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Publication Date

2020-10-14

DOI

10.1016/j.ijdr.2020.101900

Peer reviewed



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Published in International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, December 2020

DOI:10.1016/j.ijdr.2020.101900

Trust and Compassion in Willingness to Share Mobility and Sheltering Resources in Evacuations: A Case Study of the 2017 and 2018 California Wildfires

PRE-PRINT

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ABSTRACT

Advances in the sharing economy – such as transportation network companies (e.g., Lyft, Uber) and home sharing (e.g., Airbnb) – have coincided with the increasing need for evacuation resources. While peer-to-peer sharing under normal circumstances often suffers from trust barriers, disaster literature indicates that trust and compassion often increase following disasters, improving recovery efforts. We hypothesize that trust and compassion could trigger willingness to share transportation and sheltering resources during an evacuation.

To test this hypothesis, we distributed a survey to individuals impacted by the 2017 Southern California Wildfires (n=226) and the 2018 Carr Wildfire (n=284). We estimate binary logit choice models, finding that high trust in neighbors and strangers and high compassion levels significantly increase willingness to share across four sharing scenarios. Assuming a high trust/compassion population versus a low trust/compassion population results in a change of likelihood to share between 30% and 55%, depending on scenario. Variables related to departure timing and routing – which capture evacuation urgency – increase transportation sharing willingness. Volunteers in past disasters and members of community organizations are usually more likely to share, while families and previous evacuees are typically less likely. Significance of other demographic variables is highly dependent on the scenario. Spare seatbelts and bed capacity, while increasing willingness, are largely insignificant. These results suggest that future sharing economy strategies should cultivate trust and compassion before disasters via preparedness within neighborhoods, community-based organizations, and volunteer networks, during disasters through communication from officials, and after disasters using resilience-oriented and community-building information campaigns.

Keywords: Evacuations, sharing economy, shared mobility, ridehailing, homesharing, California wildfire

HIGHLIGHTS

- We assess private citizen willingness to share mobility and sheltering in evacuations.
- People impacted by two California wildfires are shown four hypothetical sharing scenarios.
- Estimated choice models indicate a strong impact of trust and compassion on sharing resources.
- Past disaster volunteers and community organization members are usually more likely to share.
- Variables related evacuation urgency increase willingness to share transportation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Beginning with Hurricane Sandy in 2012, the sharing economy has been active in 30 disasters in the United States (U.S.) through home sharing (e.g., Airbnb) and transportation network companies (TNCs, also known as ridesourcing and ridehailing) (e.g., Lyft, Uber) (Wong et al., 2018; Wong et al., 2020a). While early sharing economy company actions were largely ad hoc, recent actions stem from highly structured disaster relief policies. For example, during the Woolsey Wildfire (2018) in Southern California, Lyft and Uber both offered ride credits to and from evacuation centers, while Airbnb activated its Open Homes Program, allowing hosts to offer free housing to evacuees (Wong et al., 2020). Even with these private company resources, public agencies may still lack resources to evacuate and shelter all citizens, particularly for mass hurricane evacuations and mass wildfire evacuations (e.g., Carr Wildfire, Camp Wildfire, and Woolsey Wildfire in California in 2018). A significant number of people also continue to have poor access to transportation, sheltering, or both. Consequently, shared resources from private citizens could encourage more individuals to evacuate and improve equitable outcomes.

Despite considerable literature in evacuation logistics and behavior (Lindell et al., 2019), the feasibility of the sharing economy in evacuations as a potential logistical strategy remains largely unstudied (Wong et al., 2018a; Wong and Shaheen, 2019), along with influencers of this sharing behavior. Under normal circumstances, individuals have significant reservations about sharing resources, especially with respect to trust. This becomes more problematic with persistent myths of looting and social discontent during disasters (Tierney et al., 2006). Concurrently, compassion through resource support, charitable donations, and recovery assistance is widespread across disasters. In 2017 and 2018, roughly 30% of U.S. households donated money to disaster aid, while 12% volunteered in a disaster (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2019).

Thus, we hypothesize that two social variables – trust and compassion – influence willingness to share in an evacuation. To test this hypothesis, we distributed two surveys to individuals impacted by the: 1) 2017 December Southern California Wildfires (n=226) and 2) 2018 Carr Wildfire (n=284). We first present background on evacuation logistics, the sharing economy, trust, and compassion in disasters. Next, we describe our methodological approach of employing binary logit choice models across four hypothetical sharing scenarios to identify influencers of willingness to share. We then present logistic, trust, compassion, and sharing concern results from our survey and discuss the models for both wildfires. Finally, we conclude with several recommendations for building a sharing economy evacuation strategy.

2. LITERATURE

In this section, we discuss several related areas from the literature including: 1) evacuation logistics, 2) the sharing economy in disasters, 3) social capital, trust, and compassion in disasters, and 4) literature gaps.

2.1 Evacuation Logistics

Evacuations require multiple logistic resources – specifically transportation and shelter – to ensure that individuals are safe. Lindell et al. (2019) reviewed this literature, describing that evacuation logistics involved evacuee’s transportation mode, number of vehicles, route, destination, and shelter. Most work on evacuation logistics has largely assessed the modal split or

shelter type split, which indicate the demand level. Resource demand, in turn, impacts evacuation metrics (e.g., evacuation time estimates), which can be managed through mechanisms that typically increase supply (i.e., reversing lanes via contraflow).

For transportation, hurricane evacuation studies have found that many evacuees use a personal vehicle, ranging from 87% to 96% of evacuees (Prater et al., 2000; Lindell et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012; Wilmot and Guidshala, 2013; Wu et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2018b). These same studies found that between 2% and 10% received a ride from someone else, while 1% or less used public transit. Evacuees also often took extra vehicles, ranging from 1.10 vehicles to 2.15 vehicles per household (Prater et al., 2000; Lindell et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2013). Households sometimes take additional vehicles to transport all household members, pack additional luggage, or protect the vehicle(s) from the disaster.

Sheltering is another key evacuation logistic that indicates housing demand, including public shelters. Across hurricane studies, the majority of evacuees stayed with friends or family, ranging from 44% to 70% (Prater et al., 2000; Whitehead, 2003; Smith and McCarty, 2009; Cheng and Wilmot, 2011; Lindell et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2012; Wilmot and Gudishala, 2013; Wu et al., 2013; Yin et al., 2014; Wong et al., 2018b). These studies found relatively low public shelter use (2% to 11%), while a significant number of evacuees used hotels/motels, ranging from 7% to 46%. Wong et al. (2018b) also found that 5% of evacuees used a peer-to-peer platform, such as Airbnb, to find sheltering for Hurricane Irma.

2.2 The Sharing Economy in Disasters

The sharing economy is a collection of Internet-based transactions where goods are shared or obtained (Hamari et al., 2016). For this study, we focus on several mobility sectors along with home sharing to potentially aid in disaster relief:

- Transportation Network Companies (TNCs): On-demand access where users request rides through a smartphone application.
- Carpooling: Grouping of travelers for trips that would have otherwise occurred.
- Carsharing: Short-term access to vehicles, while forgoing auto ownership costs.
- Bikesharing: On-demand access to bicycles for one-way or roundtrip travel.
- Scooter sharing: On-demand access to electric scooters for one-way or roundtrip travel.
- Home sharing: A marketplace for homes and rooms where people host and rent their space.

Three private companies – Airbnb, Lyft, and Uber – have been primary actors in disasters. Wong et al. (2020) reviewed the sharing economy in evacuations by assessing past private company actions, interviewing experts in the emergency space, and surveying evacuees from Hurricane Irma. The research found some benefits of the sharing economy for public agencies (e.g., resource redundancy, supporting vulnerable populations, and information sharing opportunities) and private companies (e.g., positive press coverage, improved business continuity, and stronger community connections). Still, limitations included fostering driver and host reliability, ensuring safety, reducing surge pricing, determining liability, reducing congestion on roadways and wireless networks, and overcoming the digital divide (i.e., inequality in accessing computers/Internet).

Despite these limitations, private companies remain active in disasters. Airbnb deploys its Open Homes Program following most major disasters, allowing users to provide their home for free to evacuees (Airbnb, 2018). Lyft employs its Wheels for all Program, partners with organizations including the American Red Cross, United Way, and Team Rubicon, and offers ride credits to and from evacuation centers (Lyft, 2018). Uber operates its Global Security Center and offers ride credits to and from evacuation centers (Hawkins, 2018). Given the increased structure of disaster relief, private companies are likely to continue and improve their assistance.

Along with the business-to-peer mechanisms, the sharing economy also comprises private citizens who exchange goods and services via the Internet (peer-to-peer). For Hurricane Irma, Wong et al. (2019) found that private citizens were moderately likely to share resources to evacuees for a future evacuation, but more so for transportation. Wong and Shaheen (2019) found similar results, while also conducting four focus groups of vulnerable populations (low-income, older adult, individuals with disabilities, and Spanish-speaking). All groups expressed low trust of both drivers and companies in disasters. Groups offered recommendations for developing a sharing economy framework, including planning in advance, widely disseminating resource opportunities, and building a community-based approach (e.g., neighbors helping neighbors). Other recent work has assessed shared mobility potential in China by surveying potential evacuees, experts, and TNC drivers (Li et al., 2018). While this study sampled respondents without disaster experience, it found shared mobility could be a viable evacuation option, including no-notice situations in city centers (Li et al., 2018). For carless individuals, 83% would have taken shared mobility in a hypothetical disaster. This research also found that shared mobility could reduce the number of intermediate trips (i.e., trips to pick up family members), thus decreasing total simulated evacuation trip time. Most recently, research conducted by Borowski and Stathopoulos (2020) assessed TNC potential for no-notice evacuations through a mode choice model that incorporated demographic variables, context, warning message content, and emotionality. Borowski and Stathopoulos (2020) found that perceived urgency from the given scenarios increased TNC use. Moreover, they found that young adults, those in unfamiliar locations, and people who needed to travel far distances were less likely to use established modes (i.e., personal vehicles, carpool, public transit). Finally, Wong et al. (2020b) found that some vulnerable groups could benefit from sharing economy resources in disasters, but severe limitations and barriers remain for many, particularly challenges related to finding vulnerable populations and training drivers and hosts to adequately assist individuals in need of special assistance. This study, along with Wong et al. (2020a), mark a key shift in recognition of shared mobility as possible transportation modes in disasters.

Other related work to the sharing economy strategy has focused on the role of social networks in evacuation decision making, finding that the strength of social networks is a key influencer of evacuation choices (Madireddy et al., 2015; Sadri et al., 2017a; Sadri et al., 2017b; Sadri et al., 2018). For example, Sadri et al. (2017a) found that social partners that contact each other daily and live near each other were more likely to both evacuate. The geographical proximity indicated that some special evacuation resources could be distributed and would help impact social partners' decision making in a similar manner.

2.3 Social Capital, Trust, and Compassion in Disasters

Despite the sharing economy development, the ad hoc method of sharing resources is not new to disasters. Volunteerism and an outpouring of humanitarian support have been regular aspects of disasters and serve as reminders of the ability of people to come together in a crisis for

the greater good. Much of this support can be explained by the availability of social capital. In the social sciences, social capital has been thoroughly developed (see Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1997; Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 1998; Putnam 2001; Szreter and Woolcock (2004) for examples). These early studies had different definitions of social capital, but consistently noted the role of social networks and trust and the function of social capital to achieve some positive end. For the purposes of this paper, we first use a traditional understanding of social capital from Szreter and Woolcock (2004) that subdivides the term into three distinct forms:

Bonding social capital: “trusting and co-operative relations between members of a network who see themselves as being similar” (e.g., among family or friends);

Bridging social capital: “relations of respect and mutuality between people who know that they are not alike in some socio-demographic (or social identity) sense (differing by age, ethnic group, class, etc.)” (e.g., between strangers); and

Linking social capital: “norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society” (e.g., between communities and governments).

Considering the context of social capital in disasters, we find it fitting to include a definition of social capital from Nakagawa and Shaw (2004), defining it as “the function of mutual trust, social networks of both individuals and groups, and social norms such as obligation and willingness toward mutually beneficial collective action.”

A number of studies have further developed the concept of social capital by applying it to disasters (see Ritchie and Gill, 2007; Aldrich and Meyer, 2015 for overviews). Indeed, Meyers (2018) found 195 publications between 1998 and 2015 focusing on social capital and disasters, noting distinct differences in conceptualizing social capital as a private resource versus a collective resource. Meyers (2018) also found that the majority of work has studied social capital generally across disasters, with significantly fewer papers on wildfires. Regardless of the unit of analysis or disaster type, studies have focused on the influence of social capital for specific states of the disaster cycle, with a focus on preparedness, response, and recovery. Before disasters, social capital has been found to assist communities in preparing for natural disaster (Paton 2007). Paton (2007) found that preparedness intentions were heavily influenced by social capital in the form of trust in civic agencies that provided preparedness strategies (i.e., strong linking ties). In a study of both preparedness and recovery, Murphy (2007) determined that communities and their associated social capital (in the form of network ties) impacted disaster preparedness and recovery. The research also pointed to the need to determine the sufficiency of ties in social capital and that community involvement needed to occur in addition to official involvement, drawing on pre-existing organizations to develop resiliency (Murphy 2007). In a case of earthquake preparation, research found that having an individual in one’s social network discuss preparations was a key factor in increasing preparedness (Heller et al. 2005). For wildfires, Bihari and Ryan (2012) employed statistical measures, finding that communities with higher community cohesion (i.e., social capital) were more likely to undertake preparedness such as clearing vegetation, engaging with proactive planning measures, and advocating for more community-based preparedness. It should also be noted that social capital can differ significantly by geography. For example, Straub et al. (2020) found that while rural communities often band together to increase preparedness and

build resilience, they often lack relational ties with urban areas (due in part to lack of trust and low expectations of reciprocity), which decreases preparedness.

During disasters, individuals often turn inward to close relationships, which indicates strong bonding ties (Pelling and High 2005). However, this process has been found to be detrimental to bridging ties, decreasing general societal trust and interactions. Pelling and High (2005) also reviewed additional literature on social capital in disasters through the lens of climate change, noting that the formation, operation, and utility of social capital helped develop an understanding of individual response in disasters, especially those with multiple risks. Social capital in the form of networks was also found to be a key factor in evacuations (Dynes 2006). For example, Dynes (2006) described how socially isolated individuals often take less preventative actions and that groups and networks can help influence individuals to leave. Most critically, social networks can be crucial in increasing the willingness to provide both short- and long-term housing to others. At the same time, the evacuation process can be severely debilitating to evacuees in terms of breaking social capital bonds, leading to disorientation over multiple years (Cox and Perry, 2011). It should also be noted that social capital has limits in an evacuation (Litt, 2008; Elliot et al., 2010), as even populations with strong network ties and high social capital are unable to assist each other if everyone is vulnerable. One more recent study determined that social ties were an important factor in evacuee choice making, specifically the decision to leave or stay between an individual and social partners (Sadri et al., 2017a). Indeed, if an individual and social partner communicated regularly or lived close to each other, they were more likely to evacuate. This verifies other studies that have found that social influence (e.g., from peers) through social ties can impact one's decision to evacuate or stay (Riad et al., 1999; Hasan and Ukkusuri, 2011; Lovreglio et al., 2016).

The majority of research on social capital has focused on recovery, with much of the literature pointing to the power of strong community ties and social capital in improving recoveries (see Aldrich, 2012 for a detailed explanation). Bolin and Stanford (1998) found that since needs were unmet after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, multiple NGOs and CBOs stepped forward by leveraging their extensive social networks. These community-based approaches were especially useful for post-recovery housing for marginalized populations. Chamlee-Wright (2010), in a review of social capital in disasters, noted multiple disaster cases where socially embedded resources proved vital for recovering communities. Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009a) found that the level of social capital in neighborhoods heavily influenced the recovery process and that the reconstruction of strong social networks (such as churches as noted in Rivera and Nickels, 2014), allowed some areas of New Orleans to rebuild following Hurricane Katrina. Moreover, a strong sense of place was a strong motivator for returning to the Lower Ninth Ward (Chamlee-Wright 2009b). Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2011), in a study of St. Bernard Parish after Hurricane Katrina, used in-depth interviews to find that social capital in the form of collective narratives (such as self-reliance) facilitated resilience and shaped recovery strategies. In an analysis of Hurricane Katrina evacuees, Hawkins and Maurer (2010) found that bonding ties were most critical for immediate support while strong linking and bridging ties were more useful for long-term recovery. Shaw and Goda (2004) also found that high social capital improved recovery outcomes, specifically reconstruction speed and satisfaction, through a case study of the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. The study noted that areas with high social capital and strong connections among residences were able to conduct collective decision-making, while communities with loose connections and newer developments were less able. Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) also provided substantial review of the

role of social capital in disaster recovery and found communities with social capital to be highly effective in rescue and relief across two case studies. Despite the largely positive influence of social capital in disasters, Elliot et al. (2010) found important limits to social capital, discovering that residents of the Lower Ninth Ward during Hurricane Katrina received less network assistance from community members before, during, and after the disaster when compared to the more affluent Lakeview neighborhood. Moreover, the research found that despite inequalities in receiving assistance from personal ties, formal assistance (via NGOs, CBOs, and others) was largely equal between the two neighborhoods, but not proportional to need (Elliot et al., 2010). Haney (2018) in a study of flooding in Calgary found that while those most affected by the flood tended to increase their level of civic engagement and form new network ties, their attachment to place did not increase.

The full capacity of transportation and sheltering resources remains untapped in disasters, perhaps due to a lack of social capital, specifically related to trust. Individuals tend to distrust strangers and only 35% of Americans agreed that “most people can be trusted” (World Values Survey, 2014). Lack of trust can also be a major barrier to consuming collaboratively under even normal conditions (Möhlmann, 2015; Hamari et al., 2016). In disasters, research has found mixed results. Before disasters, research on low-income Mexican Americans found that individuals with higher levels of civic trust of other people were more likely to report higher preparedness levels. After disasters, impacted communities typically displayed higher levels of trust across countries and disaster types (Toya and Skidmore, 2014). However, trust of institutions (e.g., the government) was often lower (Hommerich, 2012; Miller and Rivera, 2011) and social trust substituted for these institutions and even markets (Yamamura et al., 2015). Other work found that trust levels did not change following disasters, and reciprocity (i.e., giving back to others who helped) was lower in impacted areas (Fleming et al., 2014). Using two surveys before and after the Tohoku Earthquake, Nakayachi (2014) found that trust of risk-managing organizations (e.g., for nuclear and earthquake) decreased, but trust of organizations not directly related to the disaster (e.g., for new infectious diseases, airplane accidents) remained the same or even increased. More positively, if social trust was high in a community before a disaster, then trust-increasing effects were larger compared to low trust communities (Dussaillant and Guzman, 2014). Finally, research has found that community engagement principles helped elevate both preparedness for disasters and community trust (Paton, 2007). Given these mixed results, low trust may decrease willingness (and eventual action) to provide shared resources in disaster.

While low trust may reduce sharing, compassion may overcome social capital and trust barriers and increase sharing behavior. Research has found that the human capacity for empathy spurred sentiments of pity or compassion, which led individuals to pursue humanitarian response (Carbonnier, 2015). Often, traumatic experiences have led to positive compassion changes to help form deeper relationships (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 1996). Other research found that community-based compassion through organizations has alleviated local victim suffering in disasters (Shepherd and Williams, 2014). Individuals also preferred policies that reflect compassion, which may be somewhat impacted by self-interest (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2006), and tended to be less compassionate for individuals who made high-risk decisions (i.e., knowingly living in a flood plain). Research has also found that empathy was predictive of the willingness to help but not predictive of actual actions to help victims (Marjanovic et al., 2012).

2.5 Key Literature Gaps

Despite considerable research on evacuation logistics, social capital, trust, and compassion, two key gaps remain. First, research on wildfire logistics remains sparse. Fischer III et al., (1995) interviewed evacuees from the Ephrata Fire, finding that most evacuees stayed with friends or family during the evacuation. For a hypothetical wildfire, Mozumder et al. (2008) found similar sheltering rates as hurricane evacuations (57% with friends and family, 29% in a hotel/motel, and 2% in a public shelter). However, with very few studies, the demand for evacuation resources (including transportation resources) remains largely unknown for wildfires. Second, research on why people may or may not be willing to share resources for evacuations is lacking. Wong et al. (2019) and Wong and Shaheen (2019) only provided descriptive statistics on the capacity and willingness to share. Neither of these studies nor Li et al. (2018) identified factors that impact willingness to share. Borowski and Stathopoulos (2020) focused on TNC mode choice using stated preference data from only non-evacuees, assessing the demand for shared resources but not the potential capacity. Wong et al. (2020b) only researched vulnerable populations who would receive resources. Moreover, based on the disaster literature, social capital – especially indicators such as trust and compassion – could be critical influencers on willingness to share. This paper seeks to fill these literature gaps.

3. METHODOLOGY

We developed an online survey to better understand the role of trust and compassion in disasters for the 2017 and 2018 California wildfires. In this section, we present the survey distribution method, scenario development, the discrete choice models, and study limitations.

3.1 Survey Distribution

We distributed two surveys to individuals impacted by the: 1) 2017 December Southern California Wildfires (n=226) from April to June 2018 and 2) 2018 Carr Wildfire (n=284) from February to April 2019. The 2017 December Southern California Wildfires (shortened to the 2017 Southern California Wildfires in this paper) were a destructive series of wildfires – primarily composed of the Thomas, Creek, Rye, and Skirball Fires – that led to mass evacuations. The Thomas Fire was one of the largest fires in California history, burning over 280,000 acres and destroying more than 1,000 structures (Cal Fire, 2018a). The Carr Wildfire in 2018 was a destructive fire in Redding, California that required thousands to evacuate, burned over 121,000 acres, and destroyed more than 1,500 buildings (Cal Fire, 2018b).

The survey was distributed online with the help of local partnering agencies and organizations. We first developed a list of potential partners including transportation, public transit, and emergency management agencies, news media, community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Potential partners were contacted and asked to post the survey to online sources including Facebook, Twitter, listservs, alert subscription services, and websites. Participants were incentivized with the chance to win one of five \$200 gift cards for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires and one of ten \$250 gift cards for the Carr Wildfire. After removing unfinished surveys and cleaning based on key questions, we achieved a survey sample of 226 for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires and 284 for the 2018 Carr Wildfire.

Demographics of the samples (2017 Southern California Wildfires and 2018 Carr Wildfire) can be found in Table A1 and are explained in-depth in Wong and Shaheen (2019). For our surveys, respondents were predominately female (73.9% and 69.7%), highly educated (77.5% and 59.2% with a four-year degree or higher), and mostly white (81.5% and 90.8%). Both samples had low participation from individuals with a high school degree or less (0.9%, 5.6%), Hispanics (11.1% and 5.3%), and young adults under age 25 (2.7% and 2.8%). In general, age was highly varied including 19.0% and 22.9% who were 65 or older. This aligns with the employment statistics with 57.1% and 47.9% employed full time and 22.1% and 26.1% retired. A fairly large percentage of the households in the samples (14.2% and 18.7%) had an individual with a disability. Household income from the previous year was generally high (48.7% and 33.4% at \$100,000 or more), although some respondents had incomes below \$50,000 (12.3% and 22.5%). The majority of participants from both wildfires lived in a single-family home (73.9% and 91.2%), while a minority of respondents had children present in the household (25.2% and 35.2%). The samples exhibited high technology usage as most respondents in both samples owned a smartphone (92.0% and 93.0%) and had access to the Internet at home (98.7% and 97.2%). Nearly all or all survey respondents owned/leased at least one personal vehicle (99.1%, 100%), with many reporting that they owned/leased three or more vehicle (29.7% and 42.6%). Most individuals had previously experienced a wildfire prior to the most recent wildfire (93.4% and 89.1%) but many less had evacuated (35.3% and 31.0%). Most respondents from the 2017 Southern California Wildfires were largely split between three counties: Ventura (43.8%), Santa Barbara (41.6%), and Los Angeles (13.3%). Almost all respondents from the Carr Wildfire resided in Shasta County (94.0%).

3.2 Scenario Development

To better understand the potential for shared resources in evacuations and recovery efforts, we created four scenarios related to resource sharing in a future evacuation. The scenarios assess willingness to share resources and are the dependent variables in our discrete choice models to better understand the factors that impact this willingness:

- S1-Shelter-Cost: Sheltering – Individual’s willingness to offer shelter to other evacuees at a cost per night
- S2-Shelter-Free: Sheltering – Individual’s willingness to offer shelter to other evacuees for free
- S3-Transport-Before: Transportation – Individual’s willingness to offer a ride to other evacuees before the evacuation process begins
- S4-Transport-During: Transportation – Individual’s willingness to offer a ride to other evacuees during the evacuation, enroute to the destination.

These sharing scenarios follow the same pattern as Wong et al. (2018b) and were designed to address potential opportunities for sharing. The two sheltering scenarios were designed to test if potential profit for hosts impacted willingness to share. The two transportation scenarios differ by temporal impact, which is less relevant for sheltering. Our goal is to determine whether sharing transportation is more effective before or during an evacuation. We focused entirely on free transportation in contrast to profit-based transportation scenarios, which is a limitation of our design. All respondents answered questions regarding each of the sheltering scenarios, while only evacuees answered the transportation scenarios. The individual(s) receiving assistance was not specified beyond “individual(s).” The scenarios asked for willingness on a scale with five options:

1) extremely likely, 2) moderately likely, 3) neither likely nor unlikely, 4) moderately unlikely, and 5) extremely unlikely.

3.3 Discrete Choice Models

We developed eight binary logit models to assess willingness to share, following the methodology of Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985). For the analysis, we divided the “choice” of willingness to share into a binary decision: 1) extremely likely to share and 2) all other answers. This was chosen to better isolate individuals who would realistically share in a future disaster (i.e., stated willingness of extremely likely), which is why we did not estimate an ordered logit model. In our paper, we wanted to develop a distinction between people who would be extremely likely to share and those who would be moderately willing to share. We also tested several models taking advantage of heterogeneous parameters through a mixed logit model. We found strong insignificance of almost all random parameters, which is likely due to a single observation per individual. We estimated the binary logit models using the Python package *Pylogit* (Brathwaite and Walker, 2018). The binary logit models are presented emphasizing each of the following variable types: 1) trust and compassion; 2) demographic variables; 3) evacuation circumstances, and 4) urgency indicators. Urgency indicators are characteristics of the evacuation (specifically departure time and route choice) that highlight the stressful and difficult choice context in a disaster. This includes characteristics of the hazard (e.g., fire threat) and choice alternatives (e.g., police presence). We selected variables following recommendations in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), consisting of variables that are significant, behaviorally important, and/or a correct *a priori* coefficient sign. We note that in several instances we retained some non-significant variables since they were behaviorally important with the correct *a priori* coefficient sign. The decision to retain insignificant variables, while less efficient, decreases bias in our results. We also conducted a sample enumeration for each scenario by setting all responses for trust and compassion variables to be one or zero, thus mirroring a highly trustful sample and very distrustful sample. This is supplemented by probability weighted cross tabulations of sharing choice and reservations to find potential differences in sharing concerns.

4. RESULTS/DISCUSSION

4.1 Wildfire Logistics

We first provide the wildfire logistic results for both wildfires (see Table 1 below and Table A2 in the appendix). We find that most individuals evacuated from both samples with low non-compliance rates (i.e., receiving a mandatory evacuation order but not evacuating). Shadow evacuation rates (i.e., not receiving a mandatory evacuation order but still evacuating) were high, most likely a result of poor communication throughout both wildfires. Evacuation travel times were concentrated between 30 minutes and several hours (see Table A2), suggesting short-distance evacuations. This is confirmed by destination choice: approximately two-thirds of respondents from both wildfires remained within county.

TABLE 1. Key Evacuation Logistics and Choices

	2017 Southern California Wildfires	2018 Carr Wildfire
<i>All Respondents</i>	<i>n=226</i>	<i>n=284</i>

Evacuation Choice		
Evacuated	77.4%	89.4%
Did Not Evacuate	22.6%	10.6%
Received Mandatory Evacuation Order		
Yes	61.1%	66.2%
No	38.9%	33.8%
Non-Compliance Rate (<i>out of individuals who received a mandatory order</i>)	13.0% (<i>n=138</i>)	3.2% (<i>n=188</i>)
Shadow Evacuation Rate (<i>out of individuals who did not receive a mandatory order</i>)	62.5% (<i>n=88</i>)	75.0% (<i>n=96</i>)
<i>Evacuees Only</i>	<i>n=175</i>	<i>n=254</i>
Departure Timing by Hour		
12:00 AM – 5:59 AM	22.9%	9.1%
6:00 AM – 11:59 AM	19.4%	7.9%
12:00 PM – 5:59 PM	20.0%	19.7%
6:00 PM – 11:59 PM	14.9%	63.4%
Mode Choice		
One personal vehicle	45.1%	33.9%
Two personal vehicles	40.6%	45.3%
More than two personal vehicles	8.6%	16.5%
Other (e.g., Recreational vehicle, aircraft, rental car, carpool, carsharing, truck and trailer, walk)	5.7%	4.4%
Open Seats with Seatbelts in Evacuating Vehicles		
0	29.7%	24.8%
1	6.3%	6.7%
2	14.3%	9.8%
3 or 4	25.1%	21.3%
5 or more	24.6%	37.4%
Primary Route by Road Type		
Highways	62.3%	39.4%
Major Roads	15.4%	17.5%
Local or Rural Roads	5.1%	9.8%
No Majority Type	17.1%	36.6%
Shelter Type		
A friend's residence	30.3%	39.8%
A family member's residence	32.6%	29.9%
A hotel or motel	22.9%	13.4%
A public shelter	3.4%	2.4%
Other (e.g., second residence, portable vehicle, peer-to-peer service)	10.9%	14.5%
Within County Evacuation		
Yes	66.3%	66.1%
No	33.7%	33.9%
Returned Home		
Yes	92.6%	96.9%
No	7.4%	3.1%

Spare Beds/Mattresses		
Yes	83.7%	89.5%
No	16.3%	10.5%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding

For mode choice, we found most respondents used one vehicle (33.9% to 45.1%) or two vehicles (40.6% to 45.3%) to evacuate. The Carr Wildfire had a higher number of evacuating vehicles, perhaps due to auto dependency in the Redding area. With a significant number of multi-vehicle evacuations, 64.0% and 68.5% of respondents had at least two spare seatbelts for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires and Carr Wildfire, respectively. For shelter choice, most respondents stayed with family or friends, which mirrors hurricane literature (Lindell et al., 2019). Hotels and motels were also popular, but under 4% stayed at a public shelter. A significant number of respondents also sheltered at more than one destination (see Table A2), suggesting shifting fire danger or inadequate long-term sheltering. Finally, most respondents did not use GPS while evacuating (see Table A2), suggesting that evacuees relied on their own experience or directions from officials.

4.2 Trust, Compassion, and Volunteerism

Next, we provide descriptive statistics on respondents’ trust, compassion and volunteerism (see Table 2 below), finding similar results between the wildfires. While individuals trusted most people, the level of trust differed by group. Family and friends ranked the highest, followed by coworkers. Average trust (from a Likert scale of 1 to 5) of neighbors ($m = 3.61$ and $m = 3.80$) ranked slightly higher than trust of community members and individuals from other cities. Higher trust of neighbors and closer connections suggests focusing on these social networks for sharing resources. One difference was that respondents from the Southern California Wildfires had a higher trust of strangers ($m = 3.50$) than respondents from the Carr Wildfire ($m = 3.00$), indicating potential differences in sharing levels with strangers. Most respondents for both wildfires also perceived an increase in trust in the community following the wildfires, indicating the trust-building nature of disasters. Indeed, individuals who received assistance from neighbors and had strong personal networks experienced faster disaster recovery (Sadri et al., 2018).

TABLE 2. Trust, Compassion, and Volunteerism

	2017 Southern California Wildfires	2018 Carr Wildfire
<i>Sample Size</i>	226	284
General Trust of Most People		
Yes, it is possible to trust most people	68.6%	63.7%
No, we can never be too cautious	29.2%	36.3%
No answer	2.2%	0.0%
Change in Trust of Others in Community Following Wildfires		
Increased substantially	23.9%	20.1%
Increased moderately	30.1%	41.2%
Remained the same	39.8%	32.4%
Decreased moderately	3.5%	4.2%

Decreased substantially	0.4%	2.1%
No answer	2.2%	0.0%
Past Disaster Volunteer		
Yes	36.7%	33.5%
No	61.9%	66.5%
No answer	1.3%	0.0%
Volunteer for Wildfires		
Yes	44.2%	46.8%
No	54.9%	53.2%
No answer	0.9%	0.0%
Mean Trust of Groups of People (Out of 5)		
Family	4.66	4.61
Friends	4.35	4.48
Coworkers	4.02	3.95
Neighbors	3.61	3.80
Other Neighborhoods in Community	3.29	3.56
Other Cities	3.10	3.21
Strangers	3.50	3.00
Bus Drivers	3.60	3.64
Lyft/Uber Drivers	3.41	3.27
Taxi Drivers	2.37	3.20
Police	3.77	3.95
Government	3.62	3.56
Mean Compassion (Out of 5)		
General Compassion (GC)	4.20	4.14
Stranger Compassion (SC)	3.97	4.04
Helping Compassion (HC)	3.60	3.80
Not-Selfish Compassion (NSC)	3.57	3.40
Tender Compassion (TC)	2.62	3.82

GC: When I hear about someone (a stranger) going through a difficult time, I feel a great deal of compassion for him or her.

SC: I tend to feel compassion for people, even though I do not know them.

HC: One of the activities that provides me with the most meaning to my life is helping others in the world when they need help.

NSC: I would rather engage in actions that help others, even though they are strangers, than engage in actions that would help me.

TC: I often have tender feelings toward people (strangers) when they seem to be in need.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.

About one-third of wildfire respondents were a past disaster volunteer, indicating strong networks to provide support. Moreover, around 45% of respondents were volunteers for the wildfires, revealing significant outpouring from the community for others. For compassion, we found similar average levels between the wildfires, except for tender compassion (i.e., tender feelings for strangers in need). In addition, non-selfish compassion (i.e., engaging in activities to help strangers before self-serving activities) had a low average score, but this could still impact willingness to share.

4.3 Concerns About Sharing

We also asked respondents about reservations they had with sharing resources in an evacuation (see Table 3). These questions were asked in the context of the shared resource scenarios for both transportation and sheltering. We found that concerns were very similar between the two datasets. Uncertainty about one’s own safety and security was the largest concern for sheltering, followed by feeling responsible for additional house guest(s), disruption to everyday tasks, and having to interact with a stranger. These results indicate that potential hosts place high value in safety and liability, perhaps requiring a formalized system of matching to overcome these concerns. However, individuals were not concerned that a sharing strategy would not have government oversight, suggesting that a strategy could be carried out by NGOs, CBOs, and/or private companies.

For transportation, safety and security was still a major concern, but respondents were also highly worried about not having enough vehicle space for the additional passenger(s) belongings and adding extra time to the evacuation. These concerns were more prominent for the 2017 Southern California wildfires, which may reflect some geographical and cultural differences. Reservations about vehicle space could significantly hamper a sharing strategy, especially since vehicle “guest” passengers would be unlikely to split their households into different vehicles. Further, concerns about adding extra time could require dedicated pickup locations to ensure that drivers do not have to deviate far from their planned evacuation route. Indeed, evacuation route deviation was expressed as a concern by around one-third of participants. Feeling responsible for passengers was also a key concern for transportation. We note that having to interact with a stranger was much less of a reservation for transportation, suggesting a shared mobility strategy among private citizens may be more feasible in evacuations than a shared housing strategy.

TABLE 3. Concerns about Sharing Sheltering and Transportation in an Evacuation and During Recovery

Reservations of the Sharing Economy (Top Four Reservations Highlighted)	2017 Southern California Wildfires	2018 Carr Wildfire
Reservations About Sheltering an Evacuee (Full Sample)	<i>n</i> = 226	<i>n</i> = 284
Uncertainty about one’s own safety or security	55.3%	57.4%
Feeling responsible for the additional house guest(s)	48.7%	45.1%
Disruption of everyday tasks	42.0%	37.3%
Having to interact with a stranger	40.7%	35.9%
Not enough space for the additional guest(s)’ belongings	29.6%	29.6%
General dislike of hosting	21.2%	20.4%
Having to drive the individuals around	12.8%	16.5%
Not having enough water and/or food	24.8%	24.3%
No government oversight	5.3%	3.9%
I do not have concerns/reservations	4.0%	9.5%
Concerns About Transporting an Evacuee (Evacuees Only)	<i>n</i> = 175	<i>n</i> = 254

Uncertainty about one’s own safety or security	44.6%	48.4%
Feeling responsible for the additional passenger(s)	44.6%	25.6%
Not enough space for the additional passenger(s)’ belongings	53.7%	42.9%
Adding extra time to the evacuation	56.6%	45.7%
Having to deviate from the evacuation route	39.4%	31.9%
Having to interact with a stranger	25.7%	16.9%
Having to drive evacuee(s) for a long period of time	22.3%	13.0%
Not having enough fuel	18.3%	16.1%
Not having enough water and/or food	8.0%	6.3%
I do not have any concerns/reservations	6.9%	13.0%
No government oversight	6.3%	1.2%

4.4 Willingness to Share Resources

In this section, we present modeling results for the willingness to share resources, which are organized by wildfire and by sharing sector (i.e., shelter and transportation).

4.4.1 2017 Southern California Wildfires – Shelter

We found for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires that individuals were more willing to share housing for free (24.3% extremely likely) than at a cost (11.5% extremely likely). See Table 4 below. From modeling, trust and compassion variables were positive and significant for both S1-Shelter-Cost and S2-Shelter-Free. Those who perceived increases in community trust were more likely to share shelter, suggesting that newly established trust can increase resources. Young adults and lower-income households were more likely to share for S1-Shelter-Cost, perhaps due to familiarity with priced home sharing and possible monetary benefits. However, females and smaller households were less likely to share. For S2-Shelter-Free, families were less likely to share, perhaps due to safety concerns. Long-term residents and smaller households were also less likely share. Smaller households may have less space for an evacuee (including fewer available bedrooms). It is not readily clear why long-term residents were less likely to share, but the result may be related to a lack of trust of newcomers into their neighborhood. Spare capacity was positive for both S1-Shelter-Cost and S2-Shelter-Free but not significant, highlighting the more powerful role of trust and compassion in willingness to share.

4.4.2 2017 Southern California Wildfires – Transportation

Compared to sheltering, individuals were significantly more likely to share transportation overall but also more so while evacuating (58.9%) than before evacuating (36.6%). In Table 4, we found that trust of neighbors was positive and significant for both S3-Transport-Before and S4-Transport-During, suggesting that neighbor-based resource pooling may be most effective. High tender compassion was also positive and significant for both scenarios, indicating high concern for others’ welfare. Individuals who were part of a community organization were somewhat more likely to share for S3-Transport-Before, while past volunteerism increased willingness for both scenarios. Those with older adults in their household were also more likely to share, perhaps due to their knowledge of the evacuation needs of vulnerable populations. Again, long-term residents were less likely to share. In this case, these individuals may have conducted more pre-evacuation

trips to prepare their property and gather supplies. Previous evacuees and lower-income households were less likely to share during the evacuation, perhaps due to past poor evacuation experiences and resource constraints, respectively. Those living in Ventura County were much more likely to share transportation during. For evacuation circumstances, sheltering with a friend increased willingness for S3-Transport-During. Evacuation circumstances increased willingness for S4-Transport-During, including spare seatbelts and receiving a mandatory evacuation order. Mandatory orders could be potential mechanisms to increase sharing by notifying evacuees of transportation needs in their community. Urgency indicators were also important, specifically the higher pressure from officials to leave and the high presence of police along the route adding to increased willingness. As such, officials, police, and other first responders may present a strategy for communicating resource needs to private individuals and encouraging sharing. We note that police presence is classified under urgency since law enforcement typically provides mandatory evacuation orders and/or traffic orders that are based on the current hazard situation.

4.4.3 2018 Carr Wildfire – Shelter

We found 14.1% and 29.6% were extremely likely to share for S1-Shelter-Cost and S2-Shelter-Free, respectively, for the Carr Wildfire. We found positive and significant variables for trust and compassion, with an emphasis on trust of strangers and non-selfish compassion (see Table 5 below). For S1-Shelter-Cost, previous volunteers and members of community groups were more likely to share, indicating a potential avenue for a shared resource network. High-income households (\$100,000 and above) were less likely to share for a cost, likely due to their lower need for additional income. Households with spare beds and previous evacuees were more willing to share, but the variables were slightly insignificant. For S2-Shelter-Free, smaller households were more likely to share, which differs from the 2017 Southern California Wildfires models. Other demographic characteristics for both sheltering scenarios were not significant but exhibited correct signs.

4.4.4 2018 Carr Wildfire – Transportation

Respondents were extremely willing to share for S3-Transport-Before (48.4%) and S4-Transport-During (72.0%). Trust of strangers was significant and positive for S3-Transport-Before, while overall trust impacted S4-Transport-During (Table 5). High non-selfish compassion was positive and significant for both scenarios, and high overall compassion was significant for S4-Transport-During. Most demographic variables were weak influencers except for households with children, who were much less likely to share for both scenarios. Young adults were less likely to share during the evacuation, which may be related to less experience driving during an evacuation. Interestingly, being part of an organization (e.g., arts/cultural, education/school/PTA, professional/trade, religious, social service/charitable) was negative for S3-Transport-Before, albeit insignificant. This finding runs counter to our other models. Homeowners were less likely to share for S4-Transport-During, perhaps because they wanted to defend their home and evacuate later. Spare capacity (i.e., more than three spare seatbelts) was positive for both scenarios but only significant for S4-Transport-During. For S3-Transport-Before, individuals who did not have any pre-evacuation trips were more likely to share, since they had more time to assist. However, individuals who stayed with family were much less likely to share. Interestingly, those who received a mandatory evacuation order were less likely to share. This is likely because they had little time to consider helping others before evacuating themselves. We also found urgency

variables – high visual fire levels, high smoke, low visibility, and high traffic – to be positive and almost all significant for S3-Transport-Before. Very high fire danger and police presence was positive for S4-Transport-During, while the high presence of first responders was negative. These urgency variables suggest that disaster risk may trigger sharing, increasing empathy and concern for other evacuees.

1 **TABLE 4. Estimation Results for Sharing Scenarios for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires**

Choice 1: Extremely Likely to Share in a Future Disaster

Choice 2: Somewhat Likely, Neither Likely nor Unlikely, Somewhat Unlikely, or Extremely Unlikely to Share in a Future Disaster

	S1-Shelter-Cost			S2-Shelter-Free			S3-Transport-Before			S4-Transport-During		
Survey Results: Extremely Likely to Share in a Future Disaster	11.5%			24.3%			36.6%			58.9%		
Variables	Coef.	p-value		Coef.	p-value		Coef.	p-value		Coef.	p-value	
Constant Share	-3.91	<0.01	***	-1.45	0.05	*	-2.69	<0.01	***	-1.25	0.02	*
<i>Trust and Compassion</i>												
High Trust of Friends	1.58	0.01	**	-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----	
High Trust of Neighbors	-----	-----		0.89	0.04	*	0.95	0.04	*	1.25	0.02	*
Perception of Substantial Increase in Community Trust	1.58	<0.01	***	1.04	0.01	**	-----	-----		-----	-----	
High Non-Selfish Compassion	1.04	0.08	†	-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----	
High Helping Compassion	-----	-----		0.78	0.03	*	-----	-----		-----	-----	
High Tender Compassion	-----	-----		-----	-----		1.29	<0.01	***	0.66	0.13	
<i>Demographics</i>												
Young Adult (Under 35)	1.03	0.05	*	-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----	
Female	-0.80	0.11		-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----	
Part of Organization	-----	-----		0.42	0.36		0.47	0.29		-----	-----	
Volunteer in Past	-----	-----		-----	-----		0.51	0.17		0.92	0.02	*
Used Homesharing Before	1.15	0.22		-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----	

Previously Experienced a Wildfire	-----	-----	-----	-----		0.69	0.35	-----	-----	
Previous Evacuee	-----	-----	-----	-----		-----	-----	-0.62	0.10	†
1- and 2-Person Household	-0.68	0.16	-1.09	0.02	*	0.40	0.29	-----	-----	
Household Income Under \$50,000	1.15	0.09	-----	-----		-----	-----	-0.69	0.21	
Children Present in Household	-----	-----	-1.58	0.01	**	-----	-----	-----	-----	
More than 10 Years in Residence	-----	-----	-0.89	0.02	*	-0.76	0.04	*	-----	-----
Older Adult(s) Present in Household	-----	-----	-----	-----		0.76	0.06	†	-----	-----
Resident of Ventura County	-----	-----	-----	-----		-----	-----	1.13	<0.01	***
Any Spare Beds	0.62	0.42	0.56	0.28		-----	-----	-----	-----	
<i>Evacuation Circumstances</i>										
Received Mandatory Evacuation Order	-----	-----	0.36	0.32		-----	-----	0.43	0.26	
Any Spare Seatbelts	-----	-----	-----	-----		-----	-----	0.66	0.09	†
Shelter Choice - Friends	-----	-----	-----	-----		0.54	0.16	-----	-----	
<i>Urgency Variables</i>										
Very High Official Pressure to Leave	-----	-----	-----	-----		0.50	0.23	-----	-----	
Very High Presence of Police on Route	-----	-----	-----	-----		-----	-----	1.44	0.02	*
Extremely Likely to Share: <i>Sample Enumeration – All High Trust and Compassion Dummy Values = 0</i>	2.5%		14.8%			26.8%		52.0%		
Extremely Likely to Share: <i>Sample Enumeration – All High Trust and Compassion Dummy Values = 1</i>	53.8%		67.6%			73.6%		84.7%		
Observations	226		226			175		175		
R-Squared	0.60		0.29			0.17		0.18		
Adjusted R-Squared	0.53		0.23			0.08		0.10		

Significance: † 90%, * 95%, ** 99%, *** 99.9%

1

2 **TABLE 5. Estimation Results for Sharing Scenarios for 2018 Carr Wildfire**

Choice 1: Extremely Likely to Share in a Future Disaster

Choice 2: Somewhat Likely, Neither Likely nor Unlikely, Somewhat Unlikely, or Extremely Unlikely to Share in a Future Disaster

	S1-Shelter-Cost			S2-Shelter-Free			S3-Transport-Before		S4-Transport-During			
Survey Results: Extremely Likely to Share in a Future Disaster	14.1%			29.6%			48.4%		72.0%			
Variables	Coef.	p-value		Coef.	p-value		Coef.	p-value		Coef.	p-value	
Constant Share	-5.36	<0.01	***	-2.04	0.01	**	-0.25	0.64		1.05	0.17	
<i>Trust and Compassion</i>												
Moderate and High Trust of Strangers	1.14	0.01	**	0.59	0.09	†	0.70	0.07	†	-----	-----	
High Trust of Neighbors	0.57	0.18		-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----	
High Trust Overall	-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----		0.72	0.03	*
High Non-Selfish Compassion	0.93	0.03	*	1.98	<0.01	***	1.36	<0.01	***	1.68	0.02	*
High Overall Compassion	-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----		0.60	0.09	†
<i>Demographics</i>												
Young Adult (Under 35)	-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----		-0.88	0.05	*
White	-----	-----		-0.48	0.30		-----	-----		-----	-----	
Volunteer in Past Disaster	0.76	0.05	*	0.26	0.38		-----	-----		-----	-----	
Part of an Organization	1.02	0.06	†	-----	-----		-0.40	0.22		-----	-----	
Previously Experienced a Wildfire	-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----		-0.59	0.30	
Previous Evacuee	-0.47	0.25		-----	-----		-0.46	0.14		-----	-----	
1 and 2 Person Household	-----	-----		0.99	0.02	*	-----	-----		-----	-----	
Children Present in Household	-----	-----		0.40	0.37		-0.79	0.02	*	-0.73	0.03	*
Residence - Single Family Home	0.81	0.32		-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----	
Homeowner	-----	-----		-----	-----		-----	-----		-0.82	0.07	†
Household Income \$100,000 and Above	-0.83	0.05	*	0.27	0.39		0.44	0.18		-----	-----	

Any Spare Beds	1.68	0.12	0.29	0.59	-----	-----	-----	-----	
<u>Evacuation Circumstances</u>									
Received Mandatory Evacuation Order	-----	-----	-----	-----	-0.73	0.03	*	-----	-----
More than 3 Spare Seatbelts	-----	-----	-----	-----	0.28	0.38		0.91	0.01 **
0 Trips Before Evacuating	-----	-----	-----	-----	0.67	0.05	*	-----	-----
Items to Tow	-----	-----	-----	-----	0.53	0.17		-----	-----
Shelter Choice - Family	-----	-----	-----	-----	-1.18	<0.01	***	-----	-----
Shelter Choice - Friends	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----		0.63	0.06 †
<u>Urgency Variables</u>									
Very High Visual Fire Level	-----	-----	-----	-----	0.38	0.20		-----	-----
Very High Smoke Level	-----	-----	-----	-----	0.82	0.01	**	-----	-----
Very Low Visibility	-----	-----	-----	-----	1.37	0.04	*	-----	-----
Very High Traffic Levels	-----	-----	-----	-----	0.58	0.06	†	-----	-----
Very High Fire Danger Level on Route	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----		0.88	0.08 †
Very High Presence of First Responders on Route	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----		-1.39	0.02 *
Very High Presence of Police on Route	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----		1.24	0.06 †
<hr/>									
Extremely Likely to Share: <i>Sample Enumeration – All High Trust and Compassion Dummy Values = 0</i>	8.3%		20.8%		41.9%		55.1%		
Extremely Likely to Share: <i>Sample Enumeration – All High Trust and Compassion Dummy Values = 1</i>	48.5%		75.6%		79.1%		94.7%		
<hr/>									
Observations	284		284		254		254		
R-Squared	0.52		0.24		0.19		0.3		
Adjusted R-Squared	0.47		0.19		0.1		0.22		
Significance: † 90%, * 95%, ** 99%, *** 99.9%									

4.5 Willingness to Share: Key Takeaways

In the discrete choice analysis, we found a nuanced story among sharing scenarios and between the two sets of wildfires in 2017 and 2018. We found trust and compassion variables greatly increased willingness to share, particularly trust of strangers, trust of neighbors, and non-selfish compassion. Demographic variable influence was scattered across scenarios and wildfires with several notable exceptions. Volunteers in past disasters and members of community organizations were usually more likely to share, except for members of organizations (e.g., arts/cultural, education/school/PTA, professional/trade, religious, social service/charitable) who were less likely to share transportation before evacuating for the Carr Wildfire. On the other hand, previous evacuees and families were less likely to share, except for families interested in sharing their housing at no cost to evacuees for the Carr Wildfire.

We found some weak indication that higher-income households were more likely to share, except for sharing shelter for a cost (vs. sharing for free). We determined that long-term residents were less likely to share for the Southern California Wildfires (but not the Carr Wildfire), which may be tied to cultural differences between the impacted areas. The modeling results also indicated that most demographic variables were only significant for one or two scenarios (e.g., young adults, female, white, used homesharing before, older adults present in the household, homeowner, single family home residence). While demographics will differ by geography, these variables help pinpoint potential provider groups for a more generalized sharing strategy. We also tested a number of other demographic variables across all four scenarios (e.g., education, employment status, TNC experience, etc.) but found little significance. These results point to the greater importance of individual levels of trust and compassion for resource sharing.

Several evacuation circumstances were significant for some of the transportation scenarios (i.e., receiving a mandatory evacuation orders, number of trips prior to evacuating, shelter/accommodation choice during the wildfires). Spare capacity was sometimes significant in increasing willingness to share (especially for spare seatbelts), but we found that the variable for spare beds was typically insignificant. Spare capacity may be a prerequisite for sharing, but social variables may activate sharing behavior. Finally, we found several urgency variables for departure timing and routing impacted some transportation scenarios. Evacuees may realize that other neighbors need significant help and would perish without receiving transportation, indicating that sharing behavior is triggered by the urgency of disasters. Urgency variable were particularly important for the Carr Wildfire, suggesting that hazard and cultural characteristics may influence the degree to which urgency impacts sharing willingness.

Across the scenarios, we found similar model fit, except for sharing shelter at a cost. This is likely due to the very strong negative constant value, but this could also result from overfitting a smaller sample. We also conducted a brief sample enumeration for likelihood to share by transforming all trust and compassion variables into zeros (i.e., no respondents have high trust or compassion) and ones (i.e., all respondents have high trust or compassion). We found a significant range between a low trust/compassion population and a high trust/compassion population (between 30% and 55% difference depending on scenario), suggesting that very low trust/compassion communities and very high trust/compassion communities will have significantly different likelihoods (and eventual action) to share. Finally, the modeling results indicate that the four sharing scenarios produce unique behaviors that are not necessarily consistent. While it may be easier to construct a general framework that applies to sharing across these scenarios, the results suggest that the characteristics of the scenarios play an important role in willingness to share.

4.6 Concerns for Sharers and Non-Sharers

To supplement our understanding of the discrete choice results, we also conducted a weighted sample aggregation by the different reservations for sheltering and transporting an evacuee. For this analysis, we used the prediction probabilities calculated for each model and the individual results for each concern/reservation. The result is a weighted percentage of sharers and non-sharers who stated they had reservations about sharing resources (Table A3 and A4). While this cross tabulation by sharing choice and concern/reservation could have been conducted without our models, we note that the choice probabilities now factor in the different independent variables that influence sharing choice. Consequently, these probabilities are a consistent estimate of the number of sharers and non-sharers for each concern/reservation (see Train, 2009 for more on aggregation).

We found that across the sheltering scenarios for both wildfires, more non-sharers had concerns/reservations regarding sharing housing than sharers. While this was expected, we found especially high divergence between sharers and non-sharers for uncertainty about safety and security, feeling responsible for the evacuee, and disruption of everyday tasks. Overall, the sharers for the S2-Shelter-Free scenario had more reservations than sharers for the S1-Shelter-Cost scenario. This result is likely due to the higher percentage of individuals who were willing to share in the S2-Shelter-Free scenario. This indicates that concerns/reservations do not remain constant or decrease even as willingness increases, suggesting that sharers are still highly worried about aspects of sharing in an evacuation. Between each of the wildfires, we found that sheltering sharers had similar concern/reservation levels. However, the Carr Wildfire non-sharers generally had fewer concerns/reservations for both sheltering scenarios than the Southern California Wildfire non-sharers. This difference mirrors the concern/reservation results presented in Table 4 and is likely due to cultural differences and/or wildfire context differences. We note that the separation between wildfires is not enough to make any concrete conclusions, suggesting fairly strong consistency in reservations.

For transportation, we found that more non-sharers had concerns/reservations than sharers for S3-Transport-Before for both wildfires. However, we found that sharers had more concerns/reservations than non-sharers for S4-Transportation-During. This result is impacted by two factors: 1) high predicted choice probabilities for sharers in the discrete choice models, which influences aggregated probabilities upward and 2) real and substantial concern from sharers about this scenario. Two of the strongest concerns/reservations where sharers and non-sharers diverge are associated with the scenario itself (having to deviate from the evacuation route and adding extra time to the evacuation). We note that these concerns/reservations may not be enough to convince someone not to share, but they indicate that these concerns will need to be addressed, if employing sharing economy resources in a disaster/recovery effort. Between the wildfires, Carr Wildfire non-sharers for both scenarios had less reservations than the Southern California non-sharers. This indicates that addressing these transportation reservations would likely yield a less meaningful behavioral change for the geography impacted by the Carr Wildfire.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

From the wildfire logistic results, we developed several evacuation recommendations for local agencies (see Table 6). We also provide specific recommendations derived from the modeling results to help build a strategy for private resource sharing in evacuations. We also link the recommendation to previous work in the disaster field (albeit not necessarily wildfire research),

1 particularly related to the role of CBOs and NGOs in disaster recovery and relief. We acknowledge
 2 in advance that many of these recommendations require additional research and pilot programs to
 3 determine exact communication and organizational mechanisms. We recommend that future
 4 research on the sharing economy strategy in evacuations focus on newly formed sharing programs,
 5 such as the Neighborhood Evacuation Team Program in San Diego County (Moe, 2020).

6 **TABLE 6. Local Agency Recommendations**

<i>SoCal = 2017 December Southern California Wildfires</i>		<i>Carr = 2018 Carr Wildfire</i>	
Recommendations from Descriptive Statistics and Modeling Results			
Recommendation	Evidence	Discussion	Supporting Literature
<p>Increase community trust and compassion as part of disaster preparedness to increase willingness to share resources</p>	<p>Trust, especially trust of neighbors and strangers, significantly increased willingness to share for most sharing scenarios.</p> <p>Compassion, especially non-selfish compassion and tender compassion, significantly increased willingness to share for most sharing scenarios.</p> <p>Between 20.1% (Carr) 23.9% (SoCal) stated that trust in others substantially increased.</p>	<p>Trust and compassion were important factors in willingness to share, but it is not guaranteed that communities have adequate trust or compassion levels. Multiple approaches may be necessary to increase trust and compassion prior to the disaster. Strategies might include building community cohesion through civic pride (e.g., identity, slogans, flags, campaigns), easy-to-replicate neighborhood networks (e.g., phone trees, neighborhood associations), social neighborhood events (e.g., block parties), preparedness events (e.g., community meetings, training), and disaster-specific neighborhood groups (e.g., Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)). Some trust/compassion building strategies, such as developing community carpools, could function under both normal conditions and disaster conditions. Support for these strategies could come from monetary grants or local fire marshals, chiefs, and boards with knowledge expertise. Developing preparedness guidebooks and brochures would help increase both preparedness and willingness to share, especially if the materials include information on how to share. Agencies should also consider training leaders within neighborhoods on how to connect sharing providers and users. Trustworthy and compassionate leaders and providers are likely rooted in the community and/or have strong social connections.</p>	<p>Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) (Flint and Stevenson, 2010; Carr and Jensen, 2015)</p> <p>Community cohesion and citizen participation programs (Payton et al., 2005; Bihari and Ryan, 2012; Prior and Eriksen, 2013).</p> <p>Social and neighborhood networks (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2009a Aldrich, 2012; Dussailant and Guzman, 2014; Fan et al., 2020)</p> <p>Leadership (e.g., Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004; White and Fu, 2012)</p>
<p>Ensure that community</p>	<p>Past volunteers in disasters were</p>	<p>A significant number of respondents were active volunteers in the wildfires. Given that many</p>	<p>Volunteer mechanisms</p>

<p>members, including evacuees, can easily volunteer</p>	<p>moderately more likely to share for several sharing scenarios.</p>	<p>individuals also evacuated, agencies should continue to make volunteering easy (e.g., developing volunteering groups, fast signup, guiding emergent behavior), which will help to increase the amount of resources available for response, recovery, and future disasters.</p>	<p>(Quarantelli, 1984; Drabek and McEntire, 2002; Fernandez, 2007; Starbird and Palen, 2011; Scanlon et al., 2014; Whittaker et al., 2015</p>
<p>Maintain volunteer networks to keep volunteerism high for the next disaster</p>	<p>Volunteerism was high for the wildfires as 44.2% (SoCal) and 46.8% (Carr) volunteered.</p> <p>Volunteerism for the wildfires increased by 7.5% (SoCal) and 13.3% (Carr) compared to past volunteerism.</p>	<p>Past volunteers were more likely to share under certain circumstances, indicating that volunteer networks could be part of a sharing strategy. Network maintenance may require local agencies to reward assistance through volunteer recognition, communicate with volunteers on a regular basis, and host social gatherings for volunteers.</p>	
<p>Strengthen partnerships with CBO volunteer networks, which can be called upon in a disaster for transportation and sheltering</p>	<p>Members of a local community organization or group were typically more likely to share for several sharing scenarios.</p>	<p>Some community organizations may be positioned in the local area to provide rapid response in disasters, due to their volunteer and supply networks. Members of community organizations can provide needed transportation and sheltering resources through a more trusted organization (instead of through private citizens). Some networks already exist and should be expanded (e.g., American Red Cross, churches), but more local organizations may be more flexible in meeting community needs.</p>	<p>CBO partnerships (Sutton and Tierney, 2006; Austin, 2012; Ishiwatari et al., 2012; Matsuoka et al., 2012; Rivera and Nickels, 2014)</p>
<p>Link local CBOs and volunteer networks with known centers, neighborhoods, and communities with a high proportion of access and functional needs populations</p>	<p>13.0% (SoCal) and 3.2% (Carr) of respondents received a mandatory evacuation order but did not evacuate.</p> <p>Members of a local community organization or group were typically more likely to share for several sharing scenarios.</p> <p>Past volunteers in disasters were moderately more likely to share for several sharing scenarios.</p>	<p>Some individuals continue to remain at home even though they received a mandatory evacuation order. While some individuals may defend their home, others may be unable to leave due to lack of resources and/or low mobility. Local CBOs could provide resources, especially since organization members are more willing to share resources. Agencies may need to first compile a list of areas with functional and access needs populations. Public assets may be able to meet these needs, but CBOs may be well-equipped to aid when necessary.</p>	<p>NGO/CBO strategies for vulnerable populations (Bolin and Stanford, 1998; Drabek and McEntire, 2002; Sutton and Tierney, 2006; Simo and Bies, 2007; Klaiman et al., 2010; Matsuoka et al., 2012; Chandra et al., 2013; Gin et al., 2016)</p>

<p>Increase public resources (e.g., public transit) and/or NGO and CBO resources (e.g., carpools) for areas that previously evacuated from wildfires</p>	<p>Previous evacuees were less likely to share for several sharing scenarios.</p>	<p>Past evacuation experience sometimes decreased willingness to share. Local public transit and emergency management agencies could deploy resources to areas that they previously evacuated. Agencies will need to maintain continuity of knowledge to ensure that previously evacuated areas and fire perimeters are identified and mapped.</p>	<p>Higher capacity transportation resources (Wolshon et al., 2005; Bish, 2011; Swamy et al., 2017; Dulebenets et al., 2019; The City of New Orleans, 2019; Wong et al., 2020c)</p>
<p>Minimize safety concerns by matching providers and evacuees through established CBOs</p>	<p>Safety and security concerns were expressed by a significant number of respondents for both transportation and sheltering (non-sharers were especially concerned). Members of a local community organization or group were moderately more likely to share for several sharing scenarios. Respondents were not concerned about the lack of governmental oversight for a shared resource strategy.</p>	<p>With safety as a primary concern, both providers and users of shared resources may be more comfortable with sharing through established CBOs and volunteer networks. CBO credibility may also increase trust of neighbors and strangers. While local agencies could also match providers and users, CBOs may be better positioned to encourage members and other volunteers to share resources. Private sharing companies often partner with CBOs to provide rides and shelter.</p>	<p>CBO partnerships (Sutton and Tierney, 2006; Austin, 2012; Ishiwatari et al., 2012; Matsuoka et al., 2012; Rivera and Nickels, 2014) Private sector resources (Johnson et al., 2011; White, 2012; Wong et al., 2020a)</p>
<p>Leverage police and fire personnel to communicate the need to share resources and check on neighbors</p>	<p>High police presence on the route increased willingness to share transportation while evacuating for both SoCal and Carr. High pressure from officials to leave somewhat increased</p>	<p>Public officials, particularly police and fire personnel, assist in distributing evacuation orders within neighborhoods. Authority figures with subject matter expertise (e.g., fire marshals and firefighters for wildfires) may be highly trusted in disasters, especially if they provide accurate and useful public information. This trust level may allow experts to communicate additional information on how to share transportation and sheltering and check on neighbors during the</p>	<p>Wildfire response communication strategies (Kumagai et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2005; Taylor et al., 2007; Stidham et al., 2011; Steelman and McCaffrey,</p>

	<p>willingness to share transportation before evacuation for SoCal.</p> <p>Mean trust of police was higher than trust of neighbors.</p>	<p>disaster. Moreover, since police and fire are assisting within neighborhoods, they can communicate directly with sharing providers and users. Other public officials and local politicians can also play a role in communicating sharing needs to the community.</p>	<p>2013; Steelman et al., 2015)</p>
<p>Set pickup points for shared transportation along major arterial roadways</p>	<p>Respondents stated that two of their primary reservations of sharing were the possibility of a longer evacuation and having to deviate from the evacuation route. Both sharers and non-sharers were highly concerned.</p>	<p>With such limited time to evacuate and travel to a destination, evacuees exhibited strong risk aversion to increasing the travel time of their evacuation or deviating from their route. A future shared resource strategy could consider pickup points along major arterial roadways to reduce the need to deviate. These pickup points could also be integrated into a public transit-based response. Not all individuals will be able to travel to these pickup points so some vehicles will have to provide point-to-point service to ensure safe and equitable outcomes.</p>	<p>Pickup points for evacuations (Abdelgawad et al., 2010; Bish, 2011; Bian and Wilmot, 2017; Qazi et al., 2017; The City of New Orleans, 2019)</p>
<p>Increase community trust and compassion during and after the disaster to increase willingness to share resources</p>	<p>Trust, especially trust of neighbors and strangers, significantly increased willingness to share for most sharing scenarios.</p> <p>Compassion, especially non-selfish compassion and tender compassion, significantly increased willingness to share for most sharing scenarios</p> <p>Between 20.1% (Carr) 23.9% (SoCal) stated that trust in others substantially increased.</p> <p>Several urgency variables (e.g., high visual fire level,</p>	<p>While a significant amount of trust/compassion building can occur prior to the disaster, some strategies could be used during or after the disaster. Based on the significance of urgency variables, disasters may help to trigger sharing behavior. Local agencies can encourage this behavior by using community-building language (e.g., positive and encouraging press releases focused on community strength and resilience), communicating directly with local neighborhood associations, leaders, or CERTs, and encouraging sharing response – especially transportation pickups – in high urgency neighborhoods with proximity to the fire. Agencies can also offer continuing information on community needs throughout the wildfires and recovery, including how residents can supply long-term sheltering or transportation for evacuees to gather basic necessities or access health care.</p>	<p>Wildfire response communication strategies (Kumagai et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2005; Taylor et al., 2007; Stidham et al., 2011; Steelman and McCaffrey, 2013; Steelman et al., 2015)</p>

	high smoke level, high traffic levels and low visibility) increased willingness to share transportation, indicating that sharing can be triggered by the disaster.		
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2 **6. STUDY LIMITATIONS**

3 It is important to note that our study design has several limitations. First, our survey has a
 4 self-selection bias, since respondents opted into the study. The online survey only reached
 5 individuals with Internet access, causing significant under sampling of technology non-users. This
 6 undersampling, while not problematic for modeling willingness to share, likely causes an
 7 overestimation of sharing resource capacity. We attempted to reduce these limitations by
 8 distributing the survey across multiple agencies with varying captured populations. We also
 9 received assistance from local CBOs and news organizations to distribute the surveys more
 10 broadly. To reduce self-selection and non-response bias, we also offered an incentive via a random
 11 drawing. Incentives are designed to encourage higher response across the general population, who
 12 may be less likely to participate in an incentive-absent survey compared to captive individuals
 13 with a high interest in the topic. Still, both survey samples skew female, white, higher income,
 14 higher education, and higher vehicle ownership. Consequently, this likely overestimates the
 15 available capacity of sharing economy resources. This sampling limitation also prevents us from
 16 knowing how vulnerable populations make choices. Indeed, willingness to share is likely
 17 overestimated, as those without vehicle access (who were under sampled) are unable to provide
 18 transportation in disasters. In our case, vulnerable populations could be either providers or users
 19 of shared resources. We attempted to use less precise variables by homogenizing groups in the
 20 sample that could still denote vulnerable populations (e.g., white vs. non-white; households with
 21 an individual with a disability vs. household without; high-income vs. medium-income vs. low-
 22 income). However, we generally found that these variables were not significant in our modeling,
 23 indicating that future work is necessary to build consensus.

24 We also recognize that some limitations exist in the design of the survey instrument, which
 25 included over 150 questions and may have led to severe survey fatigue. Future work is needed to
 26 reduce the number of survey questions to key variables or split the instrument into separate
 27 surveys. For the sharing economy questions, respondents may not have been able to conceptualize
 28 sharing resources in a disaster or during recovery efforts. While we asked respondents about their
 29 evacuation experience, characteristics of their choices, and sociodemographics, we did not ask
 30 respondents about their social networks. The strength of social networks could be a key indicator
 31 for willingness to share. We asked respondents about their social connections via community
 32 groups and volunteering, which serve as reasonable proxies for social networks.

33 We note several modeling limitations with our chosen binary structure. We attempted to
 34 model choice through several multinomial choice structures but found that the most distinctive
 35 difference in behavior was between extremely likely sharers and all other responses. However, a
 36 future research direction would be to take advantage of the ordering of responses through an

1 ordered logit model. Moreover, the choices in these scenarios are likely to be correlated. Given
2 this potential correlation structure, future research could also attempt to model these choices
3 jointly, taking advantage of nested, portfolio choice, or latent class choice models to determine
4 any potential joint preferences. We also did not find any benefit in a mixed logit formulation. This
5 negative result may not appear in other datasets and should continue to be tested in other situations.

6 Finally, we acknowledge that the sharing economy is just one tool for evacuating
7 individuals and would likely be a small fraction of mode and shelter choices. However, we stress
8 that any tool that could increase the amount of resources available in evacuations deserves
9 exploration, especially if these resources increase compliance, decrease congestion, and ensure
10 more equitable evacuations.

11 12 **7. CONCLUSIONS**

13 In this paper, we explored wildfire logistics and the feasibility of the sharing economy for
14 wildfire evacuations using survey data from the 2017 December Southern California Wildfires and
15 the 2018 Carr Wildfire. For wildfire logistics, we found low non-compliance rates, a significant
16 number of multi-vehicle evacuations, and high usage of family and friends for sheltering. Public
17 shelter use and peer-to-peer services were low for both wildfires, and most evacuations were within
18 county. We also found evidence of spare capacity across evacuating vehicles for both wildfires.

19 Through four sharing scenarios, survey respondents were somewhat likely to share shelter
20 at cost, moderately likely to share shelter for free and transportation before an evacuation, and very
21 likely to share transportation while evacuating. A significant number of wildfire respondents
22 recently volunteered and perceived trust increases in their community following the wildfires.
23 Through eight binary logit models, we found a nuanced story regarding willingness to share that
24 was highly dependent by scenario and wildfire. We found a strong presence of trust and
25 compassion in increasing willingness (confirming our original hypothesis), moderate impact of
26 evacuation urgency, and weaker impact of evacuation circumstances and demographics.
27 Moreover, we found that non-sharers had considerably more concerns/reservations than sharers,
28 with the exception of transportation during the evacuation, which suggests that concerns will need
29 to be addressed to retain a higher likelihood of sharing.

30 We conclude that a sharing economy strategy is feasible for wildfire evacuations, albeit
31 with some important limitations including sharing reservations and sometimes low willingness
32 depending on the scenario. We recommend that future sharing economy strategies should build
33 trust and compassion prior to disasters within neighborhoods, CBOs, and volunteer networks, but
34 they should also leverage communication mechanisms to trigger trusting and compassionate
35 responses during an evacuation. We recommend that future work, such as Rezende et al. (2016)
36 and Sadri et al. (2018), continue to assess social capital and social networks for disruptive events.
37 Social media in disasters (for example as studied in Ukkusuri et al., 2014 and Roy et al., 2020)
38 may be a possible mechanism to bridge social networks and a sharing economy strategy, while
39 work related to social capital indices for disaster (Cox and Hamlen, 2014) could identify
40 communities able to share resources. Future work should also continue on the demand side of the
41 sharing economy, such as the work conducted by Borowski and Stathopoulos (2020), especially
42 by asking evacuees about their mode choice in previous events. We hypothesize that sharing can
43 be developed pre-disaster, but it can also be activated, guided, and promoted by agencies during a
44 disaster. While the sharing economy may remain an evacuation tool for only a small fraction of

1 the community, an increase in resources would help more citizens access transportation and
 2 sheltering. Future work should continue to build upon this research through the exploration and
 3 development of a practice-ready framework for building trust in the community as part of disaster
 4 preparedness, which addresses barriers to resource sharing.

5
 6 **7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

7 This study was made possible through funding received by the University of California
 8 Institute of Transportation Studies from the State of California via the Road Repair and
 9 Accountability Act of 2017 (Senate Bill 1). The opportunity to explore this topic was made
 10 possible by the Graduate Research Fellowship Program, which is administered by the National
 11 Science Foundation. The opportunity to undertake this research was also made possible by the
 12 Dwight D. Eisenhower Transportation Graduate Program, which is administered by the Federal
 13 Highway Administration. The authors would also like to thank the many agencies and community
 14 organizations across California for distributing the surveys.

15
 16 **8. AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS**

17 The authors confirm contribution to the paper as follows: study conception and design: S. Wong
 18 and S. Shaheen with input from J. Walker; data collection: S. Wong; analysis and interpretation of
 19 results: S. Wong and S. Shaheen; manuscript preparation: all authors. All authors reviewed the
 20 results and approved the final version of the manuscript.

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 22 **9. DATA AVAILABILITY**

23 Data will be made available upon request with permission from the authors.

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 25 **10. APPENDIX**

26 **Appendix A: Tables**

27 **TABLE A1. Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents**

	2017 Southern California Wildfires	2018 Carr Wildfire
Individual Characteristics	<i>n=226</i>	<i>n=284</i>
Gender		
Male	26.1%	30.3%
Female	73.9%	69.7%
Age		
18-24	2.7%	2.8%
25-34	17.7%	12.7%
35-44	15.0%	19.0%
45-54	19.0%	22.9%
55-65	26.5%	19.7%
65+	19.0%	22.9%
Race		
Asian	2.7%	1.1%
Black or African American	0.4%	0.0%
Mixed	7.5%	3.5%

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Native American/Alaska Native	0.4%	1.4%
Pacific Islander	0.9%	0.0%
White	81.4%	90.8%
Other	4.0%	0.0%
Prefer not to answer	2.7%	3.2%
Ethnicity		
Hispanic	11.1%	5.3%
Not Hispanic	76.1%	87.3%
Prefer not to answer	8.8%	7.4%
Education		
Less than high school	0.0%	0.7%
High school graduate	0.9%	4.9%
Some college	15.9%	23.2%
2-year degree	5.8%	12.0%
4-year degree	41.2%	27.8%
Professional degree	28.3%	27.5%
Doctorate	8.0%	3.9%
Prefer not to answer	0.0%	0.0%
Employment		
Employed full time	57.1%	47.9%
Employed part time	11.9%	10.9%
Unemployed looking for work	2.2%	2.8%
Unemployed not looking for work	2.7%	4.2%
Retired	22.1%	26.1%
Student	2.2%	1.8%
Disabled	1.3%	2.8%
Prefer not to answer	0.4%	3.5%
Primary Mode of Transportation		
Drive alone using a car, SUV, pickup, or van	87.6%	92.6%
Carpool/vanpool	2.2%	1.4%
Rail (e.g., light/heavy, subway/metro, trolley)	0.9%	0.0%
Bus	1.8%	0.0%
Motorcycle/scooter	0.9%	0.4%
Bicycle	0.9%	0.7%
Walk	0.4%	0.0%
Shuttle service	0.0%	0.4%
Work from home	1.8%	1.4%
Other	0.9%	2.8%
Prefer not to answer/No answer	2.7%	0.4%
Previous Evacuee		
Yes	35.3%	31.0%
No	64.7%	69.0%
Previous Wildfire Experience		
Yes	93.4%	89.1%
No	6.6%	10.9%
Mobile Phone Type		
Do not own a mobile phone	2.7%	3.2%
Own a typical mobile phone (non-smartphone)	5.3%	3.9%
Own a smartphone	92.0%	93.0%

Access to Internet at Home		
Yes	98.7%	97.2%
No	1.3%	2.8%
In-Vehicle or Smartphone Navigation		
Yes	79.6%	78.2%
No	20.4%	21.8%
Household Characteristics	<i>n=226</i>	<i>n=284</i>
Displacement after Wildfire		
Same Residence	88.9%	87.0%
Displaced	10.6%	13.0%
No answer	0.4%	0.0%
Length of Residence		
Less than 6 months	5.8%	3.2%
6 to 11 months	4.9%	5.3%
1 to 2 years	12.4%	13.7%
3 to 4 years	14.6%	9.5%
5 to 6 years	7.1%	7.7%
7 to 8 years	5.3%	5.3%
9 to 10 years	4.9%	6.0%
More than 10 years	45.1%	49.3%
Residence Structure		
Site build (single home)	73.9%	91.2%
Site build (apartment)	19.5%	4.2%
Mobile/manufactured home	6.2%	4.6%
Prefer not to answer	0.4%	0.0%
Homeownership		
Yes	67.3%	81.3%
No	29.6%	17.3%
Prefer not to answer	3.1%	1.4%
Live in Cal Fire Very High or High Risk Area*		
Yes	38.1%	37.7%
No	28.8%	35.2%
I don't know	33.2%	27.1%
Household Characteristics		
Household with Disabled	14.2%	18.7%
Household with Children	25.2%	35.2%
Household with Elderly	28.3%	31.3%
Households with Pets	63.7%	81.7%
Household Income (Prior Year)		
Less than \$10,000	0.4%	0.7%
\$10,000 - \$14,999	1.3%	3.9%
\$15,000 - \$24,999	2.2%	2.8%
\$25,000 - \$34,999	2.2%	5.6%
\$35,000 - \$49,999	6.2%	9.5%
\$50,000 - \$74,999	14.6%	17.6%
\$75,000 - \$99,999	11.5%	14.8%

\$100,000 - \$149,999	21.2%	19.7%
\$150,000 - \$199,999	13.3%	5.6%
More than \$200,000	14.2%	8.1%
Prefer not to answer	12.8%	11.6%
Vehicle Ownership/Leasing		
0 vehicles	0.9%	0.0%
1 vehicle	23.0%	15.8%
2 vehicles	46.5%	41.5%
3+ vehicles	29.7%	42.6%
County of Residence	<i>n</i> =226	<i>n</i> =284
Ventura	43.8%	
Santa Barbara	41.6%	
Los Angeles	13.3%	
Other California	1.3%	
Shasta		94.0%
Other California		2.5%
Non-California		3.5%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding
 *Very High or High fire severity zone as defined by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire)

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TABLE A2. Additional Evacuation Logistics

	2017 Southern California Wildfires	2018 Carr Wildfire
<i>Evacuees Only</i>	<i>n</i> =175	<i>n</i> =254
Evacuation Travel Time		
Less than 30 min.	13.1%	5.1%
30 min. – 59 min.	25.7%	24.0%
1-1.99 hours	22.9%	23.2%
2-2.99 hours	13.7%	17.3%
3-3.99 hours	6.3%	10.2%
4-4.99 hours	6.9%	5.1%
5-9.99 hours	6.3%	6.3%
10 hours or more	5.1%	7.9%
No answer	0.0%	0.8%
Usage of GPS for Routing		
Yes, and followed route	18.3%	7.5%
Yes, but rarely followed route	4.6%	5.5%
No	77.1%	87.0%
Multiple Destinations		
Yes	41.7%	48.4%
No	58.3%	51.6%
Length Away from Home		
Less than 1 day	4.6%	1.2%
1-2 days	22.9%	11.8%
3-4 days	24.6%	18.1%
5-6 days	14.3%	22.8%
7-8 days	7.4%	23.2%

9-10 days	5.7%	7.1%
11-14 days	9.1%	3.9%
15-21 days	4.6%	4.3%
More than 21 days	6.9%	7.5%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding

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TABLE A3. Weighted Concerns/Reservations for 2017 Southern California Wildfires

Concerns/Reservations About Sheltering an Evacuee (Full Sample)	S1-Shelter-Cost		S2-Shelter-Free	
	Sharers	Non-Sharers	Sharers	Non-Sharers
Not having enough water and/or food	9%	33%	16%	38%
Uncertainty about one's own safety or security	17%	82%	27%	76%
Having to interact with a stranger	11%	55%	19%	54%
Feeling responsible for the additional house guest(s)	15%	71%	26%	69%
Having to drive the individuals around	2%	16%	8%	19%
Disruption of everyday tasks	11%	66%	23%	57%
General dislike of hosting	4%	30%	10%	28%
Not having enough space for the additional guest(s)' belongings	5%	35%	12%	39%
No government oversight	2%	10%	3%	7%

Concerns/Reservations About Transporting an Evacuee (Evacuees Only)	S3-Transport-Before		S4-Transport-During	
	Sharers	Non-Sharers	Sharers	Non-Sharers
Having to deviate from an evacuation route	26%	50%	43%	36%
Adding extra time to the evacuation	41%	69%	66%	48%
Not having enough fuel	15%	21%	22%	14%
Not having enough water and/or food	5%	9%	9%	8%
Uncertainty about one's own safety or security	33%	54%	51%	40%
Having to interact with a stranger	16%	31%	26%	28%
Feeling responsible for the additional passenger(s)	34%	55%	50%	39%
Having to drive the individuals for a long period of time	15%	29%	24%	21%
Not having enough space for the additional passenger'(s) belongings	41%	66%	60%	49%
No government oversight	4%	7%	6%	7%

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1 **TABLE A4. Weighted Reservations for the 2018 Carr Wildfire**
 2

Concerns/Reservations About Sheltering an Evacuee (Full Sample)	S1-Shelter-Cost		S2-Shelter-Free	
	Sharers	Non-Sharers	Sharers	Non-Sharers
Not having enough water and/or food	12%	40%	16%	32%
Uncertainty about one's own safety or security	14%	73%	31%	74%
Having to interact with a stranger	8%	42%	21%	47%
Feeling responsible for the additional house guest(s)	12%	63%	23%	56%
Having to drive the individuals around	5%	19%	9%	20%
Disruption of everyday tasks	9%	49%	21%	49%
General dislike of hosting	3%	23%	11%	27%
Not having enough space for the additional guest(s)' belongings	11%	51%	17%	38%
No government oversight	1%	6%	3%	5%

Concerns/Reservations About Transporting an Evacuee (Evacuees Only)	S3-Transport-Before		S4-Transport-During	
	Sharers	Non-Sharers	Sharers	Non-Sharers
Having to deviate from evacuation route	27%	36%	45%	22%
Adding extra time to the evacuation	40%	51%	66%	31%
Not having enough fuel	16%	16%	21%	8%
Not having enough water and/or food	7%	6%	7%	3%
Uncertainty about one's own safety or security	45%	51%	66%	37%
Having to interact with a stranger	14%	19%	25%	15%
Feeling responsible for the additional passenger(s)	22%	28%	38%	20%
Having to drive the individuals for a long period of time	10%	15%	18%	10%
Not having enough space for the additional passenger'(s) belongings	35%	50%	61%	33%
No government oversight	1%	1%	2%	1%

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Appendix B: Selection of Key Survey Questions

Trust and Compassion Questions

Q1: We are going to mention some people in particular and we would like you to tell us if they are trustworthy or not. Do you find the following people **trustworthy**?

	Almost never trustworthy	Not usually trustworthy	Sometimes trustworthy	Generally trustworthy	Almost always trustworthy
Members of your family					
Your friends					
Your co-workers					
Your neighbors					
People from your town/city					
People from other towns/cities					
Strangers					
Local law enforcement					
Local government					
Bus Drivers					
Uber/Lyft Drivers					
Taxi Drivers					

Q2: Generally speaking, would you say that it is possible to trust most people or, on the contrary, that we can never be too cautious in our dealings with other people?

- It is possible to trust most people.
- We can never be too cautious in our dealings with other people.

Q3: Think back to the wildfires and the time following the fires. Did your trust in most people **in your community** increase or decrease after the wildfires?

- Increased substantially
- Increased moderately
- Remained the same
- Decreased moderately
- Decreased substantially

- 1 Q4: Please answer the following questions honestly and quickly using the scale from 1 to 5.
 2 1 = not at all true of me
 3 5 = very true of me

	1 (not at all true)	2	3	4	5 (very true)
When I hear about someone (a stranger) going through a difficult time, I feel a great deal of compassion for him or her.					
I tend to feel compassion for people, even though I do not know them.					
One of the activities that provides me with the most meaning to my life is helping others in the world when they need help.					
I would rather engage in actions that help others, even though they are strangers, than engage in actions that would help me.					
I often have tender feelings toward people (strangers) when they seem to be in need.					

4

5 Q5: In the wildfires, did you volunteer in any capacity during the relief efforts?

- 6
 - Yes
- 7
 - No

8

9 Q6: Prior to the wildfires, had you volunteered in any capacity during previous relief efforts for a
 10 disaster?

- 11
 - Yes
- 12
 - No

13

14 **Scenario Questions**

15 For the next several questions, imagine a possible situation in which you had known of non-
 16 household individuals in need of a ride near the time of the evacuation.

17 Q1: If you had known of individuals in need of a ride, how likely would you have transported
 18 any individuals **before** the evacuation process?

- 19
 - Extremely likely
- 20
 - Somewhat likely
- 21
 - Neither likely nor unlikely
- 22
 - Somewhat unlikely
- 23
 - Extremely unlikely

24

1 Q2: If you had known of individuals in need of a ride, how likely would you have transported any
2 additional passenger(s) **during** the evacuation process?

- 3 • Extremely likely
- 4 • Somewhat likely
- 5 • Neither likely nor unlikely
- 6 • Somewhat unlikely
- 7 • Extremely unlikely

8
9 Q3: What reservations, if any, do you have about transporting other individuals? Check all that
10 apply.

- 11 • Having to deviate from evacuation route
- 12 • Adding extra time to the evacuation
- 13 • Not having enough fuel
- 14 • Not having enough water and/or food
- 15 • Uncertainty about one's own safety or security
- 16 • Having to interact with a stranger
- 17 • Feeling responsible for the additional passenger(s)
- 18 • Having to drive the individuals for a long period of time
- 19 • Not having enough space for the additional passenger'(s) belongings
- 20 • Having child/children and stranger near each other
- 21 • No government oversight
- 22 • Other _____
- 23 • **I do not have any reservations**

24
25 Q4: How many total seatbelts were in all vehicles you used to evacuate?

26 _____
27

28 Q5: How many seats with seatbelts were occupied (i.e., with people, luggage, pets) in all
29 vehicles you used to evacuate?

30 _____

1 Q6: How many spare beds do you have at your residence (including air mattresses)?

- 2 • 0
- 3 • 1
- 4 • 2
- 5 • 3
- 6 • 4
- 7 • 5
- 8 • More than 5
- 9

10 Q6: Consider a situation where you were **not** given any official orders to evacuate or stay and
11 you decided to stay at your residence.

12 To what extent would you be willing to rent part of your residence out to an evacuee **for a**
13 **cost/fee?**

- 14 • Extremely likely
- 15 • Somewhat likely
- 16 • Neither likely nor unlikely
- 17 • Somewhat unlikely
- 18 • Extremely unlikely
- 19

20 Q7: To what extent would you be willing to rent part of your residence out to an evacuee **for**
21 **free?**

- 22 • Extremely likely
- 23 • Somewhat likely
- 24 • Neither likely nor unlikely
- 25 • Somewhat unlikely
- 26 • Extremely unlikely
- 27

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Q8: What reservations do you have about housing other evacuees? Check all that apply.

- Not having enough water and/or food
- Uncertainty about one’s own safety or security
- Having to interact with a stranger
- Feeling responsible for the additional house guest(s)
- Having to drive the individuals around
- Disruption of everyday tasks
- General dislike of hosting
- Not having enough space for the additional guest(s)’ belongings
- Having child/children and stranger near each other
- No government oversight
- Other _____
- **I do not have reservations**

Sharing Economy Usage in Wildfire

Q1: Did you use a ridesourcing/TNC or ridesharing platform at any point during your evacuation or reentry to your residence? This may include Uber, Lyft, Gett, Chariot, or Via.

- Yes (for both)
- Yes (for evacuation only)
- Yes (for reentry only)
- No

Q2: Did you use a carsharing platform at any point during your evacuation or reentry to your residence? This may include Zipcar, car2go, Getaround, or Turo.

- Yes (for both)
- Yes (for evacuation only)
- Yes (for reentry only)
- No

Q3: Did you use a shared housing platform at any point during your evacuation? This may include Airbnb, Couchsurfing, Tripping, HomeAway, VRBO, or Wimdu.

- Yes
- No

1 **Key Evacuation Questions**

2 Q1: Did you receive the following orders for the wildfires? Please answer each part.

	Yes	No
Mandatory Evacuation Order		
Voluntary/Recommended Evacuation Order		
Shelter-in-Place Order		
No Official Order		

3

4 Q2: How many trips did you take between receiving the evacuation notice and evacuating (e.g.,
5 trips may include but are not limited to trips to gather supplies, pickup family members)?

6

7

8 Q3: As a reminder, the Carr Fire began on Monday, July 23rd around 1:15 pm near French
9 Gulch.

10

11 Choose the date or the approximate date **you evacuated**.

12 ▼ Monday, July 23... After Sunday, Aug. 5

13

14 Q4: What time or approximate time did you evacuate?

15 ▼ 12:00 AM... 11:00 PM

16

1 Q5: What primary mode of transportation did you use to evacuate?

- 2 • One personal vehicle
- 3 • Two personal vehicles
- 4 • More than two personal vehicles
- 5 • Carpool/vanpool with non-household people
- 6 • Shuttle service
- 7 • Ridesourcing/TNC (e.g., Uber, Lyft)
- 8 • Microtransit (e.g., Chariot)
- 9 • Carsharing (e.g., Zipcar, car2go)
- 10 • Rental car
- 11 • Rail (e.g., light/heavy, subway/metro, trolley)
- 12 • Bus
- 13 • Walk
- 14 • Motorcycle/scooter
- 15 • Bicycle
- 16 • Aircraft
- 17 • Recreational vehicle (RV)
- 18 • Other _____
- 19

20 Q6: Please provide the main roads/route you used to evacuate to your final destination. Separate
21 roads by commas. For example: Iron Mountain Rd., California Route 299, Interstate 5.

22 _____

23 Q7: For what overall percentage of your evacuation route did you use the following road types?
24 (Must add to 100). This can be an approximation.

- 25 • Highways : _____
- 26 • Major local roads : _____
- 27 • Minor local roads : _____
- 28 • Rural roads : _____
- 29

30 Q8: Did you use any smartphone or GPS-based navigational tool during the evacuation (Waze,
31 Google Maps)?

- 32 • Yes, and I frequently followed the instructions
- 33 • Yes, but I rarely followed the instructions
- 34 • No

35

1 Q9: What type of shelter was your final destination?

- 2 • A friend's residence
- 3 • A family member's residence
- 4 • A hotel or motel
- 5 • A second residence
- 6 • A public shelter
- 7 • Any shelter found through a peer-to-peer service (e.g., Airbnb)
- 8 • A portable vehicle (e.g., automobile, camper, RV)
- 9 • Other _____

10

11 Q10: What state was your final destination? (i.e., California, Oregon, Nevada)

12 _____
13

14 Q11: What county was your final destination? (i.e., Shasta, Butte, Sacramento)

15 _____
16

17 Q12: What city was your final destination? (i.e., Redding, Chico, Sacramento)

18 _____
19

20 Q13: Did you tow a large item during the evacuation process (i.e., trailer, boat, motor home,
21 camper, or something similar)?

- 22 • Yes
- 23 • No

24

25 Q14: Since the wildfires, have you returned to your original residence yet? This could be
26 permanently or to check on your residence.

- 27 • Yes
- 28 • No

29

30 Q15 Please type the date in which you returned home (i.e. 12/04/2017 was when the fires
31 began).

- 32 • _____

1 **Urgency Variables**

2 Q1: Please rank from extremely high to extremely low, your perceptions of the following
 3 characteristics of your departure time. [*Used for Transportation Before Scenario*]

	Extremely high	Moderately high	Slightly high	Neither high nor low	Slightly low	Moderately low	Extremely low
Visual fire level							
Smoke level							
Pressure by officials to leave							
Pressure from neighbors to leave							
Visibility (i.e. from daylight and smoke)							
Amount of supplies packed (i.e. water, food, clothes, mementos, etc)							
Uncertainty of escape route safety							
Traffic levels							

4

5 Q2: Please rank from extremely high to extremely low, your perceptions of the following
 6 characteristics of your route. [*Used for Transportation During Scenario*]

	Extremely high	Moderately high	Slightly high	Neither high nor low	Slightly low	Moderately low	Extremely low
Distance on the route							
Fire danger (i.e., probability of fire on route)							
Prior experience with the route							
Difficulty in driving (i.e., hilly, winding)							
First responder presence (i.e., fire, medical)							
Police presence							
Traffic levels							

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