Diyor Ki." April 16, 1951.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Kıbrıs'tan Sesler." June 12, 1950.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Moskova Radyosuna Cevap." February 22, 1948.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Pakistan Sefiresinin Türk Kadınlığı Hakkındaki Görüşleri." June 5, 1950.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Rus Kadınlığı Hakkında." February 2, 1948.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Sovyetler Birliğinde Kadınların Acıkların Hali." May 30, 1949.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "TKB'nin Açacağı Kurslar." July 2, 1951.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Türk Kadınları Atalarının Heykellerini Beklemek İçin Nöbet Almak İstiyor!" April 9, 1951.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Türk Kadınlığının Pakistan Kadınlığına Mesajı." January 2, 1950.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Türk-Amerikan Kadınları Kültür Toplantılar." December 12, 1949.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Asiler Irak'ta Cumhuriyet İlan Etiler." July 19, 1958.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Hatay Sayımız." May 11, 1957.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "İzmir'den Kıbrıs'a Anaların Selamı." September 9, 1954.
- Kadın Gazetesi.* "Kadınlar Atatürk'ü Bir Daha Bulamayacaklarını Anladılar." October 19, 1957.

Kadın Gazetesi. “Kadınlar Birliđi Sosyal Himaye Evinin Temel Atma Töreni.” November 5, 1953.

Kadın Gazetesi. “Kıbrıs Bir Asya Parçasıdır.” April 10, 1954.

Kadın Gazetesi. “Milli Tesanüt Birliđi Laiklik Beyanatı.” April 17, 1954.

Kadın Gazetesi. “T.K. Birliđi İstanbul Merkezi’nin İdare Kurulu Raporu.” March 19, 1953.

Kadın Gazetesi. “TKB İstanbul Merkezinin Köycülük Hareketleri.” May 5, 1952.

Kadın Gazetesi. “TKB Sosyal Himaye Evi Temel Atma Töreni.” October 29, 1953.

Kadın Gazetesi. “T.K.B. Tunus’ta.” October 11, 1958.

Kadın Gazetesi. “Türk Kadınlığı Büyük Atasının Açtığı Yolda Başarıyla Yürüyor.” April 3, 1954.

Kadın Gazetesi. “Türk Ordusu Milli İradeyi Eline Aldı.” May 28, 1960.

Kadın Gazetesi. “Kıbrısta Nefret ve İğbirar Yaratan Haber.” November 27, 1952.

Kandiyoti, Deniz. “Bargaining with Patriarchy.” *Gender & Society* 2, no. 3 (September 1988): 274–90. <https://doi.org/10.1177/089124388002003004>.

———. *Cariyeler bacılar yurttaşlar: kimlikler ve toplumsal dönüşümler*. Translated by Aksu Bora, Fevziye Sayılan, Şirin Tekeli, Hüseyin Tapınç, and Ferhunde Özbay. 1. basım. Kadın araştırmaları dizisi 11. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1997.

———. “Cariyeler, Fattan Kadınlar ve Yoldaşlar: Türk Romanında Kadın İmgeleri.” In *Cariyeler bacılar yurttaşlar: kimlikler ve toplumsal dönüşümler*, translated by Aksu Bora, Fevziye Sayılan, Şirin Tekeli, Hüseyin Tapınç, and Ferhunde Özbay, 1. basım. Kadın araştırmaları dizisi 11. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1997.

———. “Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case.” *Feminist Studies* 13, no. 2 (1987): 317. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3177804>.

- . “Some Awkward Questions on Women and Modernity in Turkey.” In *Remaking Women Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, edited by Lila Abu-Lughod. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- . “The Politics of Gender and the Conundrums of Citizenship.” In *Women and Power in the Middle East*, edited by Suad Joseph and Susan Slyomovics, 52–58. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. <https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812206906.52>.
- , ed. *Women, Islam, and the State*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.
- Kara, Leyla. “Çalışan Anne.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 14, 1950.
- Karaömerlioğlu, Asım. *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem*. 1. baskı. Araştırma-İnceleme Dizisi 200. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2006.
- . “The People’s Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 4 (1998).
- . “Turkey’s Return to Multi-Party Politics: A Social Interpretation.” *East European Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 89–107.
- Kathryn, Libal. “Staging Turkish Women’s Emancipation: Istanbul, 1935.” *Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies* 4, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 31–52.
- Kaynar, Mete. “Türkiye’nin 1950’li Yılları Üzerine Bazı Notlar.” In *Türkiye’nin 1950’li yılları*, edited by Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.
- Keddie, Nikki R., and Beth Baron, eds. *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- Keyder, Çağlar. *Türkiye’de devlet ve sınıflar*. 17. baskı. İletişim yayınları Araştırma - inceleme dizisi, 77 14. İstanbul: İletişim, 2011.
- Kınalı. “Göçmenlere Yardım.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1950.

- Koca, Bayram. "Ellili Yıllarda Merkez Sağ: Demokrat Parti'nin Özgürlük İle İstismar Arasındaki Dini Politikaları." In *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, edited by Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.
- Koğacıoğlu, Dicle. "Citizenship in Context: Rethinking Women's Relationships to the Law in Turkey." In *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, edited by Thaleia Dragōna and Faruk Birttek. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Köksal, Duygu. "Yeni Adam ve Yeni Kadın: 1930'lar ve 40'larda Kadın, Cinsiyet ve Ulus." *Toplumsal Tarih* 51 (March 1998).
- Köksal, Nezihe. "Anadolu Kadını." *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 2, 1955.
- Küçükaksoy, Bedia. "TKB İstanbul Merkezi Başkanlığı Köycülük Kolu Köy Gezileri Röportajı." *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 12, 1952.
- . "Türk Kadınlığı İşbaşında." *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 11, 1950.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey / Bernard Lewis*. 3rd ed. Studies in Middle Eastern History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Lockman, Zachary. *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606786>.
- Loomba, Ania. *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*. Third edition. New Critical Idiom. London ; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.
- Mahmood, Saba. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012.
- Makal, Ahmet. "Türkiye'de 1950-1965 Döneminde Ücretli Kadın Emeğine İlişkin Gelişmeler." *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 56, no. 2 (2001).

- . “Türkiye’de Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kadın Emeği.” *Çalışma ve Toplum* 25, no. 2 (2010).
- . “Türkiye’de Kadın Emeği’nin Tarihsel Kökenleri: 1920-1960.” In *Geçmişten Günümüze Türkiye’de Kadın Emeği*, edited by Ahmet Makal and Gülay Toksöz. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2015.
- Maral, Tevfik. “Yeni Bir Kore Zaferi Lazım.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 29, 1951.
- Mardin, Şerif. *Jön Türklerin siyasi fikirleri: 1895 - 1908*. 5. baskı. İletişim yayınları 13. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994.
- . *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. 1st Syracuse University Press ed. Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
- . *Türk Modernleşmesi*. 1. baskı. Makaleler 4. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.
- Mardin, Şerif, Şerif Mardin, and Şerif Mardin. *Türk Modernleşmesi*. 1. baskı. Makaleler 4. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.
- Mazower, Mark. *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*. Penguin Books History. London: Penguin Books, 1999.
- Moghissi, Haideh. *Populism and Feminism in Iran: Women’s Struggle in a Male-Defined Revolutionary Movement*. Reprinted (with alterations). Women’s Studies at York Series. Basingstoke, Hampshire London: Macmillan, 1996.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.” *Boundary* 2 12, no. 3 (1984): 333. <https://doi.org/10.2307/302821>.

- Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993.
- Muhittin, Nezihe. “Yüzlerimizi Peçelemek İçin Bir Utancımız Mı Var?” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 28, 1952.
- Najmabadi, Afsaneh. “Crafting and Educated Wife and Mother.” In *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity*, 181–207. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
- . “Hazards of Modernity and Morality: Women, State and Ideology of Contemporary Iran.” In *Women, Islam, and the State*, edited by Deniz Kandiyoti, 48–76. London ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.
- . *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
- Navaro-Yaşın, Yael. “‘Evde Taylorizm’: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin İlk Yıllarında Evişinin Rasyonelleşmesi (1928-40).” *Toplum ve Bilim* 84 (Spring 2000): 51–75.
- Nihal, Şukufe. “Cezamızı Çekiyoruz.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 1, 1947.
- . “Erkeğin Ahlakı Üzerinde Kadının Ekonomik Rolü.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 22, 1947.
- . *Gayya*. Muallim Ahmet Halim Kütüphanesi, 1930.
- . “İnkılap Kadını Böyle Mi Evlat Yetiştiriyor.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 28, 1948.
- . “Kadın Memurlar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 26, 1948.
- . “Sokak Çocuklarını Kurtarmalıyız.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 19, 1948.
- Omay, Hikmet. “Türk Kadını Kendi Haklarına Suikast Mı Hazırlıyor?” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 21, 1952.

Onat, Lamia. “Mali Kararlar ve Siyasi Durumumuz.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 3, 1949.

Orbay, Nagehan. “Rum Vatandaşlar Neden Susuyorsunuz.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 7, 1957.

Örnek, Cangül. *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı: Antikomünizm ve Amerikan Etkisi*. İstanbul: Can Sanat Yayınları, 2015.

Oruz, İffet Halim. *Arkadaşlar*. İstanbul: Selamet Basımevi, 1936.

———. “Bizdeki Giyim İsrافی.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 8, 1947.

———. “Çıkış Amacımız.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 1, 1947.

———. “Geçim Güçlüğünün Sebepleri.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 5, 1948.

———. “Kadın Birliği.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 5, 1947.

———. “Kamçısız Kadınlık.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 2, 1948.

———. “Kara Borsacı Kadınlar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 8, 1947.

———. “Kimsesiz Çocuklar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 19, 1947.

———. “Kış Gelirken.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 8, 1947.

———. “Pastırma Yazı.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 6, 1947.

———. “Son Günlerin Siyasi Olayları ve Kadınlığımız.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 22, 1947.

———. “Çalışan Kadınların Derdi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 5, 1949.

———. “Cibali Tütün Fabrikasında Çalışan Kadınlar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 13, 1950.

———. “Çocuk Davamız.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 22, 1948.

———. “İstanbul'un Çocuk Davası.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 6, 1950.

———. “Kadınların Zaferi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 22, 1950.

———. “Kadınlığımızın Kalkınması.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 7, 1948.

- . “Kadınlık Alemimize Dair Müşahadeler.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 29, 1950.
- . “Memleketini Temsil Eden Kadın.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 15, 1948.
- . “Mısır Kadınları ve Otuz Yıl Önceki Hatıralar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 17, 1949.
- . “Rus Delegesine Cevap.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 2, 1948.
- . “Ruslar ve Türk Kadınlığı.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 23, 1948.
- . “Tayyör ve Şapka.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 4, 1948.
- . “Türk Kadın Birliği.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 18, 1949.
- . “Türk-Amerikan Kadınları Kültür Toplantısı Hakkında.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 16, 1950.
- . “Üç Misli İleri Üç Misli Geri.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 8, 1950.
- . “Yol Vergisi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 23, 1948.
- . “Atatürk Gençliği.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 12, 1951.
- . “Atatürk’ün Yolu.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 13, 1950.
- . “Beyrut’ta Bir Gün.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 5, 1951.
- . “Bir Mücadele Yolunda.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 5, 1950.
- . “Dış Ellerden Gelen Evlatlar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 9, 1950.
- . “Göz Nuru Gönül Buyruğu.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 18, 1950.
- . “İkinci Hac.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 22, 1951.
- . “İslam Konferansının Kadınlar Celsesi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 26, 1951.
- . “İslam Kongresi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 26, 1951.
- . “İşte Türk Kadınlığının Vicdanı.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 29, 1950.
- . “Kadın Aleyhtarlığı.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 15, 1951.
- . “Nalina Mihına.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 31, 1950.

- . “Nişanlı Kız.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 7, 1950.
- . “Pakistan Hakkında Konferans.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 5, 1951.
- . “Pakistan Kadınlığı Arasında.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 12, 1951.
- . “Pakistan’ın Kalkınması.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 19, 1951.
- . “Şehit Evlatlar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 27, 1950.
- . “Tehcir Olunanların İztrabı.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1950.
- . “Türk Anasının Duası.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 1, 1951.
- . “Yeşil Kıbrıs.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 18, 1950.
- . “Altıncı Yıla Girerken.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 3, 1952.
- . “Arap Memleketlerinde Bir Gezi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1951.
- . “Asistans Sosyal.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 16, 1951.
- . “Atatürk.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 14, 1951.
- . “Atlantik Paktı.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 25, 1952.
- . “Devrim Ocakları.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 3, 1952.
- . “Dünyanın Hali.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 4, 1952.
- . “Gazeteciler Heyeti Halep’te.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 21, 1951.
- . “Gene Mi Kıbrıs.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 14, 1952.
- . “Kadın.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 2, 1951.
- . “Köy Anneleri.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 16, 1951.
- . “Köy Davası.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 12, 1952.
- . “Köy Gezici Kursu Öğretmenleri Arasında.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 5, 1951.
- . “Köy Kadınları Gezici Kursları.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 25, 1951.
- . “Köylü Davası.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 2, 1951.

- . “Köylü Kadınıımızın Kalkınması.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 17, 1951.
- . “Kurultaya ve Kadınlığımıza Dair.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 3, 1951.
- . “Libyalı Kadına Dair.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 21, 1952.
- . “Suriye Kadınlığı.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1951.
- . “Suriye Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü’nün Ziyafetinde Verdiği Demeç.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 28, 1951.
- . “Asıl Dava Mevzuu.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 18, 1952.
- . “Atatürk ve İnkılapları.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 13, 1952.
- . “Başkan Ester Graff İle Bir Mülakat.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 29, 1952.
- . “Bikini Mayoları.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 28, 1952.
- . “Bu Bayanlar Kim.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 22, 1953.
- . “Cumhuriyet Kadını.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 31, 1954.
- . “Defne Çelenkli Kız.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 30, 1953.
- . “Hareketli Bir Hafta.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 27, 1954.
- . “İnsan Hakları ve Köylülerimiz.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 12, 1953.
- . “Kadınlığımıza Dair İsveç’ten Akseden Sesler.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1953.
- . “Kıbrıs Adasına Dair.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 11, 1953.
- . “Kıbrıs Meseleleri.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 8, 1952.
- . “Köy Çalışmaları.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 30, 1953.
- . “Köylerin En Büyük Meselesi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 26, 1952.
- . “Milletlerarası Kadın Birliği.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 6, 1952.
- . “Mutlu Gün,” June 19, 1954.

- . “Sosyal Çalışmalar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 21, 1953.
- . “Sosyal Himaye.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 22, 1954.
- . “Stalin’in Ölümü ve Akisleri.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 12, 1953.
- . “Türk Kadınlığı Hakkında Yanlış İsnatlar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, November 20, 1953.
- . “15 Günün Olayları.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 12, 1955.
- . “Amerikalı Kadın Gazeteciden Alınan İntiba.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 12, 1955.
- . *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye’de Kadın Devrimi*. İstanbul: Gül Matbaası, 1986.
- . “Bir Garip Merak.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 27, 1958.
- . “Çarşafın Yasak Edilmesi Hakkında.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 24, 1956.
- . “Çifte Bela.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 20, 1957.
- . “Hatay’da Kadınlık.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 18, 1957.
- . “İşçi Kadınları Aydınlatma Yolunda Çalışmalar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 11, 1956.
- . “Karıncı Yuvaları.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 29, 1957.
- . “Kim Sorumlu.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 4, 1958.
- . “Kıbrıs.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 21, 1959.
- . “Kıbrıs Bizimdir.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, March 8, 1958.
- . “Komşunun Tavuğu.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 18, 1954.
- . “Kreşler Meselesi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, January 15, 1955.
- . “Meydanların Sesi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 21, 1958.
- . “Milletler Arası Kadınlar Kongresi.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 6, 1958.
- . “Milli Tesanüt Çalışmalarına Tutulan Işık.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 6, 1955.
- . “Orta Doğu Hadiseleri.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, July 19, 1958.
- . “Rivayete Göre.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, February 12, 1955.

- . “Yazıklar Olsun.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, October 29, 1955.
- . “Yurdun Bağına Sinen Kıbrıs.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 24, 1957.
- Özbay, Ferhunde. *Dünden bugüne aile, kent ve nüfus*. 1. baskı. İletişim yayınları Araştırma - inceleme dizisi, 2222 369. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015.
- . “Gendered Space: A New Look at Turkish Modernisation.” *Gender & History* 11, no. 3 (November 1999): 555–68. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.00163>.
- Özcan, Gencer. “Ellili Yıllarda Dış Politika.” In *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, edited by Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.
- Özdemir, Nuray. “Cumhuriyet döneminde Türkiye’de yol vergisi.” *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 32, no. 53 (2013): 213–47. https://doi.org/10.1501/Tarar_0000000541.
- Özkan Kerestecioğlu, İnci, and Aylin Özman. “Türkiye’de Akademi-Feminizm İlişkisi.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 10*, 1. Baskı., 641–50. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.
- Özman, Aylin, and Ayça Bulut. “Sabiha (Zekeriya) Sertel: Kemalizm, Marksizm ve Kadın Meselesi.” *Toplum ve Bilim* 96 (2003): 184–218.
- Paidar, Parvin. *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran*. 1. paperback ed. Cambridge Middle East Studies 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Pamuk, Şevket. *Uneven Centuries: Economic Development of Turkey since 1820*. Princeton, New Jersey ; Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2018.
- Parla, Ayşe. *Precarious Hope: Migration and the Limits of Belonging in Turkey*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019.
- Pateman, Carole. *The Sexual Contract*. Reprint. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.

- Persentili, Nurşen. *Türk Kadınlar Birliği 1923-2013*. Karınca Yayınları, 2013.
- Russell, Mona. *Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity, 1863 - 1922*. New York: palgrave macmillan, 2004.
- Salih, Ruba. "Bodies That Walk, Bodies That Talk, Bodies That Love: Palestinian Women Refugees, Affectivity, and the Politics of the Ordinary." *Antipode* 49, no. 3 (June 2017): 742–60. <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12299>.
- Sancar, Serpil. *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti: Erkekler Devlet, Kadınlar Aile Kurar*. 1. baskı. Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 302. İstanbul: İletişim, 2012.
- Sarıtaş, Ezgi, and Yelda Şahin. "50'li Yıllarda Kadın Hareketi." In *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, edited by Mete Kaynar, 2. baskı. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2020.
- Saygılıgil, Feryal, ed. *Kadınlar Hep Vardı: Türkiye Solundan Kadın Portreleri*. 1. baskı. Kızılay, Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2017.
- Seikaly, Sherene. *Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016.
- Selek, Pınar. *Sürüne Sürüne Erkek Olmak*. 5. baskı. Bugünün Kitapları 114. Çağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011.
- Selen, N. "İşçi Kadınlarımız ve Çocukları." *Kadın Gazetesi*, September 27, 1948.
- Selim, Samah. *The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt: 1880 - 1985*. 1. publ. RoutledgeCurzon Studies in Arabic and Middle Eastern Literatures 6. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.
- Sertel, Sabiha. "Dünyanın İçinde Bulunduğu Buhran." *Tan*, June 10, 1943.
- . *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi*. Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 2009.

- . *İlericilik ve Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 2006.
- . *Kadınlığa Dair*. Sel Yayıncılık, 2019.
- . *Kadınlığa Dair: (1919-2019): 100. Yılında Sabiha Sertel'in Büyük Mecmua Yazıları*. Birinci baskı. Sel Yayıncılık ; Kadın Kitaplığı 963. Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Sel Yayıncılık, 2019.
- . “Mebus Bayanlar Neye Bağırıyorsunuz.” *Projektör*, March 1936.
- . “Önsöz.” In *Kadın ve Sosyalizm*, by August Bebel, translated by Sabiha Sertel. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2019.
- . *Roman gibi*. 1. basım. Anı. İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2015.
- . “Üçüncü Bir Harbin Çıkmasını Önlemek Mümkün Mü?” *Tan*, April 22, 1943.
- . “Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşları.” *Tan*, April 24, 1945.
- Sertel, Yıldız. *Annem: Sabiha Sertel kimdi neler yazdı*. 3. baskı. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2001.
- Sezer, Mehçure. “Kadınlar Birliğinin Erzurum Köylerindeki Gezisinden İntibalar.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, August 14, 1954.
- Sharabi, Hisham. *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992.
- Sirman, Nükhet. “Constituting the Modern Family as the Social in the Transition from Empire to Nation- State.” In *Ways to Modernity in Greece and Turkey: Encounters with Europe, 1850-1950*, edited by Anna Phrankoudakē and Çağlar Keyder, 2020 paperback ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020.

———. “Feminism in Turkey: A Short History.” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 3 (1989): 1–34.

<https://doi.org/10.15184/S0896634600000704>.

Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 1979.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815805>.

Soydan, Serdar. “Sonsöz.” In *Dirilen Mumya*, by Suat Derviş. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2021.

Tekeli, Şirin. *1980’ler Türkiye’inde kadın bakış açısından kadınlar*. 3. baskı. Bugünün kitapları 7. İstanbul: İletişim, 1995.

———. *Feminizmi Düşünmek*. 1. baskı. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları ; Sosyoloji, 580. 25. Şişli, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2017.

Thompson, Elizabeth. *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*. The History and Society of the Modern Middle East. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Toprak, Zafer. *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2020.

———. *Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935)*. Birinci basım. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2015.

Tunara, Girizan. “Garplılara Kendimizi Tanıtma Yolunda.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, April 25, 1949.

———. “Lüks Vergisi Bir Lükstür.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, December 13, 1948.

Üstel, Füsun. “Makbul Vatandaş”ın Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet’ten Bugüne Türkiye’de Vatandaş Eğitimi. 1. baskı. Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 172. Çağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2004.

- Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
- Yarkin, Mesadet. “Çocuk ve Yuva.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, June 19, 1954.
- Yeğen, Mesut. *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*. 1. baskı. Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi 82. Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira. *Gender & Nation*. Politics and Culture. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 1997.
- Zihnioğlu, Yaprak. *Kadınsız inkılap: Nezihe Muhiddin, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği*. Dördüncü basım. İstanbul: Metis yayınları, 2019.
- Zilfi, Madeline C. *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Design of Difference*. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Zorlutuna, Halide Nusret. “Kadın İnkılabımıza Dair.” *Kadın Gazetesi*, May 15, 1950.
- Zürcher, Erik Jan. “Ottoman Sources of Kemalist Thought.” In *Late Ottoman Society The Intellectual Legacy*, edited by Elisabeth Özdalga, 1st ed. London: Taylor and Francis, 2013.
- . *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*. London ; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010.
- . *Turkey: A Modern History*. 3rd ed. London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004.